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For young people who are poor, navigating a path from adolescence to adulthood is a risky, 
isolating, and challenging process. Successful navigation of multiple and concurrent 
transitions in the education, employment and family formation domains is dependent upon 
both the structural inequalities that shape a young person’s opportunities and the ability of 
a young person to manage these transitions on their own. One of the largest structural 
factors organising a youth transition is the welfare state. While there are many 
investigations of state interventions that focus on the education and training sectors, low 
income young people in liberal welfare states also access the means-tested benefit system: 
however, considerably less is known about how this type of support impacts young 
people’s transition outcomes. 
This research aims to quantify the impact of government transfers on the achievement of 
economic independence for cohorts of young people in the United States and the United 
Kingdom. To achieve this aim, this thesis will use four waves of the 1970 British Cohort 
Study and sixteen waves of the United States National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 
covering the youth period to mid-life. This research employs longitudinal models for three 
measures that comprise economic independence—individual wages, work intensity and 
household economic status – to produce case-specific results. These case results will then 
be discussed comparatively using the welfare mix framework, which illuminates the extent 
to which young people rely on the labour market, family, and the state to achieve economic 
independence.  
Both cases found that the benefit system is a notable and mediating factor in the transition 
experiences of young people who are structurally disadvantaged. The positive results for 
young parents and very poor sample members in particular showed that intervention 
through means-tested benefits is associated with some characteristics of a successful safety 
net, which may be able to contribute to positive labour market outcomes for these target 
groups. These initial results call for more research to understand how these groups can use 
government assistance to improve their economic and labour market outcomes. For 
policymakers, these results suggest that there is scope for liberal welfare states to 
positively influence a wider group of ‘deserving’ young people with challenging youth 
transitions. The family welfare source also emerged from this work as a key avenue 
whereby inequality is manifested in youth transitions in the two countries, and should be a 
3 
 
prominent consideration in future research; particularly for work that bridges the fields of 
welfare state and youth transitions as was done in this investigation.  
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Lay Summary  
This thesis investigates the impact of receiving means-tested welfare benefits on a young 
person’s achievement of future economic independence in two countries, the United States 
and the United Kingdom. This work therefore engages with current debates on the role of 
government assistance in a low-income young person’s transition to adulthood. The 
research uses large-scale cohort datasets that follow the same respondents from the youth 
period (age 16-24) to mid-life to investigate wages, labour market attachment, and 
household income. Because the two countries have quite similar welfare systems, a 
comparison can explore whether the same types of policies, operating on the same types of 
principles, do indeed affect long-term outcomes similarly for young people.  
Both cases found that the benefit system is a notable and mediating factor in the transition 
experiences of young people who are structurally disadvantaged. The positive results for 
young parents and very poor sample members in particular showed that means-tested 
benefits are associated with some characteristics of a successful safety net and more 
positive labour market outcomes for these two groups.  These results illustrate the 
potential for benefits to be a positive factor in a youth transition, and also suggest that it 
may be valuable to reconsider who among young people are ‘deserving’ of government 
assistance. This is particularly pertinent as more and more young people struggle to 
become economically independent before the official ‘end’ of the youth period. A young 
person’s family resources also emerged as an important way that young people are helped 
or hindered in their youth transition period, and points to new research areas for youth 
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For young people who are poor, navigating a route to adulthood is particularly tumultuous: 
widening and persistent inequality in education and employment exacerbates the 
challenges of attaching to the labour market, establishing a home away from parents, and 
accessing and completing the education necessary for economic success. Youth 
unemployment, underemployment, and disconnection spiked as result of the most recent 
global recession and brought the challenges of youth transitions to the political forefront. 
However, questions on the role of government in the life course transitions of young 
people are perennial, and engage with issues of dependency and deservingness that 
characterise nearly all debates about the welfare state.  
Questions on the role of the state and the extent of its involvement in individual lives are 
particularly prescient in liberal welfare states which seek to assist only the ‘deserving poor’ 
and then only as a safety net of last resort. In the two liberal welfare states of this 
investigation, the United Kingdom and the United States, shifts in poverty reduction policies 
in the last thirty years resulted in systems of means-tested benefits that serve fewer 
citizens in both countries and changed who among the poor is deemed deserving of 
assistance (Atkinson & Micklewright 1989; King 1999; Pierson 1994; Wiggan 2012). The 
population of poor young people complicates questions of deservingness further, as young 
people are in a period of ‘semi-dependence’ (Coles 1995) with expectations that they are 
able to provide for their own welfare either through the labour market alone or with 
additional support from their family of origin rather than the welfare state (Antonucci et al 
2014b).  
Where government intervention for young people does occur it is generally focused within 
the education and training systems (Wallace & Bendit 2009); given the abundance of 
evidence affirming the importance of higher education to more positive economic 
outcomes (Crawford et al 2016; Croxford & Raffe 2014; Furlong 2006; Shapiro et al 2017; 
Walker & Zhu 2011; Wickrama et al 2012). Higher educational attainment alone does not, 
though, entirely close the gaps between the advantaged and disadvantaged nor is higher 
education accessible or appropriate for all young people. Different interventions are 
therefore necessary to adequately support young people where the education sector 
cannot (Bozick & DeLuca 2011; Goldin 2014; Shavit & Muller 2000). However, investigating 
the role of government intervention for young people beyond the education sector can be 
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challenging to undertake because ‘youth policy’ is necessarily cross-cutting, engaging with 
the multiple life course transitions occurring in this period (Antonucci et al 2014b; Wallace 
& Bendit 2009; Walther 2006). Young people are transitioning out of secondary school and 
into higher education or the labour market, out of their parental home, and perhaps also 
forming their own families – often concurrently. Although not frequently discussed, low-
income young people interact with the means-tested benefit system during and through 
these multiple transitions, even in the residual liberal welfare states of the US and the UK.  
However, because many low income young people are not considered a key deserving 
population for means-tested assistance, policymakers know considerably less about how 
young people as a demographic group interact with the benefit system. Rather, young 
people’s interactions are usually considered within the context of their place in the further 
and higher education system or in their roles as parents (if applicable). However, recent 
policy focus on this demographic group and the ‘life cycle effects’ of the welfare state (Hills 
2015) has brought new attention to how interaction with government assistance affects 
youth transitions and how those experiences can influence long-term outcomes. It is 
valuable therefore to analyse previous cohort evidence to investigate whether receiving 
means-tested assistance impacts long-term economic outcomes and how the system of 
cash assistance impacts some groups more notably. Through this work, research can ideally 
uncover how the state plays an explicit role in the youth transition experiences of low 
income young people. How does interacting with the benefit system during this period of 
the life course impact independence outcomes? And how does the context in which these 
benefits are delivered (both macroeconomically and programmatically) influence variation 
in long-term impacts, even among countries that function under the same welfare regime?  
Research Aims and Question  
To address these issues, and to provide evidence to policymakers and engage with current 
policy debates, this research aims to quantify the impact of government assistance on the 
achievement of economic independence for two cohorts of young people from the US and 
the UK; the US National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY) and the 1970 British 
Cohort Study (BCS). Importantly, this investigation includes explicit considerations of key 
domains of a youth transition, aiming with the research design to bridge the fields of 
welfare studies and youth transitions studies. The one research question guiding the 
investigation in both cases is as follows:  
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What is the impact of receiving government transfers in youth (age 16-24) on a low-income 
young person’s ability to become economically independent – live above a poverty income 
and attach steadily to the labour market – by their mid-30s/early 40s in the United States 
and the United Kingdom? 
While there is some evidence in the econometric literature about the impact of cash 
assistance on benefit recipients’ economic outcomes in the short term (e.g. ‘leavers studies’ 
reviewed in Chapter 2.4), the evidence on the impact of government transfers on the 
trajectory of a citizen’s economic well-being in the long term is not as developed. Evidence 
with this time horizon may be able to confirm or counter narratives of the ‘cycle of 
dependency’ that some claim benefit receipt causes and can illuminate whether benefit 
receipt has scarring effects for those who receive it; or conversely, whether there is 
evidence that government assistance indeed serves as a valuable resource in a youth 
transition for particular groups. This research also uniquely analyses the role of government 
assistance (the purview of welfare state researchers) through a youth studies lens, bringing 
together these two fields to consider broader questions of how a welfare state promotes 
independence and/or dependence, the key concept grounding this work. 
The life cycle effects of government assistance here can differ based on the demographic 
characteristics of the recipient, but can also differ based on variation in means-tested 
benefit programmes themselves; and while the US and the UK function under the same 
broad welfare state principles (Pierson 1994), programmes in practice indeed differ. In 
many ways the system of support in the UK is considered to be more ‘generous’ primarily 
because the US has a notably meagre safety net (Holmwood 2000; Walker & Wiseman 
2003), and a comparison can provide evidence on ways that variations of a liberal welfare 
state might impact low income citizens differently. The comparison is best considered a 
contrast of contexts in the spirit of Skocpol and Somers (1980) on the programmatic level 
and between two cohorts, to determine if the same types of policies organised by the same 
principles have similar or divergent outcomes based on the country context. If policies do 
indeed work similarly, as previous policy learning between the two countries would 
suggest, this may provide further evidence that both governments should reconsider their 





Thesis Outline  
Chapter 1 outlines the principles of liberal welfare states that function within the United 
States and the United Kingdom, how policymakers frame the government’s interaction with 
disadvantaged young people using these principles, and how these principles are 
implemented in practice. This sets the policy context for this investigation. Chapter 1 also 
engages with tensions that arise between the conceptual and practical characteristics of 
liberal welfare states when the population of young people are considered in reference to 
their youth transition experiences. Chapter 2 grounds this investigation in the field of youth 
transitions research, detailing the characteristics of a youth ‘transition project’ (Settersten 
et al 2005) in each case and the way that inequalities impact it. Chapter 2 ends with a 
discussion of previous empirical evidence on government assistance that addresses the 
issues of this investigation. Chapter 3 details the research design and methodology, 
including a discussion of the comparative element in this thesis as a ‘contrast of contexts’ 
(Skocpol & Somers 1980) and the quantitative models that will be produced to answer the 
research question. Chapters 4 and 5 are the empirical results chapters presented as two 
cases: Chapter 4 provides the empirical results from the United Kingdom case and Chapter 
5 provides the results from the United States case. Chapter 6 first presents each of the case 
results as a case narrative on a young person’s transition to economic independence in 
each country. This is followed by the comparison of these results using the ‘welfare mix’ 
(Powell & Barrientos 2004) analytical framework to discuss the impact of state intervention, 
the family, and the labour market welfare sources in the achievement of economic 
independence in both cases. Chapter 6 concludes with the policy implications of this work, 
identifying four important areas to consider in future investigations in this field and details 
how this investigation reframes the role of the state in the transition project. Chapter 7 
concludes, summarising the approach and its limitations, the key contributions of this 




Chapter 1: The Principles and Practices of a Liberal Welfare 
State  
As the purpose of this research seeks to measure the impact of government interventions 
in the youth period of the life course, the literature needed to orient this work must come 
from two strands. First, the work must be grounded in an understanding of the principles of 
the welfare state most applicable to this investigation that function in both cases, how 
those principles are implemented in practice, and the tensions that arise when the 
conceptual meets the practical in each country context. Second, a literature review must 
also detail what is known about the youth transition period for each of these cohorts; 
including key conceptual issues in youth transitions research, the composition and 
characteristics of a ‘transition project’ in each case (Settersten et al 2005), and how the 
welfare state is involved in this transition project (Chapter 2). The aim of bringing these two 
literatures together is to detail what is known and unknown about how the welfare state 
impacts young people, and to orient this work in two bodies of evidence.  
1.1 Welfare State Principles  
Frameworks for understanding the US and UK Welfare State  
Most research on welfare states generally begins with a discussion of Esping-Andersen’s 
The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (1990), as his work provides a foundation to 
explore citizens’ relationship to the labour market and the welfare state. The United States 
and the United Kingdom are grouped together in the liberal welfare regime and the 
dimensions that characterise a liberal welfare state apply to both. Although Esping-
Andersen’s typologies provide a number of concepts that apply to this study, the two 
concepts of de-commodification and de-familialization are most relevant as they both 
directly impact the opportunities and choices available to young people during the 
transition phase. The dimension of ‘de-commodification’ is defined as the extent to which 
‘citizens can freely, and without potential loss of job, income, or general welfare, opt out of 
work when they themselves consider it necessary’ (Esping-Andersen 1990, p. 23). Liberal 
regimes are characterised by low de-commodification, where there is very little assistance 
from the government for those who opt out of the labour market. Rather, the market is 
considered to be the primary source of welfare and thereby citizens must commodify their 
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labour in the market as individual actors (Esping-Andersen 1990). The government’s role in 
welfare provision therefore is to meet the needs only of those who are unable to provide 
for themselves in the market, a determination often made by the state and done primarily 
through means-testing government benefits; a key characteristic of liberal welfare states. 
Esping-Andersen’s original work was criticised in its assumption of a male-breadwinner 
model and its omission of the way that the welfare state is ‘gendered’, or how the 
organisation of the welfare state moderates the relationship between women’s labour 
market participation, unpaid caring work and welfare state provision (Orloff 1996, 1993; 
Sainsbury 1996). His subsequent work on welfare regimes therefore added a dimension of 
de-familialization, which is the ‘capacity of women to form and maintain their own 
households’ (Smeeding and Phillips 2002, p.105) in the absence of a male breadwinner 
(Esping-Andersen 1999). Identifying the level of de-familialization in a liberal welfare state 
is not particularly straightforward, as social policies that aim to improve female labour 
market participation (such as government subsidised childcare) may not exist in in the 
United States yet there is still very high female labour market participation (Smeeding & 
Philips 2002). Other measures, such as cash assistance for lone parents and parental leave 
generosity, may also improve de-familialization for females in each case but these differ 
slightly more in practice between the US and the UK, with the UK system generally 
considered to be more generous for women to stay in the home if so desired and for 
childcare to be subsidised (Orloff 2004).  A liberal welfare regime could therefore be 
considered relatively high in de-familialization in some areas, but low in others.  
The concept of de-familialization has also been applied to the study of welfare regimes 
related to young people, notably in Chevalier’s framework of ‘varieties of youth welfare 
citizenship’ (2016). In this framework familialization is the degree to which parents in a 
welfare state have legal requirements to financially support their children, and by extension 
when young people in a welfare state are considered their own benefit unit. For liberal 
welfare states, familialization according to Chevalier is quite low, as parents are no longer 
legally required to financially support their children after 18. However, this distinction is 
complicated when the welfare state for young people is detailed in practice and is a key 
tension of a liberal welfare state, which will be returned to in Chapter 1.3. Chapter 2 posits 
how this work might combine the two understandings of familialization from Esping-
Andersen and Chevalier in both theory and practice to consider the extent to which young 
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people can become self-sufficient apart from their family of origin in the youth period; a 
new way to conceptualise defamilialization.  
The second framework used to foreground this research and case selection is varieties of 
capitalism. Detailed by Hall and Soskice (2001) and Estevez-Abe and colleagues (2001), this 
framework works in concert with the worlds of welfare framework by detailing how each 
country’s ‘corporate strategy’ works within the country’s political economy outlined by 
Esping-Andersen (Hall & Soskice 2001, p. 14). In this framework the liberal market 
economies (LMEs) of the US and UK are defined by a highly fluid labour market that 
generally relies on markets and private actors to ‘coordinate endeavours in the financial 
and industrial relations systems’ rather than for governments to do so (Hall & Soskice 2001, 
p. 30). The welfare state functions instead as ‘a complement in national production 
systems’ (Estevez-Abe et al 2001, p. 146), where a liberal market economy is 
complemented by low levels of state benefits characterised by means-testing. This 
implicitly serves to also affirm the primacy of private firms rather than government 
interventions in a citizen’s labour market trajectory (Huber & Stephens 2004; Mares 2003; 
Swenson 2002). Participation in the labour market is therefore of primary importance, and 
LMEs require a large number of workers with general skills who are able to move fluidly 
between firms as required by market conditions. This preference of firms produces 
complementarities in the education and training system to favour general skills and 
switchable assets, with little investment in state-sponsored or highly specified training 
programs so that workers can be more adaptable to labour market needs as defined by 
firms (Estevez-Abe et al 2001).  
The complementarities of the education system have a direct impact on young people, 
where a focus on providing young people with general rather than specific skills ultimately 
means that success in the educational system is tipped in favour of those with high 
academic achievement, who are in turn rewarded most handsomely in the labour market. 
Iversen and Stephens (2008) also note that a focus on general skills in LMEs comes with a 
deficit in funding for vocational education programmes. Those who are academically weak 
and unable to enter into the higher education system are left with fewer options to gain 
skills in their early adulthood and may therefore be stuck in a ‘poverty trap’ of low-skilled 
and low-wage work (Estevez-Abe et al 2001, p.155). In general, the transition from school 
to work can best be considered ‘weakly institutionalised’ in both countries (Iversen & 
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Stephens 2008, p.608). While there are slightly different educational and labour market 
systems1 in the United States and the United Kingdom, these differences are variations on 
the theme of a liberal market economy rather than two different types of economic and 
educational functioning altogether. In particular this ‘welfare-skills formation nexus’ 
(Estevez-Abe et al 2001, p. 155) detailed in the varieties of capitalism framework can serve 
as a focal point in working between the two literatures. 
Together both Esping-Andersen’s framework and the varieties of capitalism literature detail 
key characteristics of liberal welfare regimes and liberal market economies that were 
established and functioned in each country during the ‘Golden Age of Welfare’ from 1945 
to 1975 (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1996), which were notably translated into practice in the 
turn towards liberalism in the 1980s. Described as an effort to ‘mobilize the state on behalf 
of the market and reconfigure the state as a quasi-market operation’ (Soss et al 2004, p.20), 
the changes brought about by liberalism’s resurgence in the 1980s took the state’s 
interaction with a liberal market economy even further; such that some functions of the 
welfare state were put under private control and harsher means-tests were put in place, 
increasing the reliance on the market as the primary welfare2 source for citizens. Together, 
the principles that underpin the welfare states described by Esping-Andersen (1990) and 
the economy described by Hall and Soskice (2001) and Estevez-Abe and colleagues (2001) 
in the varieties of capitalism framework combine in this new political world of liberalism to 
form the liberal welfare state of the youth cohorts investigated here.  
From frameworks to key principles of liberal welfare states 
Policymakers (both past and present) in both countries therefore translate the relatively 
broad features of a liberal welfare state outlined in the frameworks above – such as 
commodification, fluidity in labour markets and individualism – into key tenets that guide 
their work. Often brought to bear in practice from policy learning between the countries 
(Alesina et al 2001; Holmwood 2000; Pierson 1994; Walker & Wiseman 2003), these 
principles not only end up shaping the expectations of citizens who interact with the 
welfare state most frequently, but also characterise an ideal liberal welfare state. The 
                                                          
1 Differences in the educational sector between the US and the UK are explored in more detail in 
Chapter 2.2. 
2 In the context of this investigation, ‘welfare’ does not only refer to systems of government benefits 
or cash assistance. Rather, this work engages with ‘welfare’ broadly as the economic and social well-
being of a citizen, which can be, but is not exclusively, discussed in reference to government policy.  
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principles of independence, paternalism, contractualism, and residualism are the most 
notable to detail for consideration in this study. 
The principle of independence in liberal welfare states can perhaps most be tied to the low 
de-commodification properties that characterise them (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999). 
Labour market participation through waged labour is encouraged as a way to achieve 
personal independence and to assert one’s agency in the life course, with a belief that work 
is a virtue in itself and is a normative part of one’s identity (Ellwood 1998 in Prideaux 2001; 
King 1999). High levels of individual participation in the labour market, encouraged by both 
normative and financial imperatives of this welfare state, would theoretically ensure that 
the vast majority of people do not rely on government assistance to survive. Most citizens 
are subsequently ‘independent’ from the welfare state while enabling liberal welfare states 
to function primarily as ‘safety-net institutions’ (Esping-Andersen 1990).   
The concept of independence as independence from the welfare state is paired with the 
negative concept of welfare ‘dependency’ (Fraser & Gordon 1994; Pivan & Cloward 1972; 
Wiggan 2012). Fraser and Gordon (1994) detail the emergence of these paired concepts in 
political discourse: ‘As wage labor became increasingly normative – and increasingly 
definitive of independence – it was precisely those excluded from wage labor who 
appeared to personify dependency’ (p. 316). A large number of citizens who are dependent 
on government assistance in particular is a problem in liberal welfare states not only 
because of concerns over growing government expenditures, but because this dependency 
runs counter to the individual market principles that a liberal welfare state espouses. 
Writing in 1972, Piven and Cloward detailed why those seen as ‘dependent’ in the United 
States are in conflict with the founding concepts of a liberal market economy and therefore 
receive the ire of the public and the government:  
‘What has to be understood, however, is that the loathing of ‘reliefers’ is not an accidental 
feature of American culture. It has deep roots in the two main tenets of market ideology: 
the economic system is open, and economic success is a matter of individual merit (or luck); 
those who fail – the very poor – are therefore morally or personally defective’ (p. 148). 
According to this narrative the problem of the poor and welfare dependent is not framed as 
an economic problem, but rather an individual moral one. To solve this problem liberal 
welfare states began implementing more notably paternalistic principles in the 1980s, with 
the task of government now to ‘remoralise the poor’ (Soss et al 2004). The modern 
emergence of paternalism began with the writings of US authors Charles Murray in Losing 
23 
 
Ground (1984) and Lawrence Mead in Beyond Entitlement (1986), and both the US and UK 
governments took a decided turn towards paternalism from the late 1980s onward. 
According to Mead the government should serve as ‘authority figures as well as helpmates’, 
and implement both carrot and stick measures to incentivise welfare dependents into work 
(Mead 1986 in Soss et al 2004, p.58). Introduced first in the United States, these types of 
policies included administrative changes to the benefit structure (via lowering the benefit 
reduction rate), introducing workfare programmes, and enforcing sanctions if welfare 
recipients did not meet labour market activity requirements (Moffitt 2003; Prideaux 2001; 
Soss et al 2004). The UK followed suit with the introduction of many of these same types of 
policies in the mid-1990s (Daguerre 2004; Davies 2012). A fundamental belief driving 
welfare policy in both countries is that work in itself is a value to be upheld, for with it 
citizens are able to find self-worth through economic participation and be included in 
society (Bowring 2000, p.310). For those who are ‘choosing’ not to engage in this work, the 
government must work to incentivise and reinforce these socially positive behaviours 
whenever possible and actively discourage and sanction negative behaviours if necessary 
(Churchill 2011 in Davies 2012). Importantly, the moral imperative of work and avoidance 
of welfare dependency are ideals agreed upon by both centre-right and centre-left parties 
in both countries; centre right discussions of limiting ‘dependency’ and centre left 
discussions of solving ‘worklessness’ serve as two sides of the same coin.  
The policy most researched as an outgrowth of paternalism in both countries is workfare 
(also at times called ‘activation’ programmes), whereby citizens who receive government 
assistance are obligated to undertake a set of work-related activities in order to continue 
receiving benefits (Daguerre 2004; Finn 2003; Handler 2004; Moffitt 2003; Walker & 
Wiseman 2003). This welfare state development is described by researchers as 
‘contractualist’, with an (at times) explicit agreement or contract being made between 
government agencies and benefit recipients (Deacon 2004; Sage 2012; Walker & Wiseman 
2003). As Deacon (2004) notes, welfare states that function under contractualism and 
paternalism both claim workfare is justifiable for benefit recipients but for different 
reasons. While paternalism views workfare as a way to incentivise the values of paid work, 
contractualists view workfare as ‘fair because it limits free-riding’ (Deacon 2004, p. 911), 
while also being part of the ‘reciprocal responsibilities’ of citizenship (Sage 2012, p. 361). 
Together, these two concepts are applicable in tandem in workfare programs to ‘remove 
aspects of an individual’s behaviour judged morally unacceptable’ and to reaffirm the duty 
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that citizens have to their state (King 1999, p. 21). In practice these principles result in a 
much smaller cash benefit system in both countries and deters the increasingly smaller 
number of citizens eligible for benefits from receiving them (Daguerre 2004; King 1999; 
Prideaux 2001).  
The political debate surrounding welfare state intervention in the lives of young people also 
hinges on these two principles, particularly given a young person’s status as neither fully 
dependent or fully independent (a tension discussed in Chapter 1.4). Direct government 
intervention for young people is a greater feature of UK policy debates because this group 
is generally able to receive cash assistance; unlike eligibility for most assistance in the US, 
which is limited only to those with children if younger than 25. Low income young people 
are viewed as particularly susceptible to making poor choices if given cash assistance, and 
contractualist and paternalist interventions introduced by both parties in the UK ensures 
that ‘with the new opportunities for young people come new responsibilities’, particularly if 
activation programme funding is accessed (Gordon Brown in HC Debate 02 July 1997). 
Discussion in the last three decades in UK welfare policy has focused on how to ensure 
young people avoid receiving cash assistance and are rather incentivised to work. 
Activation and job training programmes like the Youth Training Scheme (YTS) and its 
descendants are framed primarily in paternalistic terms, supported by ministers in both 
parties as a way to keep young people, in the words of Harold Walker Labour MP, from 
walking the ‘gangplank into the dole queue’ (HC Debate 02 February 1983). Rather, the 
government should work to give young people ‘positive choices’, put bluntly by Prime 
Minister Cameron: ‘Go to school. Go to college. Do an apprenticeship. Get a job’ (2013). In 
both of the countries investigated in this research, whether through encouraging young 
people into a prescribed labour market programme or making the majority of young people 
ineligible for assistance altogether, the message conveyed is that cash assistance the worst 
way to support this group.  
For both young people and those over 25, the principles of paternalism and contractualism 
are put into practice only for a targeted group of citizens – the dependent poor. It is this 
group who are directly impacted by government assistance programs, and the vast majority 
of citizens do not come into direct contact with means-tested government assistance by 
design. The principle of residualism targets government assistance almost wholly towards 
the poor, creating a dualistic structure whereby the majority of citizens receive their 
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welfare from the market and a targeted group interact with the government directly 
(Esping-Andersen 1990). The use of means tests in both the US and the UK welfare state is 
the vehicle by which residualism is delivered and is situated as a focal point of government 
assistance (Soss et al 2004), which signals to citizens that government assistance is only 
meant for those in greatest need.  
However, the determination of those who can receive assistance in a residualist welfare 
state subsequently engages with the debate over who among those in need is deserving or 
undeserving of that assistance. Indeed, in Moffitt’s discussion of the development of 
means-tested benefits in the United States (2003), citizens are ‘judged to be needy not just 
on the basis of income but on the basis of some other characteristic that leads them to be 
deserving in the eyes of the public’ (p. 6), an often shifting subjective determination.  
Although present at the founding of the American welfare state most notably, the United 
Kingdom has also developed into a more decidedly residualist welfare state from the 1970s 
onward (Atkinson & Micklewright 1989; McGinnity 2004; Soss et al 2004; Walker & 
Wiseman 2003). At the founding of the United States’ modern welfare state in 1935 those 
deserving included the aged, blind, children, widows, and those temporarily unemployed, 
but group membership has not stayed static (Handler & Hasenfeld 1991; King 1995; Pierson 
1994). In both countries, single mothers eventually were added to the deserving category 
(although this varies in practice, as the US also applies means tests for benefits to single 
mothers), while those unemployed without any insurance contributions have been falling 
out of the deserving category in the eyes of the public and the state (Deeming 2015; Sage 
2012). This unemployed group in particular is viewed as being able to work or to be 
incentivised back into work and choosing not to do so (Deeming 2015; Fraser & Gordon 
1994; Pierson 1994; Wiggan 2012).  
The designation of young people as a deserving subgroup is a slightly more complicated 
issue than benefit eligibility for those considered adults (generally over 25 years old), and is 
an area of contrast between the UK and US cases. Implied by the UK policy discussions of 
which policies to implement is the recognition that indeed low-income young people who 
are deserving of some modicum of support; both young people without children as well as 
young parents. This designation in the UK is again an area currently up for debate, 
particularly for young people without children, but government interventions in the training 
sector such as YTS and in the New Deal for Young People suggest that there is some 
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political will to assist this group. Deserving classification in the UK, however, is also starting 
to change particularly in the age of austerity: assistance in a jobs programme in the UK is 
the remit of the education system (e.g. Modern Apprenticeships) and rather job search and 
readiness assistance is provided as part of a contractual element for cash benefits. This is 
contrasted with the US case, where government assistance for the youth subpopulation is 
relatively absent. Rather, young people are considered eligible for benefits by virtue of 
parenting status or in rare cases leaving care or the juvenile justice system. While US 
policymakers agree that the best way to assist young people is with education or a job, 
there is little discussion of what explicitly the government should do about this issue. The 
lack of a deserving designation for young people in the US results in far fewer benefit 
programmes available and notably no large scale government job and training programme 
for low-income young people (detailed further in Chapter 1.2). 
Although the narrowing of those in the deserving category of government assistance is a 
characteristic of liberal welfare states generally, it is also important to recognise how the 
composition of those in the deserving category has changed given the rise of in-work 
poverty in both countries (Fraser et al 2011; Shipler 2008). The development of policy tools 
aimed to assist those in work but who are still poor, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(EITC) in the United States and the Working Tax Credit (WTC) in the United Kingdom, signals 
that governments do indeed assist poor citizens but only if they engage in the labour 
market (Clegg 2015; Howard 1997; Myles & Pierson 1997). The ‘hidden welfare state’ 
characterised by these programmes (Howard 1997), however, only necessarily reaches 
those with earnings; those with very little or no wage income are therefore not served by 
these programmes (Fox et al 2015; Meyer & Wu 2018). It would stand to reason then that 
the poverty reduction effects of these programmes will not reach those in deep poverty 
(50% of the US Federal Poverty Line, [FPL]). This is an important consideration when 
analysing how a welfare state functions as both a safety net and a poverty reduction tool, 
an issue returned to in Chapter 2.4: while tax credit programmes indeed have been proven 
to reduce poverty, their function suggests that the label of ‘safety net’ benefit may not be 
entirely appropriate. The rise in prominence of these policy tools also engages with broader 
theoretical questions about how these programmes align with key welfare state features. 
Government assistance predicated on labour market participation through the use of tax 
credits is characteristic of the contractual features of liberal welfare states, albeit in a 
27 
 
softer, more implicit way, but challenge the traditional characteristics of a liberal welfare 
state as a residualist entity.  
The four organising principles of the liberal welfare states detailed above – independence, 
paternalism, contractualism and residualism – in the US and the UK function consistently 
and concurrently, so cannot entirely be viewed in isolation. However, investigating how 
each are manifested in specific policies in both countries will hopefully guide the discussion 
of how each welfare state lives up to the ‘ideal’ in practice, and how in particular the 
country context and welfare state histories impact the expression of these principles in the 
survey period of each cohort investigated.  
1.2 Principles in Practice 
There is generally consistent agreement among scholars that the principles detailed above 
had their most notable renaissance in the Thatcher and Reagan years, as both governments 
pivoted away (or further away) from Keynesian economic principles and instead took on a 
neoliberal policy agenda (Holmwood 2000; Lowe 2005; Pierson 1994; Soss et al 2004; 
Walker & Wiseman 2003). The policies which implemented these principles were done so 
at different times in each country, but both the UK and the US samples of this investigation 
were in the youth stage of the life course (roughly age 16-24) during particularly notable 
changes in each welfare system. As Billari notes, the social and economic policies of a 
nation indeed impact the transition to adulthood (2004) and it is therefore extremely 
valuable to detail the specific policy context of each survey period of this research, 
particularly each cohort’s youth period. The context-setting work done in this section 
therefore details the ‘period effects’ that ‘modify the opportunities that young adults face 
in their early adult years’ (Billari 2004, p.22). Detailing these policies also helps to define 
what is meant by ‘benefit receipt’ in the upcoming results, and illuminates the unique 
contextual issues that impact the expression of the welfare state for each case.  
The UK welfare state of the 1970 British Cohort Study  
The UK cohort used in this investigation, the 1970 British Cohort Study (BCS), was in the 
youth period in the mid-1980s to mid-1990s (turning 25 in 1995), when changes in the 
provision of out-of-work benefits and in the housing market have been identified as 
particularly notable for this cohort’s youth transition (Bynner et al 1997; Furlong & Cartmel 
1997). The most prominent policy changes of the Conservative governments of this period 
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were included in the Social Security Act of 19863, which enacted major changes in the 
provision of government assistance to the poor who were out of work and did not have a 
substantial contribution record to receive National Insurance benefits (Atkinson & 
Micklewright 1989; Dilnot & Walker 1989; Lowe 2005). Some of these changes in particular 
reshaped the way that young people were perceived in the welfare state, both as 
independent benefit units and as part of their family of origin’s benefit unit.  
This act changed the Supplementary Benefit programme to the Income Support (IS) 
programme, the monthly means-tested system of cash benefits to the unemployed who did 
not have substantial contributions to any insurance-based assistance. This act reformed 
many of the basic elements of this benefit to tighten eligibility and redefine benefit units, 
including the change in 1988 that increased the eligibility threshold for IS receipt from 16 to 
18 (Dilnot & Walker 1989; Ogus et al 1995). While today this age threshold is 
commonplace, many young people in the late 1980s left school at age 16 to directly enter 
the labour market and may have had periods in unemployment before age 18, of which 
there was now no available assistance (Atkinson & Micklewright 1989; Bynner et al 1997; 
Dilnot & Walker 1989). The age of independence for a benefit unit thus was changed from 
age 16 to 18, and concurrent changes to Child Benefit resulted in young people now 
considered as part of their family’s benefit until age 18.  
For those between ages 18 and 25 who were an independent benefit unit, the introduction 
of a lower rate of Income Support also likely impacted a young person’s ability to function 
independently of financial or residential assistance from their family. The language of the 
act implied that all young people remain dependent on their family of origin, with young 
people (and young workers) referred to as ‘non-householders’ in their parent’s home who 
could therefore reap the benefits of shared accommodation and resources (Dilnot & 
Walker 1989; Harris 1989). The assumption of family support led to a standard practice of 
‘youth rates’ in the UK welfare state beginning from that period onward, with lower rates 
for the under 25s in Income Support (now Jobseeker’s Allowance), Housing Benefit, and in 
the youth minimum wage (Harris 1989). These policy changes implied to young people that 
the family rather than the state was the first port of call for welfare support, furthering the 
residualist nature of the cash benefit system and low de-familialization dimensions of a 
                                                          
3 While this act overhauled many welfare state systems, the focus here is on those that are most 
likely to impact BCS respondents, so necessarily leaves out changes in policy areas like pensions. 
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liberal welfare state as it applies to young people (Chevalier 2016; Esping-Andersen 1999; 
Wilding 1997).  
Another direct and unique intervention for the UK cohort in this study is the Youth Training 
Scheme (YTS), an ‘activation’ policy intervention in the UK specific to young people 
introduced in 1983 (HC Debate 02 February 1983) which was an iteration of the ‘slowly 
evolving training programme’ begun with the Youth Opportunities Programme (YOP) in 
1978 (Bradley 1995). In 1986 the one year YTS programme was extended to cover two 
years of training (both on and off the job) for 16-year-old school leavers and one year of 
training for 17-year-old school leavers, with a guaranteed place available to all unemployed 
statutory school leavers (as priority places) and some 17 year-olds entering as non-priority 
cases (Bradley 1995; Bynner 2012; Dolton et al 2000). The recruitment of young people into 
the programme was performed by the Careers Service, a function of the local education 
authority which ‘identified likely YTS participants before they left school, endorse[d] them 
for certain types of provision and then… arrange[d] interviews between the young person 
and a suitable managing agent [of the YTS programme in government]’ (Bradley 1995, p. 
38). This was a slightly more proactive approach by Careers Service than in the previous 
iteration of YOP, where Careers Service informed young people of YTS while in school and 
they then had to have a 6 week qualifying period of unemployment in order to access the 
YOP programme through the Manpower Services Commission (the government 
employment agency who delivered the programme) (Bradley, 1995).  
It is important to recognise that the YTS programme was voluntary, and while a place was 
‘guaranteed’ it was still up to the young person to accept the offer. The incentives for 
choosing to accept a place on a YTS scheme for young people was a weekly stipend of £27 
to £30 a week in 1986 (slightly more than what was paid on unemployment benefit at the 
time) with the additional work experience and training element (Bradley, 1995; Dolton et 
al, 2004). In Bynner’s review of the BCS cohort he notes that while the cohort was 
theoretically able to ‘sign on’ and receive unemployment benefits (as eligibility was 
withdrawn for 16 to 17 year olds only in 1988), many were encouraged to stay in school 
until 18 or join a Youth Training Scheme by Careers Services in their school (Bynner et al 
1997). Dolton and colleagues (2004) also note that ‘young people were made to wait for an 
increasingly long time’ before unemployment benefits were paid, which may have also 
incentivised young people to enter YTS.  
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Once a young person agreed to enter the scheme, say at age 16 in 1986 (as the experience 
of the BCS cohort), they would be recommended to the YTS managing agent to be placed in 
either a ‘basic’ or ‘premium’ stream based on their skill level determined by the Careers 
Service in their former secondary school. This administrative feature of the programme is 
particularly notable, as researchers note that in many cases managing agents merely 
‘creamed’ those deemed to be the ablest into the ‘basic’ scheme as a priority, where they 
would be able to be placed with employers almost immediately rather than in community 
work or further remedial training and managing agents would receive a commission for this 
placement (Bradley, 1995). Those who were in the ‘premium’ scheme were deemed to 
have more basic training needs before they would be placed with an employer. Most 
participants were placed into the basic scheme, where they would be placed within a firm 
along with a minimum of 20 weeks of off-the-job training in the course of a year (Dolton et 
al., 2004). In some cases, employers would also choose to take on YTS participants as 
‘employed’, providing participants with a small additional top up to their stipend amount 
(although still less than a formal apprentice) in exchange for more trainees placed in their 
firm from managing agents at little cost to the employer (Bradley, 1995; Dolton et al, 2000). 
In this way firms could use YTS as a screening mechanism for ‘borderline’ apprenticeship 
candidates, where a YTS recipient would be treated as a lower-cost apprentice who would 
then be able to be kept on after the YTS programme duration if desired by the firm 
(Bradley, 1995; Dolton et al 2004). The experience of ‘employed’ YTS participants, however, 
is perhaps the ‘best case’ scenario for those who entered the scheme. In MacDonald and 
Coffield’s qualitative research with low income young people in Teesside, they note that 
among their sample a ‘common’ experience was that those who participated in YTS at 16 
and 17 then left the programme at 18 (when the official programme ended) to merely 
apply for unemployment benefits (1990).  
Even though 15% of school leavers, or 263,000 young people, were on YTS in 1986, still a 
further 22% of school leavers were unemployed (Dolton et al 2001 & 2004), likely because 
the YTS scheme was voluntary. A key criticism of YTS from youth researchers is that the jobs 
available in the programme were concentrated in construction, mining and manufacturing; 
criticised for creating a bridge to work ‘only to certain gender-typified jobs’ (Coles 1995, p. 
39). Some previous empirical work (which will be detailed in Chapter 2.4) addressed YTS 
impacts for different gender groups to consider these concerns, and it will also be possible 
to address the effects of YTS for both genders directly in this investigation. Importantly, 
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successive UK governments of both parties have implemented policies in the same vein as 
YTS, but notably with a greater focus on participants gaining National Vocational 
Qualifications at least to level 2, with less prescribed durations on the programme as with 
YTS (Dolton et al 2004). More recent iterations of government sponsored youth training, 
both in the New Deal for Young People (a New Labour initiative) and Work Programme (a 
Conservative initiative in the 2000s), were characterised by prescribed job training or 
workfare employment elements for young people in order to continue to receive any type 
of cash assistance, and therefore a smaller proportion of the youth population was involved 
in these programmes than in YTS. In 1988 the proportion of school leavers on YTS grew to 
22% (Dolton et al 2004), and thus there may be a notable group of BCS sample members 
who participated in YTS at some point in their youth period. 
The final notable area of welfare state transformation undertaken during the Conservative 
governments of the 1980s and early 1990s was in the area of housing policy, which had 
long term consequences for the UK cohort investigated here. Most researchers view the 
Right to Buy scheme as the most transformative policy change in this period, considered 
the ‘cornerstone for a radical redesign in housing policy’ (Pierson 1994, p.75). This policy 
gave any tenant in a council flat with more than 3 years’ residence the opportunity to buy 
the flat at a discount, with sales peaking at 200,000 units in 1981 (Mullins et al 2006). This 
reduction in the provision of social housing by the government caused the rental housing 
sector to become tighter and more privatised, increased rents in both the social and private 
rental housing sector, and was a factor in increased levels of homelessness (Pierson 1994; 
Lowe 2005). Rather than providing social housing as the primary policy tool for assisting low 
income tenants, Housing Benefit became most common, where the government either paid 
rent in full or paid the difference in the rental contribution from the tenant via the Local 
Housing Allowance. Benefit tapers (the rate of withdrawal of benefit amount for every £1 
earned over the earnings threshold) were increased from 17% of gross earnings in 1986 to 
43% of gross earnings in 1988; which meant that Housing Benefit would be withdrawn 
faster and would put a lower ceiling on the earned income for eligibility (Berthoud 1989). 
These changes, combined with the introduction of a lower housing benefit rate for under 
25s and the introduction of a capital limit for eligibility (£8,000 in 1989) (Berthoud 1989), 
resulted in Housing Benefit more targeted to the very worse off; the majority of Housing 
Benefit recipients today also receive another form of cash assistance (Browne & Hood 
2012; Lowe 2005). The changes in targeting however did not decrease the overall 
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expenditure in the programme. In fact, between 1989-1990 and 1993-1994 the overall 
expenditure on Housing Benefit increased by 84% (Hood & Oakley 2014, p. 14). This 
increase is considered to be the result of the rapid increase in the number of private 
tenancies with higher rents than the social housing sector, the removal of rental controls of 
new tenancies beginning in 1989, and the recession of the early 1990s (Hood & Oakley 
2014). Since that time the expenditure on Housing Benefit continued to grow, such that it is 
now one of the largest benefit programmes by expenditure in the UK welfare state 
portfolio (Browne & Hood 2012; Hood & Oakley 2014).  
The policy changes above are the most notable in the youth phase of the UK cohort in this 
investigation, but it is also important to mention that the principles and policies set forth in 
the Conservative period were by and large accepted by subsequent Labour governments 
(Lowe 2005). Crucially, these policies combined with a new focus on workfare (translated 
from the American welfare state) to bring about a new wave of reforms in New Labour’s 
‘New Deals’; the first of which was the New Deal for Young People (Daguerre 2004; 
Holmwood 2000; Lowe 2005; Walker & Wiseman 2003). A second related change was 
creation of the Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) programme, introduced in Parliament in 1994 
and passed in the Jobseeker’s Act in 1995 by the Conservative government, and 
subsequently implemented in 1997 by New Labour (Strickland 1996). JSA replaced Income 
Support for childless adults with workfare principles at its core, which entrenched the 
contractualist welfare state principles in many programmes for UK cohort members from 
their mid-20s onwards (Lowe 2005; Manning 2009). New Labour also extended the use of 
tax credits as a poverty reduction tool which were implemented to ‘top up’ the wages of 
workers both with and without children4 on a low income (modelled on the EITC in the 
United States) (Clegg 2015; Gregg et al 2009; Lowe 2005; Manning 2009). The introduction 
of JSA and the expansion of tax credits signalled a shift in the British welfare state towards a 
recipient’s responsibility to work, with a primary goal of the programmes to promote 
‘activation’ in the labour market (Clegg 2015). As mentioned in the previous section, these 
changes also necessarily revised who was defined as ‘deserving’ of government support 
(Dwyer 2004; Whitworth & Griggs 2013). While these policy changes did not directly impact 
the UK cohort in the youth period, they were available to cohort members in their 
adulthood survey waves.   
                                                          
4 Those without children must be over 25 to be eligible for Working Tax Credit. 
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Aside from the changes in the welfare state, the BCS cohort was growing up in particularly 
challenging economic times as the result of Conservative economic and monetary policy 
(Lowe 2005; Soss et al 2004). Deindustrialisation in particular had profound impacts on this 
cohort’s ability to attach to the labour market as readily as previous generations (Bynner 
1997; Furlong & Cartmel 1997; Gallie & Paugam 2004; Heinz 2003; Scherer 2001), and the 
growing inequality and recession of the early 1990s would have likely affected a cohort 
members’ transition outcomes. A higher reliance on the benefit system may indeed come 
as a result of these adverse economic conditions, which may be seen in empirical work on 
this sample. However, there is still a considerable proportion of young people during this 
time period who leave school and enter the labour market at 16, so this research may find 
earlier labour market attachment than would be expected for current cohorts. This 
research might also find a greater proportion of UK case members who access government 
assistance in the survey period because there are simply more assistance programmes 
available to them. The system of Income Support, a variety of lone parent credits and 
benefits, and Housing Benefit all have lower eligibility thresholds and serve more low 
income British citizens than means-tested benefits in the US, and therefore the welfare 
state interacted with in the UK cohort can be considered a more ‘generous’ system overall 
(Table 1). 
The US welfare state of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY) 
cohort  
The NLSY cohort was in the youth period in the late 1990s/early 2000s following one of the 
largest changes to the American system of cash assistance, 1996’s Personal Responsibility 
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act5 (PRWORA). This act fundamentally altered the 
system of cash assistance for low income families with children (Dreier et al 1994), 
abolishing the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) programme and replacing it 
with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) programme (Moffitt 2003); 
‘ending welfare as we know it’ (Clinton 1992). The dismantling of the cash assistance 
program – what most Americans think of when they think of ‘welfare’ – was the 
                                                          
5 The statutory purpose of TANF is to ‘increase state flexibility to achieve four goals: (1) provide 
assistance to needy families with children so that they can live in their own homes or the homes of 
relatives; (2) end dependence of needy parents on government benefits through work, job 
preparation, and marriage; (3) reduce out-of-wedlock pregnancies; and (4) promote the formation 
and maintenance of two-parent families’ (Falk 2017). 
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culmination of the conservative principles of Murray (1984) and Mead (1986) put into 
practice. Not only did the passage of PRWORA change the cash assistance program, it 
reified the US as an exemplar of the principles of a liberal welfare state: becoming more 
residualist, paternalistic, and contractualist towards the majority of working-aged citizens 
on a low income. The NLSY cohort therefore likely had a very different experience with 
government assistance programmes than those in the BCS cohort primarily because many 
of the programmes in the United States were not eligible to be received or were not 
accessed by those eligible; an issue returned to in Chapter 2.4. Importantly, there is also no 
large-scale government training programme in the United States comparable to YTS 
available to the NLSY cohort. In general, any job training assistance for young people 
without children is accessed via Workforce Development Centers voluntarily rather than as 
part of obligations to receive cash assistance, and the small JobCorps training programme 
for low income young people is not of comparable scope to be included as an intervention 
in this investigation (Fernandes-Alcantara 2017). 
The two programmes detailed in depth here are the Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF) programme and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, 
formerly Food Stamps), as these are the two most notable programmes in the US welfare 
state that affect the life course of the NLSY cohort investigated. There are other programs 
available to low-income Americans that may indeed impact a small minority of sample 
members (most notably Housing Choice Vouchers) which are detailed below, as well as 
poverty reduction programs that comprise a large part of the safety net for low-income 
workers (e.g. Earned Income Tax Credit, Unemployment Insurance, Medicaid). These 
programs are not explicitly investigated in this empirical work but impact the overall ‘safety 
net’ available for low income Americans which cohort members may have accessed later in 
the survey period. Of particular note is the Earned Income Tax Credit, which has expanded 
since its introduction in the 1970s to now serve as the largest poverty reduction 
programme in the United States for the non-elderly (Moffitt 2016; Meyer & Wu 2018; 
Shapiro et al 2017). In 2013, a total of $68.1 billion was claimed by 28.8 million tax filers 
(19% of all tax filers) that serves primarily families with children; indeed, 97% of all EITC 
dollars were claimed by these families (Falk & Crandall-Hollick 2016). Importantly in the 
context of this investigation, Americans without children under the age of 25 are not 
eligible to receive EITC.  
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The TANF program was the first federally mandated implementation of workfare principles 
for citizens who participated in the cash assistance programme, following state AFDC 
waiver programmes in the 1980s which served as workfare pilots (Blank 2009; Handler 
2004; Moffitt 2003; Pierson 1994). A major policy change in TANF was that federal funding 
was administered as a matching block grant to states rather than federally administered, 
which states were able to spend on a combination of cash assistance and non-cash 
assistance programmes as desired. This could range from workforce training programmes 
to childcare subsidies and homelessness assistance (Falk 2014). One of the TANF 
programme’s stated goals was to end ‘welfare dependency’, in particular to solve the 
‘problem’ of families receiving AFDC benefits for many years and not engaging in the labour 
market6. This goal was translated by public administrators into caseload reduction targets 
achieved through tighter eligibility requirements, the introduction of work conditionality, 
and lifetime limits on cash assistance (Falk 2014; Moffitt 2003).  
While TANF regulations were set at federal minimums (e.g. the 60-month lifetime limit on 
cash assistance), states were given wide berths to make programmes more restrictive and 
many did (e.g. Alabama’s lifetime limit set at 24 months) (Falk 2014; Kassabian et al 2013). 
This state flexibility resulted in large variation in both the cash assistance programmes and 
the non-cash assistance programmes that states chose to fund (Falk 2014; Fellows & Rowe 
2004; Kassabian et al 2013; Moffitt 2003). Variation by state is particularly notable in the 
amount of maximum cash benefit for a family of three, which can range from $770 a month 
in New York state to $142 in Tennessee (Falk 2014, p.13). Although some of this variation is 
due to the state’s cost of living, most scholars also believe that the political values of the 
state are reflected in the generosity of the TANF programme, with traditionally 
Conservative states tending to enforce stricter regimes for cash assistance (Fellows & Rowe 
2004). TANF funds given as block grants to states also resulted in steep declines on average 
of the percentage of federal and state funding going to cash assistance across the nation: 
                                                          
6The group of families who are ‘long term dependent’ on AFDC benefits was identified by Bane and 
Ellwood in 1994’s Welfare Realities, which extended their work on poverty dynamics (1986) to 
understand the population of low income Americans receiving AFDC. Researcher David Ellwood was 
brought into the Clinton Administration to help craft policies to address this issue, and in the 1994 
book proposed a move away from ‘workfare’ jobs for recipients, more support for childcare, and 
more programmes to ‘make work pay’ (a higher minimum wage, medical insurance and expanded 
EITC) to solve the problem of long term dependency (1994, pp. 148-150). However, once the 
administration’s and Congress’ proposals were brought to Ellwood for review, the harsh sanctions, 
time limits and continuance of workfare principles moved further away from the policies proposed in 
his research, and he resigned his position in government in protest (DeParle 2004). 
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whereas around $0.70 of every $1.00 went to cash assistance in the AFDC programme each 
year, only around $0.30 of every $1.00 every year on average goes to cash assistance in the 
TANF programme (Ziliak 2016, p.304). Federally and at every state level, the TANF 
programme therefore spends the majority of funding on in-kind transfers such as childcare 
subsidies, mental health services, or substance use counselling.  
The introduction of TANF was followed by an extremely steep decline in the TANF caseload 
(Moffitt 2003). The national caseload declined by 50% between 1997 and 2001 (Loprest 
2012), and notably reduced the percentage of single mothers the programme served: 
whereas in 1990 around 50% of poor single mothers received AFDC, by 1999 that rate had 
reduced to around only 30% (US DHHS 2001 in Moffitt 2003, p. 309). The dramatic decline 
in caseloads has been attributed to a variety of factors, with the positive macroeconomic 
climate of the mid- to late-1990s in the United States considered the largest driver of the 
decline and TANF policies accounting for around 20% of the decline (Grogger & Karoly 
2005). The deterrent effects of a workfare regime must also be considered when viewing 
caseload declines. Work by Besley and Coate (1992, 1995) found that the requirements of 
workfare can be used as a screening device to deter the ‘most able’ from entering 
programmes, and by 2016 32 states had ‘formal diversion programs’ which kept eligible 
applicants off caseloads by giving them a 3-month lump sum payment in lieu of monthly 
assistance (Ziliak 2016, p.319).  The main TANF policy change contributing to this decline 
was the lowering of income and asset thresholds, and in many states in order to be eligible 
for assistance a participant has to earn less than half of the poverty line per month (Falk 
2014). Therefore, those who are in the TANF caseload are a population with more unstable 
work histories and are more likely in deep poverty than those who left the caseload when 
PRWORA was introduced, or who are poor and who do not receive TANF (Frogner et al 
2009).   
PRWORA may have been the most effective at changing the obligations the state has to low 
income families. Importantly, note Edin & Shaefer (2016):  
…under the new plan, no one with children would have the legal right to receive a dime of 
cash welfare from the government, even if the family had no other means of support. The 
old welfare program, AFDC, had ensured that right (25).  
The loss of these rights cannot be overstated. This change meant that for the NLSY cohort 
and other low income families (generally single mothers with children), the TANF 
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programme is for many reasons unavailable or not accessed (Edin & Shaefer 2016; Floyd et 
al 2017; Hays 2006).  
The second programme explicitly modelled in this research is the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP), called the Food Stamp program until 2002. Operating 
nationwide since 1974, an important characteristic of Food Stamps/SNAP is that it provides 
a ‘uniform, minimum, nationwide threshold below which assistance cannot fall’ (Currie 
2003, p.200), in part to offset the variation in other cash assistance programmes. SNAP has 
income thresholds above that of TANF (e.g. 130% of the federal poverty level (FPL) 
compared to 100% FPL or below for TANF), and provides monthly cash benefits on a debit-
like EBT card to use on ‘qualifying purchases’ for food (Aussenberg 2014). For families with 
children there are no work requirements as in TANF, and there are less stringent eligibility 
requirements for SNAP for those without children. This results in a different population of 
Americans served by the programme compared to TANF. Overall SNAP families are not 
nearly as poor and have a higher proportion with earned income; nationally around 44% of 
families have earned income but still 40% with incomes at or below half the poverty line 
(UDSA 2017). The interplay between TANF and SNAP is also particularly valuable to consider 
when viewing the forthcoming empirical results. Those who receive TANF are categorically 
eligible for SNAP but the share of SNAP recipients who are also receiving TANF dropped 
considerably after PRWORA, from around 37% to only 5% of the SNAP population in 2016 
(FNS 2017). Unlike TANF, SNAP assistance is also not restricted to (primarily) single parents. 
While still an important recipient group, the share of SNAP recipients who are single parent 
households declined after the Great Recession when more families became eligible due to 
low incomes, such that around a quarter of recipients were in single parent families in 2012 
(CBPP 2018). However the majority of eligible single parent families do indeed take up 
SNAP benefits as opposed to the take up challenges seen in the TANF programme (CBPP 
2018; Currie 2003). SNAP has been found  to reduce post-tax and transfer poverty among 
the large number of Americans it serves, and is considered to be one of the most successful 
poverty reduction programmes in the country7 (Currie 2003; Ziliak 2016). 
Although SNAP is able to reach a larger number of low income Americans, PRWORA 
legislation also enforced work requirements and time limits in the SNAP programme for 
able bodied adults without children for the first time. Generally, if a recipient works less 
                                                          
7 Empirical evidence regarding the poverty reduction effects of SNAP are detailed in Chapter 2.4. 
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than 20 hours a week or fails to meet the other work-related requirements they can only 
receive SNAP for 3 months in any 36-month period (although this was waived during the 
Great Recession from 2009 to 2013) (Aussenberg 2014; Currie 2003; Hoynes & 
Schanzenbach 2013). In 2013 around 13.3 million Americans were subject to work 
requirements in order to receive SNAP (Aussenberg 2014, p. 9). However, the population of 
SNAP recipients in one person households (around 53% of recipients nationally) are not 
particularly deterred by these requirements as many have earned income of some kind or 
are disabled (FNS 2017). Generally speaking, however, the NLSY sample members who 
receive SNAP will be in families with children, as many of the single adult households in the 
nationwide SNAP figures are elderly (FNS 2017).  
A smaller programme of note received by NLSY sample members is the supplemental SNAP 
Women, Infants and Children Program (SNAP-WIC), which provides ‘food, nutrition 
education, breastfeeding promotion and support, and referrals to health care and social 
services to nutritionally at-risk, low-income pregnant women, new mothers, infants, and 
children up to age 5’ (FNS 2017). The USDA reports that for the last 10 years WIC has served 
between 55 to 64% of those who are eligible for the programme. Because this programme 
is specific to women and their young children, those who are WIC eligible are also SNAP 
eligible for other food purchases. WIC recipients are included in the empirical estimates of 
‘SNAP receipt’ in this investigation, and because of this the results here may find a 
particularly higher proportion of those who are young parents who access SNAP/SNAP-WIC 
in this sample.  
SNAP has been proven responsive to economic downturns because almost any family type 
living under 130% of the federal poverty level is eligible, which resulted in a large increase 
in caseloads during the Great Recession (Hoynes & Schanzenbach 2016). Nearly one in 
seven Americans participated in SNAP in 2014 and the program raised the post-tax and 
transfer income of 4.7 million people, including 2.1 million children, above the federal 
poverty line (CBPP 2015). For many low income families and for low income childless 
Americans, SNAP is the only government assistance they can or do receive (Edin & Shaefer 
2016), indicating a particularly threadbare safety net during the youth transition period for 
the childless members of the US cohort investigated here. It is also important to consider 
when analysing the impact of SNAP that it is an in-kind benefit, and does not work for 
recipients in the same way that a cash assistance benefit would: it does not pay rent, keep 
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the electricity on, or buy children clothes for school. While SNAP is indeed a lifeline for 
families in the United States, it still does not provide the freedom of cash (Edin & Shaefer 
2016).  
Finally, there are some smaller programmes included in the upcoming empirical models of 
‘benefit receipt’ that are worth mentioning here, with housing assistance most notable due 
to its divergence from the British case. The proportion of Americans receiving housing 
assistance is less than half of that in the UK; just 3% of the total population, or 4.8 million 
households in 2014 (CBO 2015). This is primarily because housing assistance is not an 
entitlement programme based on income alone, and the amount of funding given to local 
Public Housing Authorities for places in Public Housing, Project Based Rental Assistance, or 
for Housing Choice Vouchers has always been an area of discretionary spending (CBO 
2015). Housing Choice Vouchers are the largest element of housing assistance in the US 
($18 billion spent in 2014) that are generally targeted to families with children and the 
elderly, which pays the difference between 30% of the tenant’s monthly income and the 
cost of area market rent to an approved private landlord (CBO 2015; HUD 2015). Because 
funding levels for housing assistance are fixed within a Public Housing Authority, in most 
parts of the country need far outstrips the numbers of vouchers available – in Baltimore, 
Maryland, for example, the waiting list for vouchers only opens once every decade, and 
then only roughly 1,000 to 1,500 families a year receive a voucher out of upwards of 50,000 
families on the list (Wenger 2014).  
Importantly, those who receive housing assistance are generally poorer than those eligible 
for other programs (such as SNAP), as ‘initial eligibility for federal housing programs is 
limited to households with no more than 50 percent area median income (AMI), and 
roughly three quarters of assisted households have income of no more than 30 percent of 
AMI’ (CBO 2015). While Americans living in the very poorest of households are eligible for 
housing assistance, still ‘only about one-quarter of eligible families get any type of rental 
subsidy’ (Edin & Shaefer 2016, p. 77). Families that receive housing assistance have higher 
post-tax and transfer income, lowered risk of homelessness and living in overcrowded 
units, and decreases in the likelihood that the family will have to move in a five-year period 
(i.e. a reduction in housing instability) (Briggs 2005; Edin & Shaefer 2016; Dreier et al 2001; 
Rosenbaum & Argeros 2005). However, because of the eligibility limitations only a very 
small number of NLSY cohort members receive any sort of housing assistance during the 
40 
 
survey period. The final programme to consider is Supplemental Security Income (SSI), a 
cash benefit for low income people with disabilities: all those who receive SSI must have a 
disability and meet asset and income requirements. The programme serves roughly 8 
million Americans of all ages annually (Moulta-Ali 2013), and therefore there will likely be a 
small minority of NLSY cohort members who receive SSI.  
Unlike the BCS cohort, the NLSY cohort was in the youth period in a time of economic 
expansion and low unemployment, and for this reason it is expected that fewer 
respondents will access government assistance in the youth period. This, along with the 
fewer number of government programmes available for low income Americans, will likely 
result in a much smaller percentage of the NLSY cohort who receive government assistance 
than the BCS cohort. As detailed in the previous section, young people in the US are not 
considered a deserving subpopulation for government intervention as explicitly as in the UK 
cohort and therefore low-income young people under age 25 are simply not eligible for 
government assistance to the same extent as young people in the UK. This contrast can be 
seen by viewing Tables 1 and 2, which summarise the means-tested benefit systems in the 
UK and the US that were available to the BCS and NLSY cohort members between age 16 
and 24 (what is considered the youth period for this investigation), broken down by family 
type. What is particularly notable is the dearth of programmes available for young people in 
the US cohort without children, the much more stringent conditions of benefit receipt and 
time limits that characterise the US system from 1996 onwards, and the state variation in 
programmes (which are captured by the last two columns on the right in Table 2). Finally, a 
summary of key welfare reforms as they relate to the cohorts of this investigation are 




Table 1: UK benefit system entitlement, BCS sample members without a disability in the youth period  
Programme Name  Benefit type  Eligibility Criteria  
Conditions of 
receipt Maximum monthly amount 
Family type: single without children  
Supplementary Benefit 
(1986-1988) Cash assistance  
Low income  
unemployed 16 or 
older 
Must be available for 
employment and not 
working more than 
24 hours a week If ind benefit unit, £29.80/wk in 1986 





Must be available for 
employment and not 
working more than 
24 hours a week If ind benefit unit, £31.15/wk in 1991 




Must be available for 
employment   £41.40/wk in 1991 
Housing Benefit  
In-kind, full rent or 
portion paid to 
landlord Low income  
Assets and earned 
income not above 
threshold; £8,000 
capital limit in 1991 
Amount paid to landlord determined by 
earned income of respondent and 
withdrawn at rate of £0.43 for income £1 
over threshold (1989 regs), lower youth 
rate 
Council Tenancy 
In-kind, place in 
social housing Low income  
Assets and earned 
income not above 
threshold; £8,000 






Family type, couple without children  
Supplementary Benefit 
(1986-1988) Cash assistance  
Low income including 
partner income , 
unemployed 16 or 
older 
Must be available for 
employment and not 
working more than 
24 hours a week £48.40/wk in 1986 
Income Support (1988 -) Cash assistance  
Low income including 
partner income, 
unemployed 18 or 
older 
Must be available for 
employment and not 
working more than 
24 hours a week £62.25 in 1991 




Must be available for 
employment   £41.40 in 1991 
Housing Benefit  
In-kind, rent paid to 
landlord 
Below low income 
threshold including 
partner income 
Assets and earned 
income not above 
threshold 
Amount paid to landlord determined by 
earned income of respondent and 
withdrawn at rate of £0.43 for income £1 
over threshold (1989 regs) 
Council Tenancy 
In-kind, place in 
social housing 
Below low income 
threshold including 
partner income 
Assets and earned 
income not above 








Family type, couple with children  
Supplementary Benefit 
(1986-1988) Cash assistance  
Low income including 
partner income, 
unemployed 16 or 
older 
Must be available for 
employment and not 
working more than 
24 hours a week £58.60/wk with one child under 11 in 1986 
Income Support (1988 -) Cash assistance  
Low income including 
partner income, 
unemployed 16 or 
older 
Must be available for 
employment and not 
working more than 
24 hours a week £75.60/wk with one child under 11 in 1991 




Must be available for 
employment   £41.40/wk in 1991 
Housing Benefit  
In-kind, rent paid to 
landlord 
Below low income 
threshold including 
partner income 
Assets and earned 
income not above 
threshold 
Amount paid to landlord determined by 
earned income of respondent and 
withdrawn at rate of £0.43 for income £1 
over threshold (1989 regs) 
Council Tenancy 
In-kind, place in 
social housing 
Below low income 
threshold including 
partner income 
Assets and earned 
income not above 
threshold   
Child Benefit  Cash assistance  
Threshold only if 
high-income family, 
child under 18    £9.25/wk for one child in 1991 
Family Credit  Cash assistance  
Maximum amount 
available for families 
on low income, 
reduced with income 
over threshold to 
certain amount  
At least one family 
must be working 
Average amount of family credit was 




Family type, lone parent 
Supplementary Benefit 
(1986-1988) Cash assistance  
Low income, 
unemployed 16 or 
older 
Must be available for 
employment and not 
working more than 24 
hours a week £50.00/wk with one child under 11 in 1986 
Income Support (1988 -) Cash assistance  
Low income, 
unemployed 18 or 
older 
Must be available for 
employment and not 
working more than 24 
hours a week £52.98/wk with one child under 11 in 1991 




Must be available for 
employment   £41.40/wk in 1991 
Housing Benefit  
In-kind, rent paid to 
landlord 
Below low income 
threshold including 
partner income 
Assets and earned 
income not above 
threshold 
Amount paid to landlord determined by 
earned income of respondent and 
withdrawn at rate of £0.43 for income £1 
over threshold (1989 regs) 
Council Tenancy 
In-kind, place in social 
housing 
Below low income 
threshold including 
partner income 
Assets and earned 
income not above 
threshold   
Family Credit  Cash assistance  
Maximum amount 
available for families 
on low income, 
reduced with income 
over threshold to 
certain amount  
Family must be 
working 
Average amount of family credit was 
roughly £57/week in the mid-1990s  
Child Benefit (Lone 
parents) Cash assistance 
Threshold only if high 
income family,  child 
under 18   £14.85/wk with one child in 1991 
Sources: Dilnot & McCrae 1989; Berthoud 1989; Institute for Fiscal Studies 2013; Ogus et al 1995; Rutherford 2013. Note: This table does not include any health benefits delivered through the NHS which is 
free at the point of use or disability benefits, which were not included in this analysis. The YTS programme is also not included in this table because it is not a means-tested assistance programme, although 
BCS sample members did access this intervention (detailed on pp 28-31).  
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Table 2: US benefit system entitlement, NLSY sample members without a disability in the youth period  
Programme 
Name  Benefit type  Eligibility Criteria  Conditions of receipt 
Maximum monthly 
amount Duration/time limit Access limitations 
Family type: single without children  
SNAP  
In-kind; EBT card for 
qualifying food purchases  
Must be over 18 and 
have gross income  
< 130% of FPL; net 
income < 100% FPL, 
assets below roughly 
$2,000. Must not be 
enrolled in higher 
education.  
To be eligible 
continually must be 




(including job search), 




determined by cost 
of Thrifty Food Plan 
and 30% of net 
income  
If not meeting 
conditions can only 
receive SNAP for 3 
months in any 36 
month period but 
can be waived by 
state agencies if 
state has high 
unemployment.   
General 
Assistance 
Cash assistance (in some 
states given directly to 
landlord for rent/utility 
payments) 
Very low income (often 
under 50% FPL) who is 
not eligible for TANF or 
SSI.   
GA amounts vary by 
state. Range from 
$95 to $455/mo for 
non-disabled. Most 
benefit levels less 
than half the 
poverty level 
income for single 
adult.  Varies by state. 
Only available in 30 
states and is state-
funded only. In some 
states (12 in 
FY2011), a person 
can be 'employable' 
but in others a 
person must be 
'unemployable' but 
does not qualify as 
having a disability. 
Public 
Housing/Housing 
Choice Voucher  
In kind, either place in 
public housing unit or 
voucher amount paid 
directly to private landlord  
Limited to those 
(primarily to families) 
with no more than 50% 
AMI   
For housing choice 
vouchers, amount 
based on the 
difference between 
30% tenants income 
and amount of rent   
Families with 
children prioritised 
for assistance only in 
cases of persistent 
homelessness or 
disability. Funding 
also fixed in housing 
authority so 




Insurance  Cash assistance 
Must have qualifying 
contributions through 
previous employment 
and seeking work   
Amount varies by 
state, from low of 
roughly $230 to 
$650. Aim to 
replace half of 
workers earnings, 
but does not do so 
for previously high 
earners. 
Generally 26 weeks 
maximum 
For young people, 
employment 
contributions may 
not sufficient to be 
eligible for UI 
 
Family type, couple without children  
SNAP  
In-kind; EBT card for 
qualifying food purchases  
Must be over 18 and 
have gross income  < 
130% of FPL; net 
income < 100% FPL, 
assets below roughly 
$2,000  
To be eligible 
continually must be 
working more than 
20 hours/week or 
performing work-
related activities 
(including job search) 
, states can tighten 
these conditions 
Roughly $350, 
determined by cost 
of Thrifty Food Plan 
and 30% of net 
income  
If not meeting 
conditions 
household can only 
receive SNAP for 3 
months in any 36 
month period but 
can be waived by 
state agencies if 
state has high 
unemployment   
Public 
Housing/Housing 
Choice Voucher  
In kind, either place in 
public housing unit or 
voucher amount paid 
directly to private landlord  
Limited to those 
(primarily to families 
w/children) with no 
more than 50% AMI   
For housing choice 
vouchers, amount 




amount of rent   
Families without 
children prioritised 
for assistance only 
in cases of 
persistent 
homelessness or 
disability for one or 
both members of 
family. Funding also 
fixed in housing 
authority so 




Insurance  Cash assistance 
Must have qualifying 
contributions through 
previous employment 
and seeking work   
Amount varies by 
state, from low of 
roughly $230 to 
$650. Aim to 
replace half of 
workers earnings, 
but does not do so 
for previously high 
earners. 
Generally 26 weeks 
maximum 
For young people, 
employment 
contributions may 
not sufficient to be 
eligible for UI 
 
Family type, couple with children  
SNAP  
In-kind; EBT card for 
qualifying food purchases  
Must be over 18 and 
have gross income  < 
130% of FPL; net 
income < 100% FPL, 
assets below roughly 
$2,000    
Dependent on 
household size. For 
household of 3, 
max benefit of 
roughly 
$500/month; 
dependent on cost 
of Thrifty Food Plan 
and 30% net 
income and 
deductions      
SNAP-WIC 
In-kind; EBT card for 
qualifying food purchases 
along with health referrals 
and other programmes 
Must be eligible for 
SNAP and have 
household member 
who is pregnant/post-
partum.    
Although varies by 
state, food package 
around $55/month. 
If remaining eligible 
SNAP-WIC support 
continual until child is 
5 if deemed at 
nutritional risk due to 




when state funds 
run out those 
eligible cannot be 
served. 
EITC  
Earnings subsidy delivered 
as reduction in tax liability 
or refund if very low 
earnings.  
Must have qualifying 
child to be eligible for 
EITC; maximum 
earned income 
amount is $9,720 
before phase-out.  Must have earnings.  
Families with one 
child maximum 
credit amount is 
$3,350     
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Child Tax Credit  
Reduction in tax 
liability/refund if very low 
earnings 
Must have child 
under age 17; phase 
outs begin at limits of 
$110,000 for married 
filers filing jointly   
$1000 per child 
before phase out     
TANF  Cash assistance  
Gross income <100% 
FPL and not receiving 
UI. 
With some exceptions 
varying by state, 
adults required to 
participate in work or 
workfare activities.  
Benefit levels vary 
by state and 
number of 
dependents, and 
range in lower 48 
from maximum of 
roughly $142 in TN 
to $770 in NY for 
family of three 
(single parent, 2 
children)8 
Federal lifetime limit 
for TANF is 60 
months, although 
states tighten to 
shorter lifetime 





couples is very 
limited, varying 
by state. In most 
states this family 




Choice Voucher  
In kind, either place in 
public housing unit or 
voucher amount paid 
directly to private landlord  
Limited to those 
(primarily to families 
w/children) with no 
more than 50% AMI   
For housing choice 
vouchers, amount 
based on the 
difference between 
30% tenants 
income and amount 
of rent   
 Funding also 








Insurance  Cash assistance 
Must have qualifying 
contributions through 
previous employment 
and seeking work   
Amount varies by 
state, from low of 
roughly $230 to 
$650. Aim to 
replace half of 
workers earnings, 
but does not do so 
for previously high 
earners. 
Generally 26 weeks 
maximum 
For young people, 
employment 
contributions 
may not sufficient 
to be eligible for 
UI 
                                                          




Family type, lone parent  
SNAP  
In-kind; EBT card for 
qualifying food purchases  
Must be over 18 and 
have gross income  < 
130% of FPL; net 
income < 100% FPL, 
assets below roughly 
$2,000    
Dependent on 
household size. For 
household of 3, 
max benefit of 
roughly 
$500/month; 
dependent on cost 
of Thrifty Food Plan 
and 30% net 
income and 
deductions      
SNAP-WIC 
In-kind; EBT card for 
qualifying food purchases 
along with health referrals 
and other programmes 
Must be eligible for 
SNAP and have 
household member 
who is pregnant/post-
partum.    
Although varies by 
state, food package 
around $55/month. 
If remaining eligible 
SNAP-WIC support 
continual until child is 
5 if deemed at 
nutritional risk due to 




when state funds 
run out those 
eligible cannot be 
served 
EITC  
Earnings subsidy delivered 
as reduction in tax liability or 
refund if very low earnings.  
Must have qualifying 
child to be eligible for 
EITC; maximum 
earned income 
amount is $9,720 
before phase-out 
begins  Must have earnings.  
Families with one 
child maximum 
credit amount is 
$3,350     
Child Tax Credit  
Reduction in tax 
liability/refund if very low 
earnings 
Must have child 
under age 17; phase 
outs begin at limits of 
$75,00 income for 
single earner   
$1000/yr for each 
qualifying child     
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TANF  Cash assistance  
Gross income <100% 
FPL and not receiving 
UI. 
With some exceptions 
varying by state, 
adults required to 
participate in work or 
workfare activities.  
Benefit levels vary 
by state and 
number of 
dependents, and 
range in lower 48 
from maximum of 
$142 in TN to $770 
in NY for family of 
three (single 
parent, 2 child) 
Federal lifetime limit 
for TANF is 60 
months, although 
states tighten to 
shorter lifetime 




Choice Voucher  
In kind, either place in public 
housing unit or voucher 
amount paid directly to 
private landlord  
Limited to those 
(primarily to families 
w/children) with no 
more than 50% AMI   
For housing choice 
vouchers, amount 
based on the 
difference between 
30% tenants 
income and amount 
of rent   
 Funding also 








Insurance  Cash assistance 
Must have qualifying 
contributions through 
previous employment 
and seeking work   
Amount varies by 
state, from low of 
roughly $230 to 
$650. Aim to 
replace half of 
workers earnings, 
but does not do so 
for previously high 
earners. 
Generally 26 weeks 
maximum 
For young people, 
employment 
contributions may 
not sufficient to 
be eligible for UI 
Sources: CBPP 2008, 2014; CBO 2015; Currie 2016; Falk 2017; IRS 2018; Moffitt 2016,  
Note: This table does not include the Medicaid programme of the Children’s Health Insurance Program, which are available to families with children living under 100% FPL or 200% FPL 









Unique Features of the US Policy Context  
Apart from the programmatic differences in the system of benefits for low income citizens 
in each country, there are two unique features to the US context that impact the welfare 
state in practice. For Alesina and colleagues, two characteristics of the United States – 
federalism and race – are primary reasons why the US welfare state does not have the 
same redistributive functions as European welfare states, or even other liberal welfare 
states (2001). The founding of the United States as a ‘federation of independent territories’ 
(Alesina et al 2001) results in political institutions that are ‘are constructed to minimize or, 
if possible, avoid the exertion of concentrated power’ (Radin & Boase 2000, p. 67). This de-
concentration of power is built into the American system of governance, with very little 
power in the hands of the federal government and a large role for states and local 
governments in the creation and implementation of policies (Krane 1993; Radin & Boase 
2000). As illustrated in the TANF programme, many of the decisions on eligibility and 
recipient requirements for some government assistance programmes are left to state 
actors and are therefore prone to a state government’s attitude towards benefit recipients. 
Redistributive policies like TANF and Housing Assistance in particular become challenging to 
implement evenly across states because ‘issues that involve redistribution cut closer than 
any others along class lines and activate interests in what are roughly class terms’ (Lowi 
1964, p. 707). In practice, a federalist system results in an uneven distribution of program 
benefits (both cash and non-cash) to low income Americans. For the US cohort members 
investigated here, their location may therefore play an outsized role in their eligibility and 
access to government assistance9.  
This stands in stark contrast to the United Kingdom’s welfare state functioning during the 
BCS cohort’s youth period, where cash assistance in the Department for Work and Pensions 
portfolio was administered centrally and was not devolved as it is for more current cohorts. 
The Thatcher government in particular centralised more power in the executive, especially 
in the areas of housing policy and education, and was able to therefore bring about 
incremental changes (like benefit freezes) to all localities at once with no recourse available 
from other governmental actors (Soss et al 2004). These practices were continued in 
subsequent centre-left and centre-right governments (Lowe 2005). Although there may be 
                                                          
9 Please see the Chapter 3 for more detail on how this issue is addressed in this investigation and the 
limitations of this investigation in addressing state variation in government assistance. 
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variation in outcomes by region in Britain for economic reasons, there is not variation in 
welfare state functioning by region that would potentially cause unequal outcomes as in 
the United States for this UK sample. However, an investigation of welfare programmes 
using current cohorts of young people would need to take into account devolved powers of 
the Northern Irish executive, Welsh Government and the Scottish Government. In 
particular, the Scotland Act of 2016 gave new powers to administer benefits in devolved 
areas and supplement some benefit payments in reserved areas (including Universal Credit, 
tax credits and Child Benefit), which are currently being implemented by the Social Security 
Act of 2018 of the Scottish Parliament (Scottish Government 2018).  
Any analysis of the American welfare state must necessarily include a discussion of the 
pervasive power of race and racism in shaping the economic circumstances of minority 
communities, and the related public attitudes and subsequent policy choices towards those 
who receive government assistance. Communities of colour (notably Black communities) in 
the United States have been subject to both explicit and implicit policies which have limited 
educational attainment and social mobility, as well as increased social and geographical 
isolation. A particularly notable example of a discriminatory policy with institutionalised 
racism is in housing, where the practice of redlining has impacted nearly every economic 
and social outcome for Black Americans as a demographic group. Most researchers 
consider the practice to have begun in the 1930s by the Home Owners Loan Corporation 
(HOLC), a federal institution that created maps for use in the home loan industry 
nationwide that drew boundaries based on the riskiness of lending starting with 239 
American cities (Hillier 2003). Neighbourhoods the HOLC determined ‘most risky’ were 
coloured in red (hence the term ‘redlining’), and lenders used these maps to decide where 
to make loans and what types of loans to make (Hillier 2003). And although other 
organisations such as the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) undertook a similar risk 
assessment system of neighbourhoods for home loans, the colour-coded HOLC maps 
illustrated the difference in neighbourhoods most clearly10. A neighbourhood’s ‘riskiness’ 
was influenced in particular by the belief that Black residents would decrease property 
values in a White neighbourhood, and the resulting maps were consistently drawn to 
delineate White and Black neighbourhoods; systematic economic underinvestment by 
                                                          
10 For examples of historical redlined maps from the HOLC, see Aaronson et al 2017. 
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private and public institutions in Black neighbourhoods and their citizens in the 1930s and 
beyond followed (Drier et al 1994; Hillier 2003; Massey & Denton 1993).  
After World War II, the Federal Housing Administration used these same maps to 
determine which American GIs would be able to get home loans in the post-war housing 
boom. Black residents, more likely to live in these redlined neighbourhoods, were 
systematically discriminated against in accessing FHA loans to own homes in these or in 
new suburban neighbourhoods, while some of these suburban neighbourhoods explicitly 
barred Black Americans from moving into their community (Massey & Denton 1993). 
Researchers have recently determined that persistent housing discrimination and 
systematic lack of access to credit for African Americans can be linked directly to the 
practice of redlining (Aaronson et al 2017); negative outcomes for communities of colour 
that are felt even decades after the practice was outlawed by the Fair Housing Act of 1968 
(Dreier et al 1994).  
A country-wide character of institutionalised racism, or ‘to extent to which racism is 
embedded in the dominant organizations and power structure of society’ (Wade 1993, p. 
543 in Hardaway & McLoyd 2009), results in disparate outcomes for Black and Latino 
Americans across every indicator of income, education and social mobility such that ‘racial 
stratification maps on to socioeconomic stratification’ (Hardaway & McLoyd 2009, p. 247; 
Jones 2000; Wilson 1987 & 1996). Redlining is perhaps the most clearly illustrated example 
of institutionalised racism, where the negative effects of housing discrimination for 
communities of colour expanded into other areas of social and economic life. What is 
perhaps most notable about the effects of redlining – and today’s less explicit forms of 
housing discrimination and credit accessibility issues – is the way that these policies limit 
wealth creation for African Americans, which affects current and intergenerational wealth 
for this group (Austin-Turner & Ross 2005; Briggs 2005; Oliver & Shapiro 1995). Chetty and 
colleagues’ work on intergenerational mobility confirms that even for Black families at the 
top of the income distribution, the lack of wealth inhibits the ability for a family to pass 
down advantage compared to White families with the same income: ‘Indeed, a Black child 
born to parents in the top quintile is roughly as likely to fall to the bottom family income 
quintile as he or she is to remain in the top quintile; in contrast, White children are nearly 
five times as likely to remain in the top quintile as they are to fall to the bottom’ (2018, p. 
3). The problem of the Black/White wage gap and poverty gap is also (perhaps even more 
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notably) a Black/White wealth gap (Oliver & Shapiro 1995), and notably changes the way 
that young Black Americans are advantaged by their family of origin. 
While this disparity in poverty concentration and wealth is a phenomenon in the United 
States that has existed since social research began, concentrated poverty in the African 
American community brought about by overt and de facto racism was brought to the 
forefront of the national consciousness in Gunnar Myrdal’s An American Dilemma (1944). 
This issue entered the national policy conversation later, most notably in the Moynihan 
Report in 1965 (Acs et al 2013). The report concluded that racist policies were to blame for 
concentrated poverty among Black Americans; a problem the authors stated was 
exacerbated by the rise of ‘out of wedlock’ births that signalled the ‘destruction’ of the 
nuclear family for Black Americans (Acs et al 2013). Conservative authors in the 1980s 
interpreted the Moynihan Report results to conclude that the primary problem facing Black 
Americans was a ‘culture of poverty’ (Murray 1984) that should be solved by paternalist 
and contractualist policies (King 1999). This conservative explanation shaped the dominant 
narrative about the causes of poverty for Black Americans and shaped how White 
Americans in particular view the role of the welfare state in assisting the poor (Fraser & 
Gordon 1994; King 1999; Soss et al 2004). Although there are a higher proportion of Black 
and Latino Americans who are poor there is a larger number of White Americans who are 
poor (US Census Bureau 2017): indeed, the problem of poverty is one that cuts across racial 
boundaries. However, the ‘culture of poverty’ description is viewed by Whites as not 
applicable to their own racial group (Gilens 1996; King 1999). Gilens’ research with white 
Americans found that ‘beliefs about blacks in general, and black welfare mothers in 
particular, are substantially more important in shaping whites’ welfare views than beliefs 
about the poor or perceptions of white welfare mothers’ (Gilens 1996, pg. 601 in King 
1999). In the United States, then, the problem of welfare dependency and related poverty 
is viewed as a culturally-specific racial minority problem (Soss et al 2004).  
These views are exacerbated for communities that are segregated, as each group is able to 
distance themselves from the problem of the ‘other’ and entrench racist narratives (Dovidio 
2005) which can lead to lower support for redistributive programmes like TANF. This 
hypothesis was tested by Alesina, Baquir and Easterly (1999) who found that states that 
have higher levels of residential segregation spend a smaller fraction of their budget on 
social services and more on crime prevention; as public officials and the citizens who voted 
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for them see little need for more social services to aid the poor. Further work by Soss and 
colleagues (2004) and Fellows and Rowe (2004) both identify the role that racial attitudes 
play in changes to state TANF policy, confirming that the greater proportion of African 
Americans in a state, the lower the benefit levels and tighter eligibility requirements in the 
state’s TANF program.  
The both imagined and real connection between minority groups, poverty and government 
assistance is a phenomenon not nearly as prevalent in the United Kingdom case (although 
income and social mobility disparities exist by ethnicity, see Weekes-Bernard 2017), and 
not for the BCS cohort, where over 90% of the sample is White. Future work with British 
cohorts however will need to engage with inequality issues by ethnic minority status. 
Practically, the two unique features of the US welfare state result in models that are slightly 
different in specification. The US model will necessarily include a race covariate, which will 
be used as a control variable but will also be used explicitly to determine if there are any 
disparate impacts of benefit receipt by race.  
Detailing the two policy contexts technically informs the upcoming empirical analysis by 
providing an introduction to the policies included in the measure of ‘benefit receipt’ and 
the sort of period effects that might influence outcomes. Notably, that young people in the 
BCS cohort will be able to access more assistance from the government than the NLSY 
cohort. This policy review serves a theoretical purpose as well by drawing out the variations 
in the expressions of a liberal market economy and liberal welfare state for these two 
countries. The analysis will focus in particular on the effects of the common practice of 
means-tested benefit provision on a young person’s transition to adulthood in each of 
these contexts.  
1.3 Tensions in the Welfare State  
There are some distinct tensions in liberal welfare state principles and practices as they 
relate to young people; both systemic and individual tensions. The two systemic tensions 
are between the principles of libertarianism and paternalism (introduced most notably by 
Desmond King, 1999), and between individualism and familialism (discussed by both 
Esping-Andersen [1990, 1999] and Powell and Barrientos [2004]). A discussion of these 
tensions can be particularly informative before reviewing evidence on the youth period, as 
one could argue that the welfare state serves as the largest structural apparatus at work for 
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young people; who are both directly and indirectly impacted by its form and function 
(Settersten et al 2005). The tension at the individual level is found between the concepts of 
independence and dependence as defined by the welfare state, which warrants a separate 
discussion. These concepts defined by welfare state literature must also be analysed 
because they are present in the youth transitions literature with different normative 
definitions; it is the last individual tension that can serve as a way to conceptually connect 
these two strands of literature. 
Libertarianism and Paternalism  
A thread running through most of the principles and policies of the US and the UK, although 
not always stated explicitly (in the case of the UK) is the importance of individual freedom 
from the government (libertarianism). These freedoms are enshrined in the US Bill of Rights 
but are also implicitly conveyed through the generally low-touch functioning of the welfare 
state, with a ‘tendency of the culture to associate liberty with limited government’ (Radin & 
Boase 2000, p. 68). The liberal welfare state which focuses on the market and family rather 
than the government for one’s welfare sends this message of ‘freedom’ from government 
(Powell and Barrientos 2004). This is one of the guiding principles of a liberal democracy 
(and liberalism generally) that both the US and UK ascribe to, where liberalism ‘accords 
primacy to individual freedom in political arrangements’ (King 1999, pg. 1) while also 
ensuring equality of treatment to citizens and due process under the law if citizens’ social 
rights are delimited (Drake 2001; Marshall 1950). This idea of freedom is used as a guiding 
principle by policymakers in both countries (albeit perhaps to different extents) to reinforce 
the welfare and economic systems detailed above, with a clear focus on individualisation 
and lack of interference from the state as a preferred form of governance. 
King and others would argue that these principles stand in direct conflict with the social 
policies that now are put into practice in liberal welfare states (1999). The principle of 
paternalism, at work for those deemed ‘morally unacceptable’ by the government (i.e. 
those not active in the labour market), result in welfare-involved citizens not afforded this 
freedom (King 1999). Workfare and other activation programmes receive the most criticism 
from scholars who point out this tension, as the freedom of those involved in government 
programmes is sacrificed because their problems are viewed as unable to be solved without 
the interference and goading of the government (Handler 2004; Prideaux 2001). The 
incentives and work requirements placed upon the poor in both countries are viewed as 
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removing the recipient’s agency to the detriment of the values of liberalism (King 1999). For 
young people who are involved in the benefit system, including those in prescribed labour 
market programmes, is their freedom as a citizen in a liberal democracy then not ever 
realised?  
Individualism and Familialism 
The second systemic tension engages with the principle of individualism adhered to by 
liberal welfare states and the encouragement of young people to attach to the labour 
market successfully with little institutionalised support; and what happens when this 
attachment is unsuccessful. The concepts introduced by Esping-Andersen’s (1999) and later 
Powell and Barrientos’ (2004) work can be used to investigate the liberal welfare state’s 
relationship with the family as a space that may come into conflict with the principle of 
individual independence. In practice, the inability for a young person to be ‘de-familialized’ 
with the help of government assistance is particularly low because of the residual character 
of liberal welfare states; and indeed, government policies assume that the family will be a 
larger source of welfare than the state (Antonucci et al 2014a; Powell & Barrientos 2004). A 
reliance on the family as a primary source of welfare for those in liberal welfare states is 
also included as a key characteristic in Powell and Barrientos’ welfare mix framework 
(2004). The ‘mix’ of sources of welfare between the labour market, the family and the state 
is tipped in the direction of the labour market and family in a liberal welfare state, with the 
labour market as the first source of welfare followed by the family11 (Powell and Barrientos 
2004). The assumption of dependency on one’s family of origin is a major issue of concern 
from the viewpoint of youth transitions research, where government policies limiting 
access to independent benefits and a challenging youth labour market can stifle the ability 
of a young person to become an individual actor in the economy.   
The tension between the principle of individualism espoused by these welfare states and 
the practice of using the family as the first ‘safety net’ is perhaps most complicated for 
young people who struggle in the labour market. Young people are encouraged to become 
independent actors in the labour market as the best way to become an adult (e.g. ‘the best 
way out of poverty is work’ [Cameron 2013]) – but the process of attaching to the labour 
market may likely be prolonged and complicated. When this attempt at labour market 
                                                          
11 This framework will be considered in more detail as it applies to young people in Chapter 2.3. 
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attachment fails, government policies for those under 25 are often not able to support low 
income young people as a benefit unit on their own, which may push them back to their 
family of origin (Antonucci et al 2014a; Danziger & Ratner 2010; Smeeding & Phillips 2002). 
Policies in the UK that might push young people back to (or keep them from leaving) their 
family of origin include those that set benefit amounts lower for the under 25s (in JSA in 
particular) and Working Tax Credit youth eligibility limits. In the US, there is almost no 
government assistance for those younger than 25 without children, and creates challenges 
for a young person to be entirely independent from their family of origin during this period. 
So although the welfare state encourages individualism in young people, the structural 
constraints of policies for disadvantaged young people (or the lack thereof) and the 
assumption of family support creates a tension in the practical reliance on the family 
welfare source.  
Independence and Dependence  
The final individual level tension of note is between the concepts of independence and 
dependence. Independence in liberal welfare states is implicitly defined by what it is not; 
dependence on government assistance. The discussion in Chapter 1.2 highlighted the 
policies put forth by governments in each country to limit this dependence (e.g. benefit 
eligibility limited to those over 25) and young people are therefore deterred in both explicit 
and implicit ways to not be dependent upon the welfare state. However, the stringent and 
residualist policies in a liberal welfare state to limit welfare dependence can lead to another 
type of dependence for young people; dependence on the family of origin. In the youth 
studies literature, however, independence is framed not in reference to the state but 
primarily as independence from one’s family of origin (Lee & Mortimer 2009; Whittingdon 
& Peters 1996). Which conceptualisation of independence, then, is best applied in this 
case? Although social policies in liberal welfare states ascribe more importance to 
independence from the benefit system, this independence may have adverse effects on 
how a low-income young person may be financially independent of their family of origin 
when state resources are not available (Kendig et al 2014; Lee & Mortimer 2009); this 
research engages explicitly with these two conceptualisations of independence. 
Perhaps of most importance for low income young people, independence from both the 
benefit system and the family of origin must come via the labour market, and at the young 
person’s own risk. In some cases this is not possible, especially as the push-pull of welfare 
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state policies in both countries further complicate the ability of low income individuals to 
be entirely free of the state or the family in the youth period (Antonucci et al 2014a; 
Furstenberg 2010; Kendig et al 2014; Smeeding & Phillips 2002). Young people therefore 
bounce between reliance on both in their welfare mix when labour market participation is 
uneven and low. This experience has negative consequences for achievement of either 
conceptualisation of independence (Powell & Barrientos 2004; Smeeding & Phillips 2002). A 
discussion of the dual concept of independence and dependence in the youth transitions 
literature will illuminate areas of conceptual commonality in these two literature strands, 
which will enable the creation of a working definition of independence as the outcome this 
work investigates in the empirical work to follow. 
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Chapter 2: Youth Transitions and Empirical Evidence  
The welfare state literature detailed in the previous chapter was done so to theoretically 
and practically ground the empirical work of this research in the welfare state field, which 
will subsequently ground the later comparative discussion of each country’s results. The 
specific focus on the youth period, however, warrants an exploration of a second strand of 
research broadly termed youth transitions. As research on the youth period of the life 
course encompasses everything from partnering and childbearing to educational 
achievement to labour market attachment, it is important to properly orient this particular 
investigation among existing youth transitions research. The majority of literature that is 
conceptually applicable to the upcoming empirical work here is sociological, although 
research from both life course studies and developmental psychology also influences how 
the youth transition is conceptualised and explored. This chapter details the concepts and 
definitions that will inform the outcomes investigated here, what is known about the 
‘transition project’ in each country and the inequalities that shape it, and details previous 
empirical research on welfare state impacts on individual outcomes. Together with Chapter 
1, this chapter provides the foundation for this investigation found in the literature. 
2.1 Concepts and Definitions 
Work by life course researchers in the last thirty-five years shifted the paradigm from 
viewing the youth period as a short phase from childhood to adulthood to a life course 
stage in its own right, with specific experiences and attendant risks across many years 
(Elder 1998; Vickerstaff 2006). Much of the foundational work in life course literature 
focused on defining what it means to become an adult and how adulthood is achieved by 
different groups of young people in different generations and contexts (Buchmann 1989; 
Elder 1985; Hogan 1981; Rindfuss 1991). There were and are challenges and tensions 
present in the field about what defines adulthood, varying in particular based on the author 
of those definitions and the context in which the definitions of adulthood are created. It is 
valuable therefore to explore which definitions may serve this research best (and how state 
definitions may not be up to the theoretical task undertaken here), with an understanding 




Definitions of Adulthood 
Many of the first studies of the youth period were done by life course and longitudinal 
researchers, who sought to measure how different groups of young people were achieving 
key ‘markers’ of adulthood using quantitative data. The work of these researchers in the 
1980s and 1990s generally used five markers as measures of adulthood achievement: 1. 
Moving out of the parental home; 2. Enrolling in higher education; 3. Entering the labour 
market; 4. Getting married/beginning a long-term partnership and; 5. Becoming a parent 
(Buchmann 1989; Hogan 1981; Rindfuss 1991). These transition steps are referred to as 
‘social qualifiers’ (Mary 2013), ‘demographic transitions’ (Benson & Furstenberg 2012) or 
‘markers of adulthood’ (Shanahan 2000), and were canonised through research as the steps 
one needed to take to ‘become’ an adult12. In the 1980s and 1990s, work often compared 
the timing and sequencing of the achievement of these five markers for young people in 
the latter half of the 20th century to the timing of previous cohorts (Buchmann 1989; 
Goldscheider & Goldscheider 1989; Hogan 1981). For the immediate post-war cohort of 
young people in Western Europe and the United States (young people of the 1950s), 
researchers described their youth transition and achievement of these markers of 
adulthood as ‘linear’ and ‘uniform’ in their overall pattern (Furlong & Cartmel 1997) with 
fewer destinations and pathways than more recent cohorts (Vickerstaff 2006). And 
although it is argued that the transition experiences of earlier youth cohorts are no less 
complex than recent cohorts (Goodwin & O’Connor 2005), there is agreement that the 
range of options and outcomes available and accessed by young people today are more 
numerous and varied (Coles 1995; Elder 1998; Furlong & Cartmel 1997).   
Early research using these five markers found the pattern of achievement to differ from the 
cohorts of the post-war period, and described youth transitions of cohorts from the late 
1980s to the present as neither uniform nor linear. Rather, modern youth transitions are 
described as ‘destandardized’ (Elzinga & Liefbroer 2007; Walther 2006), ‘nonnormative’ 
(Shanahan 2000) and ‘protracted’ (Buchmann & Kriesi 2011; Corijn & Klijzing 2001; Furlong 
et al 2006, Gauthier et al 2007). Multiple transitions in school, work and family formation in 
the youth period are detailed accurately as ‘a set of movements which are less predictable 
                                                          
12 Further life course research on young people using these markers includes Corijn and Klijzing 2001, 
Elzinga and Liefbroer 2007, Buchmann and Kriesi 2011, Billari 2004, and Gauthier et al 2007 to name 
a small few. 
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and involve frequent breaks, backtracking and the blending of statuses’ (Furlong et al 2003, 
pg. 24 in Roberts 2011). The results of this ‘pathways’ work led some researchers to 
question the appropriateness of using traditional markers of adulthood in future youth 
transitions research (Amato et al 2008; Andrew et al 2012; Benson & Furstenberg 2012; 
Schoon 2015; Schoon & Lyons-Amos 2016). The definition of youth transition ‘success’ for 
many young people themselves has also necessarily changed given the new risks and 
experiences of younger cohorts (Furlong & Cartmel 1997), and it is therefore important to 
detail how some researchers in the field are moving beyond traditional markers, and how 
tensions in these definitions inform this research.  
The most radical departure from the use of the traditional markers of adulthood is in the 
work of American psychologist Jeffrey Arnett. Arnett’s 1997 study was one of the first of its 
kind to ask young people what they believe constitutes an adult identity, and noted that 
young people in his study ‘consistently ranked individual characteristics like responsibility 
and independence very high and role transitions (like getting married or having a full time 
job) consistently low’ (Arnett 1997 in Benson & Furstenberg 2012, pg. 202). His subsequent 
research with young adults confirmed these ideas, and he went on to boldly claim that, 
‘most young Americans13 regard specific events traditionally viewed as marking the 
transition to adulthood, such as finishing education, beginning full time work, and marriage 
as irrelevant to the attainment of adulthood status (Arnett 2000, pg. 63). From this 
research Arnett created a model of ‘emerging adulthood’ wherein he defined the 
demographically and subjectively distinct youth period with the defining feature of a 
prolonged adolescence from age 18 to 30. In theories of emerging adulthood, the process 
of becoming an adult is characterised by exploration of roles and identity (including 
exploration in the labour market), which may or may not directly prepare a young person 
for the ‘roles’ outlined by the traditional markers (Arnett 2000). The focus is rather on 
‘individualistic qualities of character’ that define what it means to be an adult (Arnett 2000, 
pg. 271), such as accepting responsibility for one's self and making independent decisions 
(Arnett 1998, 2000). The importance of a young person’s individual and agentic moves in 
this period is also a thread in some sociological work, where researchers argue that 
transition experiences are driven more by individual choice. The ways young people 
themselves navigate ‘new social risks’ (Beck 1992) results in an individual ‘choice biography’ 
                                                          
13 Arnett’s empirical work was done in the United States, but he believes his theory of emerging 
adulthood is applicable to youth in all industrialised countries (2000). 
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(duBois Reymond 1998) where adulthood roles are self-determined (Goodwin & O’Connor 
2005; Lawy 2002). In the emerging adulthood model and to those who subscribe to it, 
adulthood is necessarily defined individually and intrinsically in these unique experiences. 
Definitions of adulthood in this view are thus highly subjective and individualised. 
There are however major criticisms of the emerging adulthood model which question in 
particular its universality and the assumptions made about young people’s ability to 
‘explore’ in this period (Bynner 2005; Côté 2014; Côté & Bynner 2008; Kendig et al 2014). 
Much of Arnett’s interview and focus group subjects were convenience samples of White, 
middle class young people (many of whom were at university during the research), who 
have the resources to undertake longer transitions by their own choice (Andrew et al 2012; 
Smith et al 2016). However, young people of colour and those from working-class 
backgrounds who do not attend university may need to step into adult roles out of 
necessity rather than choice – regardless of if they believe they are ‘mature’ enough to do 
so (Burton 2007; Furstenberg 2010; Kendig et al 2014; Smith et al 2016). Indeed, the 
phenomenon of ‘early adultification’ affirms that children and young adults from 
economically disadvantaged backgrounds and those from minority communities in the US 
often take care of younger children, contribute financially to the household, and manage 
the day to day operations of a household in greater proportion than higher income, White 
peers (Burton 2007; Kendig et al 2014; Nebbit & Lombe 2010). For the population of 
interest in this empirical work, low income young people who may be involved in the 
welfare state, the idea of a prolonged transition and identity exploration proposed by 
Arnett may not be practically possible. In general, critics of his model note overextension of 
the concept of ‘emerging adulthood’ to all social classes without proper evidence as the 
primary concern (Bynner 2005; Côté 2014; Côté & Bynner 2008). Further, the concept of 
emerging adulthood as a ‘universal life stage’ of Western youth may also be marginalising 
to those who cannot ‘take advantage of the moratorium opportunities available, especially 
regarding participation in further and higher education’ (Schoon & Schulenberg 2013, pg. 
46).  
Instead, traditional adulthood markers such as labour market attachment may serve as 
conduits for low income and low-skilled young people to achieve these subjective feelings 
of maturity and responsibility. For example, one’s ability to feel independent (a subjective 
marker) is likely more reliant on his or her ability to enter the labour market (a role-based 
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marker) if they do not first leave their family of origin to attend university. The use of 
subjective and role-based markers together is perhaps a more relevant way to define 
achievement of adulthood identities in the context of this research, and previous 
sociological work tends toward this middle ground (Andrew et al 2012; Benson & 
Furstenberg 2012; MacDonald & Marsh 2005; Mary 2013; Scheer & Palkovitz 1994; 
Shanahan et al 2005). Adulthood therefore may be attained via subjective feelings of 
independence which are often based on role achievement in the labour market or leaving 
the parental home. Specifically, in further research ‘financial independence’ ranked 
prominently in young people feeling like adults regardless of income and education level, 
which some researchers identify as one of the more appropriate measures of adulthood for 
current youth cohorts (Andrew et al 2012; Benson & Furstenberg 2012; Kendig et al 2014; 
Settersten & Ray 2010; Shanahan et al 2005). Financial independence in youth transitions 
research has been defined by leaving the parental home and being ‘self-sufficient’ (Lee & 
Mortimer 2009) and serves as a mid-range concept between subjective and role-based 
definitions of adulthood and may serve this empirical work well.  
Both types of adulthood definitions stand in stark contrast to how the state defines 
adulthood, where adulthood is defined neither by role transitions nor by subjective, 
developmental concepts. In part due to the practicalities of implementing policy, the state 
in its various institutions determines adulthood by particular ages when the social security 
system defines independence from the family benefit unit, and thus when ‘adult’ 
responsibilities are required of the young person (Harris 1989). However, in most cases, 
‘legal rights and responsibilities of adulthood are given gradually (and in seemingly 
inconsistent or arbitrary ways) so that there is no clear end to adolescence and beginning of 
adulthood’ (Settersten et al 2005, p. 552). For example, the criminal age of responsibility in 
England and Wales is age 10 (UK Government 2018), the minimum age for enlisting in the 
armed forces in the UK is 16 (ForcesWatch 2011), and the age one is still classed as a 
dependent in the eyes of the UK benefit system is either age 18 or 20 depending on 
educational status (Department for Work and Pensions 2018); variation that occurs 
similarly (although with different ages) in the US. The age at which a citizen becomes an 
adult to the state, therefore, is dependent upon which institutional system the young 
person is interacting with.  
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Additionally, the use of age in itself to determine adulthood is problematic for researchers 
and for young people because one is deemed an ‘adult’ seemingly overnight, with the 
policies of the state effectively ‘transform[ing] physical age into social age’ (Mary 2013, p. 
417). This transformation also assumes that the necessary competencies exist within a 
young person to properly navigate different state systems on their own, with potentially 
disastrous consequences for young people with additional support needs (Osgood et al 
2010). Because of these negative consequences, youth sociologists and other researchers 
agree that adult identity is based on moving through particular transition steps and life 
course achievements often defined by the young person themselves, and age is an archaic 
way to define adulthood in the presence of transitions research evidence (Antonucci et al 
2014b; Benson & Furstenberg 2012; Mary 2013; Settersten et al 2005; White & Wyn 2008). 
To the state, however, adulthood is something prescribed, and does not take into account 
neither individual agency nor developmental and role transitions. 
Independence and Dependence  
Engaging with debates on the definition of adulthood and youth transitions research 
naturally leads to a discussion of the core concept of this work, independence (both role-
based and subjective feelings of independence) (Andrew et al 2012; Scheer & Palkovitz 
1994; Settersten et al 2005; Settersten & Ray 2010). As noted above, these role-based 
feelings of independence, such as leaving the parental home and becoming self-sufficient 
apart from the family of origin, serve as conduits for subjective feelings of independence. 
The concept of independence in youth transitions, primarily financial independence, is 
therefore the most primary concept to explore, as its importance in defining adulthood ‘has 
remained relatively consistent over time and across social class groups’ (Kendig et al 2014, 
p. 271). 
The conceptual challenges of defining ‘independence’ for this research was mentioned 
briefly at the end of the previous chapter, as independence in the welfare state literature 
refers to independence from the benefit system while in the youth transitions literature 
independence is from the family of origin (Coles 1995; Fraser & Gordon 1994; Furstenberg 
2010; Goldscheider & Goldscheider 1999; Lee & Mortimer 2009; Schoeni & Ross 2005). A 
common thread of ‘self-sufficiency’ can be found in both of these conceptions of 
independence, where self-sufficiency is the ability to subsist away from the welfare state 
and/or your family of origin by participation in the labour market (Dworsky 2005; Gowdy & 
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Pearlmutter 1993; Hong et al 2009; Kendig et al 2014; Lee & Mortimer 2009; Settersten & 
Ray 2010; Smeeding & Phillips 2002). Financial independence in youth transitions literature, 
however, does not necessarily entirely align with conceptions of ‘self-sufficiency’ (Andrew 
et al 2012; Lee & Mortimer 2009; Whittingdon & Peters 1996). Rather, this concept may 
often just indicate that young people do not receive parental transfers to supplement or 
serve as their income, a definition that may overlook a discussion of self-sufficiency that 
one engages when defining independence in welfare state literature (Dworsky 2005; 
Gowdy & Pearlmutter 1993). Indeed, researchers find that low income young people 
generally are ‘financially independent’ from their families because they receive far fewer 
financial transfers from their parents, but this independence does not necessarily equate to 
economic success (Burton 2007; Furlong & Cartmel 2007; Kendig et al 2014). For those from 
low income backgrounds, then, financial independence as defined in the youth transitions 
field often results in continued poverty and would therefore not fulfil the aim of self-
sufficiency that independence in the welfare state requires (Kendig et al 2014; Settersten & 
Ray 2010).  
There is some ambivalence with how the welfare state engages with the concepts of 
independence and dependence as it is described in youth transitions literature, particularly 
in the benefit system. As detailed in Chapter 1.3, there are distinct tensions with how much 
a young person is expected to be implicitly dependent on their family of origin because of 
the eligibility criteria for individual benefits. Benefit policy is not equipped to define 
adulthood by roles as sociologists would prefer, but there can be more consideration to the 
labour market experiences and transition challenges that confront current cohorts of young 
people if a liberal welfare state wants to enable successful independence from the family of 
origin. 
A proposed way to conceptualise the independence outcome of a young person’s transition 
to adulthood within the institutional framework of a liberal welfare state is using the 
concept of economic independence. Although introduced in the early 1990s by Jones and 
Wallace (1992) as the ‘key’ transition outcome (Coles 1995), the concept was 
operationalised most usefully for this investigation in the work of Smeeding and Phillips 
(2002). They measured transitions to economic independence for young people through 
market work alone, through market work and government transfers, and from the 
combined effects of the market, state and family (Smeeding & Phillips 2002, p.106); other 
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welfare state researchers like Dworsky (2005) also have used this conception to measure 
individual self-sufficiency. By measuring economic independence in this way Smeeding and 
Phillips recognise that young people will likely have to rely on the welfare state and family 
resources at some point in their transition period, but also note that the concept can be 
narrowed in measurement to include just market work (2002). The proposal in this research 
is to use economic independence as the key outcome, defined as the ability to live above a 
poverty income and attach steadily to the labour market 14. Labour market attachment can 
serve as a conduit for self-sufficiency and therefore the ability to use market work as the 
primary welfare source. Importantly, this conception does not exclude state assistance in a 
definition of economic independence, which is done so explicitly: low-income young people 
may indeed use state resources if they are unable to rely on parental transfers and in the 
absence of consistent gainful employment, and this investigation seeks to measure if and to 
what extent economic independence is affected by receiving government assistance.  
2.2 The Transition Project and Inequalities in the US and UK 
An investigation into the achievement of economic independence for the two youth 
cohorts here must be foregrounded by a review of what is known about the transition 
project. Previous work in this area informs not only the research design and analytical 
strategy, but it brings to the fore key theoretical issues about how best to view a youth 
transition for different subgroups of young people. In particular, previous work shapes 
what divergent outcomes are likely to be expected in the upcoming investigation due to 
structural inequalities of class, race, and gender, as well as from particularly ‘risky’ life 
course experiences in the youth period.  
As detailed in Chapter 2.1, researchers generally point to the large-scale deindustrialisation 
of the Western world as the primary structural reason for the more ‘disjointed’ transition 
patterns of current youth cohorts, as this phenomenon ostensibly severed a direct link 
between school to work for a large proportion of young people who did not enter higher 
education (Antonucci et al 2014b; Billari 2004; Heinz 2003; Mortimer 2011; Scherer 2001). 
Concurrent developments in higher education, gender equality in the labour market, and 
greater individualisation and choice in transition destinations also changed the 
macroeconomic conditions of young people’s life courses (Furlong et al 2006; Furlong & 
                                                          
14 A full description of what measures are used to operationalise the concept of economic 
independence is found in Chapter 3 (Research Design and Methodology). 
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Cartmel 1997; Schoon 2015). Research into the causal mechanisms behind diverging youth 
transition patterns emerged partially in response to these changes, and in particular the 
school to work transition provided fertile ground for both small-scale and cross-national 
research of young people’s various experiences and outcomes. But what is a youth 
transition, and what are the key drivers that can guide an analysis?  
Settersten and colleagues’ (2005) use of the ‘transition project’ concept provides a useful 
framework to analyse the experiences of young people, taking into account the multiple 
and concurrent transitions in this period. A ‘transition project’ in this view involves a young 
person’s activities in three domains – education, employment and family formation – each 
with a set of choices and structural constraints that a young person must work within and 
through (Settersten et al 2005). This takes the analysis beyond the usual focus of only 
labour market attachment. The experiences of young people in these three domains are 
culturally and contextually structured by both the common characteristics of a liberal 
market economy and liberal welfare state and the different macroeconomic contexts in 
which the young people grow up in. As the economic contexts (as LMEs) and welfare state 
contexts at a high level (as liberal welfare states) are common among the two cases, 
transition experiences in the US and UK are considered broadly similar, but key differences 
in context outlined in the previous section (e.g. race) and period-specific effects will be 
highlighted in order to better analyse the upcoming empirical results.  
Transitions in each of the three domains are considered by life course researchers as a site 
where young people’s agency and the influence of structural factors collide, and therefore 
life course research explicitly embeds any discussion of transition experiences within socio-
historical and cultural contexts while also determining how opportunity structures and 
inequalities interact with individual agency processes (Elder 1998; Schoon & Lyons-Amos 
2016).  Middle theories with concepts that link the structure/agency dichotomy such as 
‘bounded agency’ (Evans 2002; Shanahan 2000) and ‘structured individualisation’ (Roberts 
1995) can helpfully frame the way this work approaches youth transitions in these three 
areas (Antonucci et al 2014b; France 2008; Schoon 2015). These linking concepts are able to 
capture the experiences of low-income young people particularly well, as this particular 
group of young people are considered to be ‘strategic in that they foster plans and pursue 
them, but they are also constrained by the limits that attend their position in the 
educational and occupational systems’ (Vogel 2002, pg. 682). In each of the transition 
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domains the impact of gender, socioeconomic, and racial inequalities particularly structure 
experiences in this period (Furlong & Cartmel 1997). Thus the ability for a young person to 
make agentic moves in these domains is bounded by individual and macroeconomic 
characteristics, even as ‘individuals are forced to play a much more active role in their 
biography’ (Antonucci et al 2014b, p. 14). As the opportunity for individual agency has 
increased, so too has the responsibility of an individual to manage their transition 
experience and any potential ‘risks’ that are involved in it (Beck 1992; Chisholm & 
Hurrelman 1995; Furlong & Cartmel 1997). For example, the relatively unstructured 
experience of initial labour market attachment can be at once exhilarating and terrifying 
depending on the skills one has to succeed on their own, and thus management of risks and 
the inequalities in experiencing these risks in each of the three domains diverge based on a 
complex set of factors for different groups of young people. The next sections aim to 
illuminate the key components and issues in each of these domains to inform how to 
approach an empirical investigation into economic independence.  
Education Domain  
The education domain primarily involves transitions within the secondary to tertiary/higher 
education system and more broadly from school to work (Coles 1995; Jones & Wallace 
1992). Activities and outcomes in this domain are structured primarily by the type of 
economy functioning in that state: a liberal market economy’s reliance on general skills 
formation is necessary in order to complement the flexible labour market required, and the 
education system is organised to meet those ends (Estevez-Abe et al 2001; Hall & Soskice 
2001; Iversen & Stephens 2008). As mentioned in Chapter 1, these general skills are 
developed in a secondary education system that rewards individuals who are academically 
adept, often failing to meet the career preparation needs of those who do not do well in 
traditional secondary education (Boliver 2011; Estevez-Abe et al 2001; Croxford & Raffe 
2014). In particular, vocational education systems in the US and the UK are relatively under-
developed for practical and political reasons (Winch 2012), and therefore there are 
‘relatively few opportunities’ for young people to improve their labour market values 
outside the school system (Estevez-Abe et al 2001; Iversen & Stephens 2008). The focus in 
liberal market economies on this type of skills provision has therefore had distinct effects 
on the development of the tertiary/higher education sector as the primary site for skills 
formation for young people since World War II.  
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The expansion of higher education in both countries during the survey periods impact the 
transition choices in the education domain, and research into this expansion also outlines 
the types of economic returns young people experience from higher education. The 
expansion of higher education in the United States resulted in the percentage of all 18 to 24 
year olds in degree-granting postsecondary institutions (both two-year and four-year 
institutions) increasing from around 25% in 1970 to around 40% in 2015 (NCES 2016). The 
higher education system in the US is characterised by diversification (Arum et al 2007) into 
top tier research universities and second-tier universities awarding four-year Bachelor’s 
Degrees and above, community colleges (awarding two-year Associate of Arts, or AA, 
Degrees) and vocational education institutions. The decentralisation and deregulation of 
the higher education sector (Walters 2000) has resulted in around 7,200 degree granting 
institutions in the United States enrolling 20.4 million students in 2017 (McFarland et al 
2017). For many young people and their families in the US today, ‘the availability of 
schooling is taken for granted’ (Walters 2000, p. 242 in Arum et al 2007), although the type 
of institution attended and the returns to education are still extremely structured by class 
and racial inequalities (Arum et al 2007; Cameron & Heckman 2001; Hardaway & McLoyd 
2009). The community college system in particular is an area of research interest for those 
focussing on transition experiences of low income youth, as this group accesses higher 
education most commonly from these institutions (Berlin et al 2010). The attrition rate in 
these institutions is quite high, as only around 30% of young people who enter community 
college finish their two-year degree within six years (Karpilow & Reeves 2013). The negative 
outcomes resulting from this high attrition rate is therefore concentrated among poorer 
students and causes concern particularly because educational attainment, particularly post-
secondary attainment, has been found to mediate the negative impacts of low 
socioeconomic status and adverse childhood experiences for minority youth15 (Schoon 
2008; Wickrama et al 2012). 
                                                          
15 Although not covered in the upcoming empirical work done with this UK sample, ethnicity in the 
UK has also been identified as a source of variation in educational and later economic outcomes. 
However, the results of British ethnic minorities differs from experiences seen in the US sample. 
Ethnic minority groups in the UK have a greater proportion with higher education qualifications than 
their White peers, but still face worse labour market outcomes, both in attachment and returns 
(Zwysen & Longhi 2016). In particular, a pattern of overqualification for ethnic minorities has been 
found to be a particularly prominent feature of the more recent UK cohorts (Rafferty 2012), which 
can carry labour market penalties in underemployment (Lindley 2009). Importantly, research has not 
been able to completely explain the gaps in ethnic minority and White British labour market returns: 
Zwysen and Longhi (2016), using a homogenous group of higher education graduates in the same 
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Inequality in access to higher education in the United States is partially a function of class 
and racial differences in academic attainment in secondary school, influenced by 
inequalities in parental income, parental education and community factors (Bozick & 
DeLuca 2011; Cameron & Heckman 2001; Conger et al 2010; Leventhal & Brooks-Gunn 
2000; Wickrama et al 2012). Higher education enrolment is also highly dependent upon the 
financial resources of families to pay high tuition fees or a student’s willingness to take out 
student loans, with the high cost of higher education a deterrent for low-income students 
to attend four-year institutions (Arum et al 2007; Hardaway & McLoyd 2012; Schoeni & 
Ross 2005). Because of the wider array of post-secondary education options available, 
however, the majority of young people in the NLSY sample will have some experience in 
higher education, likely with higher labour market returns from this experience found for 
poor young people or racial minority cohort members. This reflects the idea that there is 
‘more to lose’ for these structurally disadvantaged groups if they do not enter higher 
education, with education serving as a moderating factor on the influence of structural 
disadvantage (Schoon 2008; Wickrama et al 2012). For those from low income backgrounds 
who do enrol in some form of higher education, an emerging issue in the United States is 
also the increase in the number of students in higher education who are poor, food 
insecure and homeless (or have housing instability), as there is little income support for full 
or part-time students available from government assistance programmes (Goldrick-Rab et 
al 2018).  
Higher education in the UK also expanded following World War II such that now around a 
third of 18 to 24 year olds are in full time education, equating to 1.87 million students16 
(ONS 2016). Two periods of expansion identified by Boliver (2011) are notable for this work: 
the development of polytechnic universities in the 1960s as characteristic of the new 
‘binary’ education sector and later the upgrading of these institutions to ‘New’ universities 
in the 1992 Further and Higher Education Act. The upgrading of post-1992 institutions in 
particular signalled the beginning of the ‘mass tertiary education’ phase of expansion 
(Halsey 2000), which aimed to decrease educational and subsequently economic disparities 
between different socioeconomic groups of young people. Indeed, researchers confirm that 
                                                          
cohort, found that ‘differences in parental background, local area characteristics and university 
career did not explain ethnic inequalities in employment (163). This suggests, although not explicitly 
stated, that there may be labour market discrimination issues at play for this group. 
16 This figure however does not include those who are in part time education. 
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there are substantial returns to higher education in the UK for those who attend and 
graduate (Walker & Zhu 2011) and expansion efforts ideally close these access, and in turn 
attainment, gaps. However, successful outcomes from and access to higher education are 
still differentiated by socioeconomic status, with young people from poorer families less 
likely to go into higher education at all, and if they do enter higher education they are more 
likely to be accepted into and attend less prestigious ‘New’ universities (Crawford et al 
2016; Croxford & Raffe 2014). This divergence again has been identified as primarily a 
function of inequalities in educational attainment in secondary school combined with 
socioeconomic disadvantage (Crawford et al 2016; Howieson & Ianelli 2008; Murray et al 
2012,); a pattern of educational achievement and higher education enrolment described as 
‘boringly class predictable, even after decades of reform’ (Shildrick 2008).  
The inability to continue on in higher education in both countries is therefore a particularly 
notable expression of structural disadvantage in this domain. A key difference between the 
cases investigated here is that there is a relatively high rate of ‘early’ school leavers at age 
16 in the UK who do not continue in secondary school to 18 (the compulsory age in 
America) or go on to further education or training at any time in the youth period; still 
around 10.5% of 16 year olds left school at this earlier age in 2016 (European Commission 
2016). Researchers unsurprisingly find that young people who leave school at 16 have more 
tumultuous transitions than those who do not, with a higher incidence of periods of 
disconnection from school and the labour market during the youth period and beyond 
(Furlong 2006; Howieson & Iannelli 2008). This is partially because the skills formation 
necessary for better socioeconomic attainment is not undertaken in a formalised setting as 
it is for those who continue to at least 18, putting this group of young people in both 
countries at higher risk of labour market failure (Benson et al 2007; Howieson & Iannelli 
2008). In the United States, the risks associated with leaving education even at 18 are 
illustrated in the large difference in median wages between those who are able to attain a 
Bachelor’s Degree and those who only have a high school diploma ($50,000 compared to 
$31,800 a year) (McFarland et al 2017) and in the higher proportion of non-college 
educated Americans in poverty (30.4% compared to 8.7% of all working age Americans) 
(Shapiro et al 2017). The higher poverty rate among non-college educated Americans also 
subsequently means that this group engages with the benefit system in a more notable 
way, particularly as the main beneficiaries of government assistance: 9 out of 10 adults who 
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are lifted out of poverty by government assistance are those lacking a college degree 
(Shapiro et al 2017, p. 1).  
It is valuable to note, however, that vocational secondary education does indeed exist in 
both countries, and the evidence does show some positive employment results for those 
who choose this option (Shavit & Muller 2000). However, positive results from vocational 
education are premised primarily on whether the system is focused on highly specific 
occupational skills (Blossfeld 1992). In the United States, the system of vocational education 
that provides more general rather than specific skills does little to close the employment 
and income gap between those who undertake vocational rather than higher education 
(Simpson & Cieslik 2007; Shavit & Muller 2000). Notably, research has shown that those 
with vocational qualifications17 rather than academic qualifications do no better in the 
labour market if these qualifications are at a low level, and therefore young people with 
low vocational qualifications are not particularly ‘diverted’ from low or unskilled work 
(Shavit & Muller 2000). However, it is valuable to mention that the population of young 
people who do not enter higher education is not homogenous as a low-attaining and 
poorer group. Bozick and DeLuca found in particular that nearly 20% of their US national 
sample who had the academic preparation and family income support to enter into higher 
education chose not to do so in order to enter the labour market (2011). Rather, ‘the 
heterogeneous motives…suggest that postsecondary decisions are not always guided by 
academic and economic barriers’ (Bozick & DeLuca 2011, p. 1249). Although in general 
previous work finds lower economic attainment for those who do not enter higher 
education, the choice to continue on in education may not always be the preferred or 
appropriate choice for all young people. 
Taken together, changes in the education domain result in transition projects with more 
opportunities for choice due to expansion efforts in higher education, but are still 
structured by demographic and institutional characteristics that reward some more than 
others. It will be valuable then to investigate if and how educational qualifications affect 
particular demographic groups, and if education does indeed influence economic 
independence outcomes differently for particular demographic groups. Transitions within 
                                                          
17 The National Vocational Qualification framework (NVQ) has undergone many changes in the 
United Kingdom, although there has been some form of qualification categorization that can map 
onto academic qualifications for empirical research. There is no such institutionalised vocational 
qualification system in the United States that is used in this way for typical quantitative research.  
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the education domain complement perhaps the most-researched employment domain of 
the transition project (or the school to work transition), and therefore experiences in 
education have a direct impact in experiences in this area.  
Employment Domain 
The experience of labour market attachment and employment for young people has 
changed dramatically since the 1970s, particularly as the ‘certainties of industrialisation’ 
eroded (Antonucci et al 2014b, p. 17) and structural unemployment became a permanent 
feature of the youth labour market (Bell & Blanchflower 2011; Gallie & Paugam 2004; Heinz 
2003; Mortimer 2011; Scherer 2001). Deindustrialistion in particular had the most negative 
effects for those with low skill levels and low academic qualifications, as decently paid, 
permanent low skilled work all but disappeared from both the UK and the US labour market 
after the late 1970s (Heinz 2003). For young people who may first enter the labour market 
with low skills, this experience is often in the service industry which is generally poorly paid, 
flexible and inconsistent, and with less opportunity for advancement than in other careers 
(Auer & Cazes 2003; Fagan et al 2012; MacDonald 2011; MacDonald & Marsh 2005; 
Mortimer 2011; Standing 2011).  
Although most young people do not spend their careers in the low wage service sector, it is 
an example of two key characteristics of the youth labour market; flexibility and precarity 
(Bell & Blanchflower 2011; Furlong & Cartmel 1997; MacDonald 2011; Mortimer 2011). 
Flexibility in this transition domain can be viewed positively, as flexible work provides 
young people the opportunity to explore career options as ‘stepping stones’ in their choice 
biography (du Bois Reymond 1998). Indeed, part time employment opportunities make it 
possible for many young people to successfully combine work and full time education, 
which is becoming a common experience for students18. However, the young people of 
interest in this research who may engage with government assistance experience labour 
market flexibility as primarily negative: zero hour contracts, non-union work, concentration 
in the lower earnings decile and in industries of high turnover in the US and the UK result in 
economic precarity (Bell & Blanchflower 2011; Furlong 2006; Furlong & Cartmel 1997; 
MacDonald 2011; Standing 2011). This group of young people may indeed spend the 
majority of the youth period as part of the new ‘precariat’ group of workers (Standing 
                                                          
18 In 2012, OECD reported that around 47% of students in the UK work during their studies and 
around 57% of students in the US combine work and study.  
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2011), and churn between low paid work and government assistance (MacDonald 2011; 
MacDonald & Marsh 2005; Shildrick et al 2009). The structure of the youth labour market 
today therefore complicates the transition experiences of young people who wish to find 
full time work19, a particularly challenging proposition for young people without the 
necessary skills and labour market experience to be successful. Whether viewing the youth 
labour market in terms of stepping stones or precarity, the common thread is that ‘stable 
employment biographies’ no longer exist (Roberts 2011), and that ‘all young people will 
more likely experience unemployment or nonstandard forms of employment’ at some point 
in the youth period (Fagan et al 2012 in Chevalier 2016). 
As with all the transition domains, experiences in access and returns from employment can 
differ dramatically between young people based on socioeconomic status, gender, and 
race; all of which are likely be key drivers of outcomes in this investigation. Divergent 
experiences in the employment sector are particularly notable in the United States based 
on race, where discrimination in access to employment and remuneration remains a 
feature of labour market experiences for Black Americans that negatively affect their 
employment biographies (Fryer et al 2013; Hardaway & McLoyd 2009; Pager et al 2009; 
Sum et al 2014; Wilson 1996). For example, studies of Black adolescents by Entwisle and 
colleagues (2000) found that ‘although Black adolescents were applying for more jobs than 
their White counterparts, they were less likely to obtain employment, even after controlling 
for socioeconomic status and academic achievement’ (Entwistle 2000 in Hardaway & 
McLoyd 2009, p. 247). The experience of first attaching to the labour market for Black 
respondents may therefore be later in adolescence than White respondents, and may 
negatively affect their ability to obtain further steady work in later youth. And while some 
would argue that the ‘race gap’ in employment outcomes is merely a function of divergent 
levels of educational attainment (Roland 2011), further field experiments have provided 
evidence that subtler forms of discrimination are still a factor to consider in the 
employment experiences of Black and Hispanic Americans (Bertrand & Mullainathan 2003; 
Fryer et al 2013; Pager 2003; Pager et al 2009). In the low wage labour market, the 
experiences of these minority groups is particularly disadvantaged, where the issues of race 
                                                          
19 It is important to recognise, however, that full time work may indeed not be the preferred 
outcome for some respondents in the samples here; particularly for women who choose to stay at 




and class intersect. Perhaps one of the more notable field experiments in this area was 
conducted by Pager and colleagues (2009), where Black low-wage job applicants were 
found to be half as likely as equally qualified White applicants to receive a callback or job 
offer; indeed, Black and Hispanic applicants with no criminal record had the same level of 
success as White applicants with a criminal record (p. 790). Black young people in the 
United States in particular have to contend with the additive effects of discrimination in the 
employment sector on top of any other disadvantages that may influence their 
opportunities in the labour market.   
Another intersectional issue in the employment domain in the United States is the 
intersection of race and gender, where researchers continue to find much lower wage and 
labour market attachment outcomes for Black and Hispanic men on average than White 
men and all women (Blundell 2008; Chetty et al 2018; Pager et al 2009; Wilson 1996). Work 
by economists confirm that the gap in overall employment rates between Black and White 
Americans is driven by the extremely large difference in outcomes between Black and 
White men (Chetty et al 2018), with Blundell finding that ‘high educated Black men have 
employment rates comparable to high school dropout White men’ (2008, p. 8). The gaps 
between Black and White male outcomes also holds with Black men from more affluent 
families, as Chetty reports that the employment rates of Black men from parents in the 75th 
income percentile are comparable to White men from parents in the 9th income percentile 
(2018, p. 32). An important strand of sociological work aims to untangle the causal effects 
of these divergent outcomes, and point to a confluence of neighbourhood effects and 
residential segregation (Drier et al 2001; Massey and Denton 1993; Wilson 1987 & 1996), 
the phenomenon of mass incarceration (Alexander 2010), and racial discrimination 
(Bertrand & Mullianathan 2003; Pager 2003; Pager et al 2009; Sum et al 2015) as some 
important factors that drive this gap. Therefore, although much of the work on government 
assistance recipients focuses on the minority female subgroup, it is important to bear in 
mind that perhaps the largest differences in economic independence outcomes occurs 
between Black and Hispanic men and their White peers.  Both Blundell et al (2008) and the 
more recent work by Chetty (2018) using Census data finds no gap in labour market 
attachment and wages among Black and White women, where the only difference among 
women is rather in educational attainment. In fact, Black women have the highest labour 
force participation rates among females in the United States (at 62.2% in 2017) 
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(DuMonthier et al 2017) but this higher level of participation does not correspond to higher 
annual income.  
In both cases the transition experiences in all three domains differ based on the gender of 
the respondent, and do so similarly when women are viewed as a demographic group. The 
effects of gender emerge most explicitly in the employment domain, as previous work 
suggests that the patterns of lower wages and lower work intensity for women remain a 
defining feature of the labour market, and will likely also hold in the two cases investigated 
here (for a review of the gender wage gap literature, see Altonji & Blank 1999 and Blau & 
Kahn 2017). From the 1970s to the 1990s the wage gaps between men and women in both 
countries reduced primarily due to the increase in higher education and years in the labour 
market for women (broadly termed human capital formation) (Altonji & Blank 1999; Goldin 
2014; Livanos & Nuñez 2012). As females now outperform males in higher education 
achievement in both the US and the UK, ‘the portion of differences in earnings by gender 
that was once due to differences in productive characteristics has largely been eliminated’ 
(Goldin 2014, p. 116). While some economists have attempted to explain this gap as a 
result of different psychological or socio-cultural characteristics of men and women’s 
approaches to the labour market, the explanatory power is generally found to be minimal 
(reviewed in Bertrand 2011). Rather, differences for women in the employment domain 
may best be considered as a more general ‘child earnings penalty’ (Waldfogel 1998), where 
women are more likely to have labour market breaks or combine work and family more 
deliberately than men in the transition period (Aassve et al 2007). These family formation 
choices and experiences led to lower labour market attachment and wages for women with 
children compared to both men and single women, particularly for lone mothers 
(Christopher et al 2002; DiPrete & McManus 2000; Goldin 2014; Katz & Goldin 2008). This 
phenomenon has been identified as the ‘feminization of poverty’ (Bane & Ellwood 1994; 
Christopher et al 2002), and therefore it is likely that changes in the family formation 
domain will play a much larger role in female labour market outcomes and subsequently 
there will be more interaction between females and the means-tested benefit system.  
Despite theoretical discussions in the field about the shrinking influence of parental 
socioeconomic status in youth transitions literature in the UK (reviewed in Shildrick et al 
2009), research with young people from poor socioeconomic backgrounds identifies 
particularly challenging labour market attachment for this group (Conger et al 2010; DiPrete 
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& Eirich 2006; Furlong 2006; Schoon 2014; Schoon & Lyons-Amos 2016). Young people from 
poorer households have more unstable employment or periods of unemployment, which 
result in long-term negative impacts on income and wages in the form of ‘wage scars’ that 
can last into a person’s mid-life (Gregg & Tominey 2005). As much of government 
intervention for young people in these two cases is focused on either initial labour market 
attachment or intervention in the case of unemployment (Gallie & Paugam 2004), the 
group of young people from disadvantaged families engage more explicitly with 
government programmes. Indeed, the in-depth, multiyear qualitative project by MacDonald 
and Marsh detailed a portrait of low income ‘disconnected youth’ in Teesside who cycle 
between unemployment, low wage work and government training and assistance schemes 
(2005). Because of this higher level of involvement with and eligibility for government 
assistance, this investigation will necessarily focus on the same group of disadvantaged 
young people in each cohort. 
However, a research focus on young people who are disconnected from education, training 
or the labour market can potentially mask a discussion of how parental socioeconomic 
status can also work to the advantage of young people. The group of young people who are 
neither disadvantaged nor extremely advantaged has been dubbed the ‘missing middle’ 
and has gained prominence in the research field as they constitute the majority of the 
youth population (Murray et al 2012; Roberts 2011). Investigations into how parental 
background influences transition outcomes should therefore consider both cumulative 
disadvantage and advantage as a ‘mechanism for inequality’ between groups of young 
people (DiPrete & Eirich 2006); expressly detailed in the next section. 
Family Formation Domain 
The final transition domain is that of family formation, wherein a young person moves from 
their family of origin to their family of destination (Settersten 2005). This domain is also 
comprised of multiple transition experiences, the patterns of which have also changed 
substantially in the last thirty years: the age at which one leaves the parental home, age at 
first marriage and the age when one becomes a parent have all increased since the 1970s 
(Corijn & Klijzing 2001; Elzinga & Liefbroer 2007; Furstenberg 2010; Goldschneider & 
Goldschneider 1999). Prolonged transitions in this area are the result of economic and 
cultural changes, including expansions in higher education and the labour market (leading 
to more time in post-secondary education and subsequent career development particularly 
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for women); higher housing costs; and the uneven economic returns from the youth labour 
market (Furstenberg 2010; Settersten & Ray 2010). Although, as mentioned previously, 
some of the traditional ‘markers’ of adulthood in this area are not considered to be 
necessary for a ‘successful’ transition to adulthood, this should not undermine experiences 
in this domain as important in this research. Divergent experiences in family formation, 
particularly residential independence and in young childbearing, indeed are both a function 
of inequalities by gender, race and parental background, but also may influence and 
exacerbate inequalities in economic independence in the long term (Amato et al 2008; 
Amato & Kane 2011; Osgood et al 2010).   
The experience of residential independence in particular is comprised of ‘normative 
expectations about when to leave home, stress factors motivating an exit, a general 
preference for autonomy… and intergenerational transfers’ (Garasky et al 2001), and 
involves inputs and negotiation between the young person and their parents that may not 
be as present in the other domains (Aassve et al 2002; Ermisch 1999; Ermisch & DiSalvo 
1997; Mulder 2013; Schoeni & Ross 2005, Swartz et al 2011; Whittingdon & Peters 1996). 
Both qualitative research with young people and quantitative research with cohort data 
confirms that economic factors such as housing costs and low incomes inhibit young people 
in establishing independent households (Ermisch 1999; Ermisch & DiSalvo 1997; Mulder 
2013); indeed, young adult incomes and full time work remain the primary indicators of an 
exit into residential independence (Aassve et al 2002; Whittingdon & Peters 1996). Labour 
market failure has also been shown to push young people back to their family of origin if 
they have made an exit, a ‘boomerang’ experience that is becoming more common due to 
uneven success in the labour market during youth (Barrington et al 2014; Roberts et al 
2016). Ermisch (1999) modelled mid-1990s housing transitions using British Household 
Panel Survey Data and found that a spell of unemployment during the year doubles the rate 
of return to the parental home, especially for those under 25. Moving back in with one’s 
family of origin is an even more common experience for recent youth cohorts, particularly 
following the labour market shocks during and after the Great Recession (Dey & Pierret 
2014; Kaplan 2012).  
As a result of macroeconomic conditions and a welfare mix tipped towards family rather 
than state support, intergenerational family transfers (both cash and in-kind) are now 
viewed as far more important to a young person’s transition in this domain than for 
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previous cohorts (Furstenberg 2010; Hogan et al 1993; Kaplan 2012; Kendig et al 2014; Lee 
& Mortimer 2009; McLanahan 2004; Schoeni & Ross 2005). The family can be considered as 
both a ‘safety net’ and a ‘scaffold’ during this period (Swartz et al 2011). As a ‘safety net’, 
parents serve to shelter their children from negative economic experiences with periods of 
longer co-residence, and their children’s long term poverty outcomes reflect this sheltering: 
research from Aassve and colleagues find much higher poverty rates throughout early 
adulthood for early home leavers as opposed to those who are able to say with their family 
of origin (2006). As a scaffold, parents provide monetary resources for a young person to 
live independently when their income is not yet high enough for self-sufficiency (Aassve et 
al 2006; Ermisch 1999; Ermisch & DiSalvo 1997; Fingerman 2015; Schoeni & Ross 2005).  
Young people from higher income backgrounds therefore are able to access more transfers 
for this scaffolding process than those from lower income backgrounds (DiPrete & Eirich 
2006; Fingerman 2015; McLanahan 2004), and live independently at higher rates than their 
lower income peers (Dey & Pierret 2014). In their 2005 work, Schoeni and Ross reported 
that young adults in the top quartile of the income distribution received average transfers 
of roughly $71,000 between age 18 and 34 (in 2001 dollars), and those in the bottom 
quartile received an average of $23,414, which include in-kind transfers as well as cash 
transfers. And while higher income parents are able to give more to their children than 
lower income parents, the share of parental income going towards children is roughly the 
same between parental income groups (Furstenberg 2010), and highlights an ever-
increasing share of young people who have ‘semi-dependence’ (Coles 1995) on their 
parents later into the youth period (Antonucci et al 2014b; Arundel & Ronald 2016). Indeed, 
Smeeding and Phillips find that the majority of young people in both the US and the UK 
cannot earn enough income to support a family of three with neither their own income nor 
their own income including government assistance until at least their mid-20s (2002), so 
reliance on family is a necessity for most (if it is possible). Although neither of the datasets 
nor the analysis here includes parental financial transfers in detail (and it is not the primary 
focus of this study), it will still be useful to investigate the type of respondents who receive 
parental support in the form of co-residence, and if indeed the experience is universal or 
confined to particular groups of young people.  
A particularly prominent ‘risk factor’ identified in previous research in the family formation 
domain is young parenting, an experience that has long been identified as correlated with 
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higher rates of poverty among teen parents and with long-term negative economic and 
educational outcomes (Basch 2011; Moore at al 1993; Wickrama et al 2012). Basch’s 
systematic review on these impacts in the United States reported teen mothers’ education 
to be approximately two years shorter than women who delayed parenting until age 30, 
with teen mothers 10-12% less likely to complete high school (2011). Research in the 1990s 
identified not only the impacts of early childbearing on poverty outcomes but also sought 
to identify causal factors in early childbearing, and identified links between lower 
socioeconomic status measured by a variety of indicators (e.g. low educational 
achievement, high unemployment/underemployment, neighbourhood disadvantage) and 
younger childbearing (Basch 2011; Bonell 2004; Moore et al 1993; Penman-Aguilar et al 
2013). Early childbearing in the United States is thus also racially stratified, with a higher 
proportion of minority youth experiencing this particular risk factor as a result of higher 
proportions of the group from lower socioeconomic backgrounds (Basch 2011).  
There is a small group of researchers in the youth transitions field who do not view young 
parenting as an altogether ‘risky’ or negative experience in and of itself, and young 
parenthood is rather the manifestation of social disadvantage (Duncan 2007; SmithBattle 
2000). SmithBattle’s work in particular changed the way those in the field of public health 
thought about this phenomenon, as her work with teenage mothers from lower 
socioeconomic backgrounds found that mothers viewed the experience as having a 
stabilising influence on their youth period and as positively transforming (1995, 2000). 
Indeed, further qualitative research found that for young people from poorer backgrounds, 
becoming a parent ‘gives entry into a valued social role’ that can be a way to ‘forge an adult 
identity’ where success in the labour market is elusive (Graham & McDermott 2005 in 
Duncan 2007, p.318). For young women in particular, researchers note that this identity 
making experience can increase further educational aspirations, and serve as a positive 
‘turning point’ in a youth transition (Carlson 2016; Edin & Kafelas 2011; Smith-Battle 2000). 
However, regardless of aspirations, the majority of young mothers and fathers in previous 
qualitative and quantitative research were found to be far less successful in achieving 
educational or labour market success compared to their non-parenting peers (SmithBattle 
2000 in Carlson 2016). Additionally, any scarring that arises from the timing of becoming a 
parent is combined with the ‘child earning penalty’ (Waldfogel 1998) found to affect 
women’s economic outcomes more than men’s at any age; it is likely then that young 
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female parents will have particularly worse economic independence outcomes in this 
investigation.  
From reviewing each of the transition domains it becomes clear that experiences are 
shaped by demographic factors out of the control of the young person, as inequalities by 
gender, race and socioeconomic status influence the opportunity structure of each young 
person in different ways. The accumulation of multiple disadvantages is particularly 
relevant to consider in the analysis of results (DiPrete & Eirich 2006); therefore, this 
research acknowledges intersectionality as a lived reality for these sample members, 
particularly for respondents who may sit within two subordinated groups in the welfare 
state and labour market (Crenshaw 1991). Operationally speaking in quantitative work, 
researchers can consider the inclusion of interaction effects to try and capture these 
multiple dimensions, which is done here. Intersectionality can also be another conceptual 
guide when reading the results of this work, bringing to light how the welfare state shapes 
the ways that particular groups of recipients in poverty access programmes and if particular 
groups (e.g. young Black mothers) may be served or not served by government assistance. 
These multiple identities and attendant inequalities shape both transition experiences and 
subsequent economic independence and are likely the largest factors in a young person’s 
experience. However, this work must also turn to how the other major structural factor, the 
state, is theorised in youth transitions work. 
2.3 The Welfare State and Youth Transitions: Frameworks and 
Applicable Concepts  
The previous chapter’s work on welfare state functioning in the US and the UK set the 
context for the upcoming empirical research; introducing how government actors speak (or 
do not speak) about young people as a group deserving of assistance and the best way for a 
welfare state to intervene, and the key tension that exists between state concepts of 
independence and dependence. The use of economic independence as the key outcome for 
this work was introduced as a way to resolve tensions between the two strands of work, 
but it is not yet clear just how to approach the analysis of the role of the welfare state in a 
youth transition. The welfare state has been described as ‘the only overarching agency’ that 
has direct influence over the life course (Settersten et al 2005), and as research on youth 
transitions increased so too did the need for frameworks to understand the influence of the 
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welfare state in these transitions. Some of these frameworks and their key concepts are 
reviewed to identify which might be most appropriate to both guide the empirical analysis 
and in discussions of the subsequent results. 
The starting point for frameworks that theorise the youth welfare state is Esping-
Andersen’s welfare regime typology, which categorised the institutional settings which 
impact the degree of commodification or familialization that a welfare state imparts on its 
citizens (1990, 1999). The previous section’s review detailed the way the organisation of a 
liberal welfare state impacts principles and programmes of the social security system, 
suggesting that the high commodification and low de-familialization for young workers in 
particular shape the opportunities young people have to become independent. The 
principles outlined in the liberal welfare regime also fit rightly with the assumption about 
how young people should act in a liberal market economy – together beginning to provide a 
picture of the expectations a state holds for its young adult citizens. Walther’s research on 
regimes of youth transitions (2006) was one of the first to systematically extend welfare 
regime typologies and varieties of capitalism concepts to this subpopulation rather than 
only applying pieces of Esping-Andersen’s theory to a particular phenomenon or policy 
problem of the youth phase. Walther asserted that in order to fully understand welfare 
regimes as they relate to young people one must also include the education and training 
system and how the welfare state structures the labour market opportunities of women 
(particularly for countries with highly stratified/structured vocational education systems) 
(2006). With this focus Walther extended the aspects of Esping-Andersen’s work regarding 
commodification most explicitly.  
Perhaps the most theoretically notable aspect of Walther’s work is the discussion of the 
ways in which ‘institutions and concepts merge into what is conceived as “normal” in a 
given context’ (2006, p. 124).  This outlined what a ‘normal’ youth transition looks like in 
each youth transition regime (organised by Esping-Andersen’s welfare regimes) and 
therefore when and how a state should intervene when the transition is ‘abnormal’. The 
idea of a ‘climate of normality’ (Walther 2006, p. 135) is present in nearly all youth 
transitions research, especially work that distinguishes a ‘normal’ or ‘linear’ transition from 
one that is ‘prolonged’ or ‘disjointed’. The value judgements underlying descriptions of 
transitions in this way speak to the engrained normative assumptions about a youth 
transition in the Western world, with the pattern of ‘school to work to family formation’ as 
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standard, even with variations on how long each of these transition experiences last in 
different contexts (Furlong et al 2006; Furlong & Cartmel 1997; Settersten & Ray 2010). In 
liberal welfare states of the US and UK, early economic independence is identified by 
Walther as the key ‘climate of normality’, which aligns with both Esping-Andersen’s work 
on commodification and Hall and Soskice’s work on the values of a liberal market economy 
that extend to young workers. Therefore, the choice of Walther to focus on unemployment 
as a key site of transition ‘abnormality’ is unsurprising. Walther focuses on how states 
conceptualise youth unemployment and disadvantage, and therefore what school to work 
transition policies a welfare state implements. In the liberal transition regime of the UK 
(and by extension the US), youth unemployment is viewed via the culture of dependency 
(echoing language of conservative policymakers) and disadvantage is individualised, 
resulting in transition policies that seek to attach young people to the labour market as fast 
as possible (e.g. Youth Transition Schemes, New Deal for Young People) (Walther 2006). 
The regime subsequently has less focus on skill formation, and vocational education is not 
viewed as an institution to invest in heavily.  
Chevalier’s recent work (2016) critiques Walther’s regime typology and revises it, with the 
primary complaint that not only is the regime type unidirectional (and therefore the 
dimensions are correlated with one another), the framework does not include the second 
pivotal concept in Esping-Andersen’s regime types work – that of familialization. This 
concept has been discussed in previous youth transitions research (Jones & Wallace 1992) 
although not within a framework as Chevalier does; in all cases however, familialization is 
the degree to which youth is considered as ‘an extension of childhood’ and therefore when 
the legal requirement for the family of origin to provide financially for the young person 
ends (Chevalier 2016, p. 6). In welfare states with low familialization and therefore high 
individualisation, young people are viewed as independent benefit units in the social 
security system earlier in the youth period (often 18), and therefore the family of origin is 
not obligated to care for them or support them financially after that time. High 
familialization occurs in countries where legal responsibilities for the parents extend often 
to age 25 (Chevalier 2016). The concepts of familialization and individualisation comprise 
the social citizenship dimension of Chevalier’s framework and details the legal relationship 
between the young person and their family of origin. The second dimension, economic 
citizenship, details how the state seeks to integrate young people into the labour market. 
This necessarily then details the academic and vocational education systems and how a 
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state addresses adverse experiences such as unemployment for young people. Together, 
the two dimensions create a framework that is meant to characterise both welfare policies 
(e.g. when the state defines independence from the family of origin) and school to work 
policies (e.g. how the state approaches labour market attachment).  
The economic citizenship dimension of Chevalier’s framework, which details school to work 
policies, has perhaps the most in common with Walther’s framework. Both describe an 
education system in liberal regimes that provides less structured support into employment, 
with demand side policies focused on entrance into employment regardless of employment 
quality, and state intervention saved primarily for the highest skilled of those who do not 
follow an academic route in school (Chevalier 2016, p. 7).  A selective strategy for 
workforce development (e.g. few places in high quality apprenticeships) leaves a distinct 
subgroup of young people in each country with neither academic qualifications nor specific 
skills to be integrated into the labour market as successfully as their peers. On the social 
citizenship dimension, the focus in liberal welfare states on early economic independence 
(as first detailed by Walther 2006) results in the age of independence in social security 
programmes relatively young, at 18 or 20 (varying based on the institution of focus, see 
Chapter 2.1) (Harris 1989). In Chevalier’s framework this relatively early age of 
independence as defined by the state indicates low familialization in liberal welfare states 
(and other Beveridgean states), contrasted with countries like France and Germany 
(Bismarckian states) where the age at which young people are independent benefit units is 
much older (2016, p. 8). 
The challenge in viewing the youth transitions/welfare state relationship with this 
framework is two-fold: first, the framework does not detail the way in which the state 
impacts transitions in the family formation domain and second, does not fully account for 
the ways in which a young person in a liberal welfare state may in practice still remain 
dependent on the family of origin (first identified in Chapter 2.1). The two frameworks 
detailed above only focus on the school to work transition perhaps because this is both the 
area of greatest direct government investment in this period but also because it is generally 
viewed as the most ‘important’ transition. However, youth sociologists and life course 
researchers contend that because issues of residential independence, partnering, and 
childbearing in the youth period have long-term consequences for the individual and the 
economy (Furstenberg 2010; Kendig et al 2014; Settersten et al 2005; Settersten & Ray 
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2010; Smeeding & Phillips 2002), transition experiences in this area should not be ignored 
as drivers of outcomes. This work must therefore widen its scope to think about how the 
state implicitly structures these choices and experiences as well, and in particular how 
support for residential independence from parents may alter long term economic 
outcomes.  
Second, it can be argued on practical grounds that welfare states like the US and the UK do 
little to decrease familialization in the youth period, as they provide far less support for 
young people under 25 to become economically and residentially independent even if they 
are an ‘adult’ in the eyes of the welfare state (Harris 1989; Macdonald & Marsh 2005; 
Settersten et al 2005; Swartz et al 2011). Youth researchers rightly identify the ‘dependency 
assumption’ of the welfare state in both cases, which assumes that young people will be 
able to receive the support of their family until 25 and is the reason for lower benefit levels 
and ineligibility for some programmes for young people (Harris 1989, Jones & Bell 2000). 
The prominence of intergenerational transfers during this period regardless of the income 
level of the parents contradicts the idea that young people are indeed ‘independent’ of 
other sources of support besides the labour market (Ermisch 1999; Kendig et al 2014; Lee & 
Mortimer 2009; McLanahan 2004; Swartz et al 2011). This oversight in Chevalier’s 
framework again highlights the tension between competing concepts of independence in 
the welfare state and independence according to youth transitions researchers.  
Finally, while the frameworks above usefully categorise what each of the welfare states do 
in transition domains, they do not detail why the welfare states cluster in these ways and 
how this interacts with a young person’s life course. To investigate the latter two issues 
Antonucci and colleagues (2014a) propose another way to think about young people and 
the welfare state, by applying Powell and Barrientos’ ‘welfare mix’ framework (2004) to 
youth transitions. In this application, the investigation focuses on ‘how the different 
combinations of welfare sources in each country leads to different levels of 
decommodification and defamilialization in young people’s lives’ (Antonucci et al 2014a, p. 
25). A welfare mix lens can enable an investigation into how a young person does rely, or is 
able to rely, on the state, labour market or family as a source of their welfare in each of the 
three transition domains; an approach taken by Smeeding & Phillips in their 2002 work but 
not connected to a specific framework. Using the welfare mix framework experiences in all 
three of the transition domains can be investigated rather than just the employment 
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domain, and the analysis can also crucially include the relationship between a young person 
and their family of origin in a discussion of empirical results.  
A welfare mix framework also makes clear ‘the role of the state in setting normative 
standards in young people’s engagement with all three sources of welfare’ (Antonucci et al 
2014a, p. 26). By investigating how each of the three welfare sources are expected to be 
used by young people, the normative standards in the transition experience can be 
uncovered. This echoes and extends Walther’s ideas about the centrality of ‘climates of 
normality’ (2006) in transition regimes. Youth sociologists working in the US and the UK 
note that the characteristics of the liberal welfare state result in a young person’s welfare 
mix tipped decidedly in the direction of the market and their family of origin, a 
consequence of a welfare state that targets benefits to the few as a ‘safety net’ institution 
of last resort. This also affirms the notion of the family as a primary source of support 
(Antonucci et al 2014b; Settersten et al 2005). The complex and challenging transition in 
the employment domain in particular has been shown to influence a young person’s 
reliance on their family of origin (Ermisch 1997; Whittingdon & Peters 1999; Smeeding & 
Phillips 2002; Swartz et al 2011), even though the expectation of young people by the state 
is for economic independence early in the youth period (Chevalier 2016). The expectations 
of a welfare state on young people’s early labour market attachment and the ability of 
young people to rely on their family of origin results in diverse economic experiences for 
young people depending on their status in many socioeconomic and demographic contexts. 
Those with challenges in both the labour market and the family welfare sources will 
therefore likely interact with the welfare state in order to achieve economic independence 
and are the primary subgroup of interest in this empirical work. Recognising the importance 
of all three welfare sources and their interconnectedness in the youth period, this work will 
use the welfare mix as an analytical framework to discuss each case’s results and organise 
the case comparison (Chapter 6).  
2.4 Poverty Reduction, Welfare Recipients, and Individual Impacts of 
Government Assistance   
The purpose of this final section is to add empirical evidence on means-tested benefits 
from a national and individual level to the theoretical discussion of liberal welfare states’ 
principles and its tensions in Chapter 1. This will more adequately orient the upcoming 
investigation’s results on the variable of interest – government assistance -- in this field of 
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existing work. This section will also detail what is known about the dynamics of poverty as 
well as welfare receipt, which will likely also be applicable to respondents in these cases. 
The section concludes with what might be missing from existing welfare state research 
from the viewpoint of youth transitions researchers, and outlines how this investigation can 
bridge the two fields for this population of interest.  
The Welfare State as a Poverty Reduction Tool  
A strand of welfare state research that supplements the work of Esping-Andersen’s focus 
on the institutional/organisational structures of welfare state regimes are those which seek 
to measure the poverty reduction effects of a welfare state. This work, led by researchers 
like Kenworthy (1999, 2012), Brady (2005), Korpi (1980, 1983), and Korpi and Palme (1998), 
took the principle of poverty reduction as the ‘central aim of social welfare policies’ 
(Kenworthy 1999, p. 1129) and then sought to understand how varying welfare states 
achieved that aim. This work was therefore necessarily comparative, and used national 
welfare state measures such as the percentage of GDP spent on social expenditures to 
describe the generosity of welfare states and their effectiveness in improving outcomes for 
the poorest in society.  This strand of research generally concluded that nations with lower 
social expenditures have lower poverty reduction, and nations which spend more on both 
social spending and public health have higher poverty reduction (Brady 2005; Korpi & 
Palme 1998; Smeeding et al 1993): however, ‘even in the least redistributive nations like 
the US…[social expenditures] have a beneficial impact’ on poverty reduction (Kenworthy 
1999, p. 1124). The results of these studies placed primacy on the welfare state as a 
poverty reduction tool and therefore is oriented firmly against the liberal economic idea 
that economic growth, increases in productivity, and reducing overall unemployment will 
have the largest impacts on poverty reduction (Brady 2005).  
This conclusion is affirmed when considering the experience of those in poverty in the US, 
where low levels of unemployment and economic growth particularly in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s paired with the low redistribution and high levels of targeting did not also 
improve the experiences of those in poverty. Smeeding and colleagues (2006) make this 
point particularly salient in comparing the experience of the US and the UK in the late 
1990s in the area of child poverty, where Prime Minister Blair’s expansion of assistance for 
parents both in work and out of work reduced overall child poverty in the UK while 
government assistance in the US was not reformed to increase the wages of parents. Thus 
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during that same period child poverty in the US remained (and remains) persistently high. 
The reliance on the market alone for low-wage workers, Smeeding contends (2006), will 
simply not be enough to lift people out of poverty and the system of supports in the United 
States at current levels (and trends in this direction in the UK) is also not sufficient enough 
to make up for low levels of pay: therefore the government should play an active role in 
income support (2006).  
The challenge for proponents of expanding government assistance, however, is to make the 
case in a liberal welfare state that government assistance is indeed an effective tool against 
poverty reduction. Power-resources theories (Korpi & Palme 1998) suggest that institutions 
with high instances of targeting of government assistance (like liberal welfare states) may 
not be suited to strong levels of public support for redistributive policies, particularly 
because a smaller group of citizens are seen to be benefitting from government assistance 
who can then be vilified as ‘lazy’ or ‘shiftless’. This is indeed the case in the US and the UK, 
and is illustrated by the perennial discussions about the deserving and undeserving poor. 
Korpi and Palme (1998, 2004) along with Nelson (2004) also suggest that the poorest 
segments in society are best helped in welfare states where systems of support are not 
exclusively directed towards that group (i.e. universalism); a ‘paradox of redistribution 
hypothesis’ that seems to run counter to the current functioning of liberal welfare states 
that target benefits. However, critics of Korpi and Palme’s hypothesis have emerged with 
more recent cross-national data, suggesting that universalism in social spending does not 
necessarily lead to more redistribution and that targeted government assistance can still 
reduce poverty effectively (Kenworthy 2012; Marx et al 2013).  
Indeed, there is evidence that means-tested benefits do lift some families above the 
poverty line and close the poverty gap in both the US and the UK despite their institutional 
arrangements. Econometric evidence in the US on poverty reduction is a particularly large 
field of research, concluding that the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and SNAP have the 
largest anti-poverty effects of the means-tested programmes available (while Social 
Security is the most effective government programme overall, although it is not means-
tested) (Blank 2002; Meyer 2010; Meyer & Wu 2018; Sherman et al 2013). An important 
distinction made in previous research is that means-tested transfers such as SNAP have a 
larger effect on moving people out of deep poverty (below 50% of the poverty line) than on 
reducing the traditional poverty rate (Fox et al 2015; Tiehen et al 2015). This closing of the 
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poverty gap for the very poor indicates that recipients of this programme are rarely lifted 
above the poverty line but the gap between their income and the poverty line has reduced 
(Ravallion 1996). EITC, however, moves more recipients over the poverty line each year, 
with studies showing that EITC reduced the poverty rate by around 10% (with 2007 data) 
(Meyer 2010); around double that of SNAP, SSI or housing subsidies (Fox 2017). This, Meyer 
and Wu note, is not surprising given the recipient type, as those who receive EITC ‘tend to 
be closer to – and therefore more likely to be moved across – the poverty line’ (2018, p. 9). 
In the UK, the poverty reduction effects of both tax and transfer programmes are 
particularly notable, where the most recent OECD data showed reduction in the relative 
poverty rate by over half for jobless households, and over 65% for standard workers (2015). 
The UK is also particularly effective in targeting government assistance to those at the 
lowest income groups, and Sefton’s work (2002) indicates that the lowest income groups in 
Britain benefit from redistributive policies the most. However, redistribution in both the UK 
and the US have slowed in current years with the move towards even greater targeting of 
out of work benefits and focus on in-work benefits, which will not be able to effectively 
reach families and citizens with no income or unstable work histories (Causa & Hermansen 
2018) 
It is also valuable to understand the type of citizens who are poor, and therefore who will 
engage with government assistance each year and in the survey periods of this 
investigation. The pioneering work by Bane and Ellwood (1986) on poverty dynamics 
changed the way policymakers thought about the population of citizens in poverty at any 
one time. Their primary conclusion was that of the people who become poor in a year, only 
a small fraction will become chronically or continuously poor in the long term. Rather, 
poverty for many is a brief experience, and their work found that over 70% of those who 
enter poverty in a year will have that poverty spell end in 3 years or less (1986, p. 11). 
However, the chronically poor make up the larger share of people in poverty at any one 
point in time, such that those who are currently in poverty are more likely in a spell of ten 
years or more (1986, p. 12). Importantly, this research also introduced the idea of ‘cycling’ 
in and out of poverty, where a group of people at or near the poverty line make multiple 
entries and exits to poverty status during their lifetime. This same type of dynamic is found 
in the UK with work by Burgess and Proper (2002) and Jenkins (2011). The dynamics of 
poverty therefore also results in ‘welfare dynamics’ with relatively the same features (Bane 
and Ellwood 1994; Hills 2014). In short:  
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Most recipients stay on welfare only a short time. Most of the dollars go to people who stay a 
long time. Some people go off quickly, some people go on and off repeatedly, some stay 
almost continuously (Bane and Ellwood 1994, p. 42).  
And while US welfare reform effectively limited the possibility of the chronically poor from 
receiving cash assistance continuously in TANF (partially as a result of Bane and Ellwood’s 
research findings), the population of those in receipt of benefits in both countries will still 
be broadly similar. This work may therefore expect to find very few respondents who 
receive benefits in many consecutive years, but who may be at or near poverty long term as 
they cycle in and out of benefit eligibility. Together with the evidence on poverty rate and 
poverty gap reduction, it is likely that receipt of government assistance in a means-tested 
system will likely reduce poverty gaps among target groups who are poor, but will likely not 
be able to alter recipients’ long-term outcomes substantially in comparison to their non-
poor peers. 
After reviewing the overall poverty reduction effects of tax and transfer systems and a brief 
review of the dynamics of sample members who access government assistance, it is 
necessary to review evidence on the effects of government assistance on individual 
outcomes relevant to the upcoming empirical work. This is not meant to be a meta-analysis 
of all the evidence on means-tested transfers that exist20, but rather brings forth notable 
results and trends that may likely also arise in this investigation. Importantly, evidence on 
the effect of means-tested transfers for the specific youth population is scant because 
young people are considered firstly as either parents in the empirical research or they are 
viewed alongside the general population of benefit recipients and are not investigated as a 
specific subgroup. In the upcoming evidence presented then (save for evidence on the 
Youth Training Scheme), it is challenging if not impossible to determine impacts on young 
people who receive these benefits, as they are not the population of research interest. 
Rather, empirical research and policy evaluations of the welfare state and young people as 
it relates to their transition outcomes generally is found in the education and skills 
formation policy area (France 2008). However, the findings from previous research on 
means-tested transfers can still provide a valuable basis for interpreting and reading the 
results of this work, as the receipt of government assistance is measured both in the youth 
                                                          




period and in subsequent survey years in the upcoming investigation. And although the 
majority of the work reviewed here is from econometric models aimed at causal inference 
which is not undertaken here (discussed in more detail in Chapter 3), this empirical 
evidence is still appropriate to orient the findings of this research in the literature on the 
impacts of government assistance on similar outcomes of interest. The following section 
details existing evidence on the Youth Transition Scheme and then evidence on means-
tested benefits in each case.  
Government Assistance and Individual Outcomes: evidence from the UK  
The Youth Training Scheme  
As noted in Chapter 1, the Youth Training Schemes were introduced by the Thatcher 
government in an attempt to address supply-side issues of youth unemployment, 
particularly that young people were not equipped with the skills to succeed in the labour 
market (Bynner 2012). The earliest studies on the short-run wage impacts of YTS 
participation generally found that participation in the programme led to lower wages for 
participants: a particularly startling result from Dolton, Makepeace and Treble (1994) 
reported that typical young men whose only training was on YTS would have earned 
between 4% and 17% more if they had had no training whatsoever (in Dolton et al 2004). 
The labour market attachment results are slightly more positive, indicating that YTS 
participants are somewhat more likely to be in employment following participation (Main & 
Shelley 1990; O’Higgins 1994). Work by Upward (2002) indicated that the extent of a young 
person’s participation in a scheme made a difference to wage and employment outcomes, 
where those who completed the full 2 years of the programme showed a higher likelihood 
of staying on with the training firm or getting employment afterwards. Longer run results in 
Dolton et al (2001) found that there were no significant effects on the probability of 
unemployment for those who participated; the neutral results identified by the authors is 
evidence merely that the differences between those who participated in YTS and 
individuals in a comparable group without training can be accounted for by other 
demographic factors. Considered in a positive light, ‘their [YTS participants’] lot is not 
systematically worse than that of their colleagues with similar backgrounds who have had 
no training’ (Dolton et al 2001, p. 9).  
Perhaps the most relevant evidence on YTS participation comes from Dolton and 
colleague’s work in 2004 with around 2000 ‘low achievers’ in the 1970 British Cohort Study. 
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Although this is not the exact subsample of BCS respondents used in this investigation, the 
outcome measured at age 30 provided results a decade after participation in the 
programme and showed that the wage and labour market impacts of YTS participation 
were ‘large and negative for men and small and insignificant for women’ (Dolton et al 2004, 
p. 9). Male ex-YTS participants had mean earnings around 8 percent lower than non-YTS 
participants and their employment rate was around 8 and a half percentage points lower 
(ibid). Together with previous research, the work concluded that this type of long-term 
government investment does not significantly improve the lives of participants (Dolton et al 
2004). Given these results, it is likely that the longer-run empirical work here will also find 
either neutral or negative impacts for YTS participants after controlling for socioeconomic 
and educational factors.  
UK Benefit Programme Outcomes  
The reform of Income Support for the unemployed to Jobseeker’s Allowance in 1996 (save 
for lone parents) signalled a change in policy tone for those who are unemployed to ‘an 
allowance for those who are looking for work instead of an income for those who are 
unemployed’ as a right (Manning 2009, p. 239, emphasis added). As the first large scale 
application of workfare principles into the UK benefit system (Lowe 2005), changes in the 
stricter enforcement of eligibility conditions (most notably job search requirements) 
allowed researchers to investigate the experiences of claimants before and after reforms 
using techniques such as difference-in-difference models. The introduction of JSA resulted 
in a large decline in claimant counts very shortly after implementation (Rayner et al. 2000) 
which could give the impression that these changes resulted in more respondents in 
employment. However, Manning’s work on outflows of claimants and their destinations 
from 1996 to 1998 report that JSA increased the exit rates from the claimant count to non-
employed status (around 6.7 percentage points higher than before JSA was introduced) 
rather than into employment (2009, p. 244). Results from Petrongolo’s difference-in-
difference models (2007) using longitudinal social security data was able to extend this 
work to show that the introduction of JSA increased the probability of being in non-
employment by 4.3% the following year, and also increased the incidence of Incapacity 
Benefit for claimants as a result (p. 19); a result that was later also confirmed by Riley and 
colleagues’ 2011 report to the DWP. 
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For those who did not move onto another type of benefit and rather into some form of 
employment, the change to JSA was also found to have both unemployment and wage 
scarring effects, and the experience receiving JSA (or ‘JSA shock’) was noted to have 
particularly long-lasting effects for the 16-24-year-old group studied by Petrongolo (2009). 
For the whole group of claimants (aged 16-64), after a spell of JSA receipt there is a 
‘reduction of 4% in the probability of positive earnings the year after the shock’ that gets 
reabsorbed after 3 years. For those aged 16-24 the negative effects of a JSA spell actually 
increase slightly 2 to 4 years after JSA receipt, from around 4% to around 6% reduction in 
the probability of positive earnings (Petrongolo 2007, p. 18). One of the proposed reasons 
for these longer-lasting effects was that young people who were able to quickly re-engage 
with the labour market did so, while those who were less able only found work much later, 
causing the dip in results 2-4 years after leaving JSA. Indeed, this analysis helped to buttress 
Manning’s work on the impact of job search requirements on employment after JSA, which 
found ‘no evidence that moves into employment or measures of search activity were 
increased by JSA’ (2009, p. 247) and rather the new requirements in place did no better at 
reengaging the unemployed then the previous benefit system. For those who did exit JSA 
into employment, one of the more troubling aspects of empirical work reports that JSA 
‘leavers’ may not necessarily be better off, as Wright (2012) reports that nearly a third of 
exits do not also result in exits from poverty.  
The effects of welfare programmes on lone parents is another area of interest for this work 
because this target group of claimants is more likely to be in receipt of benefits but also 
were, along with other families with children, the focus of many of the reforms of New 
Labour in an attempt to assist low income families with children. In-work tax credits are 
considered one of the more successful interventions for the lone parent population in 
incentivising labour market participation (Blundell et al 2006). Evaluations of the Working 
Families Tax Credit by multiple researchers reported ‘unambiguously positive’ results for 
lone parents’ labour market participation (Gregg et al 2009), and found that generally there 
was a 4 to 5 percent increase in the lone parent employment rate over 5 years (Blundell et 
al 2008; Brewer et al 2006; Francesconi & ver der Klaauw 2007; Leigh 2007). The results 
from Gregg and colleagues (2009) also showed that the working hours of lone mothers who 
used to work slightly less than 16 hours also increased on average, such that the average 
hours worked per week of lone mothers became relatively similar to the average number of 
hours for mothers in couples (p. F63). The results suggest that the positive results in the 
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employment rate are likely due to employment retention for those who become lone 
parents and those who are already lone parents from leaving work, and to a much lesser 
extent getting lone parents into employment from non-employment (Gregg et al 2009, p. 
F49).  
This review of the most notable empirical work in the UK case showed divergent results for 
recipients depending on the type of benefit accessed. Jobseeker’s Allowance was found to 
be a primarily negative experience for wages and slightly increases the probability for 
further unemployment spells, while tax credits tend to have more positive results, 
particularly for lone parents. For the BCS cohort members, then, it may be challenging to 
disentangle the positive effects of benefits like the Working Tax Credit from the negative 
effects of benefits like Jobseeker’s Allowance. Importantly these results and other research 
indicate that there is an interplay between different types of out-of-work and in-work 
benefits at particular times in the life course for those with low-incomes; it is likely that in 
the course of the BCS survey period some respondents will move on and off many different 
types of both active and inactive benefits as they struggle to gain income above eligibility 
thresholds as evidenced by poverty dynamics literature (Hills 2014). However, periods of 
extremely low income that cause means-tested benefit receipt may indeed serve as shocks 
to labour market and wage trajectories that can be felt long term. 
Government Assistance and Individual Outcomes: evidence from the US  
The econometric research on US mainstream programmes is a dense field of research, 
particularly research on AFDC/TANF, and therefore it is most valuable to focus on research 
that is most relevant to the outcomes of wages, labour market participation and household 
poverty (the measures of economic independence of this investigation). The AFDC/TANF 
and SNAP programme evidence is considered in the most detail here, as they are included 
in the empirical work as separate programmes of interest.  
AFDC/TANF  
Along with the political shift towards welfare state contraction in the 1980s noted in 
Chapter 1, increased AFDC caseloads in the 1970s and research on AFDC and state waiver 
programmes by economists in the 1980s and early 1990s set the stage for TANF reform. 
Previous AFDC studies showed that AFDC reduced labour supply in estimates ranging at 
minimum by 10% and at most by 50% (Moffitt 2003, p. 317); a result that reformers hoped 
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to reverse with the introduction of work requirements and tighter eligibility in TANF. New 
TANF programme rules would theoretically reactivate former AFDC recipients in the labour 
market and reduce dependency; a hypothesis investigated in a smaller group of ‘leavers’ 
studies. These studies indicate that TANF leavers are more engaged in the labour market, 
but are not entering work that will make them enough money to be lifted out of poverty. 
Summarised by Ziliak, all of the smaller leavers studies together indicate that ‘the earnings 
gains among the low skilled a decade after the implementation of TANF have been more 
than offset by losses in transfer income’ (Ziliak 2016, p. 366). A recent study of the Kansas 
TANF programme by Mitchell and colleagues (2018) provides a particularly salient example 
of the income and labour market attachment of TANF leavers in a ‘harsh’ programme one 
to four years after leaving. While 8 in 10 leavers worked at some point in the period leaving 
TANF, their work was unsteady and was not able to lift their family above the poverty line; 
confirming that this population has notable challenges in engaging in steady work. The 
wage results are perhaps more stark, when ‘the year after leaving TANF, nearly two-thirds 
of parents had either no earnings or earnings below half the poverty line’ (Mitchell et al 
2018, p. 2 emphasis added), with nearly the same share in deep poverty four years after 
exit. Those who had to leave due to time limits have the worst outcomes overall, with 
median annual earnings in the fourth year after exit $1,370 – less than 7 percent of the 
Federal Poverty Line (Mitchell et al 2018, p. 15).  
It is important also to consider, as mentioned previously, that TANF eligibility criteria 
resulted in the programme serving fewer poor families, with a particularly notable increase 
in the number of AFDC/TANF leavers who are neither connected to work nor government 
assistance who are more likely to be living on $2 a day or less (the extremely poor) (Edin & 
Shaefer 2016). A drop in the TANF caseload was initially seen as a positive result of the 
policy, but shortly after the TANF reforms took effect, Blank and Kovak (2009) reported an 
increase in around one-third of the proportion of TANF-eligible single mothers that were 
disconnected from both work and welfare from 2000 to 2005. This is also notable 
particularly because of the strong labour market in that period. Today TANF simply does 
not reach many poor families, which will likely be reflected in this investigation as well: in 
2016, just 23 out of 100 poor families received cash assistance at any point in the year 
(Floyd et al 2017). Together with previous evidence on TANF leavers, TANF recipients in this 
investigation are expected to have particularly poor outcomes (compared to non-TANF 
survey members) in terms of labour market attachment, wages and household income, 
98 
 
particularly because after leaving benefits they are unlikely to improve their economic 
outcomes. 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Programme (SNAP) 
SNAP’s place in the American welfare state became more prominent following the welfare 
reforms of the mid-1990s and now is the third largest welfare state programme after Social 
Security and the Earned Income Tax Credit (Currie 2003). Most of the empirical work on 
SNAP investigates child and maternal health outcomes and food insecurity, as these are 
some of key outcomes for food policy specialists. The results on food insecurity are as 
expected, with the increase in benefit amount leading to a larger reduction in food 
insecurity for households overall (Rose et al 1998) and for adolescents in participating 
families (Bhattacharya & Currie 2000). There are far fewer studies done on the economic 
benefits of the programme, particularly as it is challenging to untangle the effects of in-kind 
benefits on food supply and labour market outcomes. However, there are a few results 
particularly on household consumption and labour market attachment that can inform the 
work here. In both qualitative and quantitative work, the reliability of SNAP benefits has 
been shown to be a protective factor against family income shocks, with Gundersen and 
Ziliak (2003) reporting that SNAP reduced income volatility by 12% and food consumption 
volatility by 14%. These quantitative results confirm the qualitative work by Edin and 
Shaefer (2016) with extremely poor families who report that SNAP is in many instances the 
only consistent source of income every month. Paired with the poverty gap reduction 
results detailed for those in deep poverty, this work may potentially find this type of 
‘protective’ effect for particularly disadvantaged sample members.  
The labour supply effects of SNAP have only been studied experimentally or quasi-
experimentally a few times, reviewed by Hoynes and Schanzenbach (2016): East’s (2015) 
study on immigrant family outcomes showed that married and single women’s employment 
declined (i.e. they left the labour market) while male employment rates did not decline 
though hours of work did when SNAP was received. Declines in the intensity of work for 
SNAP recipients (female headed households in particular) were also found by Hoynes and 
Schanzenbach (2012) when looking at data from the state by state rollout data of SNAP 
1961 to 1975 – however, given the lower work intensity of women in the labour market at 
that time and the higher likelihood of those households also receiving AFDC, these results 
may be less relevant. As with work on the effects of any welfare state programme, the 
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composition effects for participants must be kept in mind when analysing any results, as 
movements into and out of SNAP receipt are highly correlated with labour market 
outcomes.  
The reviews of means-tested programmes indicate particularly challenging long-term 
outcomes for those who receive government assistance, with results from JSA and TANF 
indicating negative results on future wages and future labour supply. However, there are 
some types of benefits included in the upcoming analysis that may show either positive or 
neutral results, particularly given the positive labour market attachment brought about by 
tax credit programmes in the UK and the potential protective factors of SNAP for family 
income volatility. In both cases it is also important to consider that those who currently 
receive cash assistance in one programme are eligible for or receiving other benefits, so it is 
likely that a patchwork of assistance is present in the lives of recipients. Where possible, 
then, the upcoming work will investigate if recipients who access multiple programmes are 
substantially different than those who access just one programme. When viewing the 
upcoming figures on benefit receipt in these two cases it is also important to consider that 
the proportion of citizens who receive assistance does not capture all those who are living 
in poverty and who are eligible because of lack of takeup; either due to explicit divergence 
from administrators, implicit divergence due to conditionality, or higher barriers to entry 
(reviewed in Chapter 1.2).  
And finally, the compositional characteristics of the population of citizens who receive 
means-tested benefits make it challenging to uncover precisely the direction of causation in 
the relationship between the receipt of government assistance and these economic 
outcomes, particularly in a longitudinal model that does not seek to use econometric 
methods that delineate ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ groups. Many of the reasons for receiving 
government assistance are due to challenging experiences in the labour market and low 
incomes, experiences that are unlikely to change dramatically even over the course of one’s 
lifespan (Erikson & Goldthorpe 1992; Goldthorpe 1980; Hardaway & McLoyd 2009). It is 
likely that this investigation may find lower labour market attachment for recipients in most 
cases and perhaps also lower wages, as structural disadvantages are compounded by 
further scarring from a period of very low income that makes one eligible to receive 
government assistance. The issue of causality and the nature of causal claims that can be 
made from this research are returned to in Chapter 3.  
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2.5 Orienting this Research  
One of the challenges in finding empirical evidence that speaks directly to the issue of 
means-tested benefits and young people’s independence outcomes is partially due to the 
siloed nature of theoretical and quantitative empirical research in these two fields. The 
most robust findings on the individual impacts of the welfare state on labour market 
outcomes are found in economics; however, the theoretical concerns and transition 
processes valuable to youth researchers are not a primary consideration in that work. 
Rather, some of the key drivers that youth transitions and life course researchers are 
interested in explicitly exploring – issues of structural disadvantage and certain ‘trigger’ 
events – are used as control variables or used merely to separate out subgroups of sample 
respondents in econometric work. On the other hand, much of youth transitions research 
into the primary drivers of economic outcomes (detailed in Chapter 2.2) does not explicitly 
consider how the experience of receiving government assistance can influence outcomes. 
Rather, experiences of benefit receipt may be considered as part of a larger effect of 
poverty generally, or experiences with the benefit system may be considered as part of a 
broader qualitative illustration of how young people in poverty navigate the transition 
period.  
This work seeks to bridge the two fields by explicitly applying the considerations of a life 
course framework – that transitional experiences must be considered in reference to both 
the structural issues and the agentic choices of the individual – to an investigation of how 
means-tested government assistance impacts the youth transition outcome of economic 
independence. In particular, the theoretical underpinning of the investigation is found in an 
exploration of the youth transition project, and the drivers identified in that literature are 
applied to a quantitative model of economic independence. This work also uses the 
theoretical framework of the welfare mix to guide the analysis and comparison of welfare 
states. Ideally then the work will be able to speak to two literatures: one which details how 
government assistance in a liberal welfare state impacts recipients in the long term (both 
for young people and for particular subpopulations of benefit recipients), and the other is 
interested in the state’s role in a youth transition. The next chapter details how this 




Chapter 3: Research Design and Methodology  
This chapter outlines the design of this research project, both as a quantitative longitudinal 
investigation of two cohort datasets and a comparative analysis of the case results. The 
uniqueness of this comparative approach warrants a discussion of its merits in the first 
instance, providing a theoretical basis for why these two cases should be compared. The 
research aims and question are detailed along with a discussion of the use of quantitative 
longitudinal models as most appropriate to answer the question and the nature of 
causality. The datasets that were chosen for use in each case are detailed followed by a 
technical discussion of the models that will be estimated. Finally, the post-estimation 
comparison is positioned within the larger context of comparative research.  
3.1 Rationale for Comparison  
The two datasets and subsequent models produced to measure the outcome of economic 
independence for the two youth cohorts here are detailed fully in Chapters 3.3 to 3.5. As 
will be detailed there are two separate samples and sets of empirical results that will be 
produced to answer the research question of interest, and therefore the two empirical 
analyses could stand on their own as single cases. This then begs the question of why 
compare at all. In this comparison the interest is in the ‘contextual uniqueness’ of each case 
that may impact the outcomes for the two countries investigated here (Skocpol & Somers 
1980). In this investigation the uniqueness of the cases is at the programmatic rather than 
the systemic level, and the common characteristics that attend a liberal market economy 
and the principles of a liberal welfare state serve as the ‘systematic controls’ of the 
research design (Skocpol & Somers 1980, p. 179). With these common among the cases, 
the work can then comment on the divergence of policies in practice and in outcomes that 
may emerge from these differences. This ‘contrast of contexts’ design (Skocpol & Somers 
1980) in the post-estimation comparison seeks broadly to determine the extent to which 
the expression of common concepts like ‘economic independence’, practiced in common 
macro-level environments, are affected by the country and cohort context in which these 
samples are located.  
The case comparison in this work engages with the contrasts of contexts using the 
analytical framework of the welfare mix (Powell & Barrientos 2004). The work compares 
the cases in each of the three welfare sources– the welfare state, the family, and the labour 
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market –to determine where the common principles of the two cases function similarly 
(despite the differences in period and programmatic contexts) and where divergent results 
may be caused by differences contexts. A comparative discussion of the welfare state 
source (the primary focus of this research) will detail whether the different functioning of 
the benefit systems in practice paired with the variations in time period impact target 
populations differently. In this type of comparison, then, the goal is to show how ‘the 
unique features [of each case] affect the working-out of putatively general social processes’ 
(Skocpol & Somers 1980, p.178) – in this case, the transition to economic independence.  
Therefore, rather than to disregard the ‘context-boundedness’ (Hantrais 2009) of each of 
the model results in an attempt to make general theoretical statements, this approach aims 
to use the specific contexts of the cases as the focal point. The value added of the 
comparison, then, is to determine whether the same types of policies, operating on the 
same types of principles, do indeed have similar long term outcomes for young people in 
different country contexts. This comparison will therefore be a separate analytical step in 
this investigation in post-estimation, a slightly different approach than comparativists who 
utilise large cross-national datasets to directly compare within empirical models. The value 
of analysing the separate results in comparison, then, is to determine the degree to which 
context matters in the youth transition experience of those who interact with the benefit 
system and those who are structurally disadvantaged, particularly among countries that are 
often grouped together in most welfare state research.  
3.2 Research Aims, Question and Longitudinal Design  
The aims of the research then are two-fold, as the research design can be considered a two 
stage process. The first is to determine the long-term impact of government assistance on 
economic independence for the two country cohorts, and the second is to comparatively 
discuss the achievement of economic independence in these two contexts and how the 
welfare state impacts this process.  
To achieve these aims, the research will be guided by one question:  
What is the impact of receiving government transfers in youth (age 16-24) on a low-income 
young person’s ability to become economically independent – live above a poverty income 
and attach steadily to the labour market – by their mid-30s/early 40s in the United States 
and the United Kingdom? 
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The long time horizon of this question necessarily leads a researcher to a longitudinal 
research design, a common tool for life course, econometric and other social science 
researchers. Selecting the appropriate design from the variety of longitudinal methods 
available requires consideration not only of the data available in each country context but 
importantly what the research requires.  
The primary value of a quantitative longitudinal study in social science is ‘its effectiveness 
for studying change’ (Diggle et al 2013, p. 16); in this case, studying the changes to a young 
person’s life course given a variety of individual factors, youth transition experiences and 
government interventions. There are various forms of quantitative longitudinal designs, all 
of which measure change and development over time, analyse durations in certain states, 
and/or identify the direction and magnitude of causal relationships (Menard 2002). The 
ability to make more robust statistical inferences about respondents using multiple 
datapoints is a key advantage of using longitudinal rather than cross-sectional data (Lewis-
Beck et al 2004; Menard 2002), overcoming the selection bias problem with data from only 
one time point (Guo 2009, p. 9) and controlling for residual heterogeneity, where the 
outcomes of the individual sample member are affected by unmeasured (or unmeasurable) 
variables (Menard 2002). 
In order to make these inferences about a particular group of respondents over a long 
period a longitudinal panel design was chosen, which interviews the same group of sample 
members at prescribed or available intervals in an ongoing survey period21. This type of 
design allows measurement of ‘intraindividual developmental trends’ for each individual 
(Lewis-Beck et al 2004); or more simply, the impact of time on the sample. This design can 
also help to disentangle ‘three types of effects: age, period and cohort’ among a group of 
respondents with repeated measures (Guo 2009, p. 9). In this study, age is the primary 
measure of time because it reflects changes in an outcome due to a developmental process 
that occurs regardless of the time period the survey is taken, something youth transitions 
researchers are most interested in. For example, questions about how wages may or may 
                                                          
21 There are three other types of longitudinal designs that were considered for this research but 
were not chosen because they did not provide long-term information on one sample of respondents 
to answer the research question. Total population designs and repeated cross-sectional designs were 
not chosen because they are best suited to measure population-level estimates and trends, and a 
revolving panel design (such as the British Youth Cohort Survey) was not chosen because the same 
group of respondents are only followed for a few years and therefore long-term trends are unable to 
be identified for the same group. 
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not rise as a function of a respondent’s age is an effect that is one of the first to be 
measured in this research. This research also considers period and cohort effects in the 
post-estimation analysis when discussing the two case results to investigate whether the 
date of the youth period of each survey sample impacts variation among the two cases 
(period effects), and/or whether there are generational effects in the expression of both 
the outcome and the covariates of interest (cohort effects) (Holford 2005 in Guo 2009).  
Apart from distinguishing variation among subjects, a longitudinal panel design also 
provides information across a number of years for an individual to determine how much 
variation in outcomes are due to variations within an individual life course. In this case, the 
area of interest is how the presence of government intervention in a young person’s life 
course is a factor in the trajectory of their achievement of economic independence, as well 
as how this trajectory differs from other sample members; therefore, the same cohort of 
individuals should be investigated. This type of design takes advantage of multiple years’ 
worth of data on a factor (e.g. household size) that is hypothesised to be influential to the 
outcome (e.g. the trend in a respondent’s monthly wages) for the same individual in order 
to make inferences about these trends.  
The Nature of Causality and Causal Claims 
Before this chapter details the technical aspects of model design, it is valuable to explain 
the ways in which this investigation is able to engage with causal claims from the upcoming 
regression models; broadly, the ability of this approach to infer causality. This work must 
therefore be situated within either associational or causal inference approaches. Many 
authors, particularly within econometrics, have written extensively on the ways that 
associational analysis, typified ‘by concepts such as regression, dependence, likelihood, 
odds ratios… and “controlling for”’, differ from causal analysis, which is typified ‘by 
concepts such as randomization, effect, confounding…and attribution’ (Pearl 2009, p. 99). 
Holland’s seminal work in this field notes that associational inference makes statistical 
inferences about the parameters relating to an outcome (Y) and factors (X) on the basis of 
data gathered about the outcome and factors; factors that be internal or external to the 
individual under investigation but which can be observed (1986). Causal inference, on the 
other hand, analyses the effects of causes using counterfactual analysis at its core. That is, 
analysing two causes for every effect (for a treatment and a control/comparison group) to 
properly estimate what might happen to the treated group in the absence of the treatment 
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(the counterfactual) (Abadie & Cattaneo 2018; Holland 1986). This counterfactual, of 
course, cannot logically ever be observed (what Holland deems the ‘Fundamental Problem 
of Causal Inference’), but it can be ‘created’ for the purpose of analysis by using a 
control/comparison group using either randomization or creation of a control group with a 
variety of methods like propensity score matching (Abadie & Cattaneo 2018; Holland 1986; 
Pearl 2009). Most statistical analyses in the social sciences are associational, as they are 
often interested in the relationship between factors that are likely unable to be changed by 
either the unit being investigated (e.g. race, parental background) or cannot potentially be 
applied as a treatment to all of the units of analysis (e.g. specific levels of work intensity). In 
Rubin’s Model of Causal Inference (explicated by Holland 1986) this last point is critical, 
because in causal inference ‘each unit [must] be potentially exposable to any one of the 
causes’ (Holland, 1986, p. 946), and that the key factor being investigated is viewed as a 
‘treatment’.  
It is in this specification of a treatment, and the requirement for a treatment/intervention 
to be explicitly defined, where the research question being addressed in this investigation 
does not fit well into models of causal inference. While the key independent variable of 
interest, the receipt of government assistance, can indeed be considered a ‘treatment’ it is 
the intention of this work to also consider how other aspects of a young person’s biography 
may also impact variation in the outcomes of interest. This takes the investigation beyond 
the narrowly defined econometric, hypothesis-driven models on the effects of government 
programmes (such as those reviewed in Chapter 2) to consider factors and processes that 
are of interest to sociological researchers. The factors included in the upcoming models 
which are theorised to impact the expression of economic independence (detailed in 
Chapter 3.4) may be both internal to the unit being investigated, like gender, and external, 
like receipt of government assistance; internal factors that cannot be causes in the 
specification of Rubin’s Model of Causal Inference. Second, the investigation here does not 
seek to understand the effect of a treatment/cause using the framework of counterfactual 
analysis. This is because in many ways the investigation is exploratory and descriptive at its 
core, as a way to investigate how a youth transitions lens can be brought to bear on an 
investigation into the welfare state. Thus neither is a single intervention isolated for 
investigation of causal effects nor is a comparison or control group used in the upcoming 
models as would be done in causal analysis.  
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Therefore the type of inferences that can be made from the models of this investigation are 
associational rather than causal. The model results will detail associations and factors that 
may impact the expression of the outcome variables, but will not be able to identify the 
causal effect22 as defined in experimental/causal analyses. Where the terms ‘effects’ are 
used in the upcoming chapters they refer only to ‘effect sizes’ (i.e covariate effect sizes).  
With the theoretical underpinning established, this work can now move to the technical 
aspects of the research design. The next sections detail the datasets that are used in this 
empirical research, including the sample constructed for this empirical work, missing data 
issues, and how the three main outcomes in the upcoming models are specified within each 
of the datasets chosen. 
3.3 Empirical data used in this investigation 
Rationale for dataset selection 
In order to adequately address the research question using a longitudinal panel design, the 
datasets selected had to at minimum fulfil three criteria: first, the dataset had to follow one 
cohort of respondents and cover the youth period to mid-life; second, the dataset had to 
include information on receipt of government transfers along with information in the three 
youth transition domains noted in the literature; and third, the youth period of the cohort 
would ideally be situated during or after the most recent welfare state restructuring efforts 
in the US and UK from the 1980s through the mid-1990s. As will be detailed in the following 
sections, the time points of each cohort’s youth period differ slightly due to data 
availability, but cover particularly significant welfare reform periods resulting from 
Conservative welfare principles in action (detailed in Chapter 1). Fulfilment of the third 
criterion enables the research to speak more directly to current debates on the impact of 
the welfare state on economic independence, as the welfare states accessed by cohort 
members in both cases are as similar as possible to the current system while also including 
data on outcomes in mid-life. 
                                                          
22 In Rubin’s Model this is the difference in the averages in the outcome of interest between the 
treated and control groups over individual units (Holland, 1986). According to Pearl (2009) causal 
effects must be determined by the presence of a counterfactual: ‘behind any causal conclusion there 
must be some causal assumption, untested in observational studies’ (p. 100). 
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If all three of these criteria were fulfilled the waves in each survey were synthesised to 
determine if enough cases were present for a robust longitudinal analysis to occur. In the 
UK case, the British Household Panel Survey was originally considered for use whereby a 
synthetic ‘youth’ cohort would be created from the household panel following the 
methodology of Gayle and colleagues (2009); this was proposed primarily because the 
survey period of the youth cohorts in both cases would be as similar as possible. 
Unfortunately, once this cohort was synthesised there were less than 300 observations in 
the sample, a number that would likely be reduced once cases were removed during model 
integration due to missing data. Therefore, the most appropriate cohort dataset fulfilling 
these criteria for the British case was the 1970 British Cohort Study and the dataset fulfilling 
these criteria for the American case was the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997, 
which are detailed in turn.  
The 1970 British Cohort Study (BCS) 
The 1970 British Cohort Study (BCS) captures medical and social data all of the residents of 
Great Britain who were born from 5-11 April 1970 and is currently administered by the 
Centre for Longitudinal Studies at University College London. There have been 8 sweeps of 
cohort data since the original survey at birth that are publicly available at the UK Data 
Archive: at ages 5, 10, 16, 26, 30, 34, 38 and 42. The first wave of data was collected for the 
17,198 residents born in that week using a questionnaire completed by the mother, 
administered by the midwife present at the birth (CLS 2017). Because the organisers of this 
study sought to capture all respondents living in Britain born in the same week in 1970, 
efforts were taken during waves 2 through 4 to contact eligible children who were living in 
Britain but who had not previously been surveyed. Thus, more cases were added at each 
wave up to age 16, increasing the total number of respondents to 19,101 for the life of the 
survey. In the same vein as the previous birth cohort study in Britain, the 1958 National 
Child Development Study, the aim of the BCS was primarily to trace health and education 
outcomes for the child sample members (Pearson 2017). However, as the respondents aged 
the topics of the survey necessarily broadened to include employment, income and family 
formation topics in addition to health information. 
A subsample of the British Cohort Survey has additional properties that this empirical study 
can utilise to effectively answer this research question. The Twenty One Year Sample 
Survey was given to 10% of the total sample (n = 1645) and sought to detail education, 
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income, and employment outcomes in early adulthood. Notably, the age 21 sample survey 
provides the most detailed information on respondents in the youth period after age 16 
and is the only survey that is squarely in the age range of interest of this research due to 
funding constraints for UK cohort surveys in the 1990s23. This survey notably included 
questions on employment status, usual working hours, detailed information on labour 
income, any government assistance received in the year, and government training 
participation. Finally, the survey also gathered housing and mobility information, including 
whether the respondent was currently living with their parents, or when they moved out of 
their parent’s house if applicable. 
As the age 21 sweep is the only one conducted in the youth period that captures benefit 
receipt for cohort members considered as their own benefit units, this investigation 
focused on the BCS members that participated in this subsample. The age 21 sample was 
synthesised with subsequent survey waves (at age 26, 30, 34, 38 and 42) for each 
respondent to create a person-wave dataset: however, as noted in the Data Limitations 
section, the age 26 and the age 38 survey were dropped for missingness of the key 
independent variable. One covariate from the 1986 survey, parental income quintile, was 
added to the synthesised dataset as a time-invariant measure of socio-economic 
background. In order for a case to be considered for use in this research, respondents had 
to be present in the age 42 survey24 and one other survey to ensure at least one year of 
further early-adulthood information is present in each of the models. These requirements 
resulted in 1,131 cases in the research sample, with survey waves for each individual case 
ranging between three and six (panel missingness detailed in next section). This unbalanced 
panel is taken into consideration when choosing a modelling method.  
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY) 
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 is a nationally representative sample of a 
cohort of Americans born between 1980 and 1984 ‘designed to document the transition 
from school to work and into adulthood’ (BLS 2006). The first survey was administered to 
sample members in 1997 when respondents were between 12 and 17 years old, who were 
                                                          
23 Further detail on the challenges of keeping the BCS 1970 funded and how this affected the survey 
waves available for research can be found in Helen Pearson’s book The Life Project (2017). 
24 Respondents had to be present in the age 42 survey because one of the outcomes, gross 
household income, is a time-invariant measure only captured at that time period.  
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interviewed for 16 waves annually to 2011, and biennially from 2011 onwards. At of the 
beginning of this empirical work the latest survey available for use was the 2013 wave25. 
Unlike the BCS, this dataset includes respondents from a five-year age range and therefore 
there are ‘younger’ cohort members and ‘older’ cohort members in each survey wave. This 
element of the NLSY sample was investigated in descriptive figures with the outcome 
variables to determine whether there is sufficient variation to warrant inclusion of a 
covariate indicating year of birth: however, variation between ‘older’ and ‘younger’ sample 
members in the outcome measures was not deemed sufficient, so this dataset is treated as 
a single cohort (see Appendix A for descriptive figures detailing this issue).  
The NLSY 1997 and its predecessor the NLSY 1979 are funded and administered by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) in the U.S. Department of Labor, and data is accessed 
through the BLS web system the NLS Investigator. As a project of the Department of Labor, 
much of the survey questions necessarily focus on labour market attachment and 
employment experience among cohort members. However, the survey also contains 
information on the education, training, major health issues and government programme 
participation of cohort members in each of the annual survey waves. The initial 1997 wave 
also included a parent/guardian survey with detailed information on parental income, 
education and programme participation. Together the survey provides a robust picture of 
the economic life of the respondent from adolescence to mid-life, and notably includes 
detailed (sometimes monthly) government transfer information to be used as covariates of 
interest in this research.  
The first survey wave (1997) included 8,984 respondents consisting of a representative 
sample and a supplemental sample. The 6,478 cross-sectional sample was designed to be 
representative of people living in the United States in 1997 born between 1980 and 1984, 
and a supplemental sample of 2,236 respondents who are Hispanic/Latino or Black was also 
included in the initial sample. As with most national surveys in the United States, the NLSY 
includes an oversample of minority respondents in order to have enough sample members 
to provide adequate subgroup comparisons by race and ethnicity26. The final survey wave 
                                                          
25 The 2015 survey wave was released in September 2017 when the empirical work of this 
investigation was already completed, so this panel’s data is not included in this study.  
  26 The NLSY racial breakdown for the 1997 sample is as follows: Non-black/non-Hispanic White:      




used for this analysis in 2013 (respondents between 29 and 34.5 years old) included 7,141 
respondents. The low attrition rate across 16 survey rounds (21.5%) makes this cohort 
dataset one of the more robust available (BLS 2015). All 16 waves of the survey were 
synthesised to create a longitudinal dataset organised by person-wave, and unlike the BCS 
no subsamples were utilised for this case. As there are cases in the dataset with different 
numbers of survey waves present, this dataset is also considered an unbalanced panel and 
the modelling methods chosen had to also account for this characteristic. 
Missing Data Issues  
As with other longitudinal investigations, a focus on ensuring an adequate sample size 
across panels is of primary importance. A large number of respondents with all or close to 
all panels ensures that the inferences drawn from the data are not biased and that key 
demographic groups can be adequately compared. To address the primary issue of 
adequate sample size across all panels, this work investigated missingness by panel, how 
the panels were constructed to properly address the research question, and if any 
particular covariates had missingness concerns that needed to be addressed. Panel 
construction is detailed for both datasets in turn, noting both the theoretical and practical 
considerations taken in this process.  
In the BCS sample of the 1,645 respondents from the Twenty One Year sample survey the 
investigation originally considered including data from the 1986 (age 16) survey, the 
beginning of the youth period. However once waves were synthesised over 10% of the 
sample (186 cases) did not have any data for this wave, detailed in Figure 1 of Appendix B. 
A requirement of including the full 1986 data would drop far too many cases during model 
integration and therefore the full set of 1986 indicators were not used. The only indicator 
from the 1986 survey used was parental income, where respondents without 1986 waves 
or without parental income data were denoted as missing (Skafida 2011). The household 
level outcome of gross household income was measured at age 42, and therefore cases 
without age 42 data were dropped. The requirement of data at the age 42 wave also meant 
it was not useful to apply survey weights to the BCS data to correct for attrition. Also, 
survey weights for the Twenty One Year sample cohort were not available. Those without 
one other wave of survey data were also removed from the final dataset: due to the long 
time period between the age 21 and 42 year survey it was necessary to have at least one 
other adulthood wave in order to adequately estimate trajectories on the two individual 
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outcomes with longitudinal models. This resulted in 31% of the original 1,645 cases 
dropped, with a resulting pattern of panels detailed in Figure 2, Appendix B. 69% of the 
sample (787 cases) have all panels with an additional 10% of the sample with data for all 
panels except for age 26 (183 cases). 
The NLSY dataset begun in 1997 surveyed 8,984 respondents which also includes 
information from a parental survey (if provided by the parent). All of the models for the 
NLSY data have longitudinal outcomes and therefore it was not necessary for cases to 
include the 2013 wave. Figure 3 of Appendix B describes the pattern of responses for the 
8984 cases; like in the BCS survey, to improve the validity of the estimation cases with less 
than half the panels (6 panels or less, 7.6% of the total) were removed which reduced the 
number of cases in 1997 to 8,296. Figure 4 of Appendix B details the pattern of panels after 
those cases are dropped, which shows that 4,966 cases have all 16 panels (59.6% of 
sample) with another 218 cases with all waves except for 2013 (2.6% of sample). As 
mentioned above, oversampling of racial minority groups ensured that the NLSY sample 
included large enough groups to compare and the aim for this investigation is the same; 
thus, no racial weights are applied to the data to mirror the slightly lower proportion of 
Black and Hispanic respondents in the population. 
With the newly created cohorts of the BCS and NLSY, it was therefore possible to undertake 
complete case analysis available with confidence that a large majority of observations 
would not be dropped when models were integrated, as over half of cases had all of the 
panels. The second issue to address is missing values in the proposed covariates for use in 
each case. Univariate analysis concluded that the covariate used to measure parental 
income/parental aid history had the largest occurrence of missing data; in both cases close 
to a quarter of sample members had missing data on these variables (provided in further 
detail in Appendix C). Listwise deletion of all the cases with missing data on these variables 
would likely distort the results. One of the common ways that missing income data is 
addressed is to impute estimated values based on information provided in previous or 
future panels; however, the 1986 survey in the BCS and the 1997 survey in the NLSY were 
the only panels where parental income was provided for each case and therefore imputing 
values in this way was not theoretically desirable. Instead, following the methodology of 
Skafida (2011), a separate ‘Missing’ income response category was created on the parental 
income/aid history covariate to avoid losing a large portion of cases from the analysis 
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without the labour intensive work of multiple imputation for a project of this size. Once the 
issue of non-response was addressed in the parental income covariates, univariate analysis 
concluded that missingness on other covariates affected only a small number of cases that 
were deemed not to be detrimental to the sample (see Appendix C). Once the cohorts were 
constructed to be theoretically appropriate and large enough to ensure validity, a complete 
case analysis was able to commence. 
Data Limitations 
As mentioned above, the British Cohort Study dataset has a particularly large gap in the 
time period between survey waves; most notably between age 21 and 30. Although the 21-
year survey does include benefit information in the youth period, ideally the dataset would 
have one or two more waves of data in the youth period to better estimate the impacts of 
youth-period events on the outcomes. There are also two BCS waves where benefit receipt 
information was either not gathered, or was not captured in forms compatible with prior 
survey waves for synthesis. The age 26 postal survey did not ask any questions on benefit 
receipt and therefore waves were dropped, and the age 38 telephone survey asked 
respondents about sources of income, which were deemed to have issues with 
measurement validity due to the lack of question specificity27.  
The only data-related limitation with the NLSY survey was that the Department of Labor 
does not make state-level data available to researchers at institutions outside of the United 
States. So although NLSY cohort members have state level identifiers, this investigation 
could not engage with this data. It would have been ideal to utilise this information 
                                                          
27 The 2008 survey was done by telephone and did not ask questions on receipt and amount of 
specific benefits. Rather, respondents were asked if they did or did not have particular sources of 
income. For the purposes of this investigation, the most notable of those sources are ‘tax credits’, 
‘income support’ and ‘other state benefits’. The question format is problematic in two ways. First, 
‘other state benefits’ could include many benefits that are not means-tested (e.g. Employment 
Support Allowance or Disability Living Allowance) and therefore are out of the scope of this research. 
Thus, this income source is not fully compatible with the measures of benefit receipt in the other 
waves. Second, the ‘income support’ category could be interpreted broadly as other government 
assistance rather than the specific Income Support benefit programme noted in other waves. This 
potential problem with the 2008 data was brought to my attention when the longitudinal figures for 
overall benefit receipt and Income Support had major spikes in receipt that went wildly counter to IS 





(perhaps) as a multilevel longitudinal model, but unfortunately that was not possible28. 
Rather, the geographic indicator for respondents is provided at the Census region level. 
3.4 Model Elements and Modelling Logic  
Specification of key model elements  
For each of the datasets used here, three model elements had to be specified based on 
their theoretical and methodological appropriateness for answering this research question: 
the measurement of time, the outcome measures (dependent variables), and the groups of 
factors that serve as the independent variables. These three elements are then 
operationalised using measures available in each dataset. In each of the two cases the 
measurement of time used is age of the respondent: this is a standard measurement of 
time in life course research that allows researchers to view the results in a developmental 
framework. The age measure is either specified as a continuous or categorical variable 
(used as time dummies) depending upon the type of age data available in each dataset: in 
the BCS sample age is measured at 21, 30, 34 and 42 and in the NLSY sample the age 
variable is continuous. 
The concept of economic independence was detailed in the literature review and is the 
outcome of interest, consisting of living above a poverty income and attaching steadily to 
the labour market. To operationalise the first component of economic independence, living 
above a poverty income, a household measure of economic status (household income 
quintile in the BCS, poverty ratio specified as an ordinal variable in the NLSY) and an 
individual measure of income (wage income specified as a continuous variable) are used. 
The individual measure of wage income provides evidence of the respondent’s own ability 
to live above a poverty income through waged work, and the household income/poverty 
ratio measure provides a full picture of the respondent’s economic circumstances as it 
includes partner income and income from government assistance if received (aligning with 
the approach of Smeeding & Phillips 2002). The household measure may be particularly 
relevant to explore for respondents who may have little income from their own wages but 
may indeed still live above a poverty income with other income sources. A household-level 
outcome measure also enables an investigation into whether individual drivers impact the 
                                                          
28 Suggestions of future research utilising this aspect of the NLSY data in research question like the 
one posed here are detailed in Chapter 6.3. 
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household the same as they may impact the individual; it is likely that particular factors in 
an individual outcome do not have the same type or magnitude of effect when a household 
measure of economic status is used. The second concept, labour market attachment, is 
measured by usual weekly hours of work (in the BCS) or in the number of weeks worked 
per year (in the NLSY); both measures of work intensity29. As will be noted in the Results 
chapters, there are benefits and drawbacks to these measures of work intensity, especially 
given the type of labour market participation patterns common in the youth labour market 
(e.g. more seasonal or temporary work). Notably, these measures operationalise waged 
work intensity, and therefore those who are not attached to the formal labour market in 
each case are counted as ‘zeros’ for this outcome rather than dropped in the analysis.  
The groups of factors used as independent variables were selected both based on previous 
research identifying explanatory variables in modelling economic outcomes while also 
including factors relevant to youth transitions. Independent variables included in each of 
the models were categorised into five main covariate groups in order to aid stepwise model 
building: demographic characteristics, employment domain factors30, family formation 
factors, parental background and government interventions. These groups (or blocks) 
organise the covariates included in each of the models to ensure concepts are theoretically 
grounded and consistent between cases, even though the measures necessarily differ.  
The choice of these blocks of covariates reflects previous theoretical and empirical evidence 
in each of the fields of research this work engages with. The first block of covariates 
measures demographic characteristics as appropriate to the model, including gender, race, 
highest education level, region of residence and general health. The ‘transition project’ 
framework used to organise the literature in Chapter 2 is explicitly reflected in the 
employment and family formation domains, captured in separate blocks of covariates. 
Employment domain covariates include work intensity or employment status (in wages 
models) and general health, which is included given existing evidence on labour market 
attachment and health status. Family formation domain covariates measure changes in 
family composition (e.g. household size and marriage) and key youth ‘trigger events’ 
                                                          
29 Please see Table 3 for a detailed description of the operationalisation of each outcome variable. 
Full descriptive statistics for each outcome are detailed before the presentation of each of the model 
results in Chapters 4 and 5.  
30 The employment domain block of covariates was not included in a model of work intensity, as this 
was the primary outcome measured.  
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(DiPrete & McManus 2000) such as young parenting and residential transitions31. Parental 
background, a key driver in a variety of economic, social and health outcomes, is measured 
using either parental income at the beginning of the youth period (BCS wave 1986 & NLSY 
income 199732) or parental aid history33. The final block of covariates, government 
intervention, contains where possible information both on government training 
participation and the receipt of government transfers.  
Appendix C details univariate statistics for all measures used in model estimation in both 
cases for covariates apart from outcome measures or government intervention covariates, 
which are provided in the Results chapters. The tables in Appendix C detail the distribution 
of responses in each category in each wave in the BCS and the average of four waves in the 
NLSY case for categorical variables, and the mean values of continuous covariates.  
Modelling Logic  
A stepwise modelling logic was followed for this model, where multiple iterations of the 
models were performed and sets of covariates were added to the model according to the 
theoretical logic of how factors may influence the outcome. In this case the groups (or 
blocks) of covariates are entered into a longitudinal model using a logic that can be 
                                                          
31 It was determined through preliminary covariate descriptive analyses that the BCS dataset did not 
contain an indicator of residential independence that is detailed enough to provide meaningful 
information on family formation processes as is found in the US sample. The survey at age 21 asked 
if the respondents were living in a household outside of their family of origin (yes/no), and around 
95% of respondents were indeed living away from their family home. No further information was 
provided in subsequent surveys about their moving out experience in the youth period. 
32 The measure of parental background used in the wages and work intensity models of the NLSY is 
gross household income in 1997, a measure contained in the primary cohort dataset rather than 
parental dataset. Over 97% of respondents reported household income in 1997 as their parental 
income, and therefore this measure is used as an ordinal quintile variable with a missing category as 
a family of origin covariate. 
33 The parental income quintile variable created and used in the NLSY individual models used family 
income in 1997 as the parental background measure (detailed in footnote 26), which is also used to 
create the poverty ratio outcome. Given that both the outcome variable and an independent 
variable use the same underlying measure it is not methodologically sound to use these two 
variables in the same model. A few options for a new parental background covariate were 
considered, both of which use the history of government aid receipt as the measure of 
socioeconomic status. There were issues regarding the number of valid responses for the first choice 
covariate, the variable that measured whether parents received any government assistance in the 
last 5 years, with only around 2,600 valid responses with little information on the reason for 
missingness. The second choice variable with a full sample of valid responses measures whether the 
parent received any form of government assistance since age 18 or since their eldest child was 




described as inside-out. The endogenous time-invariant factors (demographic 
characteristics) are included in a model first, after first modelling age and the outcome of 
interest, and model building proceeds generally to individual covariates in the two 
transition domains. The exogenous factors are included after those, from parental 
background information to finally covariates on government intervention. The figure below 
(Figure 2) is a template of the modelling logic followed in each of the six models used in this 
research. For each outcome a diagram is populated with covariates available and 
appropriate from each dataset that are then used in model iterations. The diagram details 
the specification of the dependent variable, the covariates included in each block and 
whether they are time-varying or time-invariant, any covariates that were tested in the 
model and not included in the final model specification (in red), and interaction terms used 
in model iterations. In this way the modelling logic diagram serves as a roadmap for the 
empirical analysis; in all, six completed logic diagrams were created for this investigation.  
Figure 2: Modelling Logic Template  
 
3.5 Methodology and Estimation Techniques  
For these and every type of quantitative model, the aim in the model building process is not 
only to include as many appropriate but parsimonious predictors in the model as possible, 
but to also select a modelling strategy that is able to control for unobserved characteristics 
of respondents that either cannot or have not been measured (Allison 2009, p. 1). For this 
longitudinal data the class of regression models considered for the linear outcomes are 
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fixed effects models, which also include random effects and correlated random effects 
models as special cases of fixed effects models (Allison 2009; Wooldridge 2002; Wooldridge 
2012). For the two ordinal outcomes, ordered logistic models are detailed. These methods 
are detailed in turn and their appropriateness is considered for use given the data and 
research question.  
Modelling a Linear Wage Outcome: Fixed Effects and Random Effects  
In the first instance of the linear outcome, either monthly or annual wages, a determination 
had to be made as to which longitudinal model was best – fixed effects (FE) or random 
effects (RE). The most substantive difference between these two models is ‘the structure of 
the associations between the observed variables and unobserved variables’ (Allison 2009, 
p. 2) and therefore how they model endogeneity (Wooldridge 2002). To properly detail the 
difference between each of these model types, the work begins with a standard 
longitudinal model, with covariates (𝛽1, 𝛽2 … 𝛽𝑘) either time-varying or time-invariant and 
two different error terms; one error term that captures the unobserved effect within an 
individual over time (𝑢𝑖𝑡) and an error term that varies between individuals that does not 
vary over time (𝑎𝑖).  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑡1 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑖𝑡2 … 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑘 + 𝑎𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡  (Equation 1.1) 
It is the handling of the subject-specific error term given in 𝑎𝑖  where the fixed effects and 
random effects models differ. In a fixed effects model, the unobserved variables 𝑎𝑖  are 
allowed to have any correlations with the time-varying observed variables in the model, 
and have fixed parameters that can be controlled for using a method called time-
demeaning (Allison 2009). This method computes the means over time for both the 
response variable and time varying predictor variables per person to create a ‘fixed’ set of 
error parameters (Allison 2009; Wooldridge 2012). The time-demeaning process then 
subtracts the person-specific means from the observed values of the variable, which also in 
turn removes the error term 𝑎𝑖  and the time-invariant predictors from any results 
(Wooldridge 2012, p. 467). By explicitly modelling this ‘fixed effect’ over time, subjects 
serve as their own controls for unobserved characteristics 𝑎𝑖  and therefore these are 
estimated out of the equations. In a fixed effects model, then, after the time-demeaning 
(also called a within-transformation) the model is specified:  
 ÿ𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽1?̈?𝑖𝑡1 + 𝛽2?̈?𝑖𝑡2 + ⋯ 𝛽𝑘?̈?𝑖𝑡𝑘 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  (Equation 1.2);  
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with ?̈? indicating the covariate is time-demeaned.  
In any fixed effects model, therefore, there are estimates for time-varying predictors and 
within-subject variation only. This type of model is generally considered to be a more 
efficient modelling technique for panel data, as the error term 𝑎𝑖  is removed and all 
observed and unobserved time-invariant predictors (with time-invariant effects) are 
controlled for (Allison 2009).  
A random effects model is specified in the same way as Equation 1.1., although now the 
error term 𝑎𝑖  is assumed to be a set of random variables with a specified probability 
distribution; in this case, 𝑎𝑖  is assumed to be normally distributed with a mean of zero 
which adds the intercept α to the equation. Importantly in this specification 𝑎𝑖  is also 
assumed to be uncorrelated with any of the time varying predictors (Allison 2009). Because 
of this assumption, a fixed effect cannot be estimated and the subject-specific error term 
cannot be removed from the model using the process of time-demeaning, nor are the time-
invariant predictors also removed in this transformation. The equation for a random effects 
model is the same as Equation 1.1 with the specified covariate structure below. This 
covariate structure indicates that the error term and each covariate and the response are 
not time-demeaned, where t is time period and j as person-year: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑡1 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑖𝑡2 … 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑘 + 𝑎𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡 (Equation 1.3) 
Cov(𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑗, 𝑎𝑖) = 0, t = 1, 2,.. T; j = 1, 2, …k  
The assumption of zero correlation between unobserved characteristics in 𝑎𝑖  and the time-
varying predictors (𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑗) is a large one, as it assumes that no variables of importance are 
omitted (Williams 2015), therefore from an endogeneity standpoint, a fixed-effects model 
is preferred. However, one of the drawbacks of a fixed effects model is that it does not 
estimate the effects of time-invariant covariates directly (like the gender of the respondent) 
and therefore these covariates cannot be analysed. Allison (2009) notes as well that a fixed 
effects approach generally sacrifices bias in estimators for greater efficiency: in general, 
fixed effects model results have larger standard errors, wider confidence intervals, and 
higher p-values because fixed effects models only use information on the within-effects 
(time-varying predictors and errors) rather than both the within-effects and between-
effects (time invariant predictors and errors) used in random effects models. Importantly, 
‘if predictor variables vary greatly across individuals but have little variation over time for 
each individual, then fixed effects estimates will be very imprecise’ (Allison 2009, p. 3). A 
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Hausman specification test is commonly used by researchers to determine which type of 
model is more unbiased by comparing both RE and FE estimates of the time-varying 
predictors. If the model does not reject the null hypothesis the estimates of time-varying 
covariates in the RE and FE models are not found to be statistically significantly different 
from one another, and random effects estimates should be used as they have lower 
standard errors.  If the test rejects the null hypothesis, a fixed effects model should be used 
(Wooldridge 2012). In the case of both the BCS and the NLSY data, models of wages were 
estimated using both the RE and FE models and Hausman specification tests were 
completed. As perhaps expected, due to the large within-subject variation in each of 
datasets on the covariates of interest the Hausman test rejected the random effects 
assumptions and therefore a fixed effects model should be used34.   
However, the drawbacks of using a fixed effects model is made clear when some of the key 
time-invariant predictors for the youth transition experiences in particular are removed 
from the model. Estimates of the impact of young parenthood, age at first move out, and 
parental background are not able to be explicitly estimated in a fixed effects model – 
potentially key areas of interest in relation to the receipt of government assistance and to 
the outcome of economic independence more broadly. In particular for the NLSY model, 
the race covariate is also now controlled for and therefore not estimated; this removes a 
covariate that may be able to provide some nuance to the discussion of both youth 
transition experiences and government assistance, particularly in interaction effects.  
Modelling a Linear Wage Outcome: The Correlated Random Effects Model  
Wooldridge (2009, 2012) presents an alternative model to both the fixed effects and 
random effects model that allows for correlation between random effects and time-varying 
predictors by explicitly allowing 𝛼𝑖 to be correlated with time-varying predictors. Rather 
than using time-demeaning to remove the time-invariant covariates and the error term 𝑎𝑖, 
this method allows correlation with the time-average of time-varying predictors as in the 
fixed effects model. This correlation is given in the linear relationship:  
𝑎𝑖 =  𝛼 +  𝛾?̅?𝑖 + 𝑟𝑖 (Equation 1.4) 
                                                          
34 See Appendix D for details of the Hausman test results performed on the final wage models for 
both the BCS and the NLSY data.  
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This function is substituted for the error term in the random effects model (Equation 1.3) 
with the vector of covariates (both time-varying and time-invariant) given as 𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡, and 
includes the addition of the vector of time-averaged variables which controls for the 
correlation between 𝛼𝑖 and the sequence of time-varying variables as was done in the fixed 
effects model (𝛾𝑥𝑖). The correlated random effects model is therefore: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾𝑥𝑖 + 𝑟𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡  (Equation 1.5); 
where 𝑟𝑖 is the time-constant unobservable error term that includes the relationship 
between itself and time-varying covariates, and 𝛾𝑥𝑖 is the vector of mean values of time-
varying predictors. 
These additions allow for the estimates of the time-varying main effects to be equal to 
those obtained using a fixed effects model while still allowing for the time-invariant 
predictors to be estimated (Wooldridge 2009, 2012). This model ‘provides a synthesis of 
the RE and FE models’ while also including time-invariant predictors ‘in what is effectively a 
fixed effects analysis’ (Wooldridge 2012, p. 480). This type of mean-centering is also 
suggested by Allison which he calls a ‘hybrid method’ between FE and RE models (2009). 
Allison notes in particular that the coefficient effect sizes for the mean-centred/time-
averaged variables (𝛾𝑥𝑖) are ‘not particularly enlightening’ (2009, p. 25) when considered 
on their own, but are used primarily to obtain more accurate estimates of the covariate 
effects of the time-invariant variables as a technical tool. Therefore, their effects in the 
Results chapters will not be considered separately.  
Modelling a Longitudinal Ordinal Outcome: Random Effects Ordered Logistic 
Regression  
The work intensity outcome in both datasets and the household poverty ratio outcome in 
the NLSY data are specified as ordinal variables that are measured at every survey wave. 
Modelling these outcomes must therefore use the only longitudinal model for ordered 
outcomes, a random effects regression – either ordered logit or ordered probit. As noted by 
Allison (2009) and others, a fixed effects model (or conditional maximum likelihood) cannot 
be used on an ordered outcome using panel data, as it ‘does not have reduced sufficient 
statistics for the error parameters’ (𝑢𝑖𝑡) (Allison 2009, p. 42). As noted in the STATA 
guidance for estimating a random effects ordered logit model, ‘The conditional distribution 
of the dependent variable given the random effects is assumed to be multinomial with 
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success probability determined by the logistic cumulative distribution function35’ (StataCorp 
2013b, p. 2). Simply, an ordered logistic regression model estimates the probability of a 
respondent’s outcome in one of the categories of the outcome variable compared to the 
higher paired category of the outcome variable. In the case of a three-category poverty 
ratio outcome, for example, the model seeks to estimate the difference in odds of being in 
a higher (or worse) poverty ratio category given particular characteristics of explanatory 
variables. As a probability function, the equation is specified as:  
Pr(𝑦𝑖𝑡 > 𝑘 | 𝐾, 𝑥𝑖𝑡 , 𝑎𝑖) = 𝐻(𝑥𝑖𝑡𝛽 +  𝑎𝑖 − 𝐾𝑘)  (Equation 2.1) 
for i = 1, . . . , 𝑛 panels, where t = 1, . . . , 𝑛𝑖 , 𝑎𝑖are panel-level random effects independent 
and identically distributed 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑣
2), and 𝐾 is a set of cutpoints 𝐾1,, 𝐾2, . . . 𝐾𝐾−1, where 𝐾 is 
the number of possible outcomes; and H(·) is the logistic cumulative distribution function 
(StataCorp 2013b).  
Perhaps more appropriate when reading STATA results, the equation is also specified as a 
latent variable, with the continuous latent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  estimated but not specifically 
interpreted. The underlying latent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  is determined by the outcome parameters 
and the logit link function (𝐻), and as respondent values of 𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  cross particular thresholds 
their values on the observed ordinal variable 𝑦 changes (Williams 2016). The latent variable 
equation is specified as:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 
∗ =  𝛽𝑥𝑖𝑡 +   𝑎𝑖 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡; and (Equation 2.2) 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  {   
1   𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖𝑡 
∗ ≤  𝐾1 
2   𝑖𝑓 𝐾1 <  𝑦𝑖𝑡 
∗ ≤  𝐾2
… . . 𝐾 𝑖𝑓 𝐾𝑘−1 ≤  𝑦𝑖𝑡 
∗  
 (Equation 2.3) 




are independent of panel-level random effects 𝑎𝑖. Equation 2.3 specifies the values of the 
latent variable that correspond to the cutpoints in the model, which are estimated (and 
                                                          
35 The logit function that distributes the errors in a logit model is contrasted with the probit function 
used in probit models, whereby the error terms are distributed following a normal curve with a 
variance of 1. Practically, the difference in the interpretation of the coefficients of logit and probit 
models guided the choice to use logit models: coefficients from a logit model are easily transformed 
into odds ratios, while coefficients for probit models are interpreted as the difference in z score 
associated with a one-unit difference in the predictor variable (UCLA Statistical Consulting Group 
2017, The Analysis Factor 2017). Because this investigation does not engage with predicted 
probabilities, it is therefore valuable to have more easily interpretable coefficients as provided by 
the logit model.  
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change) with the addition of covariates. The values of the covariates in the model, then, 
specify what effect particular characteristics have on the latent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡, in log-odds: in 
practice, reading results of a logistic regression involves estimating the changes in odds of 
being in higher categories of the outcome variable (given by the underlying latent variable). 
A major assumption of ordered logistic regression models (both with cross-sectional and 
panel data) is that the relationship between the pairs of outcome groups is the same: the 
logistic regression model estimating a respondent’s outcome in category 1 versus category 
2 is the same as it is for a model estimating a respondent’s outcome in category 2 versus 
category 3, for example (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2006). The proportional odds model 
assumption allows for one set of estimates to apply to all pairs of categories: the 
coefficients given by a model output would therefore describe the relationship between 
both the lowest and middle categories of an ordinal variable and the middle and highest 
categories (UCLA Statistical Consulting Group 2017; Williams 2016). For ordered logit 
models for cross sectional data, this assumption is tested by using a Brant test, which 
determines whether the logistic regression outcomes are similar for different pairs of 
outcomes, or if a different model should be specified. In the case where the proportional 
odds assumption does not hold, a generalised ordered logit model is run (Williams 2016). 
Unfortunately, a generalised ordered logit is not available for random effects ordered logit 
models, so this investigation must use the estimates provided by a proportional odds model 
(StataCorp 2013b).  
Modelling Household Income for the BCS 1970: Ordered Logistic Regression  
Due to lack of time-varying data on gross household income for the BCS sample, the 
outcome for household income was measured only at age 42. This feature of the data 
necessitates a different modelling logic and modelling strategy and allows for answering a 
slightly different facet of the research question. Unlike a longitudinal model, it is not 
possible to investigate how demographic, family and government assistance covariates 
influence cohort members’ outcome variable trajectories throughout the intervening 20 
survey years. Rather, this model focuses on a single point in the cohort member’s life 
course (at age 42) and the preconditions, household and youth-period specific factors that 
can help to explain variation in a cohort member’s outcome at age 42. Thus, rather than 
investigating how covariates influence the outcome variable trajectory, this models instead 
investigates how experiences from a particular time period affect the outcome variable at a 
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particular point in time. As will be noted in the modelling logic diagram for this model in 
Chapter 4.7 then, there are no time-varying covariates in the model, rather covariates are 
selected from specific panels as theoretically appropriate.   
The equation for ordered logit models without time-varying outcomes or covariates is 
relatively similar to a longitudinal ordered logit model, and can be specified as a probability 
equation and as a latent variable. The specifications, of course, have no panel-specific or 
time-specific considerations. Again, the logit function is used to model the error terms as 
opposed to the probit function for theoretical reasons (see Footnote 33).  
The ordered logit model is written where the latent variable 𝑦𝑗
∗ =  𝛽𝑥𝑗 +  𝑢  is substituted 
in the probability function below with independent samples 𝑗, and 𝑖 is defined as the values 
of the outcome variable, with 𝑖 = 1 as the minimum value for the category and 𝑖 = 2 as the 
next highest category and so on for 𝑘 categories of the outcome. The probability of 
observing outcome 𝑖 corresponds to the probability that the estimated linear function, plus 
random error, is within the range of the cutpoints estimated for the outcome:  
Pr(𝑦𝑗 = 𝑖) =  Pr (𝐾𝑖−1 < 𝛽𝑥𝑗 +  𝑢 ≤  𝐾𝑖) (Equation 3.1); 
As with the random effects ordered logit model, the error terms 𝑢 are assumed to follow a 
logit function, and the estimated coefficients in the vector 𝛽𝑥𝑗 and the error term are 
interpreted as the odds of being in a higher category 𝐾𝑖+1 (StataCorp 2013a). This 
interpretation is similar to that of the random effects ordered logit model. As this model 
does not include any panel information there is no random effects term (𝑎𝑖) to include in a 
model or time-varying covariates.  
Key features of the models are summarised in Table 3 and provide information about the 
outcome to be measured, its operationalisation in the models, and method used to model 




















Alternative Model Considerations 
The most common alternative modelling strategy considered for use with this data is event 
history analysis, a popular choice among both life course researchers and welfare state 
researchers (particularly in the United States). This strategy is defined as ‘the analysis of 
data that correspond to the time from a well-defined time origin until the occurrence of 
some particular event’ (Corbett 1995 in Guo 2009, p. 2). Researchers following these 
methods are concerned with the ‘whether and when’ of an event as the dependent variable 
in an analysis (Guo 2009; Menard 2002): for example, there are copious studies that 
measure whether a respondent receives government assistance during the defined period 
of study and how long the respondents receive this assistance (used perhaps most 
prominently in Bane and Ellwood’s 1994 work on AFDC receipt dynamics). These methods 
are employed by youth transitions researchers who use traditional markers of adulthood in 
their work, as these markers provide distinct ‘change of state’ events that can be used as 
endpoints that time can be measured against (Guo 2009). The empirical research of this 
investigation both moves away from using these markers of adulthood and is less 
concerned about when in the life course particular markers are achieved; instead the work 
Table 3: Key Features of Empirical Models, BCS 1970 and NLSY 1997  
Concept to be measured 
Outcome variable 
specification  Model estimated 




(logged) Correlated Random Effects 
Work Intensity  
Usual weekly hours of work 
(ordered categories: no 
work = 0 to high intensity = 
4) 
Random Effects Ordered 
Logistic Regression  
Household Economic 
Status 
Gross household income 
age 42 (quintiles)  Ordered Logistic Regression  
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997   
Waged Work  
Individual Annual 
Employment Income 
(logged) Correlated Random Effects 
Work Intensity  
Weeks worked per year 
(ordered categories: 
none/very low = 0 to very 
high = 4) 
Random Effects Ordered 
Logistic Regression  
Household Economic 
Status 
Poverty ratio (0 = above 
200% FPL; 1 = 100 -200% 
FPL; 2 = below 100% FPL)  
Random Effects Ordered 
Logistic Regression  
125 
 
is interested primarily in how these events or experiences influence broader economic 
independence trends for respondents. Thus, an event history analysis is not theoretically 
appropriate to answer the research question of interest.  
3.6 Analytical Strategy: The Comparison  
As noted at the start of this chapter, the second stage of this analysis is the post-estimation 
comparative discussion which occurs after the three empirical models are completed for 
each case. While the comparative aspect of this work is best described as a contrast of 
contexts (Skocpol & Somers 1980), it is valuable to place the work among other 
methodological approaches in comparative social policy and politics. Each of the country 
results can stand alone as single case studies, and indeed this work can make additional 
contributions to existing research on the BCS and the NLSY cohorts with a more direct focus 
on government interventions. The detailed single cases provide the deep level of 
description necessary for a contrast of contexts, and the two cases with in-depth data 
allows for detailed themes to emerge about how experiences in the three welfare sources 
impact each cohort’s economic independence outcomes. Again, because the similarities of 
these cases are found at the systemic rather than programmatic level it is not appropriate 
to directly compare the effect sizes between models from each case. 
However, similar concepts in the two cases must still be constructed during empirical 
modelling in order for a comparison to occur. A pivotal aspect of the research design and 
model construction is the use of ‘equivalising concepts’, which allow for the same 
phenomena to be analysed in each case but with different operationalisation as the case 
allows (Mabbett & Bolderson 1999). The creation of concepts for analysis had to necessarily 
engage with Sartori’s ladder of abstraction (1970), whereby concepts are made more 
general or more precise in order for them to ‘travel’ between the two cases. For example, 
the concept of ‘work intensity’ as an outcome is the same for each model but had to be 
operationalised differently in each case based on data availability (i.e. usual weekly hours of 
work versus weeks worked per year).  When constructing modelling logics for each case 
(using the template in Figure 2) the process of creating equivalising concepts in each of the 
blocks of covariates is of paramount importance; similar concepts must be present in order 
for any comparison to take place (Collier & Mahon 1993; Gerring 2005; Mabbett & 
Bolderson 1999; Sartori 1994). The detailed results available in the similar blocks of 
covariates and on similarly-defined concepts allows this work to engage with the similarities 
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and differences of each case concurrently and within the wider lens of intra-regime 
comparison without losing the detail of a single case study approach.  
The use of single case studies is often viewed in opposition to variable-oriented (or large-N) 
comparative studies in social policy. In this approach, many countries are compared 
quantitatively using the same set of indicators, often sacrificing the context-specific 
granularity that a single case can provide (Clasen 1999; Ebbinghaus 2005; Rose & 
Mackenzie 1991). The use of a variable-oriented approach also must use equivalising 
concepts in order for many disparate countries to be compared in the same model; for 
example, countries must be compared on outcomes like GDP, which is measured at the 
national level. This ‘loss of information about distinctive national social policy institutions’ is 
a particular drawback of focussing the work at such a high level of abstraction (Atkinson 
1995 in Mabett & Bolderson 1999). When measures can only be situated at a national level 
(like GDP) and the number of equivalent covariates between ease case is small, individual 
issues and trajectories are not able to be investigated. In previous life course studies of the 
youth phase, variable-oriented comparative studies served as the starting point for 
discussions about trends in youth transitions across countries (Buchmann 1989; Elder 1985; 
Rindfuss 1991). However, the outcome measures of these works necessarily conformed to 
the ‘traditional’ markers of adulthood (e.g. age at first marriage, first child) as these were 
some of the only outcome measures that were equivalent in many different countries. The 
new outcomes of interest here, along with the focus on how government interventions 
impact individuals rather than nations, make this study less suited to a typical large-N 
approach situated at the country level. The comparison therefore is located at the thematic 
level using the welfare mix analytical framework, investigating the structural areas that 
influence outcomes in each source. Because this investigation aims to illuminate the similar 
and unique features of each context as they relate to the outcomes of interest in the single 
cases, the work sits closer to a single case study than that of a variable-oriented approach. 
Despite this orientation, comparative design considerations had to be addressed 
(particularly equivalising concepts) in order for a post-estimation comparison to occur.  
3.7 Ethical Considerations  
Each of the datasets used in this research are publicly available and anonymised to ensure 
that respondents cannot be identified, so the majority of ethical concerns in that regard 
have been addressed by the survey administrators. The 1970 British Cohort Study was 
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accessed in the UK Data Archive with all variables included, and the NLSY 1997 was 
accessed through the NLS Investigator. I will comply with Data Protection legislation and 
with the data security policies of the survey organisations which hold the data, and will 
ensure that respondent anonymity is protected. I have completed the University of 




Chapter 4: Case 1 Results, 1970 British Cohort Study   
4.1 Introduction to the BCS Results and Government Intervention 
Descriptives 
The following pages detail the empirical results for the first of the cases investigated, the 
1970 British Cohort Study (BCS). The same research question is used both in this case and 
the US case investigation and is as follows:  
What is the impact of receiving government transfers in youth (age 16-24) on a low-income 
young person’s ability to become economically independent – live above a poverty income 
and attach steadily to the labour market – by their mid-30s/early 40s in the United States 
and the United Kingdom? 
This question will be addressed in three empirical models that investigate economic 
independence in Chapters 4.3 to 4.6. However, before any regression model estimations it 
is important to understand more about the independent variable of interest, benefit 
receipt; the results of which will be applicable to all models. Detailing benefit receipt for 
this sample of respondents, and in particular how benefit receipt differs by demographic 
characteristics, can indicate what type of respondents engage with the benefit system and 
at what time period in their life course benefit receipt may be most notable. The results of 
these figures will most directly guide the selection of interaction terms in the empirical 
models.   
Changes to government assistance programmes during the time period of the BCS sample 
(1991-2012) results in a variety of means-tested benefit programmes available to eligible 
cohort members in the survey period. Between 1991 and 2000 there were two significant 
changes to the benefit system, the introduction of Jobseeker’s Allowance and the creation 
of the Working Families Tax Credit, which likely changed the proportion of sample members 
who accessed the benefit system at age 30. Because there are only two benefit 
programmes that are available in all survey waves – Housing Benefit and Income Support – 
benefit receipt36 is captured using a binary variable indicating whether sample members 
accessed any of the benefits in the following programmes each year:  
                                                          
36 Benefit receipt for sample members is considered only when benefits are received as an 
independent benefit unit apart from their family of origin: for example, if respondents were in their 
parent’s household at age 21 and that household received Housing Benefit, this was not attributed 
to the respondent’s history of benefit receipt. 
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 1991: Unemployment Benefit, Supplementary Benefit/Income Support, 
Unemployment & Supplementary Benefit37, Family Credit, Child Benefit, Lone 
Parent Benefit, Housing Benefit 
 2000: Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA), Income Support, Working Families Tax Credit, 
Child Benefit, Council Tax Benefit, Housing Benefit, Incapacity Benefit 
 2004: Jobseeker’s Allowance, Income Support, Council Tax Benefit, Housing Benefit, 
Incapacity Benefit, Child Benefit, Child Tax Credit, Working Tax Credit  
 2012: Jobseeker’s Allowance, Income Support, Council Tax Benefit, Housing Benefit, 
Incapacity Benefit, Child Benefit, Child Tax Credit, Working Tax Credit 
 
Descriptive figures will be detailed along four demographic features, all of which are 
included as covariates in the upcoming regression models: gender, highest education level, 
young parenting status and parental background. As with the regression models, these 
figures use the age of the survey respondent as the measure of time (x-axis). Because all 
sample members were born in the same year, the figure can also be read on the x-axis in 
relation to the year of the survey wave (given in parentheses).  
Any benefit receipt descriptive figures 
At any point in the survey period roughly 14% or more of the sample are in receipt of at 
least one means-tested benefit. The increase in the proportion of sample members 
receiving means-tested benefits from age 34 onwards (in 2004) may likely be due to a 
confluence of both individual and macroeconomic factors: respondents at 34 are more 
likely to be in families with children (and therefore more eligible for benefits) and more 
respondents are also likely to have incomes under eligibility thresholds as a result of the 
economic downturn beginning in 2007/2008. The receipt trend from 2004 to 2012 for this 
sample mirrors the increase in the proportion of UK citizens who received benefits during 






                                                          
37 The data on respondents receiving Unemployment Benefit (contribution-based) and 
Unemployment & Supplementary Benefit (income-based unemployment benefit) is included in the 
1991 overall benefit receipt designation because in subsequent waves JSA receipt is measured 
without being disaggregated into those receiving contribution-based JSA or income-based JSA.  
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Figure 3: Benefit Receipt (any), total BCS sample 
 
The overall receipt figure, however, masks variation in benefit receipt by demographic 
characteristics that are known to be correlated with higher prevalence of benefit receipt. 
The first characteristic is gender, which is one of the primary areas of theoretical concern in 
welfare state literature. Figure 4 indeed details a gap in the proportion of men and women 
in receipt of benefits that increases with age. There is a relatively small difference in 
proportions of males and females who receive benefits at age 21; around 12% of males and 
around 15% of females. However, by age 42 just over 30% of females in the sample are in a 
household that receives benefits compared to just over 15% of males. This suggests that 
government assistance is likely a more prominent aspect of women’s life courses, 
something that will be investigated further in an interaction term in each model.   
Figure 5 illustrates variation in benefit receipt by highest educational qualification38, with 
the resulting trend lines as expected given previous evidence in this area. Those with no 
qualifications have the highest proportions of respondents in receipt of benefits (with 
around 25% of the group in receipt in their 20s and 30s) and those with the highest level of 
qualifications have less than 10% of the group in receipt during the survey period. 
Chapter 2.2 noted that the timing of one’s first child, when early in the youth period, is 
often considered to be a ‘risk factor’ in the achievement of economic independence 
outcomes. This experience is also more prevalent for young people from lower 
                                                          
38 Educational achievement was measured in 2012 to ensure that all educational qualifications 
during the survey period were captured. The academic equivalencies to the National Vocational 
Qualifications were provided in the BCS codebook and reflect academic qualifications when 
respondents were in secondary school, and were the response options available to sample members 
when the surveys were taken.   
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socioeconomic backgrounds, both nationally and in this sample; around half of those who 
have children before age 21 in the BCS sample are from the lowest two income quintiles39. 
Figure 6 shows wide variation in benefit receipt, as 50% of young parents in this sample 
receive some type of assistance at 21 compared to just 10% of those who are not parents. 
This gap decreases as respondents age, such that by age 42 around 40% of those who were 
young parents are in receipt of benefits while now over 20% of those who were not young 
parents receive benefits. Importantly, this figure does not provide information on whether 
the young parenting group (10% of the total sample) receives benefits consistently in all of 
the waves (detailed upcoming), just that there are members of this group who receive 
benefits at 42. Although still a greater proportion of young parents receive benefits at 42, 
because this gap in outcomes does not stay consistent or is in the same direction across the 
survey period, it suggests that this group of young parents may not remain as systematically 
disadvantaged as they age.  
The final demographic characteristic used to explore variation in benefit receipt is the 
measure of socioeconomic background, parental income quintile in 1986. Figure 7 indicates 
that across the survey period between 28% (at age 21) and 35% (at age 42) of those from 
the lowest socioeconomic background group receive means-tested benefits, compared to 
around 7% (at age 21) to just over 10% (at age 42) of those from the highest income group. 
Those with missing parental income quintile data have benefit receipt trends somewhere 
near the middle of the figure, which may indicate that these respondents may have 
parental income near the middle to second lowest income categories. The systematic 
difference in benefit receipt between the cohort members from the lowest and highest 
income quintiles suggest that indeed parental income will be valuable to investigate in an 
interaction with benefit receipt in the upcoming models. 
Descriptive statistics can also detail the dynamics of benefit receipt, both the movement of 
sample members off and on benefits between the survey waves and how many 
respondents receive benefits in every survey after 21. In two of the three transition points 
(1991 to 2000 and 2000 to 2004) 8% of those who were not receiving benefits in the first 
instance moved onto benefits in the subsequent panel, and between 50 and 60% of those 
who were receiving benefits in the first instance were no longer receiving benefits when 
                                                          
39 A cross tabulation and chi-square results for young parenthood and parental income quintile 
suggests that there is indeed a relationship between parental background and experience of young 
parenting but it is relatively weak: Pearson chi2(5) = 20.15, Pr = 0.001, Cramer’s V = 0.15. 
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surveyed again. The third transition point, from 2004 to 2012, showed a slightly higher 
percentage moving onto benefits in 2012 from those not receiving in 2004 (18.8%) and a 
slightly lower percentage of those moving off benefits among those who received benefits 
in 2004 (39%). This is likely due to the effects of the recession, which caused higher poverty 
across the country and therefore more eligibility for benefits in 2012. Finally, there was 
very little evidence that sample members who receive benefits in the youth period receive 
continuously in all of the survey periods. Only 5% of respondents receive benefits at both 
age 21 and 30, 2.6% of respondents receive benefits at age 21, 30 and 34 and there are no 
sample members who receive benefits at all four of the survey periods. The results for this 
sample are consistent with welfare dynamics literature, which suggests that the majority of 
those on benefits are not long-term recipients but who likely move off and on due to 
changes in eligibility status.  
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Figure 6: Benefit receipt (any), BCS sample by parenting       Figure 7: Benefit receipt (any), BCS sample by parental 




Youth Training Scheme participation 
The second covariate used to measure government intervention is participation in the 
Youth Training Scheme. Although this type of assistance differs from the cash or in-kind 
benefits (e.g. Housing Benefit) detailed above, for some subgroups of young people in the 
late 1980s and into the 1990s this government intervention may have played a large role in 
their transition into employment from education. As noted in Chapters 1 and 2, by the late 
1980s around 20% of school leavers nationally entered into some form of YTS programme 
each year and participation has been found to affect both labour market participation and 
wages. In the upcoming regression models participation in YTS  is measured for anyone who 
participated between ages 16 to 30 (measured at the 2000 survey); in this BCS sample 31% 
participated in a Youth Training Scheme at some point in this period. 
Because the Youth Training Scheme is targeted towards those who leave school before age 
18 and who are not bound for higher education, most of those who participate in the 
scheme are from lower income quintiles (shaded in blue): indeed, there is a relationship 
between parental income quintile and YTS participation noted in Table 4, but it is not linear. 
Those from income quintiles 1 and 3 have relatively the same rate of YTS participation, 
while those from the second lowest income quintile have the highest rates of participation 
in this programme. While there is indeed a relationship between parental income and YTS 
participation, the strength of this relationship is relatively weak and suggests that parental 
income is perhaps not the most important driver in YTS participation.  
Table 4: YTS participation by parental income quintile  
Parental Income 
Quintile  
YTS participation  
 
No YTS participation  
Quintile 1  15.6%  10.0%  
Quintile 2  26.24%  21.26%  
Quintile 3  17.38%  24.23%  
Quintile 4  2.84 % 7.59%  
Quintile 5  1.77%  4.36% 
Missing  36.17%      32.63% 
Total (column %) 100.00%  100.00%  
(Chi-square = 23.0127, Pr = 0.000, Cramer’s V = 0.15) 
In Coles’ work (1995) the Youth Training Scheme was criticised as a programme that 
provided more support for male school leavers, noting that YTS opportunities were more 
plentiful in traditionally male-dominated labour market sectors (e.g. construction and 
mining) perhaps to the detriment of female school leavers. If his criticism is correct, the 
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impacts of this type of government intervention would be felt more by males in the BCS 
sample as opposed to females. However, the relationship for this BCS sample does not 
indicate a strong relationship between gender and YTS participation and about half of the 
respondents who participated in YTS were males and around half were females (Table 5). 
However, gender may still serve to moderate the effects of YTS on economic independence 
outcomes, which can only be tested for in model iterations with interactions. 





Male  48.02%  39.33% 
Female  51.98%  60.7% 
Total 
(column %) 
100.00% 100.00%  
(Chi-square = 7.0840 , Pr = 0.008,  Cramér's V = 0.08) 
Case-specific issues: gender and labour market attachment  
A final issue to consider in preparation for model estimation is the variation in labour 
market attachment between men and women in this BCS sample. One of the primary 
covariates that measures labour market attachment for this sample is employment status, 
which includes response categories that are considered ‘out of the labour market’ such as 
those who are looking after the home and those who are sick/disabled. Figure 8 illustrates 
that across the survey period between 60% and 70% of total sample members report being 
in full time work from age 21 onwards, indicating a relatively successful transition to 
employment by age 21. As respondents age there is a higher proportion of sample 
members in part time work, reaching around 20% of the sample by age 42. The share of 
respondents out of the labour market increases to around 15% percent in the respondents’ 










Figure 8: Economic activity status age 21-42, total BCS sample  
 
When economic activity status is explored by gender there is distinct variation in the 
proportion of males and females in each of the categories, shown in Figures 9 and 10. 
Figure 9 shows the percentage of females in full time employment decreasing with age 
while the share of those in part time work increases, likely due to women in the sample 
leaving full time work during their childbearing years. The share of women who are out of 
the labour market altogether reaches a peak of around 21% at age 34, with the majority of 
that group looking after the home. Males in the sample have much lower incidence of 
status change throughout the survey period (Figure 10). Unlike females in the sample, at 
age 21 over 80% of men report being in full time work, increasing to around 95% from age 
30 onwards40. Viewed together, it becomes apparent that females in the sample are 
decreasing their labour market attachment as the household size grows in their 30s: a 
phenomenon that will be explored in the upcoming models with an interaction term on 
household size and gender. It is valuable to keep these labour market trends in mind before 
analysing any wage or labour market data by gender: it is expected that in both of the 
outcome models females will have lower wages and lower work intensity because of the 
higher proportion who are in part time work or who are out of the labour market, and also 
because of the strong labour market attachment of males in the sample from age 21. 
  
                                                          
40 There is a reporting discrepancy in the age 21 survey in particular when the data for this covariate, 
employment status, is compared to the reporting for usual weekly hours of work per week (detailed 
in Chapter 4.5); there is a higher percentage of men who report being in full time work (around 75%) 
than the percentage of men who report over 30 hours of work per week at age 21 (50%). The 
comparison of these covariates in the subsequent surveys do not see the same discrepancies in 
proportions, which suggests there may be an issue with respondents at the age 21 survey over-
reporting full time work status or not having as high of ‘usual’ weekly hours to report. 
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Figure 9: Economic activity status age 21-42, BCS sample males                         
 
Figure 10: Economic activity status age 21-42, BCS sample females      
 





4.2 BCS Monthly Wages Measure and Descriptives   
Description of outcome measure  
The first component of the concept of economic independence measures individual 
performance in the labour market via wage income. In the BCS cohort the measure used is 
gross monthly wages at all jobs, created by scaling up the measure of gross weekly pay at 
all jobs to a monthly measure (adjusted for inflation [AFI] to 2012 £). This measure is the 
only individual measure of employment income provided in all of the survey waves, 
although the measure does have some drawbacks. Perhaps the most notable drawback is 
that for respondents who are in seasonal work during the survey period they may not be 
able to accurately estimate their weekly pay depending on their employment status at the 
time. However, based on the information provided on employment status in Figure 8, most 
of the respondents from age 21 onwards are in either full time or part time work so would 
likely be able to provide an accurate estimate of weekly pay. In each of the three regression 
models the discussion is introduced by exploring the outcome measure in descriptive 
figures for the whole sample by both gender and parenting status at age 21.  
Figure 11: Average monthly wages, total BCS sample (AFI)  
 
The average monthly wage trend in Figure 11 from age 21 to age 34 is steep and linear as 
expected, although average monthly wages for the total sample decrease notably from 
around £2,800/month at age 34 to £2,400/month at age 42. This is is likely the result of a 
period effect, as the effects of the global recession depressed wages for all UK workers in 
the early 2010s; the results for this sample therefore are consistent with national trends in 
the period.  
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The previous figures detailing employment status showed divergent employment patterns 
between men and women, particularly from age 30 onward. This is reflected in divergent 
wage patterns for this sample, illustrated in Figure 12, where women in the sample exhibit 
far lower average monthly wages and slower wage growth, which becomes more 
prominent after the youth period. It is likely that in the upcoming models of monthly wages 
the effect sizes on the female covariates will be negative, although it will be valuable to 
consider these results after controlling for employment status.  
Figure 13 shows that although average wages for those who are young parents (around 
10% of the sample) are lower than those who are not parents at age 21 at all time points, 
the pattern of wage growth differs quite dramatically for each group. Wages for those who 
are not young parents rise sharply from age 21 to age 34 only to decrease sharply at age 42 
(consistent with the trend of the overall sample in Figure 11), while average wages for 
those who were young parents rises slowly but steadily from age 21 to 42. It is notable that 
the group of young parents who are in the labour market do not seem to exhibit the same 
steep downward wage trend at age 42; this may be because this group had ‘less to lose’ as 
a result of the recession than the larger group of non-young parents, so their average 
wages were not as strongly affected. This figure then may not be entirely suggestive of a 
‘scarring’ effect of young parenting for wages over the course of the survey, given that 
average wages rise and wage trends are not nearly as volatile for the young parent group 
members who are in the labour market. However, it is important to bear in mind that there 
may be a group of young parents who are not in the labour market and therefore do not 













Figure 13: Average monthly wages, BCS sample by parenting status at 21 (AFI) 
























4.3 Regression Results: BCS Monthly Wage Income, Correlated 
Random Effects Model 
Block 1: Demographic characteristics (Table 6)  
In every longitudinal model is it valuable to understand how the measurement of time 
affects the outcome variable. In this case the values on the time variable age identify the 
trend in wage growth as respondents move from the youth period into adulthood. Wage 
growth increases as respondents age, with positive covariates at every age compared to 
wages at age 21. The age effect size increases slightly as more covariates are added to the 
model. The second effect to consider is the effect of gender on wages, which shows -0.26 
lower logged wages for females by the Block 5 iteration even as labour market experiences 
are controlled for; suggesting a systematic effect of gender on wages. Finally, the third 
notable covariate in Block 1 is education level, which shows that respondents with A-level 
qualifications and above have significantly higher wages than those with no qualifications, 
although the effect sizes are reduced with the inclusion of both parental income in Block 4 
and benefit receipt in Block 5.  
Block 1 interactions (Table 7)  
The first interaction term in Block 1 is included to determine whether the effect of 
education on wages differs between men and women. The positive coefficients on each of 
the interaction terms at all education levels for females indicates that higher levels of 
education have a more positive impact on female wages, with positive and significant 
coefficients for those with Higher qualifications and degree-level qualifications. Here, a 
degree-level qualification for women increases logged wages by 0.64 compared to the 
effect of the same education level when men and women are considered together (given in 
the main effect).  
The second interaction term of age and gender investigates whether the impact of age on a 
wage trajectory differs between men and women; or more broadly if ‘growing up’ 
necessarily leads to higher wages for both males and females in the same way. The 
negative interactions on the age and female covariates indicate that women do not 
experience the same amount of positive impacts on their wages as they age. When the 
effect sizes of age are largest at age 42, the effect size of age for women is -0.52 less than 
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that of the overall age effect estimation, and indicates that wage growth is not nearly as 
strong for females.  
Block 2: Employment Domain (Table 6) 
The second block of covariates is used to capture experiences in the employment domain 
and to ensure that employment status is controlled for as further covariates are added in 
Blocks 3 through 5. As expected, those in part time work have wages much lower than 
respondents in full time work, such that in the final Block 5 main effect iteration those in 
part time work have logged wages -0.91 lower than those in full time work. Although the 
other employment status categories do have estimated coefficients (for respondents who 
report perhaps part time wages while primarily in full time education), it is most valuable to 
look at the part time work coefficient, as those in all other employment status categories 
only have any reported wage information at age 2141. Because employment status will 
provide relatively predictable results for this outcome (e.g. full time workers have higher 
monthly wages) it is best to consider employment status as a control variable to more 
appropriately estimate effect sizes for factors like gender and subsequent covariates 
related to employment. The other covariate in this block, general health, was not significant 
and is not is not carried forward into further model iterations.  
Although the interaction term of employment status and gender was tested for in Block 2, 
the insignificant value indicates that the impact of employment status on wages does not 
differ between men and women.   
Block 3: Family Formation Domain (Table 6) 
Marital status is the only covariate that is significant when added as a main effect in Block 
3, and reports married respondents with higher average wages than respondents who are 
not married, although the effect is small at 0.07. However, once benefit receipt is added to 
the model in Block 5, there is no longer a significant difference in wages between those 
who are and are not married, and suggests that benefit receipt captures some of the 
difference in wage outcomes between these two groups. Household size is not found to be 
a significant covariate in the model of wages and perhaps may be a more notable driver for 
the work intensity outcome, with the hypothesis being that household size does not impact 
                                                          
41  The effects of other employment status categories are italicised in Table 4 and all other 
subsequent regression tables for the BCS sample. 
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how much one earns but rather how much one engages in the labour market. Young 
parenting in this model is not found to be a signficant factor in wage trajectory either, with 
no significant difference in wages once demographic and labour market factors are 
controlled for. Because young parents interact with the benefit system in higher 
proportions the young parenthood covariate is carried forward in all iterations; however, 
controlling for benefit receipt in the Block 5 iterations does not notably change the results 
on this covariate.    
Block 3 interactions (Table 7) 
Although the young parenthood main effect was insignificant, it may be that young 
parenthood is significant only for one gender group, tested with a young parenthood and 
gender interaction term. The insignificant interaction term indicates that the impact of 
young parenthood on wages is similar for males and females. This interaction term was 
brought forward in Block 5 preliminary models to test whether benefit receipt influenced 
this factor; however, inclusion of this interaction term in Block 5 was not significant and 
therefore this iteration is not included in the main results of Table 4.  
Block 4: Parental Background Characteristics (Table 6) 
The main effect results for the parental income covariate are as expected on the wage 
outcome. Those who are from households from quintiles 4 and 5 have significantly higher 
wage trajectories, with wages 0.21 higher (Q4) and 0.34 higher (Q5) than those from the 
least affluent families. The results for the missing category of respondents in the wage 
model shows effect sizes between respondents in quintile 1 and quintile 2 (coeff = 0.14), 
and indicates again that these respondents are from families somewhere in the middle to 
low part of the parental income distribution. 
Block 4 Interactions (Table 7) 
The relationship between a more affluent family of origin and higher wage outcomes is 
well-researched, and social mobility research in particular confirms the persistence of 
parental background as a factor in a myriad of economic outcomes (reviewed in Chapter 2). 
For this type of life course research it is also valuable to determine if parental background is 
a static feature of one’s demographic profile or if the impacts of parental background 
change with age. This is investigated using an interaction term on parental income and age, 
which is significant (Table 7). The positive interaction coefficients at age 30 and older for 
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quintiles 4 and 5 indicate that the difference in wages between parental income groups 
widen as respondents age. In this case, parental background not only is a significant factor 
in one’s wage trajectory overall, but it is associated with a larger variation in wages 
between these groups as respondents age. 
Block 5: Government Interventions (Table 6) 
After controlling for demographic factors, youth transition experiences, and parental 
background, the final block of covariates measures government interventions, the 
covariates of interest. The first Block 5 main effects iteration (5a) includes the covariate 
measuring any benefit receipt, and the second Block 5 iteration (5b) adds the covariate 
measuring Youth Training Scheme participation. The coefficient on the any benefit receipt 
covariate is significant and negative in iterations 5a and 5b (coeff = -0.14) and indicates that 
benefit receipt negatively impacts one’s wage trajectory even with controls for some of the 
more well-known factors in wage growth and variation. The addition of the YTS covariate in 
5b is also significant as an independent effect, and reports that those who have YTS 
participation have logged wages -0.15 lower than those without YTS participation. These 
results are consistent with previous research on YTS participant outcomes, indicating that 
YTS experience is not associated with higher wages in the long term.  
The inclusion of government intervention covariates also mediates some of the other 
covariates that are significant to wages, reducing the positive effect sizes of the three 
highest education qualifications and mediating the independent effects of parental income. 
The less negative result on parental income in Block 5 models suggests that some of the 
wage differences between respondents from lower parental backgrounds and those from 
higher income levels are captured by controlling for benefit receipt.   
Block 5 interactions (Table 8) 
An interaction term of benefit receipt and gender is included to determine whether the 
negative impacts of benefit receipt differ between men and women. More pointedly, this 
interaction seeks to investigate if female wage outcomes are impacted more notably by 
benefit receipt than wage outcomes for males. The insignificant interaction term here 
indicates that benefit receipt is not moderated by gender and that the impact of benefit 
receipt can be considered similar for both men and women. An interaction term of benefit 
receipt and age is also included to determine whether benefit receipt has different impacts 
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on one’s wages depending on the age it was received, which was also found to be 
insignificant.  
The final two interaction terms with the Youth Training Scheme covariate are included for 
gender and age. In this case, there is a significant difference in the impact of YTS 
participation by gender. The negative coefficient on the YTS and Female interaction (coeff = 
0.12) does suggest that female who participate in YTS are more negatively affected in their 
wages by participation. The negative wage impacts of this government intervention 
therefore seem to be concentrated among females in the sample. The significant 
interaction between YTS and age indicates that the negative impacts of YTS appear to 
worsen with age, with significant additive negative statistical effects at age 34 (coeff = -
0.17) and age 42 (coeff = -0.14).  
Summary 
As was foregrounded by the descriptive figures, gender is indeed a prominent factor in the 
wage trajectory for the BCS cohort and shows consistently lower wages for females in the 
sample even as all other covariates are included. The women in the BCS cohort also do not 
experience the same increases in wage growth as they age; unlike men in the sample, the 
experience of ‘growing up’ does not necessarily correspond to higher wages. The impact of 
young parenthood was not found to have a significant impact on BCS cohort wages even 
when benefit receipt is included in the model, which confirms that this experience is not 
associated with worse wages for this cohort. Rather, a more prominent factor on wages 
and one that may be more influential in the long term for all BCS respondents is parental 
background, which shows much higher wages for those from higher socioeconomic groups; 
the impacts of which widen as respondents age.  
The experience of benefit receipt shows a significant and negative relationship to BCS 
respondent wage trajectories for those who receive them, however the impact was not 
found to vary between men and women. Benefit receipt was also not found to have 
differing impacts on wages based on the respondent’s age, which suggests that the timing 
of benefit receipt does not play a major role in individual wage outcomes. The other 
government intervention, participation in a Youth Training Scheme, was found to be 
associated with worse wage outcomes, an impact that increases which increases with age 
and with more negative wage penalties for female participants than male participants. 
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Table 6: Correlated Random Effects Models of logged monthly wages 1970 British Cohort Study, main effects (Blocks 1- 5) 
 
 


























              
Age (21)              
30  0.53*** (16.40)  0.59*** (19.71)  0.56*** (17.90)  0.58*** (18.9)  0.59*** (19.17)  0.58*** (19.11)  
34  0.76*** (22.36)  0.85*** (27.22)  0.83*** (25.02)  0.84*** (25.47)  0.85*** (25.77)  0.85*** (25.77)  
42  0.97*** (30.10)  1.10*** (36.33)  1.08*** (33.52)  1.08*** (33.53)  1.10*** (33.43)  1.10*** (33.42)  
Female -0.56*** (-17.13) -0.25*** (-7.84) -0.27*** (-8.10) -0.25*** (-7.84) -0.25*** (-7.89) -0.26*** (-8.44)  
Educ (No quals)              
CSE/NVQ 1  0.15 (1.71)  0.07 (0.92)  0.08 (1.03)  0.06 (0.86)  0.08 (1.0)  0.07 (0.95)  
O level/NVQ 2  0.06 (0.87)  0.03 (0.49)  0.04 (0.67)  0.03 (0.48)  0.04 (0.56)  0.04 (0.59)  
A level/NVQ 3  0.23** (3.01)  0.17* (2.53)  0.17* (2.57)  0.15* (2.19)  0.14* (2.16)  0.13* (2.02)  
Higher Qs/NVQ 4  0.42*** (5.72)  0.32*** (5.04)  0.32*** (5.02)  0.30*** (4.65)  0.28*** (4.43)  0.26*** (4.08)  
Degree +/NVQ 5  0.54*** (5.93)  0.42*** (5.32)  0.43*** (5.34)  0.38*** (4.8)  0.35*** (4.47)  0.32*** (4.04)  
Region (London)              
Rest of England -0.14 (-1.90) -0.19** (-2.89) -0.17** (-2.58) -0.19** (-2.87) -0.19** (-2.91) -0.19** (-2.86)  
Wales & Scotland -0.26 (-1.65) -0.32* (-2.39) -0.29* (-2.09) -0.31* (-2.25) -0.30* (-2.16) -0.30* (-2.23)  
Region (mean) -0.09 (-1.00) -0.05 (-0.69) -0.06 (-0.84) -0.03 (-0.42) -0.03 (-0.39) -0.01 (-0.16)  
Emp Status (FT)              
PT work   -0.93*** (-27.18) -0.92*** (-25.98) -0.93*** (-26.96) -0.91*** (-26.02) -0.91*** (-25.98)  
Unemployed   -0.20* (-2.32) -0.21* (-2.41) -0.21* (-2.35) -0.07 (-0.69) -0.06 (-0.64)  
FT Ed   -0.93*** (-9.54) -0.89*** (-9.00) -0.93*** (-9.50) -0.92*** (-9.42) -0.93*** (-9.51)  
Home   -0.24* (-2.33) -0.24* (-2.23) -0.25* (-2.33) -0.17 (-1.52) -0.18 (-1.64)  
Training   -0.35 (-0.62) -0.35 (-0.61) -0.38 (-0.63) -0.17 (-0.30) -0.09 (-0.16)  
Sick/Disabled   -0.25 (-0.76) -0.33 (-1.01) -0.31 (-0.94) -0.33 (-1.02) -0.28 (-0.87)  
Emp Stat (mean)   -0.06** (-2.90) -0.06** (-2.87) -0.06*** (-3.04) -0.03 (-1.55) -0.03 (-1.59)  
Health (Excellent)              
Good     0.02 (0.92)          
Fair   -0.01 (-0.16)          
Poor     0.05 (0.57)          
Health (mean)   -0.12** (-3.19)          
Married      0.07* (2.37)  0.07* (2.38)  0.06 (1.89)  0.06 (1.83)  
MarStat (mean)      0.06 (1.14)   0.01 (0.12) -0.01 (-0.06)   0.01 (0.17)  
Household Size     -0.02 (-1.84)        
HH size (mean)     -0.03 (-1.11)        
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Young parenting     -0.04 (-0.73) -0.05 (-0.98) -0.04 (-0.71) -0.03 (-0.57)  
Parent Inc (Q1)              
Quintile 2         0.08 (1.67)  0.08 (1.58)  0.07 (1.49)  
Quintile 3         0.18*** (3.38)  0.16** (3.13)  0.14* (2.76)  
Quintile 4        0.26*** (3.70)  0.24*** (3.50)  0.21** (3.04)  
Quintile 5        0.40*** (4.75)  0.37***  (4.37)  0.34*** (4.06)  
Missing         0.14** (2.85)  0.13** (2.76)  0.13** (2.68)  
Benefit recipient         -0.14** (-2.98) -0.14** (3.05)  
Ben recd (mean)         -0.19* (-2.12) -0.17* (-1.98)  
YTS participant           -0.15*** (-4.90)  
Intercept  6.84*** (44.61)  7.11*** (47.84)  6.96*** (44.49)  6.73*** (43.42)  6.74*** (43.67)  6.77*** (44.26)  
Between-var  0.32*** (18.04)  0.27*** (17.55)  0.28*** (17.71)  0.26*** (16.74)  0.26*** (16.61)  0.25*** (16.10)  
Within-var  0.58*** (58.14)  0.50*** (58.12)  0.50*** (57.70)  0.50*** (57.71)  0.50*** (57.73)  0.50*** (57.83)  
Observations   2552   2550   2514   2514   2514   2514 2514  
Cases   881   881   872   872   872   872 872  






























 Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t 
Age (21)         
30  0.53*** (16.39)  0.74*** (15.34)  0.56*** (17.90)  0.41*** (4.83) 
34  0.76*** (22.26)  1.02*** (20.32)  0.83*** (25.01)  0.72*** (7.39) 
42  0.97*** (30.06)  1.28*** (25.98)  1.08*** (33.51)  1.06*** (12.51) 
Female   -0.92*** (-6.43) -0.25*** (-5.13) -0.27*** (-7.95) -0.25*** (-7.74) 
Age*Gender         
30 * Female   -0.35*** (-5.50)     
34 * Female   -0.46*** (-6.79)     
42 * Female   -0.52*** (-8.20)     
Educ (No qual)         
CSE/NVQ 1 -0.07 (-0.46)  0.16 (1.82)  0.09 (1.03)  0.07 (0.83) 
O level/NVQ 2 -0.17 (-1.29)  0.08 (1.05)  0.04 (0.67)  0.03 (0.52) 
A level/NVQ 3  0.06 (0.49)  0.24** (3.18)  0.18* (2.57)  0.15* (2.29) 
Higher Qs/NVQ 4  0.14 (1.10)  0.43*** (5.92)  0.33*** (5.02)  0.30*** (4.67) 
Degree+/NVQ 5  0.11 (0.70)  0.56*** (6.15)  0.43*** (5.34)  0.37*** (4.63) 
Educ*Gender         
CSE*Female  0.32 (1.75)       
O level*Female  0.34* (2.15)       
A level*Female  0.23 (1.42)       
Higher Q*Female  0.43** (2.84)       
Degree*Female  0.64*** (3.32)       
Region (London)         
Rest of England -0.14 (-1.86) -0.16* (-2.16) -0.17** (-2.58) -0.19** (-2.88) 
Wales & Scotland -0.28 (-1.77) -0.28 (-1.81) -0.29*  (-2.09) -0.30* (-2.20) 
Region (mean) -0.09 (-1.00) -0.08 (-0.84) -0.06 (-0.83) -0.30 (-0.43) 
Emp Stat (FT)         
PT work     -0.92*** (-25.96) -0.92 (-26.80) 
Unemployed     -0.21* (-2.41) -0.23 (-2.56) 
FT Ed     -0.89*** (-9.00) -0.90 (-9.10) 
Home     -0.24* (-2.18) -0.21 (-1.94) 
Training     -0.35 (-0.61) -0.40 (-0.70) 
Sick/Disabled     -0.33 (-1.01) -0.31 (-0.95) 




Displayed are the coefficients from a correlated random effects model of logged monthly wages with t statistics in parentheses. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01 *p<0.05
Household size     -0.02 (-1.84)   
HH size (mean)     -0.03 (-1.11)   
Married      0.07* (2.37)   
Married*Female         
MarStat (mean)      0.06 (1.15)   
MarStat*Gender          
Young parenting     -0.03 (-0.33) -0.05 (-1.00) 
YParent*Female     -0.01 (-0.08)   
Parental Inc (Q1)         
Quintile 2        0.03 (0.36) 
Quintile 3        0.12 (1.52) 
Quintile 4        0.02 (0.15) 
Quintile 5        0.07 (0.53) 
Missing        0.08 (1.10) 
Parental Inc*Age         
Q2*Age 30        0.15 (1.45) 
Q3*Age 30        0.18 (1.75) 
Q4*Age 30        0.44** (3.14) 
Q5*Age 30        0.43* (2.50) 
Missing*Age 30        0.17 (1.75) 
Q2*Age 34        0.11 (0.98) 
Q3*Age 34        0.14 (1.23) 
Q4*Age 34        0.32* (2.15) 
Q5*Age 34        0.42* (2.30) 
Missing*Age 34        0.14 (1.25) 
Q2*Age 42        0.02 (0.21) 
Q3*Age 42       -0.03 (-0.29) 
Q4*Age 42        0.32 (2.30) 
Q5*Age 42        0.58*** (3.41) 
Missing*Age 42       -0.003 (-0.03) 
Constant  7.08*** (39.48)  6.63*** (43.03)  6.96*** (44.24)  6.83*** (46.34) 
Between-Var  0.317*** (17.45)  0.330*** (18.78)  0.28*** (17.71)  0.27*** (17.12) 
Within-var  0.58*** (58.07)  0.57*** (58.14)  0.50*** (57.50)  0.50*** (58.50) 
Observations  2552   2552   2512   2552  
Cases  881   881   872   881  
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Table 8: Correlated Random Effects Models of logged monthly wages 1970 British Cohort Study, interaction effects (Block 5)  
 Benefit recd 
*Gender 







 Coeff t Coeff t Coeff  t Coeff  t 
Age (21)         
30  0.59*** (19.91)  0.62*** (20.10)  0.59*** (19.91)  0.62*** (17.39) 
34  0.86*** (27.43)  0.88*** (26.60)  0.86*** (27.43)  0.92*** (24.63) 
42  1.12*** (36.31)  1.18*** (34.91)  1.12*** (36.41)  1.17*** (32.28) 
Female -0.26*** (-7.37) -0.26*** (-8.36) -0.22*** (-6.22) -0.26*** (-8.33) 
Educ (No quals)          
CSE/NVQ 1  0.07 (0.91)  0.06 (0.85)  0.07 (0.90)  0.07 (0.93) 
O level/NVQ 2  0.04 (0.59)  0.04 (0.62)  0.04 (0.59)  0.04 (0.65) 
A level/NVQ 3  0.13* (2.03)  0.13* (2.05)  0.13* (2.04)  0.14* (2.07) 
Higher Q/NVQ 4  0.25*** (4.05)  0.25*** (4.07)  0.25*** (4.07)  0.25*** (4.07) 
Degree /NVQ 5  0.31*** (3.94)  0.31*** (3.92)  0.31*** (3.97)  0.31*** (3.91) 
Region (London)         
Rest of England -0.19** (-2.89) -0.20** (-3.01) -0.19** (-2.89) -0.19** (-2.94) 
Wales & Scotland -0.30* (-2.23) -0.31* (-2.27) -0.31* (-2.28) -0.31* (-2.28) 
Region (mean) -0.01 (-0.13) -0.01 (-0.08) -0.01 (-0.07) -0.01 (-0.10) 
Emp Stat (FT)         
PT work -0.89*** (-25.90) -0.89*** (-25.93) -0.89*** (-25.88) -0.89*** (-25.94) 
Unemployed -0.05 (-0.51) -0.19 (-1.58) -0.05 (-0.53) -0.06 (-0.64) 
FT Ed -0.94*** (-9.61) -0.93*** (-9.53) -0.94*** (-9.62) -0.91*** (-9.32) 
Home -0.15 (-1.37) -0.31* (-2.57) -0.15 (-1.39) -0.15 (-1.34) 
Training -0.08 (-0.14) -0.37 (-0.65) -0.06 (-0.10) -0.14 (-0.26) 
Sick/Disabled -0.28 (-0.86) -0.28 (-0.89) -0.29 (-0.92) -0.30 (-0.94) 
EmpStat (mean) -0.03 (-1.55) -0.03 (-1.53) -0.03 (-1.49) -0.03 (-1.59) 
Parental Inc (Q1)         
Quintile 2  0.08 (1.56)  0.08 (1.58)  0.08 (1.58)  0.08 (1.55) 
Quintile 3  0.14** (2.86)  0.15** (2.90)  0.15** (2.91)  0.14** (2.86) 
Quintile 4  0.22** (3.19)  0.22** (3.20)  0.22** (3.27)  0.22** (3.17) 
Quintile 5  0.35*** (4.17)  0.35*** (4.19)  0.35*** (4.23)  0.35*** (4.14) 
Missing  0.13** (2.82)  0.13** (2.84)  0.14** (2.86)  0.14** (2.83) 
Young parenting -0.03 (-0.52) -0.01 (-0.17) -0.03 (-0.60) -0.03 (-0.54) 
Benefit recipient -0.16 (-1.95) -0.06 (-0.58) -0.15*** (-3.34) -0.15*** (-3.29) 
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BenRecd*Female  0.01 (0.08)       
BenRecd*Gender  -0.05 (-0.32)       
BenRecd (mean)  -0.09 (-0.31)  0.57* (2.20) -0.18* (-2.10) -0.19* (-2.19) 
Ben Recd*Age         
Yes*30   -0.13 (-1.00)     
Yes*34    0.08 (0.59)     
Yes*42   -0.05 (-0.41)     
BenRecd*Age    -0.02** (-3.11)     
YTS participant -0.15*** (-4.87) -0.15*** (-4.93) -0.08 (-1.91) -0.06 (-1.43) 
YTS*Female     -0.12* (-1.99)   
YTS *Age          
Yes*30       -0.06 (-0.98) 
Yes*34       -0.17** (-2.76) 
Yes*42        -0.14* (-2.33) 
Constant  6.78*** (48.46)  6.75*** (48.41)  6.75*** (48.04)  6.75*** (48.20) 
Between Var  0.25*** (16.20)  0.25*** (16.23)  0.25*** (16.08)  0.25*** (16.27) 
Within Var  0.50*** (57.93)  0.50*** (57.91)  0.50*** (57.93)  0.50*** (57.94) 
Observations  2520   2520   2520   2520  
Cases  872   872   872   872  





4.4 BCS Work Intensity Measure and Descriptives   
Description of outcome measure 
The second individual measure in the UK case that comprises economic independence is 
work intensity, operationalised using a longitudinal ordinal variable with four categories: 
high, medium, and low work intensity and a category for those not in the labour market. 
This ordinal measure was created by transforming reported hours in the variable ‘Usual 
weekly hours of work’ (which includes overtime hours) into three categories and 
transforming those who reported no hours and who identify as looking after the home into 
the out of the labour market category. This enables the model to keep all cases in the 
dataset even if respondents do not report hours for one of the survey years, and therefore 
ensures that respondents who may move in and out of the labour market are not dropped 
from the sample. Because the measure counts those who do unwaged work in the 
household as ‘zero’, the model here measures waged work intensity. The ordinal categories 
with the corresponding weekly hours are as follows, and were guided at the lower end by 
the working hour thresholds for benefit programmes such as the Working Tax Credit:  
0 = ‘Not in employment’, no hours reported  
1 = ‘Low work intensity’, 1-16 hours/week reported  
2 = ‘Medium work intensity’, 16-30 hours/week reported  
3 = ‘High work intensity’, 30 + hours/week reported  
The drawbacks to this individual measure of work intensity are relatively similar to those in 
the monthly wages measure, particularly as it relates to those in seasonal work. This group 
of respondents may have very different ‘usual’ hours of work per week, particularly at the 
first wave, and therefore depending on when the survey was taken results may vary widely. 
Employment status figures in the previous section again confirm that the majority of 
respondents are in full time work and are therefore not likely to have biased reporting on 
this measure; however, this may miss respondents who have variable hours throughout the 
year and who may report full time work but different ‘usual’ hours.  
The following descriptive figures detail the trends in the underlying variable for the ordinal 
measure, usual weekly hours of work, by gender and parenting status in the same manner 
as was done for the monthly wages measure. There are also descriptive figures that detail 
trends in the percentage of respondents in each of the categories of the ordinal variable, 
both for the overall sample and for men and women. These figures are included to detail 
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respondents who are out of the labour market and would therefore not report usual 
weekly hours of work, as the mean usual weekly hours of work figures only include those 
who report hours. 
Figure 15 shows that at age 21 the average usual weekly hours of work is high for both men 
and women, at around 40 hours/week for women and around 43 hours/week for men; 
suggesting that for those who do interact with the labour market the attachment is 
relatively strong in the youth period. After age 21 however, the results for men and women 
begin to diverge. Men’s average weekly hours of work stay at or above 40 hours a week 
through the other survey years, while average female hours of work per week decline at 
each survey to around 30 hours per week at age 42. It is likely that women’s average hours 
decrease after age 21 due to family formation factors in their 20s and 30s, suggested by 
previous research (reviewed in Chapter 2.2).  
The second demographic characteristic is included to detail whether becoming a parent in 
the youth period stifles labour market attachment. At age 21 there is very little difference 
in the average weekly hours of work for both parenting and non-parenting sample 
members who are in the labour market; in fact, respondents who are parents at age 21 
report slightly higher weekly hours of work on average. However, the group of parenting 
respondents have decreased hours on average at both the age 30 and age 34 survey 
periods to around 30 hours, below the average of the non-parenting group. While the 
difference in usual hours of work are notable during the respondent’s 30s, the gap between 
usual hours closes at age 42 between these two groups. The lack of a systematic difference 
in hours of work between these two groups suggests that the experience of young 
parenting may not have as much of an impact on work intensity as a characteristic like 
gender. Therefore, the ordinal work intensity measure is explored in figures by gender 



























The ordinal work intensity variable, detailed in Figure 17 for the total sample, indicates that 
about half of cohort members report high work intensity and about half report that they 
are out of the labour market at age 21. This is likely due to those who are still in education 
and those who are unable to attach due to other reasons in the youth period. After age 21 
there is slightly more variation in the percentage of those in each work intensity category; 
around 15% of the sample enter the labour market in some form after 21, and the 
percentage in the ‘zero’ category decreases to around 20%. The proportion of sample 
members who have high work intensity stays relatively consistent through the 30s to age 















Figures 18 and 19 detail the distribution of men and women in each of the work intensity 
categories, and show distinctly different patterns of labour market attachment particularly 
after age 21. Among BCS men there is strong labour market attachment after age 21 to age 
34, such that by 34 almost all of the male respondents are in the high work intensity 
category, with very few out of the labour market or in part time work. Among females in 
the sample there is much more variation in the percentage of women who are in each of 
the work intensity categories, particularly after age 30. Unlike the males in the sample, the 
percentage of females in high work intensity categories stays relatively consistent 
throughout the survey period, with around half of women in this group in full time work at 
any survey period. During their 30s females exhibit more movement between the lower 
work intensity categories and around 20% of females were out of the labour market at age 
42. Based on the timing of these changes (during the childbearing years), it will again be 







































4.5 Regression Results: BCS Work Intensity, Random Effects Ordered 
Logistic Regression  
As noted in Chapter 3, the regression tables for an ordered logit model are reported in odds 
ratios, and detail the difference in odds of being in a higher work intensity category 
compared to the group of respondents in the reference group (if the covariate is a 
categorical variable), or the increase or decrease in odds when a value of a continuous 
variable is increased by one unit. Odds ratios with results above 1 indicate higher odds, 
odds below 1 indicate lower odds, and odds ratios near 1 indicate that the odds are similar 
(odds near 1 will likely not report statistical significance). 
Block 1: Demographic Characteristics (Table 9) 
The age covariate reports greater odds of being in a higher work intensity category at every 
age compared to age 21. However, given what is known about the trends in work intensity 
between males and females, it will be important to investigate if and how the impact of age 
differs for each gender using an interaction term. The independent effect of gender in Block 
1 shows negative odds ratios for females (OR = 0.28) and remains relatively consistent as 
more covariates are added, indicating that the odds of being in a higher work intensity 
category are much lower for females than males. This confirms a systematic effect of 
gender on work intensity for this sample. As with the wages model, the education 
covariates also indicate higher odds of being in a high work intensity category for those 
with higher qualifications. 
Block 1 interactions (Table 10) 
The interaction terms for a categorical by categorical interaction in an ordered logit model 
are slightly more challenging to interpret than in the correlated random effects model; for 
example, the interaction term for age 30 and female represents the ratio of odds ratios on 
the covariate of interest (or the focal independent variable) and the moderating variable 
(Jaccard 2001). In this case, the focal independent variable is age, moderated by gender. 
The figure below is adapted from Jaccard (2001) and aims to illustrate how the Age 30 and 






Figure 21: Interpreting a categorical by categorical interaction in ordered logistic regression  
 
The significant interaction term on the Age 30 and Female category is the factor by which 
the odds ratio of the age 30 main effect for gender = 0 (males) must be multiplied to get 
the odds ratio on age 30 for females in the sample (working backwards from the interaction 
term in Figure 21). In Table 10 the odds ratio main effect on Age 30 for males is 7.55; when 
multiplied by the interaction term of 0.18 on Age 30*Female, the odds ratio between Age 
21 and Age 30 females is 1.38 (in bold). The interaction term odds ratio below one suggests 
that for females there will be far less positive impacts of age on their work intensity than 
for males. The values in bold in the interaction iterations in Table 7 are the odds ratios for 
Females between age 21 and the other ages in the survey; this notation stays consistent 
throughout all the other interaction tables in regression tables with interaction terms.  
Viewing the odds ratios for the male and female respondents in tandem, the large odds 
ratios for males indicates that as they age their odds of being in a higher work intensity 
category increase by a very large factor, most notable in the odds ratios between age 21 to 
age 34 (seen in the age main effect). The odds ratios for females on this covariate (in bold), 
however, are not nearly as large; although indeed the odds of being in a higher work 
intensity group increase with age for women. This suggests that there is a gender gap in 
work intensity that emerges particularly as respondents age. It is also valuable to look at 
the gender main effect in this interaction model, which details the differences among men 
and women’s work intensity when at 21 (the age reference category); an insignificant 
coefficient here indicates there is no significant difference in work intensity odds between 




Block 2: Family Formation (Table 9) 
Marital status was not found to be a significant factor in respondent’s work intensity even 
at this early stage of the model. Household size however is significant, with an odds ratio of 
0.66; this indicates that for each one-unit increase in a household size the odds of being in a 
higher work intensity category decrease by a factor of 0.66. This effect size is not 
particularly surprising given what is known about how labour market decisions are affected 
when a family increases in size. However, it is likely that the impact of household size will 
vary by gender, as previous research on female labour market attachment shows that 
women are more likely to decrease their hours of work or leave the labour market 
altogether when children are born (even if only for a short time) (Blau & Khan 2017). This 
phenomenon will be tested for in an interaction of household size and gender in the next 
subsection.  
The final main effect of the family formation covariates is young parenthood. When added 
to the model as a main effect there was no statistically significant difference in the odds of 
being in a higher work intensity category between the two parent types. However, the 
effect size of 1.22 does indicate that young parents may have higher odds of being in a 
higher work intensity category, which may change given other covariates that are known to 
interact with the experience of young parenthood (like benefit receipt). Because of these 
issues the young parenthood covariate is carried forward to all iterations as was done in the 
wages model.   
Block 2 interactions (Table 10) 
The young parenthood and gender interaction term is not significant in this model, and 
indicates that the impact of young parenthood on work intensity does not differ by gender. 
This interaction term was also included in Block 4 models but was still found to be 
insignificant. This result is perhaps surprising given how this ‘risky’ transition experience has 
been found in previous research to scar both wages and labour market attachment in other 
samples; however, for the sample of BCS females and males the negative impact are not 
present.  
The interaction term on household size and gender is significant, and its effects confirm 
that growth in household size negatively impacts the odds of being in a higher work 
intensity category more for women than for men (interaction term OR = 0.67). The odds 
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ratio for men is 0.86 while the odds ratio for women on household size is 0.58, which is 
consistent with what is known about how female labour market participation changes 
when children are born and household size increases.  
Block 3: Parental Background (Table 9) 
The parental background covariate indicates that only respondents in quintile 2 have 
significantly different odds of being in a higher work intensity category than those in 
quintile 1 (OR = 1.54). Although the odds ratio effect sizes are above 1 on each of the other 
quintile groups (indicating higher odds), the results are not statistically significant. When 
added as a main effect, then, parental income does not significantly impact a respondent’s 
work intensity. Taken together with the results from the wages models, this suggests that a 
respondent’s parental background does not impact how much one works, but rather the 
economic returns from work.  
Block 3 interactions (Table 10) 
Given the results of the parental background and age interaction in the wages model it is 
valuable to determine if the impact of one’s parental income is moderated by age in this 
model as well. The significant interaction terms on parental income quintile and age for 
respondents at ages 30 and older for those in quintiles 3 and above indicate statistically 
significant differences in work intensity among parental income quintile groups as 
respondents age. The positive interaction terms indicate that parental income becomes a 
more prominent factor in one’s work intensity outcomes with age. This results in larger 
odds ratios between those from higher income quintiles and those from quintile 1 at older 
ages: for example, the odds of being in a higher work intensity category for respondents 
from quintile 4 is 2.18 times that of quintile 1 respondents at age 42. The differences 
between much higher quintiles and quintile 1 are not apparent when respondents are 21, 
where there is only a significant difference in odds between those in quintile 2 and quintile 
1.      
The second interaction term investigates whether parental income quintile moderates the 
odds ratio on the household size covariate, to determine if the negative impacts of 
household size on work intensity differ based on parental background. The significant 
results on the interaction terms here indicate that the odds ratios on household size for 
those in quintiles 2, 3, and 5 are lower than those in quintile 1; indicating that those from 
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higher income quintiles have lower odds of being in a high work intensity category as their 
family grows. This suggests that for those from poorer backgrounds, household size does 
not negatively impact work intensity to such a degree as those from wealthier families.  
Block 4: Government Interventions (Table 9) 
The final two main effect model iterations add any benefit receipt to the model (Block 4a) 
and Youth Training Scheme participation (Block 4b). The benefit receipt covariate is 
significant and indicates that those with benefit receipt have 0.30 times lower odds of being 
in a higher work intensity category than those who do not receive benefits, even when 
controlling for some of the key drivers of work intensity like gender and household size. 
However, the picture of how benefits ‘work’ is more nuanced, as some of the other 
covariate effect sizes changed when benefit receipt was included in the model. The positive 
odds ratios of parental income quintiles above quintile 2 are slightly mediated when benefit 
receipt is included, as are the higher odds ratios on the education covariates. The lower 
odds ratio on the gender covariate has been mediated slightly from 0.27 to 0.29, which 
suggests that there is a relationship between benefit receipt and gender that will be useful 
to explore in an interaction term.  
Perhaps the most notable finding when adding benefit receipt to a model of work intensity 
is the change in the effect size on the young parenthood covariate. Here the main effect 
odds ratio between young parents and those who are not young parents increased from 
1.24 (not statistically significant) to 1.49 (statistically significant). Now after for controlling 
for benefit receipt those who are young parents have significantly higher odds of being in a 
high work intensity category than those who are not young parents. This suggests that 
benefit receipt is a notable factor in the relationship between young parents and labour 
market attachment. Therefore, it will be important to explicitly test whether the impact of 
young parenthood is moderated by benefit receipt and if benefit receipt can play a role in 
positive labour market attachment for young parents who receive them.  
The final main effect included in the model measures the effect of Youth Training Scheme 
participation, and the insignificant result indicates that those who participate in a Youth 
Training Scheme do not have significantly different odds of being in a high work intensity 
category than those who do not participate. When taken together with the YTS result on 
the wage model, the results suggest that YTS participants have no significant differences in 
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labour market attachment than other respondents, but have lower labour market returns 
from their participation.  
Block 4 interactions (Table 11) 
The interaction of benefit receipt and gender is included to investigate whether the impact 
of benefit receipt on work intensity differs between men and women, and an interaction 
odds ratio of 2.12 indicates that the negative impacts of benefit receipt are not as large for 
women as for men.  The benefit receipt main effect indicates that men who receive 
benefits have 0.17 times lower odds of being in a higher work intensity category than men 
who do not receive benefits. Women who receive benefits also have lower odds than 
women who do not receive benefits, here with an odds ratio of 0.35. The differing odds 
ratios between men and women may be due to comparison group differences; women 
overall are less likely to be in higher work intensity categories, so women who receive 
benefits may not be as ‘worse off’ than their female counterparts on this outcome. This 
may also be indicative of a particularly notable group of ‘high risk’ males in this sample who 
receive benefits, who differ substantially in their ability to engage in the labour market than 
other men in the cohort.  
Benefit receipt also has varying impacts on work intensity when investigated at different 
ages in the respondent’s life course. Notably for this research, there is no significant 
difference in work intensity at age 21 between those who do and do not receive benefits 
(odds ratio = 1.24). The negative impacts of receiving benefits on work intensity, however, 
begin to emerge from age 30 onwards, where the odds of being in a higher work intensity 
category are far lower for those who receive benefits than for those in the same age group 
who do not receive benefits. This result suggests that the timing of benefit receipt 
therefore is a valuable component to consider when determining how government 
intervention impacts respondents’ work intensity, particularly as cohort members move 
into their family of destination. 
The impact of benefit receipt on work intensity is also moderated by parental background. 
The only parental income categories with significantly different odds ratios than quintile 1 
are those in quintile 3 and quintile 4 (noted in the significant interaction terms). 
Respondents who receive benefits from quintile 3 have odds 0.41 times lower than 
respondents from quintile 3 who do not receive benefits, a much less negative odds ratio 
than the receipt of benefits for those from quintile 1 respondents (benefit receipt main 
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effect OR = 0.17). For respondents from quintile 4, benefit receipt corresponds to higher 
odds of being in a high work intensity category compared to quintile 4 respondents not 
receiving benefits (OR= 1.23); so although parental background moderates the effect of 
benefit receipt, it does so differently for groups in the middle income quintiles.  
The interaction term of young parenthood and benefit receipt was not found to be 
significant, and therefore the impact of young parenthood does not differ between those 
who do and do not receive benefits. Together with the main effect results on young 
parenthood, benefit receipt cannot be considered a factor that moderates the impacts of 
young parenthood, but rather a factor that mediates the impact of young parenthood on 
work intensity.  
The final interaction term tests whether the impact of Youth Training Scheme participation 
differs between respondents who have experience receiving benefits. The interaction term 
odds ratio of 0.51 indicates that the negative impact of YTS participation is exacerbated for 
respondents who also have benefit receipt in the survey period, and that YTS is associated 
with much lower odds of being in a higher work intensity category for cohort members who 
have benefit receipt history (bold OR = 0.62). The positive odds ratio on the YTS main effect 
(OR = 1.22) indicates that YTS may have a positive impacts on later work intensity, but only 
for respondents who also have no history of benefit receipt.   
Summary  
As with the wages model, gender is the most prominent demographic factor in the BCS 
sample’s work intensity, both as an independent effect on the outcome and as a 
moderating variable. For women in particular the experience of growing up does not 
necessarily correspond to higher work intensity, which is likely due to the harsher labour 
market attachment penalties for women as their family increases in size. Parental 
background also had particularly notable results. Although there were not large differences 
in work intensity by parental background as a main effect, the impacts of parental 
background on work intensity increase as respondents age; suggesting as in the wages 
model that parental background becomes a more prominent aspect of one’s labour market 
attachment outcomes after the youth period.  
The impact of benefit receipt on work intensity shows that those who receive benefits have 
lower odds of higher work intensity than non-recipients (however again the composition 
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effects of the recipient group must be taken into account), with slightly more negative 
outcomes for males who receive benefits than females. The timing of benefit receipt is also 
important to consider on this outcome, as benefit receipt has more negative impacts on 
work intensity if received after the youth period. The conclusions to be drawn about benefit 
receipt and work intensity are also particularly nuanced, as the result on the young 
parenting covariate suggests that the receipt of benefits mediates the impact of young 
parenthood on work intensity. When controlling for benefit receipt young parents have 
higher odds of being in a high work intensity group than those who are not young parents, 
and suggest that benefits may be a positive factor in the labour market attachment of 
young parents. The impact of Youth Training Scheme participation was found to be 
moderated by benefit receipt, with participation found to have a positive relationship with 
higher work intensity for participants, but only for participants who do not also have 
experiences with other benefits.  
167 
 



































Displayed are odds ratios from an ordered logistic regression of waged work intensity with t statistics in parentheses. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01 *p<0.05 
 
 Block 1   Block 2   Block 3   Block 4a   Block 4b  
 OR t OR t OR t OR t OR  t 
Age (21)           
30  2.57*** (7.62)  2.17*** (6.08)  2.20*** (6.37)  2.21*** (6.37)  2.21*** (6.37) 
34  3.33*** (9.98)  3.20*** (9.25)  3.23*** (9.69)  3.25*** (9.85)  3.25*** (9.84) 
42  3.40*** (10.24)  3.68*** (10.11)  3.71*** (10.58)  4.43*** (11.80)  4.43*** (11.79) 
Female  0.28*** (-13.53)  0.27*** (-12.96)  0.27*** (-13.16)  0.29*** (-12.62)  0.29*** (-12.58) 
Educ (No quals)           
CSE/NVQ 1   1.83* (2.53)  1.84* (2.51)  1.86** (2.61)  1.83** (2.73)  1.83** (2.72) 
O level/NVQ 2   1.21 (0.99)  1.26 (1.18)  1.32 (1.42)  1.29 (1.43)  1.29 (1.43) 
A level/NVQ 3   1.63* (2.44)  1.69* (2.57)  1.72** (2.71)  1.58* (2.43)  1.58* (2.45) 
Higher Q/NVQ 4   1.76** (2.95)  1.70** (2.73)  1.75** (2.92)  1.52* (2.31)  1.53* (2.34) 
Degree +/NVQ 5  2.18** (3.26)  1.85* (2.54)  1.96** (2.80)  1.60* (2.00)  1.62* (2.05) 
Region (London)           
Rest of England  0.93 (-0.49)         
Wales & Scotland  0.84 (-0.79)         
Health (Excellent)           
Good  1.19* (1.97)  1.19* (1.99)  1.18 (1.92)  1.20* (2.10)  1.21* (2.12) 
Fair  0.94 (-0.42)  0.95 (-0.37)  0.95 (-0.37)  1.04 (0.33)  1.05 (0.33) 
Poor  0.29*** (-4.30)  0.27*** (-4.52)  0.27*** (-4.42)  0.39** (-3.28)  0.38*** (-3.31) 
Young parenting    1.22 (1.41)  1.24 (1.53)  1.49** (2.88)  1.49** (2.89) 
Household size    0.66*** (-10.78)   0.66*** (-10.85)  0.66*** (-10.79)  0.66*** (-10.79) 
Married    0.99 (-0.12)       
Parental Inc (Q1)           
Quintile 2      1.54** (2.82)  1.42* (2.44)  1.43* (2.46) 
Quintile 3      1.26 (1.47)  1.09 (0.59)  1.10 (0.64) 
Quintile 4      1.28 (1.18)  1.06 (0.28)  1.07 (0.34) 
Quintile 5      1.08 (0.36)  0.87 (-0.64)  0.88 (-0.59) 
Missing      1.22 (1.36)  1.14 (0.91)  1.14 (0.93) 
Benefit recipient        0.30*** (-9.22)  0.30*** (-9.22) 
YTS participant          1.06 (0.56) 
Observations  3306   3260    3269   3269   3269  
Cases   901   891  891   891   891  
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 HH size 
*Gender 
 Parent Inc 
*Age 
 HH Size* 
Parental Inc 
 
 OR t OR t OR t OR t OR t 
Age (21)           
30   7.55*** (8.88)  2.20*** (6.38)  2.32*** (6.69)  1.09 (0.25)  2.19*** (6.33) 
34 35.15*** (11.50)   3.24*** (9.70)  3.48*** (10.01)   1.43 (1.01)  3.25*** (9.80) 
42 17.35*** (10.92)  3.72*** (10.61)  4.00*** (10.79)   1.92 (1.87)  3.81*** (10.80) 
Female   1.12 (0.67)  0.27*** (-12.68)  1.01 (0.06)  0.27*** (-13.06)  0.27*** (-13.15) 
Age*Gender           
30 *Female  0.18*** (-6.34)         
   1.38          
34*Female   0.04*** (-9.37)         
  1.45          
42*Female  0.10*** (-8.07)         
  1.68          
Educ (No quals)            
CSE/NVQ 1  1.85* (2.50)  1.84* (2.51)  1.87* (2.54)  1.88** (2.65)  1.85** (2.63) 
O level/NVQ 2  1.21 (0.96)  1.25 (1.14)  1.29 (1.28)  1.31 (1.41)  1.28 (1.29) 
A level/NVQ 3  1.65* (2.36)  1.66* (2.51)  1.71* (2.62)  1.71** (2.70)  1.67** (2.59) 
High Qs/NVQ 4  1.77** (2.84)  1.69** (2.70)  1.72* (2.55)  1.74** (2.90)  1.70** (2.81) 
Degree +/NVQ 5  2.15** (3.11)  1.85* (2.53)  1.89* (2.62)  1.93** (2.72)  1.90** (2.68) 
Health (Excellent)             
Good  1.16 (1.65)  1.19 (1.96)  1.17 (1.76)  1.18 (1.81)  1.19* (2.00) 
Fair  0.90 (-0.78)  0.94 (-0.45)  0.95 (-0.39)  0.93 (-0.51)  0.95 (-0.42) 
Poor  0.25*** (-4.16)  0.27*** (-4.51)  0.26*** (-4.67)  0.27*** (-4.48)  0.27*** (-4.59) 
Young parenting    1.20 (0.49)  1.27 (1.59)  1.23 (1.51)  1.22 (1.46) 
YParent*Female    1.00 (-0.01)       
    1.20        
Household size    0.66*** (-10.84)  0.86** (-2.48)  0.66*** (-11.08)  0.89 (-1.23) 
HH size*Female      0.67*** (-5.16)     
      0.58      
Parental Inc (Q1)           
Quintile 2        1.17 (0.47)  3.64** (3.08) 
Quintile 3        0.55 (-1.72)  5.56*** (3.90) 
Quintile 4        0.31* (-2.44)  2.47 (1.71) 
Quintile 5        0.33 (-1.90)  5.73* (2.34) 
Missing        0.75 (-0.90)  4.11*** (3.48) 
 
 




Quintile 2*Age 30        1.59 (1.04)   
        1.86    
Quintile 3*Age 30        3.15* (2.56)   
        1.74*    
Quintile 4*Age 30        5.79** (2.66)   
        1.82**    
Quintile 5*Age 30        3.59 (1.58)   
        1.17    
Missing*Age 30        1.80 (1.41)   
        1.34    
Quintile 2*Age 34         1.58 (1.05)   
        1.85    
Quintile 3*Age 34        3.38** (2.79)   
        1.87    
Quintile 4*Age 34        9.55*** (3.50)   
        2.99    
Quintile 5*Age 34        6.89** (2.62)   
        2.26    
Missing*Age 34         2.11 (1.83)   
        1.58    
Quintile 2*Age 42        1.22 (0.45)   
        1.43    
Quintile 3*Age 42        2.77* (2.42)   
        1.54    
Quintile 4*Age 42        6.95** (3.12)   
        2.18    
Quintile 5*Age 42        6.25* (2.55)   
        2.04    
Missing*Age 42        1.98 (1.70)   
        1.48    
HH *PInc           
HH size*Quintile 2           0.77* (-2.20) 
          0.68  
HH size*Quintile 3          0.64*** (-3.71) 
          0.57  
HH size*Quintile 4          0.82 (-1.33) 
          0.73  
HH size*Quintile 5          0.61** (-2.63) 
          0.54  
HHsize*Missing          0.69** (-3.24) 
          0.60  
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Observations   3306   3269   3269  3269  3269  
Cases  901   891   891   891  891  
Displayed are odds ratios from an ordered logistic regression of waged work intensity with t statistics in parentheses; odds ratios in bold are those resulting from the interaction terms. 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01 *p<0.05 
171 
 
Table 11: Longitudinal Ordered Logit Models of work intensity 1970 British Cohort Study, interaction effects (Block 4) 








 YTS* Benefits 
recd 
 
 OR t OR  t OR t OR t OR t 
Age (21)           
30  2.20*** (6.32)  2.94*** (8.23)  2.21*** (6.35)  2.23*** (6.45)  2.23*** (6.44) 
34  3.24*** (9.77)  4.41*** (11.77)  3.25*** (9.83)  3.30*** (9.93)  3.25*** (9.86) 
42  4.36*** (11.64)  5.29*** (12.24)  4.37*** (11.66)  4.54*** (11.90)  4.43*** (11.80) 
Female  0.26*** (-13.08)  0.29*** (-12.30)  0.29*** (-12.64)  0.29*** (-12.55)  0.29*** (-12.91) 
Benefit recipient  0.17*** (-5.57)  1.24 (0.73)  0.17*** (-5.58)  0.27*** (-9.09)  0.38*** (-6.01) 
Ben Recd*Female  2.12* (2.17)         
  0.35          
Ben Recd* Age 30    0.12*** (-6.27)       
    0.14        
Ben Recd* Age 34     0.11*** (-6.37)       
    0.14        
Ben Recd* Age 42     0.24*** (-4.26)       
    0.30        
Educ (No quals)           
CSE/NVQ 1  1.82** (2.73)  1.88** (2.74)  1.85** (2.77)  1.84** (2.74)  1.87** (2.84) 
O level/NVQ 2  1.30 (1.50)  1.24 (1.17)  1.30 (1.46)  1.29 (1.41)  1.30 (1.47) 
A level/NVQ 3  1.59* (2.53)  1.53* (2.19)  1.59* (2.47)  1.57* (2.39)  1.59* (2.49) 
Higher Qs/NVQ 4  1.54* (2.43)  1.46* (2.02)  1.53* (2.34)  1.52* (2.29)  1.55* (2.45) 
Degree +/NVQ 5  1.66* (2.15)  1.58 (1.86)  1.64* (2.11)  1.62* (2.01)  1.66* (2.16) 
Health (Excellent)           
Good  1.20* (2.05)  1.23* (2.26)  1.19 (1.94)  1.21* (2.11)  1.21* (2.13) 
Fair  1.04 (0.32)  1.06 (0.45)  1.04 (0.33)  1.04 (0.27)  1.06 (0.40) 
Poor  0.40** (-3.25)  0.43** (-2.85)  0.38*** (-3.41)  0.39*** (-3.34)  0.40** (-3.23) 
Household size  0.67*** (-10.70)  0.66*** (-10.77)  0.66*** (-10.91)  0.66*** (-10.80)  0.66*** (-10.79) 
Young parenting  1.46** (2.78)  1.37* (2.25)  1.51** (3.01)  1.23 (1.35)  1.50** (2.95) 
BenRecd*YParent        1.76 (1.72)   
        0.47    
Parental Inc (Q1)           
Quintile 2  1.45* (2.54)  1.43* (2.44)   1.23 (1.18)  1.44* (2.51)  1.42* (2.44) 
Quintile 3  1.11 (0.72)  1.09 (0.55)   0.89 (-0.67)  1.11 (0.67)  1.12 (0.73) 
Quintile 4  1.06 (0.31)  1.08 (0.37)   0.80 (-0.99)  1.07 (0.34)  1.09 (0.43) 
Quintile 5  0.87 (-0.62)  0.86 (-0.68)   0.71 (-1.46)  0.89 (-0.54)  0.91 (-0.45) 
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Missing  1.14 (0.96)  1.11 (0.73)   0.95 (-0.28)  1.14 (0.95)  1.16 (1.05) 
Ben Recd*P Inc           
Yes*Quintile 2      1.60 (1.16)     
      0.26      
Yes *Quintile 3       2.49* (2.12)     
      0.41      
Yes * Quintile 4      10.68** (3.27)     
      1.23      
Yes*Quintile 5       5.21 (1.51)     
      0.60      
Yes*Missing       1.85 (1.62)     
      0.21      
YTS Participant  1.06 (0.59)  1.07 (0.70)  1.05 (0.46)  1.06 (0.56)  1.22 (1.80) 
YTS*BenRecd          0.51** (-2.60) 
          0.62  
Observations  3269   3269  3269   3269   3269  
Cases  891   891  891   891   891  
Displayed are odds ratios from an ordered logistic regression of waged work intensity with t statistics in parentheses; odds ratios in bold are those resulting from the interaction terms. 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01 *p<0.05 
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4.6 BCS Household Income Measure and Descriptives  
Description of outcome measure 
The final outcome to be modelled for the UK case is gross annual household income 
measured at the 2012 BCS survey. The 2012 gross household income variable is described 
as ‘total take home income from all sources’ and thus the income is measured post-tax and 
post-transfers and before housing costs, which is consistent with the measure in the NLSY 
and elsewhere in poverty literature (Blank 2011; Meyer & Sullivan 2012). Like other surveys 
that capture household income data, respondents selected the income quintile in which 
their annual income was located rather than providing an exact amount of income 
measured as a continuous variable. The survey thus contained two different measures of 
banded gross income based on the number of earners in the household (single and two 
earners) with income bands scaled to the number of earners. The highest income quintile 
for two earner households would necessarily correspond to much higher income than the 
highest income quintile for single earner households; the lower boundary of the highest 
income band for single earner households is set at £32,400/year compared to £81,300/year 
for two earner households. 
Figure 22 details the distribution of the 784 respondents in two earner households into 
income quintiles and accounts for 69% of the total sample in 2012. The distribution of two-
earner households is slightly skewed to the higher income categories: around 40% of the 
sample have incomes in the top two quintiles and 45% of the sample have incomes in the 
middle income quintile. Figure 23 details this distribution for the 247 respondents in single 
earner households in 2012. Around 37% of respondents were in the fourth income quintile 
and another 32% were in the middle income quintile. There is a slightly larger percentage of 
single adult respondents in the highest income quintile (around 15%), which may point to 


















Figure 23: Gross Household Income 2012, BCS single earner households  
 
Preliminary model iterations for this outcome measure produced regressions separately for 
each earner type. However, because of the nature of the data as an unbalanced panel and 
the decision to run the model as complete cases, the sample size in each case fell below 
200 sample members during modelling. To rectify this issue, a new outcome variable was 
created to measure gross household income that would combine the two earner categories 
into one variable and would use income quintiles without stated income amounts. Using 
this operationalisation of the outcome variable does not sacrifice any analytical quality, 
since the interest in this investigation is on income level as relative to the rest of the sample 
members in this dataset rather than an absolute poverty threshold. As the income bands 
for single and two earner households were created by BCS survey designers to be 
appropriately scaled to the number of adult income earners in the household there are no 
major issues with using an income quintile measure without the same income amounts for 
both family types. All that must be done is to control for family type with a household type 
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dummy variable. Modelling all of the sample members in one model ensures that there are 
enough sample members to produce unbiased results and compare groups effectively.  
Figure 24 details the distribution of all sample members with gross household income data 
reported in 2012. As with the two previous figures, the majority of respondents have 
incomes in the third and fourth income quintile, with 75% of sample members having 
incomes in these two quintiles.  






















4.7 Regression Results: BCS Household Income 2012, Ordered Logistic 
Regression  
Block 1: Current Household Context (Table 12) 
The first block of covariates in this model serve as controls for the current household 
context, detailing the demographic covariates of the respondent in 2012. As this is not a 
longitudinal model there is no measurement of time in an age covariate. The results on the 
demographic characteristics in Block 1 show less significant effect sizes than in the other 
BCS models, most notably on the gender and education covariates, and is likely due to the 
fact that demographic characteristics of the individual may impact a household-level 
outcome less than in an individual outcome.  
There are a couple of covariates in Block 1, however, that are significant in the model. The 
results of the first iteration in Table 12 show that respondents in two earner households 
have lower odds of being in a higher income quintile than respondents in single earner 
households (OR = 0.69). This seems to confirm that respondents in single earner 
households are indeed slightly more affluent than those in two earner households as 
indicated by Figure 23. The general health of the respondent also has a significant impact 
on this household income, as respondents with poor health have 0.22 times lower odds of 
being in a higher household income category as respondents with excellent health.  
Finally, the odds of being in a higher household income category increase as wages 
increase, as a one-unit increase in logged monthly wages result in 1.12 times higher odds of 
being in a higher household income quintile. When the wages covariate was added after 
the other demographic characteristics the effect sizes on education, general health, and 
region of residence all reduced; this suggests that wages may be the most prominent factor 
in household income out of the household characteristics measured in 2012. Because many 
of the other demographic covariates in Block 1 are not significant as main effects in the 
model, it is likely that interaction terms that use these characteristics as moderating 
variables are also not significant.  
Block 1 interactions (Table 13) 
Significant interaction terms in Block 1 (Table 13) therefore only include the wage 
covariate. The interaction term of wages and household type is the only one that is 
significant, and was included to test whether the impact of wages on household income 
differs based on household type. The impact of wages for single earner households is 
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significantly different than that of two earner households, indicated by the significant 
interaction term. The wage effect for two earner households is 0.88 times that of the single 
earner households (interaction term OR), and indicates that for respondents in two earner 
families an increase in their logged wages makes a smaller difference in their odds of being 
in a higher income quintile (bold OR 1.09). A one-unit increase in logged wages for single 
earner families increases the odds of being in a higher household income quintile by a 
factor of 1.23 (wages main effect OR).  
The other interaction term of wages and gender was found to be insignificant, and indicates 
that the impact of wages on household income does not differ by the gender of the 
respondent (perhaps surprisingly, given what is known about female labour market 
participation). An interaction between education and household type was also tested for in 
model iterations but was also found to be insignificant, and suggest that education impacts 
household incomes similarly for both household types.  
Block 2: Youth Transition Experiences (Table 12) 
The second block of covariates detail three distinct experiences in the youth period 
(measured at age 21) that may influence household income: young parenthood, marriage, 
and employment status. When added as main effect covariates neither marital status nor 
the experience of young parenthood is statistically significant. Even though the effect size 
on young parenthood is positive (OR = 1.22), the insignificance of the young parenting 
covariate suggests that this experience does not impact the household income of this 
sample of young parents in the long term. The only significant covariate in this block is 
employment status at age 21, and it is the only youth transition covariate carried forward 
to Block 3.  
The effect sizes for employment status at 21 indicate that respondents who are 
unemployed or in full time education have significantly different outcomes than those in 
full time work at 21. The insignificance between those who work part time compared to full 
time work seems to suggest that there is no statistically significant ‘penalty’ in the long 
term by attaching to the labour market this way in the youth period. However, there are 
significant negative impacts on one’s odds of being in a higher household income quintile 
for those out of the labour market and not in education at 21. Those who are unemployed 
at 21 have 0.56 times lower odds of being in a higher income quintile at age 42 than full 
time workers. The result for those who are unemployed at age 21 is particularly notable 
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because it suggests that unemployment experiences in the youth period have long term 
effects: however, this may be due to other prior factors that affect youth labour market 
attachment, like parental income, that is controlled for in Block 3 models. Those in full time 
education at age 21 also report significantly different impacts than full time workers, with 
odds 1.87 times higher, and confirms the importance of higher education on household 
income; again, however, the statistical significance disappears by Block 4.  
Although two interaction terms were tested for in Block 2, neither were found to be 
significant in the model. Employment status at age 21 is not moderated by the gender of 
the respondent, nor is the effect of young parenthood moderated by gender.  
Block 3: Parental background (Table 12) 
The addition of parental income quintile in 1986 is a significant factor in the odds of being 
in a higher income quintile at age 42 and mediates some of the other covariate effect sizes. 
The significant and large odds ratios of those from quintile 4 (OR = 3.42) and quintile 5 (OR 
= 4.18) suggest that the parental background of the respondent indeed impacts household 
economic status in the long term. Those from quintiles 1 through 3 (where quintile 2 and 
quintile 3 covariates were insignificant) could be considered as one segment of 
respondents, while those in the top two income quintiles have markedly different 
outcomes at 42. These results are consistent with results in the wages model, as those from 
the top two income quintile groups also had much higher wages than sample members 
from poorer households. After adding covariates in Block 5, the odds ratios for the top two 
parental income quintile main effects decrease slightly but remain significant.  
Including parental income quintile to the model most notably mediates the effect sizes on 
the employment status at age 21 covariate. Now, the effect size on the unemployment 
category is no longer statistically significant compared to those in full time work, indicating 
that the impact of this early employment experience is partially a function of parental 
background.  
Block 3 interactions (Table 13) 
The wages and parental income interaction is included to determine how the impact of 
respondent wages differs between respondents from lower and higher income families. 
There are significant interaction terms for respondents from quintiles 2, 3 and 5, and odds 
ratios below 1 indicate that wages have slightly lower positive impacts on the odds of being 
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in a higher income category for these groups compared to those from quintile 1. Therefore, 
respondents in quintile 1 have the largest effect sizes, as a one-unit increase in logged 
wages for this group corresponds to 1.44 times higher odds of being in a higher household 
income category (given by the monthly wage main effect). The bold odds ratios indicate 
that those from quintiles 3 and 5 have much smaller increases in odds of being in a higher 
income category when respondent wages increase (quintile 3 OR = 1.12, quintile 5 OR = 
1.02). These results suggest that the wages of respondents from higher parental 
backgrounds have less of an impact on household income, and that these groups do not 
rely on wage income to the same extent as respondents from poorer families. This also 
suggests that those from more affluent families may have additional resources that can be 
drawn on to improve their household income in the long term. 
Block 4: Government interventions (Table 12) 
The covariates in the government intervention block assess whether receipt of government 
assistance at one point in the youth period has impacts at age 42 for this sample. Benefit 
receipt at age 21 is not found to be a significant factor in this model, and indeed there is 
almost no difference in the odds of being in a higher household income category between 
those who do and do not receive benefits at this age (odds ratio = 0.99). The inclusion of 
this covariate also does not mediate any of the other covariate effects, unlike the results of 
the individual outcome models. In order to determine if benefit receipt at age 21 was ever 
a significant covariate in the model the measure was entered in iterations at the end of 
different covariate blocks. During this process benefit receipt was found to be significant in 
the model only before employment status at age 21 was included, and indicates that the 
employment status of the respondent captures the same type of impacts on household 
income at 42 that benefit receipt does when measured at this age. 
The addition of the YTS covariate, however, does result in a significant effect on household 
income. BCS respondents in this sample who participated in YTS at any time between age 
16 and 30 have 0.72 times lower odds of being in a higher household income category than 
those who do not have this experience. This suggests that this intervention in the labour 
market trajectory of respondents in the youth period is associated with worse outcomes, 
even when income is measured at the household level. This result is consistent with what is 
found in the individual wages model, where YTS participants have a lower overall wage 
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trajectory than those without this experience, which would therefore also impact 
household income at 42.  
The final iteration in Table 12 was included to test whether the timing of benefit receipt 
impacts on household income at age 42, which was suggested by interaction terms in the 
individual models. The model with benefit receipt measured at age 30 along with the 
corresponding employment status covariate at age 30 resulted in significant effects. When 
benefits are received at age 30 there is a significant difference in the odds of being in a 
higher household income category than those who do not receive benefits (odds ratio = 
0.46). The relatively low odds ratio on benefit receipt at 30 suggests that the timing of 
benefit receipt is indeed important: while benefits received at age 21 do not impact 
household income at 42, benefits received in early adulthood (and likely as a member of 
the family of destination) will have long term impacts.   
Block 4 interactions (Table 13) 
Although benefit receipt in 1991 was not found to be significant as a main effect, an 
interaction term with gender as the moderating variable was included to test if indeed 
benefit receipt when received by women as opposed to men has different impacts on 
household income. The interaction term was not found to be significant, and therefore the 
impact (or lack thereof) of benefit receipt at age 21 can be considered to act the same 
regardless of gender. The second interaction term on YTS participation and gender is 
included to investigate whether the impact of this participation differs for male and female 
respondents. The odds ratio on the YTS main effect is significant here although the 
interaction term is not, indicating that YTS does not act differently for men and women in 
the sample. However, the main effect on the YTS covariate, which identifies the effect for 
just men in the sample is significant, where men who participate in YTS have 0.55 times 
lower odds of being in higher income category than those who do not participate.  The odds 
ratio on YTS among females is 0.88, indicating that there is not a significant difference in 
odds among females based on their YTS participation history.  
Summary  
Unlike the results for the previous individual models of economic independence, the model 
of household income at 2012 did not show the same type of independent effect sizes for 
the gender covariate. This is likely because the outcome is measured at the household 
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level. Rather, the factors that were shown to have the largest impact on household income 
were the wage income of the respondent and parental background. Wages were found to 
be a more prominent factor in household income for respondents from less affluent 
parental backgrounds, which suggests that those from higher background groups do not 
have to rely on wages to the same degree. What is perhaps surprising about this model is 
that the youth transition experience of young parenthood does not negatively impact 
household income at 42, and that employment status at 21 also did not have different 
impacts on household income once parental background was included in the model. This 
suggests that parental background has an impact on household income as an independent 
factor but also that employment status at 21 can also be considered partially as a function 
of parental background.  
Benefit receipt at 21 was not found to have a significant impact on the odds of being in a 
higher household income category at 42, and suggests that it is not an appropriate for this 
sample to assert that benefit receipt received at one point in the youth period is 
significantly associated with worse household incomes into mid-life. However, as was 
suggested in interaction terms in the individual models, the timing of benefit receipt in 
one’s life course is important to consider. When benefits are received at age 30, more likely 
now received as part of the family of destination, those who receive benefits have lower 
odds of being in a high income category than those who do not receive benefits at age 30. 
Finally, government intervention in the form of Youth Training Scheme participation had 
negative impacts on household income at 42, with men who participated in YTS exhibiting 




Table 12: Ordered Logistic Regression Models of gross household income 2012 1970 British Cohort Study, main effects (Blocks 1-4)  
 Block 1  Block 2  Block 3  Block 4a  Block 4b  
 OR t OR t OR t OR t OR t 
HH type (Single earner)           
Two earner  0.69* (-2.20)  0.63** (-2.66)  0.60** (-2.93)  0.60** (-2.93)  0.59** (-2.97) 
Female  1.02 (0.14)  1.03 (0.19)  1.07 (0.48)  1.04 (0.31)  1.18 (1.06) 
Educ (No quals)             
CSE/NVQ 1  1.41 (1.04)  1.42 (1.00)  1.29 (0.73)  1.28 (0.72)  1.21 (0.57) 
O level/NVQ 2  0.79 (-0.80)  0.80 (-0.74)  0.74 (-0.99)  0.75 (-0.94)  0.70 (-1.21) 
A level/NVQ 3  1.31 (0.90)  1.33 (0.90)  1.16 (0.48)  1.13 (0.40)  1.04 (0.12) 
Higher Qs/NVQ 4  2.35** (2.91)  2.16* (2.48)  1.86* (2.02)  1.78 (1.85)  1.75 (1.84) 
Degree+/NVQ 5  3.53** (3.26)  2.46* (2.09)  1.89 (1.51)  1.81 (1.38)  2.06 (1.85) 
Region (London)           
Rest of England  0.62 (-1.61)  0.64 (-1.51)  0.69 (-1.28)  0.71 (-1.16)  0.70 (-1.18) 
Wales & Scotland  0.35** (-2.80)  0.38** (-2.63)  0.43* (-2.27)  0.45* (-2.12)  0.45* (-2.13) 
Health (Excellent)           
Good  0.88 (-0.75)  0.93 (-0.42)  0.91 (-0.55)  0.90 (-0.63)  0.88 (-0.79) 
Fair  0.57 (-1.92)  0.64 (-1.49)  0.63 (-1.57)  0.64 (-1.51)  0.66 (-1.40) 
Poor  0.22*** (-4.10)  0.26*** (-3.58)  0.26*** (-3.57)  0.28*** (-3.51)  0.37* (-2.53) 
Monthly wages (ln)  1.12*** (4.37)  1.12*** (4.43)  1.13*** (4.63)  1.13*** (4.68)  1.11*** (4.20) 
Married 1991    1.05 (0.32)       
Young parenting    1.22 (0.58)       
Emp Stat 1991 (FT)           
PT work    0.64 (-1.42)  0.68 (-1.31)  0.68 (-1.23)   
Unemployed    0.56* (-2.07)  0.59 (-1.86)  0.60 (-1.19)   
FT Ed    1.87* (2.40)  1.72* (2.11)   1.61 (1.84)   
Home    0.45 (-1.69)  0.54 (-1.82)  0.53 (-1.48)   
Training    0.25 (-0.47)  0.30 (-0.42)   0.36  (-0.35)   
Sick/Disabled    2.05 (0.66)  2.34 (0.71)  2.47 (0.82)   
Parental Inc 1986 (Q1)           
Quintile 2      1.29 (1.04)  1.28 (0.98)  1.21 (0.74) 
Quintile 3      1.33 (1.17)  1.28 (0.98)  1.25 (0.87) 
Quintile 4      3.42*** (3.77)  3.27*** (3.59)  3.25*** (3.55) 
Quintile 5      4.18*** (3.80)  4.03*** (3.67)  3.89*** (3.56) 
Missing      1.88** (2.65)  1.87** (2.60)  1.81* (2.42) 
Ben Recd 1991        0.99 (-0.02)   
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YTS participant          0.72* (-2.30)  0.70* (-2.50) 
Emp Stat 2000 (FT)           
PT work          0.89 (-0.58) 
Unemployed          1.06 (0.18) 
FT Ed          0.60 (-0.54) 
Home          0.61 (-1.93) 
Sick/Disabled/Other          0.49 (-1.72) 
Ben Recd 2000          0.46** (-3.24) 
cut1  0.04*** (-6.70)  0.04*** (-6.63)  0.05*** (-5.68)  0.04*** (-5.78)  0.03*** (-6.08) 
cut2  0.17*** (-3.82)  0.16*** (-3.83)  0.23** (-2.88)  0.20** (-3.06)  0.15*** (-3.47) 
cut3  1.45 (0.80)  1.43 (0.76)  2.14 (1.51)  1.87 (1.19)  1.43 (0.66) 
cut4 13.04*** (5.34) 13.63*** (5.33)  21.14*** (5.87) 18.65*** (5.47)  14.14*** (4.80) 
Observations 820  805  820  820  820  


















 OR t OR t OR t OR t OR t 
HH Type (Single earner)           
Two earner household  0.67* (-2.33)  1.38 (0.85)  0.59** (-3.06)  0.60** (-2.90)  0.59** (-2.97) 
Female  1.58 (1.38)  0.99 (-0.06)  1.09 (0.65)  1.04 (0.24)  0.89 (-0.64) 
Monthly wages (ln)  1.16*** (4.15)  1.23*** (3.92)  1.44*** (4.90)  1.13*** (4.68)  1.13*** (4.63) 
Wages*Female  0.93 (-1.57)         
Educ (No quals)           
CSE/NVQ 1  1.35 (0.90)  1.33 (0.84)  1.30 (0.75)  1.28 (0.72)  1.27 (0.69) 
O level/NVQ 2  0.77 (-0.91)  0.79 (-0.79)  0.78 (-0.81)  0.75 (-0.94)  0.75 (-0.96) 
A level/NVQ 3  1.29 (0.85)  1.32 (0.93)  1.21 (0.59)  1.14 (0.40)  1.15 (0.45) 
Higher Qs/NVQ 4  2.24** (2.75)  2.36** (2.90)  1.99* (2.20)  1.79 (1.86)  1.79 (1.87) 
Degree +/NVQ 5  3.56*** (3.30)  3.54** (3.28)  1.97 (1.59)  1.81 (1.39)  1.81 (1.38) 
Region (London)           
Rest of England  0.61 (-1.66)  0.61 (-1.62)  0.68 (-1.37)  0.71 (-1.14)  0.70 (-1.23) 
Wales & Scotland  0.34** (-2.90)  0.35** (-2.80)  0.40* (-2.48)  0.45* (-2.10)  0.44* (-2.18) 
Health (Excellent)           
Good  0.87 (-0.87)  0.88 (-0.78)  0.90 (-0.62)  0.90 (-0.63)  0.93 (-0.45) 
Fair  0.56* (-2.02)  0.59 (-1.82)  0.69 (-1.20)  0.64 (-1.51)   0.65 (-1.46) 
Poor  0.21*** (-4.40)  0.26*** (-3.65)  0.26*** (-3.63)  0.28*** (-3.52)  0.28*** (-3.48) 
Wages*Two earner HH    0.88* (-2.13)        
Parental Inc (Q1)           
Quintile 2      4.18* (2.35)  1.28 (0.99)  1.28 (0.98) 
Quintile 3      5.20** (2.72)  1.28 (0.99)  1.27 (0.96) 
Quintile 4     10.89** (2.87)  3.28*** (3.59)  3.20*** (3.51) 
Quintile 5     28.38*** (3.89)  4.04*** (3.68)  4.01*** (3.66) 
Missing     10.78*** (4.27)  1.88** (2.61)  1.88** (2.60) 
Wages*Parental income           
Wages*Quintile 2      0.80* (-2.43)     
      1.16      
Wages*Quintile 3      0.78** (-2.86)     
      1.12      
Wages*Quintile 4      0.81 (-1.86)     
      1.16      
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Wages*Quintile 5      0.72** (-2.80)     
      1.02      
Wages*Missing      0.73*** (-3.93)     
      1.04      
Emp Stat 1991 (FT)           
PT work      0.65 (-1.45)  0.68 (-1.23)  0.67 (-1.27) 
Unemployed      0.56* (-2.03)  0.62 (-1.03)  0.63 (-1.08) 
FT Ed      1.73* (2.16)  1.61 (1.84)  1.63 (1.90) 
Looking after home      0.60 (-1.43)  0.52 (-1.49)  0.53 (-1.44) 
Training       0.29 (-0.41)  0.36 (-0.35)  0.40 (-0.30) 
Sick/Disabled      1.99 (0.52)  2.47 (0.82)  2.58 (0.92) 
Benefit recipient 1991        0.93 (-0.14)  0.96 (-0.11) 
Ben Recd 1991*Gender        1.09 (0.18)   
YTS participant        0.72* (-2.30)  0.55** (-2.92) 
YTS*Female          1.61 (1.71) 
          0.88  
cut1  0.04*** (-6.26)  0.06*** (-5.10)  0.17** (-2.67)  0.04*** (-5.73)  0.04*** (-5.85) 
cut2  0.20*** (-3.36)  0.28* (-2.37)  0.87 (-0.20)  0.20** (-3.04)  0.18** (-3.20) 
cut3  1.73 (1.14)  2.48 (1.69)  8.52** (3.16)  1.87 (1.20)  1.68 (0.97) 
cut4 15.59*** (5.54) 22.62*** (5.60) 84.33*** (6.43) 18.73*** (5.46) 16.81*** (5.18) 
Observations 820  820  820 820 820    
Displayed are odds ratios from an ordered logistic regression of gross household income with t statistics in parentheses; transformed interaction odds ratios are in bold.  




A summary of the final main effects models for all three of the BCS models is found in Table 
14, included here to detail broadly the effects of each of the covariates of interest. The 
demographic characteristics in the household income model are measured at 2012. However, 
these tables do not include interaction effects, which are found in the regression tables in the 
previous pages.  
Table 14: Summary of Final Main Effect Model Results, BCS    
Variable/Covariate   Wages                                  
(positive = higher 
wages) 
Work Intensity                       
(positive = higher 
work int) 
Household Income                               
(positive = higher 
income) 
Age    + *** + ***  
Two Earner Household    n/a n/a  -- ** 
Female    -- *** -- *** + 
Education (A level +) 2012   + *** + *** + 
Employment Status  
(Part Time) 
  -- *** n/a  -- 
Poor Health     -- *** -- 
Household size    -- -- *** n/a 
Married    +   
Young Parent   -- + **  
Parental Income Q4 / Q5   + ** + / -- + *** 
Benefit Receipt (any)   -- *** -- *** n/a 
Benefit Recd, age 21     + / -- 
Benefit Recd, age 30      -- ** 







Chapter 5: Case 2 Results, National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth 1997 
5.1 Introduction to the NLSY 1997 Results and Government Intervention 
Descriptives 
The following chapter details the empirical results for the second case of this investigation, 
which uses the United States’ National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997. As with the UK case, 
three empirical models will investigate economic independence. While the research question 
for both cases is the same and each of the three components of economic independence are 
conceptually similar (detailed in Chapter 3), the unique features of the NLSY dataset results in 
slightly different operationalisation of these concepts.  
As with the BCS case, longitudinal descriptive figures for the independent variable of interest, 
benefit receipt/government assistance42 are explored first. In the NLSY there are three 
different benefit receipt measures included in model iterations: receipt of any means-tested 
assistance, receipt of SNAP assistance, and the receipt of TANF cash assistance. This section 
will detail benefit receipt for this sample of respondents for each of these measures by 
particular demographic characteristics of interest43, guided by theoretical issues introduced in 
Chapters 1 and 2. 
Each survey wave in this sample contains a summary measure created by NLSY administrators 
that captures the number of months the respondent received any type of government 
assistance in the year. This measure was modified into a binary variable indicating whether or 
not the cohort member received any assistance for one month or more during the year. The 
‘Any benefit receipt’ measure in this investigation includes participation in TANF, SNAP, WIC, 
SSI (Disability), VA benefits, childcare or housing assistance44. These programmes are available 
                                                          
42 Research and policy documents that detail benefit programmes in the United States do not use the 
term ‘benefit receipt’ in their work: rather terms such as ‘cash assistance’ ‘in-kind transfers’ (in the case 
of SNAP or Housing Assistance), ‘program participation’, or the more broadly termed ‘government 
assistance’ is used. In the following regression tables the label ‘benefit receipt’ is used to align with the 
language of welfare state policy of the UK. However, the terms ‘benefits’ and ‘government assistance’ in 
this thesis are used interchangeably. 
43 Although generally considered a control variable in this analysis, descriptive figures were also 
produced by Census Region, which suggests that future research should consider regional (but ideally 
state) variation in government assistance as a driver in outcomes (see Appendix E and discussion in 
Chapter 6.3). 




at each of the survey waves and receipt is only considered for respondents as an independent 
benefit unit.  
Any benefit receipt descriptive figures   
The NLSY sample contains respondents born between 1980 and 1984, and therefore in 1997 
there are respondents who are younger than 16, the age of interest here. In order to create 
longitudinal descriptive figures with age as the time variable (x-axis) that includes the most 
sample members in each age group, figures are created for respondents from age 17 to age 34, 
measured in this survey in half years. There is data for all 8,000+ respondents from ages 17-29, 
and results from age 30 to 34 have smaller sample sizes as the ‘oldest’ cohort members. 
Because of different birth years of the NLSY cohort members, a respondent will turn 18, for 
example, anywhere between 1998 and 2002 and therefore there is no year listed on the x-axis 
of these longitudinal figures.  
Figure 26 details the percentage of the total sample in receipt of any means-tested benefits, 
which increases with age to around 22% by age 24. After the youth period the proportion 
receiving government assistance begins to plateau for the remainder of the survey. The 
primary reason why the proportion of respondents in receipt of government assistance 
increases through the youth period is because as sample members become parents they are 
eligible for more means-tested benefits.  
Almost immediately from age 16 onwards the trends in benefit receipt diverge markedly 
between men and women in the sample (Figure 27). The proportion of females who receive 
government assistance increases steadily and at a faster rate than males such that by age 24 
there are around 30% of female sample members who access any benefits compared to 
around 12% of males. After the youth period there are slightly declining proportions of females 
in receipt, and by age 34 (n = 1000) there are around 25% of females receiving benefits with 
around 10% of males receiving benefits.  
Perhaps the most important contextual difference in the US case is the effect that race has on 
a respondent’s interaction with the welfare state and more broadly on youth transition 
outcomes. Figure 28 shows that the percentage of Black benefit recipients increases from 16 
to 24 to a peak at around 32%, and stays around 30% for the rest of the survey. Hispanic 
respondents follow generally the same trend line as Black respondents during the youth 
period, and their peak of around 30% of the group receiving benefits is reached at age 25. The 
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subsequent nine years of data shows a decreasing and variable trend for Hispanic respondents, 
as the proportion in receipt stays between 20 -25%. White respondents have a trend line of 
benefit receipt much lower than the other two racial groups at every time point, and the 
proportion stays at or around 15% of the group from age 24 onwards. The trend lines in this 
descriptive figure suggest that there is indeed a systematic difference in the receipt of benefits 
depending on one’s racial group, and suggests that race will likely be a factor to consider in 
interactions with benefit receipt. 
The experience of young parenthood as it relates to government assistance is also relevant to 
consider because eligibility for means-tested benefits are often contingent on being a parent, 
and the experience of young parenthood is more prominent among lower income groups45. In 
this dataset young parenthood is defined as becoming a parent before age 24, and 33.5% of 
the NLSY sample here were parents at 24. Figure 29 illustrates a distinct difference in the 
proportion of respondents who receive benefits based on their status as young parents. 
Between 16 and 24 the percentage of young parents in receipt of government assistance 
increases dramatically, with around 50% of all respondents who are young parents receiving 
some form of means-tested benefits at age 24. Notably by age 34 (n = 1,000) still around 35% 
of this group receive government assistance. This trend diverges substantially for those who do 
not have children in the youth period, where the proportion of respondents receiving 
assistance only reaches a height of 12-15% from age 29 onwards.  
Investigating benefit receipt by parental income quintile (Figure 30) produces results 
consistent with what is known about how parental background impacts poverty outcomes 
(and, therefore, receipt of means-tested benefits). The trends in benefit receipt in Figure 30 
diverge noticeably after age 18, with around 35% more respondents from the lowest income 
quintile receiving benefits than those from the highest parental income group at age 24. 
Around age 24 the trend lines for each group begin to plateau and only after age 30 is there 
slightly more variation in benefit receipt trends for each group.  
Descriptive analysis of welfare dynamics for this sample reported between 4 to 8% of those 
who did not receive any benefits in the previous year moving on to benefits in the subsequent 
year, and around 15 to 20% of those who received in the previous year moving off benefits in 
                                                          
45 A cross tabulation and chi-square test of association on young parenthood and parental income for 
this sample concluded there is a moderate and significant relationship: Pearson chi2 = 418.56, Pr = 
0.000, Cramer's V =   0.22. 
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the next period. This pattern of movement off and on assistance is relatively consistent 
between survey waves that generally cover both the first half of the panels (1997 to 2004) and 
the second half of the panels (2005 to 2013). As the NLSY cohort includes those born between 
1980 and 1984, in general the youth period (where over 75% of the sample is over 17) extends 
from roughly the year 2000 to 2007. Around 5.8% of the entire sample (487 respondents) 
received assistance in the first two years of the youth period for all respondents (2000 and 
2001) and the percentage of respondents who receive consecutively decreases with each 
wave, where only 2.2% of the sample (187 respondents) received benefits in all seven 
consecutive waves of the youth period. A larger group of respondents, 8.1% of the sample, 
received benefits at the beginning (2000) and the end (2007) of the youth period of interest. 
Together the results of this sample illustrate that there are very few benefit recipients who 
receive in consecutive years long-term, but rather likely cycle off and on benefits throughout 
youth and into adulthood. Based on the wider variation in the figures above on gender, race, 
and young parenthood, they are also used to investigate the two government assistance 
programmes in the US detailed in the upcoming models; SNAP and TANF. Both are included as 
separate benefit covariates in order to speak to the large body of research that exists on both 
of these programmes directly and to provide more nuanced results for this investigation. As 
will be detailed in the following pages, the patterns of receipt by demographic characteristics 
are similar for SNAP and TANF so the figures by the same demographic characteristic are 
displayed together.  
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Figure 28: Benefit receipt (any), NLSY sample by race46 
 
                                                          
46 Mixed race respondents are included in the regression tables that follow, but the results on descriptive figures are not particularly notable because of the very small number 
of respondents who identified themselves as mixed race at the first survey in 1997. 
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Figure 29: Benefit receipt (any), NLSY sample       Figure 30: Benefit receipt (any), NLSY sample  
by parenting status at 24        by parental income quintile 1997 
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SNAP and TANF descriptive figures   
Receipt for the total sample 
Figure 31 illustrates the trend in SNAP receipt for NLSY sample members, which rises to a 
peak around age 27 when nearly 18% of the total sample receive SNAP in the survey year. 
This proportion of recipients stays relatively consistent until a decrease at age 30 
onwards47. The growth in the proportion of sample members who receive SNAP is not 
particularly surprising, especially as family sizes grow and more respondents become 
eligible for the programme.  
There is a smaller proportion of NLSY members receiving TANF (Figure 32) because of the 
lower income eligibility limit of 100% FPL (compared to 130% FPL for SNAP) paired with 
programme characteristics that deter participation (detailed in Chapter 1.2). In the total 
sample the percentage in receipt of TANF during the youth period increases from less than 
2% to around 3.5% by age 24 (note scale on y axis of Figure 32). The largest uptick in the 
proportion that receive TANF is from around age 29 to age 32, where there are between 4% 
and 6% of respondents who access this programme (n = roughly 2000 at each age). 
Nationally, Americans who receive TANF account for less than 5% of the total population 
(Floyd et al. 2017).   










                                                          
47 A reminder about the construction of the NLSY sample: as the sample includes respondents born 
between 1980 and 1984 the full sample contains ‘younger’ and ‘older’ members, and therefore 
results at age 30 onward in the demographic figures do not include the entire sample of cohort 
members. The full sample is survey between ages 17 and 29 (see Chapter 3.3 and Appendix A for 
additional information).  
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Figure 32: TANF receipt, total NLSY sample    







Receipt by gender  
Trends in SNAP receipt show particularly strong divergence along gender lines, with a very 
steep increase in the percentage of females in the sample receiving SNAP from age 20 to 27 
to around 26% (Figure 33). During ages 27-30 the percentage of women receiving SNAP 
stays relatively consistent at about a quarter of the group before decreasing from age 30 
onwards. This pattern is markedly different for the males in the sample, who, despite the 
growth in family size after age 25, still have only around 10% of the group in receipt of 
SNAP. As with the measure of benefit receipt, it is likely then that SNAP will have different 
impacts on females in the sample, which will be tested with an interaction.  
The divergence in outcomes between males and females who receive TANF in Figure 34 
details clearly a cash assistance programme targeted towards and serving low-income 
women with children. There is a notable increase in the proportion of women who receive 
TANF between 18 and 23 (up to 5%), and indicates that throughout youth and into early 
adulthood there is a group of single mothers who are poor enough and receive TANF; these 
mothers are therefore also particularly at risk of having poorer economic independence 
outcomes than their peers. The percentage of females who receive TANF remains around 
5% from age 22 to age 28, when the proportion begins to increase; unsurprisingly, this 
pattern is not seen among males at any time point.  
Receipt by young parenting status 
The pattern of SNAP receipt by parenting status at age 24 mirrors quite strikingly the trend 
lines in receipt by gender; however, the increase in the portion of young parents receiving 
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SNAP rises more steeply to age 27 when around 35% of young parents receive SNAP (Figure 
35). From around age 28 onwards the percentage of young parents receiving SNAP begins 
to decline, suggesting that SNAP is a particularly important source of assistance when 
children are young and becomes a less prominent part of this group’s experience in their 
early 30s. For respondents who are not parents before 24 the proportion who receive SNAP 
climbs slowly from age 25 onwards but is only ever received by around 10% of this group. 
This suggests a systematic difference in interaction with the benefit system for those who 
are young parents.  
When TANF receipt is viewed by parenting status in Figure 36, there is also a steep increase 
in receipt from age 18 to 24 for young parents; increasing from around 4.5% to around 
10%. After age 24, however, the proportion of young parents who receive TANF decreases 
back down to 5% of the group: this is likely due to the more buoyant economy of the mid-
2000s but is likely also a result of the programme itself, as recipients of TANF rarely receive 
benefits for many consecutive years (due to work requirements and time limits). Unlike the 
decreasing trends in SNAP receipt among young parents after 27, Figure 36 indicates that 
there is a consistent group of sample members who have children in the youth period that 
remain poor enough to receive TANF at some point in their later 20s and early 30s 
(however, again, this does not indicate that the same respondents have been in receipt for 
consecutive years). What is also notable to consider from this figure is not only how many 
young parents access TANF cash assistance, but how few young parents access this benefit. 
It is very likely that there are more low income young parents in the NLSY cohort who are 
eligible for TANF, but only a small proportion receive it.  
TANF take up issues are investigated for two groups to detail the reach of this programme. 
Figure 37 details the percentage of cohort members living at or below 100% FPL who are in 
receipt of TANF across the survey years. The proportion of this group receiving TANF 
increases slightly with age from 5% to 10% between ages 20 and 30, with larger jumps in 
receipt for those with survey data from 30 onwards (however, again, the smaller number of 
sample members from 30 onwards may be a reason for this increase). Figure 38 details 
TANF take up for the target group of young parents in poverty, where between ages 20 and 
30 receipt peaks at around 20% of young parents at age 24. This suggests that even for 
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young parents who are in poverty only a fifth of those who are likely eligible for TANF are 
accessing it, which is relatively consistent with national take up rates for young parents48. 
The TANF take up results are contrasted with SNAP figures, where nearly 40% of all those 
living below the poverty line receive SNAP from around age 26 onwards (Figure 38). The 
take up for SNAP among poor young parents is much higher, where around 22% of young 
parents at 21 receive SNAP, climbing to almost 60% of the group by age 24 (Figure 40). 
These receipt figures confirm that indeed SNAP is the primary form of government 
assistance accessed by citizens in poverty and by poor young parents in particular. 
Receipt by race  
Finally, the receipt of SNAP by racial group shows variation in receipt becoming more 
prominent after age 20 (Figure 41). Black respondents have a steeper increase in the 
proportion who receive SNAP from age 20 to 24 most notably (up to 25%), while both 
Hispanic and White respondent trends are relatively similar in the youth period (only up to 
around 10% of each group). Between age 24 and age 30 all groups of respondents have 
slower increases in the proportion receiving SNAP; notably the proportion of Hispanic 
respondents increases to around 20% by age 30 compared to 12% of White respondents. 
Especially in the youth period it is clear from this figure that Black respondents have much 
more interaction with this programme, as around a fifth of 24 year olds in this racial group 
access SNAP. 
As with SNAP receipt there are distinct trends in TANF receipt by racial group, albeit at 
much lower proportions (Figure 42). During the youth period the proportion of Black 
respondents receiving TANF increases to around 7.5% of the group by age 24. Again, the 
proportion of those who receive TANF is more similar for White and Hispanic respondents, 
and stays at or around 4% for both groups to age 30. The variation in TANF receipt between 
racial groups, however, is not quite as large as the differences in SNAP receipt, which 
suggests that while the impact of TANF on economic independence outcomes should 
therefore be considered by race, the interaction terms of TANF receipt may not be 
particularly notable. These figures and those for any government assistance suggest that 
race may likely moderate the effect of benefit receipt, particularly between Black and 
White respondents, which will be explored in interaction terms in each of the models.  
                                                          
48 As noted in Chapter 1.2, in 2016 around 23% of poor young parents accessed TANF nationwide.  
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Figure 35: SNAP receipt, NLSY sample           Figure 36: TANF receipt, NLSY sample  








Figure 37: TANF receipt, NLSY sample           Figure 38: SNAP receipt, NLSY sample          









Figure 39: TANF receipt, NLSY sample         Figure 40: SNAP receipt, NLSY sample 









Figure 41: SNAP receipt, NLSY sample by race         Figure 42: TANF receipt, NLSY sample by race 













Case-specific issues: residential transitions  
A unique feature of the NLSY dataset is the information provided on residential 
independence, measured by when a respondent made the initial move out of their parental 
home for more than three months. This measure has four categories, with early movers 
(before 19), middle range movers (19-21 and 21-24) and late movers (21-24). Figure 43 
provides evidence which can advise whether the age of initial move out should be 
considered with benefit receipt in interaction terms. While there is indeed variation in 
receipt particularly in the youth period to age 24, there is far less between the groups that 
leave before age 24. However, by age 24 the difference between all groups is small: 
respondents who make the initial move out early have higher proportions of respondents in 
receipt of benefits (around 22%) while those who leave after 24 have around 19% of the 
group in receipt. After the youth period it is more difficult to identify systematic variation 
by this characteristic; therefore, it is not particularly relevant to include this in an 
interaction term with benefit receipt.  
Figure 43: Benefit receipt (any), NLSY sample by age at initial move out 
 
The second unique covariate in the NLSY dataset to consider alongside the age at initial 
move out is whether the respondent moved back in with their parents, which aims to 
determine if any level of ‘boomerang’ impacts are present for this sample. Table 15 
indicates that respondents in the sample who moved out earlier in the youth period have a 
higher proportion of those who move back at least once: 71% of those who move out 
initially before 19 and 67% of those who move out between 19 and 21 move back in at least 
once. Conversely, around 73% those who don’t move out before age 24 never move back; a 
relationship that is statistically significant. This suggests that respondents who stay in their 
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parental home, supported residentially and financially, are thus more likley to make a one-
time, permanent exit to residential independence while others have the ‘boomerang’ 
experience. Results from these two measures can also provide more explicit evidence on 
the impact of family resources, provided in this case through longer periods co-residence or 
the ability to move back in if needed. 
Table 15: Cross Tabulation of age at move out and if respondent ever moved 
back after initial move out  
  
Moved back after initial move 
out    
Age at initial move out No Yes  Total  
Before 19 28.38% 71.62% 100.00% 
Between 19-21 32.64% 67.36% 100.00% 
Between 21-24 46.65% 52.35% 100.00% 
After 24 73.09% 26.91% 100.00% 
Total  45.50% 54.50% 100.00% 





5.2 NLSY Annual Wages Measure and Descriptives 
Description of outcome measure  
The NLSY measure of annual wage income is one of the individual measures of economic 
independence, here detailing individual performance in the labour market that includes 
both salary income and other wage income (adjusted for inflation to 2013 $). An annual 
measure of wage income is able to accurately capture total income earned in the labour 
market, even if respondents may be in involved in seasonal or part time work. The overall 
trend in wage growth for this sample is shown in Figure 44, and details a linear trend from 
youth to adulthood. As mentioned in the benefit receipt figures, the drop in wages 
reported in the last two age groups (age 33.5 and 34) are due to the smaller sample size 
reported for these respondents. As with the descriptive figures on benefit receipt, it is 
valuable here to produce descriptive figures on this outcome variable by the key 
demographic characteristics of gender, race and young parenthood before modelling. 
Figure 44: Annual employment income (mean), total NLSY sample (AFI) 
 
Figure 45 details the growth in wage income by gender, and shows a slow but consistent 
widening in the average annual wage income between men and women. This gap in annual 
wage income becomes more prominent after age 24 and widens slightly to around $10,000 
by age 30. For modelling purposes, then, it is useful to consider how the overall trend in 
wage income is influenced by gender in an interaction term of age and gender.  
Previous reseach on annual employment income by race reports consistently lower annual 
wages for Black and Hispanic Americans on average compared to White Americans 
(detailed in Chapter 2.2). The same type of variation by racial groups is seen in Figure 46 
with the income gap widening as respondents age. At age 24 both White and Hispanic 
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respondents have average incomes at or around $22,000 while Black respondent incomes 
are around $19,000. After the youth period average incomes diverge further, and by age 30 
the average annual wage income for White respondents is around $40,000 while the 
average for Black respondents is around $30,000. The flatter slope for both Black and 
Hispanic groups after 24 indicates a slowing of wage growth in adulthood.  
Finally, Figure 47 shows particularly wide variation in annual wage income by young 
parenting status, a gap that widens notably after age 24. Between 24 and 30, the group of 
respondents who are not young parents have annual wage income increasing to around 
$40,000, while those who are young parents have average annual wages only around 
$28,000 by age 30. This suggests that young parents in this sample indeed have 
systematically different wage outcomes over their lifecourse. The experience of youth 
parenting is modelled as a main effect in all outcomes but is also an important subgroup to 
investigate using interaction terms, particulary given the different pattern of benefit receipt 






Figure 45: Annual employment income (mean),                  Figure 46: Annual employment income (mean), 
NLSY sample by gender (AFI)       NLSY sample by race (AFi)  
















5.3 Regression Results: NLSY Annual Wage Income, Correlated 
Random Effects Model 
Block 1: Demographic Characteristics (Table 16) 
The Block 1 covariate to discuss first is the measure of time, here given in the continous 
variable age (measured in half years). Annual logged wages increase as respondents age; by 
0.19 per half year at the end of Block 1 and by 0.16 in the Block 5 model. Gender is also a 
significant main effect in Block 1, as women had wages -0.31 lower on average than men in 
the sample. The significant difference in model outcomes between men and women 
remains throughout and suggests that gender will be informative as a moderating variable 
in interaction terms (Tables 17 and 18). As mentioned in Chapter 2.2, there are a far greater 
percentage of respondents in the US youth population who enter some form of higher 
education, and a school leaving age set at age 18 ensures that most respondents achieve a 
high school diploma at the very least. Therefore those who do not have any qualifications 
have much poorer economic outcomes, with the largest gaps in effect sizes on the 
education covariate in the Block 1 model between those with no qualifications and those 
with AA (0.69), Bachelor’s (0.59) or Master’s Degrees (0.61)49.  There are two geographic 
variables included generally as control variables, Census region and urban/rural 
classification: while in some of the models there are significant differences within these 
covariates, they are not the focus of this investigation and therefore will not be fully 
detailed here. The final Block 1 main effect covariate of interest is the race of the 
respondent, with significant results for Black respondents and Mixed Race50 respondents.  
The results indicate wages for Black respondents -0.35 units lower than White respondents; 
a significant gap that persists even when controlling for education, labour market 
attachment and parental background in the Block 5a iteration (Black coeff = -0.10).  
 
                                                          
49 The insignificant results on the PhD coefficient seems uncharacteristic, but the time period 
covered in this survey must be considered when viewing this estimation of wages. Data only extends 
to the early 30s for this sample of respondents, shortly after sample members will have completed 
their PhD, and therefore the results may be unsurprising. This also means that this group of 
respondents is much smaller than those with other degree types. 
50 As mentioned in the descriptive figures, there are very few respondents who identified themselves 
as Mixed Race in 1997 and this group was not considered for oversampling by survey administrators. 
Therefore, although results for this group are reported in the regression tables they will not be 
explicated in the narrative.  
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Block 1 interactions (Table 17) 
Although many interaction terms were tested for among Block 1 covariates only three were 
found to be signficant: education and gender, race and gender, and education and race. 
What is perhaps surprising in the Block 1 interactions is that there are no significant 
interactions between age and race and age and gender, indicating that the impact of age on 
wages does not differ between men and women or between racial groups.  
The interaction of education and gender is included to test whether one’s education level 
has different impacts on wage income for men and women. The positive results on the 
education and gender interaction term at every education level indicates that for women 
there is a larger additive effect of higher education for a female’s wage trajectory. This is 
particularly notable when some level of college is attained or more (interaction coefficients 
of 0.38 and above). The results suggest that education is likely a key avenue whereby 
women change their wage trajectory.  
The same type of effect pattern emerges when education level is interacted with race, 
where Black respondents report significantly different impacts of higher education levels on 
their wage income. The positive interaction effects of education levels at high school 
diploma and above indicate that for Black respondents each level of education has a more 
positive impact on their wages than the same level does when all racial groups are 
estimated together (in the education main effect). This results in very large differences in 
wages between Black respondents with no qualifications and those with qualifications at 
high school or above, given in the large gaps in effect sizes on the interaction terms for 
Black respondents. Taken with the results from the education and gender interaction this 
suggests that education serves as a more important component of higher wage growth for 
women and Black Americans than it does for White or male sample members.  
The final interaction seeks to determine whether gender moderates the effect of race on 
wages. The Black and female interaction term is the only significant interaction, and 
indicates that the impact of being Black on wages does indeed differ for Black women. 
Black women in the sample have slightly more positive wage outcomes, by 0.18 logged 
wages units (interaction term coefficient); however the effect of being Black is still negative 
for women, here at -0.26 (-0.44 + 0.18 = -0.26). The results here are consistent with what is 
known about the labour market performance of different racial and gender groups, with 
Black men in general experiencing lower wage growth than any other demographic group. 
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Block 2: Employment Domain (Table 16) 
The impact of employment domain experiences on one’s wage trajectory is measured in 
this model by the work intensity covariate, created using the measure of weeks worked per 
year, and ranges from very low work intensity (0-10 weeks per year) to very high work 
intensity (45-52 weeks per year), a five category ordinal measure51. The second covariate 
added in this block was general health, which was found to be insignificant. The measure of 
work intensity acts as expected, with higher work intensity categories reporting larger and 
more positive effects on annual wages compared to those in very low work intensity. The 
inclusion of work intensity in this model mediates the effect most notably of the race 
covariate for Black respondents (reducing the coefficient from -0.35 to -0.22), and suggests 
that the effects of work intensity may differ by racial group in an interaction term.   
Block 2 interactions (Table 17) 
The interaction term on work intensity and race shows significantly different impacts of 
work intensity on wages for Black respondents at both the low and very high work intensity 
categories, and Hispanic respondents at very high work intensity. The most notable result 
from this interaction is for Black and Hispanic respondents in the very high work intensity 
category. The negative interaction terms at this work intensity level for Black and Hispanic 
respondents indicates that those who are Black or Hispanic receive a lower amount of 
compensation for higher work intensity (defined as attachment throughout the year) on 
average (coeff = -0.18).  
When work intensity is investigated in an interaction term with gender the results show 
that working at a higher level of intensity impacts women’s wages more positively at all 
levels (coefficients ranging from 0.31 to 0.20). This indicates that the amount that women 
work within the year matters more to their wages than it does to men’s wages, and that 
women in higher work intensity categories are better off than their female counterparts 
who are less attached to the labour market.  
Block 3: Family Formation Domain (Table 16)  
The family formation covariates of marriage and household size report that married 
respondents have higher wages than those who are not married and household size has a 
                                                          
51 This measure is used at the outcome measure in the work intensity model in Chapter 5.4 and is 
detailed more thoroughly there. 
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negative (albeit small) impact on a respondent’s wage trajectory. It will be valuable to 
investigate if the negative impact of household size is consistent among different genders, 
particularly given what is known about men’s and women’s wages and family change. The 
two residential independence covariates show significant effects, with slightly higher wage 
trajectories for respondents who leave their parental home before age 24. This seems to 
suggest that leaving home earlier in the youth period is a positive factor in one’s wage 
trajectory, likely because attachment to the labour market is higher (and therefore annual 
wage income is higher) out of necessity. However, the negative result on wages for those 
who have at least one move back in with their parents (coeff = -0.07) suggests that moving 
back may temper the positive aspects of leaving early.  
Finally, the main effect of young parenthood on wages does not show a statistically 
significant difference in the wage trajectory between those who do and do not have 
children in the youth period (coeff = -0.03), although the covariate does show a negative 
effect size for young parents. Based on previous evidence on the different impacts of young 
parenthood by gender in Chapter 2.2 an interaction term will be useful to test for.  
Block 3 interactions (Table 18) 
The household size and gender interaction indicates that women in the sample experience 
a harsher wage penalty as their household size increases by one, with a wage penalty of  
-0.12 ( -0.09 -0.03 = -0.12) compared to the overall household size effect of -0.09. A second 
family formation factor, the experience of young parenthood, also has a more negative 
impact on female wages (interaction coeff = -0.15), confirming that females in the sample 
are more likely to be negatively impacted by young parenthood. Because of both the 
significance of the young parenthood interaction terms and evidence on young parents’ 
interaction with the benefit system, this interaction term (in Model 3b) is carried forward 
into the Block 4 and Block 5 iterations in Table 16.  
Block 4: Parental Background (Table 16) 
The coefficients for the parental income covariate are relatively unsurprising and indicate 
greater positive impacts on wages for those from higher income quintiles. Respondents 
from all income quintiles have significantly different wages than those from the poorest 
income quintile, with the largest difference in outcomes for those from quintile 5 (coeff = 
0.18 in Block 4 model). The addition of parental income quintile also serves to control for 
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the independent effect notably of race, as the negative race effect size for Black 
respondents is reduced and the positive race effect size for Hispanic respondents is 
increased. This confirms that part of the independent race effect is captured by parental 
background. Parental income does not markedly change the results on the young 
parenthood covariates in the Block 4 model, which might be unexpected given the 
relationship between parental background and young parenting.  
Block 4 interactions (Table 18) 
It is valuable to investigate whether and to what extent a factor like parental background 
changes as respondents age, and may provide evidence of how parental background may 
continue to impact an individual well into adulthood. The positive results on all the 
interaction terms indicate that the difference in wages between income quintiles increases 
with age, as those in the highest income quintile experience larger wage growth with each 
half year than those in quintile 1 (interaction coeff = 0.05), and have notably higher wage 
increases than those in both quintile 2 and 3 comparatively. With each half year, then, the 
wages of those in the top two quintiles continue to increase while those in the bottom 
three stay relatively flat though the survey period. This suggests that the impact of parental 
income persists through the youth period and widens into adulthood.  
Block 5: Government interventions (Table 16) 
After controlling for all factors in Blocks 1 through 4, the result of the main effect of any 
benefit receipt in Block 5a indicates that the wage trajectory of benefit recipients is not 
statistically significant in the main effects model, and therefore not significantly different 
than the wage trajectory of non-benefit recipients; potentially surprising given the results in 
the descriptive figures. Even though this covariate is not significant as a main effect, the 
value of controlling for benefit receipt and its relationships with and impacts on other 
covariates is most valuable to analyse here. Perhaps the largest change in other coefficients 
occurs for the young parenthood main effect and the young parenthood and gender effect 
(for women). The negative effect sizes on the young parenthood covariate have been 
reduced such that now there is no difference in the impact of young parenthood between 
men and women (interaction effect reduced to 0.007). Therefore, the effect of young 
parenthood for both gender groups is similar and positive for one’s wage trajectory 
compared to those who are not young parents (Model 5a). Both these results indicate that 
benefits, especially for this target group, is a notable and potentially positive factor in the 
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way that women and young parents experience wage growth in the youth period. There are 
also relatively large changes in effect sizes for Black respondents when any benefit receipt 
is included in the model, reducing the negative independent impact of being Black on 
wages to -0.10. This suggests that benefit receipt can also partially explain the lower wage 
outcomes for Black respondents, as the variation is further explained by the inclusion of a 
benefit receipt covariate.  
The second model iteration for Block 5 (Model 5b) models the impact of SNAP and TANF 
separately. In this model both the SNAP and TANF main effects show significant and 
negative coefficients, as those who receive SNAP have a -0.16 lower wage trajectory and 
those who receive TANF have a -0.12 lower wage trajectory than those who do not receive 
those benefits. The results on other covariates such as young parenting and race in this 
model also change similarly (albeit to a lesser extent) as they did in Model 5a. This suggests 
again that although SNAP and TANF have long term negative impacts on one’s wage 
trajectory as main effects, for some subpopulations that receive them in higher proportions 
(young parents and Black respondents most notably) SNAP may also be a mediating factor 
on the negative impacts of these characteristics on one’s wage trajectory.  
Block 5 interactions (Table 18) 
The three significant interaction terms in this model are any benefit receipt and young 
parenthood, SNAP receipt and race, and SNAP and TANF receipt52. In the benefit receipt 
and young parenthood interaction, benefit receipt is not found to not harm the wage 
trajectory of young parents (given in the positive interaction term, coeff = 0.27), and 
together the main effect of benefit receipt and additive interaction effect for young parents 
show a positive and significant relationship of benefit receipt to more positive wage 
trajectories for the young parenting group (bold coefficient = 0.09). This suggests that for 
the young parent target group the experience of benefit receipt has a positive relationship 
with a higher wage trajectory outcome.  
The results on the second significant interaction term, SNAP and race, indicates that the 
impacts of receiving SNAP on wages differs for Black respondents. The interaction term on 
the SNAP and Black coefficient reports positive additive effects of SNAP for Black 
                                                          
52 The interaction terms included here are estimated on models without the young parenthood and 




respondents (interaction coeff = 0.13). Although Black SNAP recipients do still have lower 
wage trajectories (bold coefficient = -0.08), they are not as negatively impacted by this 
experience as other racial groups.  
Effects of SNAP receipt also differ between respondents who do and do not receive TANF, 
where the additive effects of receiving SNAP are positive for respondents who are also 
receiving TANF (interaction coeff = 0.29). The receipt of SNAP for TANF recipients on 
average indicates a positive impact on wages for this group (bold coeff = 0.12), suggesting 
that SNAP is a positive factor in the wage trajectories of the poorest sample members.  
Summary  
The model of wage income for this cohort showed that the demographic characteristics of 
gender and race are persistent factors in a respondent’s wage trajectory, even when 
controlling for other endogenous and exogenous factors. Gender in particular was found to 
moderate the impact of education, work intensity, and household size, where higher 
education levels and higher work intensity have larger impacts on the wages of women 
than men in the sample. Among family formation factors, females also have more negative 
wage penalties as their household size increases and if they become young parents.  
Race is a salient factor in wage outcomes for Black respondents in particular, as there is a 
negative impact of race for this group even as all other factors are controlled for. The 
impact of a respondent’s race on their wages is particularly prominent and negative for 
men, even as Black respondents also have larger wage gains from higher levels of 
education. Notably, race also moderates the impact of work intensity, with results 
suggesting that Black and Hispanic respondents do not receive the same annual wage gains 
from working at a higher level of intensity compared to White respondents.  
The receipt of government assistance was not found to have negative impacts on wages 
among recipients in the long term when compared to those with no receipt history, but 
further investigation showed that these impacts are not the same for all respondents, 
particularly for respondents in the groups that are more likely to interact with government 
assistance (young parents and Black respondents). The results for young parents suggests 
that benefit receipt has a positive association with higher wages, and benefit receipt was 
found to have a lower negative impact on wages for Black respondents compared to White 
respondents. Controlling for benefit receipt in a model of wages also reduces the negative 
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impacts of young parenthood for females in particular, and suggests that benefits are a 
notable factor in the relationship between female young parents and wages growth. The 
final interaction to consider is that for SNAP recipients who also receive TANF, as the 
positive interaction coefficient results for TANF and SNAP recipients suggest that SNAP is a 




Table 16: Correlated Random Effects Models of logged annual employment Income, NLSY 1997 main effects (Blocks 1-5) 
 Block 1  Block 2  Block 3a  Block 4  Block 5a  Block 5b  
 Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t Coeff t 
Age   0.19*** (200.68)  0.17*** (182.71)  0.15*** (149.46)  0.15*** (149.55)  0.16*** (149.53)  0.16*** (149.76) 
Female -0.31*** (-18.64) -0.30*** (-20.01) -0.31*** (-21.03) -0.26*** (-14.46) -0.23*** (-13.26) -0.23*** (-13.33) 
Race (White)             
Black -0.35*** (-16.49) -0.22*** (-11.58) -0.15*** (-7.70) -0.13*** (-6.44) -0.10*** (-4.93) -0.09*** (-4.44) 
Hispanic -0.03 (-1.28) -0.02 (-0.98)  0.02 (1.23)  0.05* (2.20)  0.05* (2.26)  0.04 (1.79) 
Mixed Race -0.23** (-2.65) -0.10 (-1.27) -0.07 (-0.97) -0.06 (-0.88) -0.04 (-0.56) -0.03 (-0.47) 
Educ (No quals)             
GED  0.27*** (7.16)  0.21*** (6.12)  0.19*** (5.85)  0.19*** (5.82)  0.16*** (4.96)  0.16*** (4.80) 
HS Diploma  0.55*** (17.13)  0.34*** (11.36)  0.30*** (10.56)  0.30*** (10.09)  0.22*** (7.59)  0.20*** (7.13) 
AA  0.69*** (16.47)  0.43*** (11.47)  0.38*** (10.10)  0.36*** (9.66)  0.28*** (7.52)  0.26*** (7.01) 
Bachelor's Deg  0.59*** (16.98)  0.33*** (10.44)  0.27*** (8.25)  0.23*** (7.04)  0.12*** (3.82)  0.11*** (3.50) 
Master’s Deg  0.61*** (12.82)  0.34*** (7.97)  0.27*** (6.34)  0.23*** (5.30)  0.12** (2.75)  0.11* (2.55) 
PhD  0.32 (1.73)  0.10 (0.61) -0.03 (-0.20) -0.09 (-0.54) -0.20 (-1.25) -0.21 (-1.35) 
Prof Degree  0.44*** (5.21)  0.42*** (5.56)  0.34*** (4.60)  0.30*** (4.01)  0.18* (2.52)  0.17* (2.30) 
Geo (Rural)             
Urban  0.14*** (9.89)  0.11*** (8.28)  0.07*** (5.59)  0.07*** (5.60)  0.07*** (5.63)  0.07*** (5.49) 
Unknown  0.24*** (9.35)  0.24*** (9.89)  0.18*** (7.31)  0.18*** (7.29)  0.18*** (7.31)  0.18*** (7.23) 
Geog (mean) -0.10** (-3.18) -0.05 (-1.84) -0.001 (0.13) -0.001 (0.04) -0.001 (-0.05)  0.005 (0.20) 
Census Reg (NE)             
North Central -0.08** (-2.95) -0.10*** (-4.17) -0.13*** (-5.76) -0.14*** (-5.76) -0.12*** (-5.26) -0.12*** (-5.14) 
South  0.02 (0.86)  0.02 (0.95) -0.02 (-0.87) -0.02 (-0.83) -0.02 (-0.67) -0.02 (-0.61) 
West  0.11** (2.98)  0.12*** (3.29)  0.08* (2.17)  0.07* (2.10)  0.08* (2.36)  0.08* (2.39) 
Census (mean) -0.05*** (-3.55) -0.04** (-3.08) -0.04** (-2.80) -0.04** (-2.76) -0.04** (-3.24) -0.04** (-3.24) 
Work Int (V.low)             
Low work int    0.06** (3.01)  0.07*** (3.96)  0.07*** (3.96)  0.08*** (3.98)  0.07*** (3.91) 
Med work int    0.21*** (8.98)  0.22*** (9.47)  0.22*** (9.46)  0.22*** (9.41)  0.22*** (9.31) 
High work int    0.43*** (25.06)  0.43*** (25.76)  0.43*** (25.78)  0.43*** (25.73)  0.43*** (25.44) 
V high work int    0.76*** (49.69)  0.74*** (49.44)  0.74*** (49.46)  0.74*** (49.15)  0.73*** (48.41) 
Work int (mean)    0.21*** (22.17)   0.21*** (22.47)   0.20*** (21.59)  0.18*** (19.93)   0.18*** (19.62) 
Household size     -0.10*** (-35.64) -0.10*** (-35.57) -0.10*** (-35.16) -0.10*** (-34.88) 
HH size (mean)      0.07*** (8.89)  0.07*** (9.07)  0.09*** (11.19)  0.08*** (10.14) 
Married      0.20*** (16.34)  0.20*** (16.28)  0.20*** (16.18)  0.20*** (16.10) 
Mar Stat (mean)       0.10* (3.12)   0.09* (2.78)  0.09* (2.87)   0.06 (1.96) 
Young parenting     -0.03 (-1.43)  0.06* (2.55)  0.13*** (5.42)  0.10*** (3.98) 
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Moved out (> 24) 
            
Before 19      0.17*** (7.48)  0.17*** (7.53)  0.19*** (8.71)  0.19*** (8.62) 
Between 19-21      0.17*** (7.81)  0.17*** (7.91)  0.19*** (9.06)  0.19*** (9.08) 
Between 21-24      0.10*** (4.72)  0.10*** (4.81)  0.12*** (5.67)  0.12*** (5.70) 
Moved back     -0.07*** (-4.40) -0.07*** (-4.66) -0.07*** (-4.51) -0.06*** (-4.29) 
Parental Inc (Q1)             
Quintile 2        0.09** (3.26)  0.07** (2.83)  0.08** (2.96) 
Quintile 3        0.14*** (5.08)  0.11*** (4.27)  0.12*** (4.33) 
Quintile 4        0.14*** (5.03)  0.10*** (3.79)  0.11*** (4.03) 
Quintile 5        0.18*** (6.27)  0.14*** (4.84)  0.15*** (5.29) 
Missing        0.13*** (5.36)  0.11*** (4.51)  0.11*** (4.65) 
Benefit recipient         -0.009 (-0.64)   
Ben recd (mean)         -0.73*** (-15.64)   
SNAP recipient           -0.16*** (-9.53) 
SNAP recd (mean)           -0.65*** (-10.61) 
TANF recipient           -0.12*** (-3.55) 
TANF recd (mean)           -0.06 (-0.50) 
Constant  4.65*** (88.36)  4.09*** (77.62)  4.43*** (69.98)  4.32*** (66.12)  4.42*** (68.51)  4.41*** (68.13) 
Between var  0.60*** (84.23)  0.52*** (80.57)  0.50*** (79.64)  0.50*** (79.33)  0.48*** (77.86)  0.48*** (77.61) 
Within var  0.89*** (320.89)  0.86*** (321.42)  0.85*** (321.40)  0.85*** (321.40)  0.85*** (321.35)  0.85*** (320.89) 
Observations  59296   59296   59296   59296   59296   59164  
Cases   7037   7037   7037   7037   7037   7035  
Displayed are the coefficients from a correlated random effects model of logged monthly wages with t statistics in parentheses. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01 *p<0.05 
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 Work Int 
* Gender 
 
 Coeff  t Coeff  t Coeff  t Coeff  t Coeff  t 
Age  0.19*** (200.68)  0.19*** (200.69)  0.19*** (200.65)  0.17*** (182.76)  0.17*** (182.59) 
Female -0.62*** (-10.47) -0.32*** (-19.26) -0.35*** (-15.09) -0.30*** (-20.22) -0.63*** (-13.02) 
Educ (No quals)           
GED  0.18*** (3.59)  0.30*** (4.99)  0.28*** (7.27)  0.20*** (5.97)  0.20*** (5.93) 
HS Diploma  0.45*** (10.93)  0.45*** (8.78)  0.54*** (17.08)  0.33*** (11.37)  0.33*** (11.44) 
AA  0.52*** (8.94)  0.56*** (8.93)  0.69*** (16.35)  0.43*** (11.33)  0.42*** (11.16) 
Bachelor's  0.36*** (7.80)  0.43*** (8.26)  0.60*** (16.98)  0.32*** (10.26)  0.32*** (10.08) 
Masters  0.28*** (3.88)  0.40*** (6.09)  0.61*** (12.73)  0.34*** (7.83)  0.33*** (7.64) 
PhD -0.37 (-1.10)  0.23 (1.14)  0.33 (1.77)  0.10 (0.61)  0.07 (0.44) 
Prof Deg  0.07 (0.58)  0.24* (2.31)  0.44*** (5.13)  0.40*** (5.28)  0.40*** (5.36) 
Educ*Gender           
GED*Female  0.23** (3.02)         
HS Dip*Female  0.23*** (3.63)         
AA*Female  0.38*** (4.53)         
Bach*Female  0.49*** (7.05)         
Mast*Female  0.63*** (6.54)         
PhD*Female  1.12** (2.76)         
Prof*Female  0.77*** (4.54)         
Race           
Black -0.36*** (-16.80) -0.72*** (-10.10) -0.44*** (-15.14) -0.49*** (-8.86) -0.23*** (-11.74) 
Hispanic -0.03 (-1.39) -0.01 (-0.20) -0.004 (-0.12) -0.14** (-2.85) -0.02 (-0.94) 
Mixed Race -0.20* (-2.42) -0.92* (-2.40) -0.19 (-1.57) -0.48*** (-3.59) -0.09 (-1.17) 
Geog (Rural)           
Urban  0.14*** (9.90)  0.14*** (9.95)  0.14*** (9.86)  0.11*** (7.99)  0.11*** (8.23) 
Unknown  0.24*** (9.34)  0.24*** (9.33)  0.24*** (9.36)  0.24*** (9.85)  0.24*** (9.77) 
Geog (mean) -0.09** (-2.86) -0.10*** (-3.21) -0.10*** (-3.37) -0.05* (-1.87) -0.05 (-1.93) 
Census Reg (NE)           
North Central -0.08** (-2.99) -0.07** (-2.8) -0.08** (-2.97) -0.10*** (-4.17) -0.10*** (-4.18) 
South  0.02 (0.86)  0.02 (0.80)  0.02 (0.82)  0.02 (0.79)  0.02 (0.90) 
West  0.11** (2.97)  0.11** (3.05)  0.11** (3.00)  0.11** (3.12)  0.11*** (3.24) 
Census (mean) -0.05*** (-3.59) -0.05*** (-3.75) -0.05*** (-3.50) -0.04** (-3.08) -0.04** (-2.97) 
Race*Gender           
Black* Female      0.18*** (4.56)     
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Hisp* Female     -0.05 (-1.22)     
Mixed*Female     -0.07 (-0.42)     
Educ*Race           
GED*Black    0.03 (0.38)       
HS Dip*Black    0.36*** (4.70)       
AA*Black    0.53*** (5.26)       
Bach*Black    0.64*** (7.43)       
Mast*Black    0.84*** (7.00)       
PhD*Black    0.25 (0.48)       
Prof*Black     0.96*** (4.03)       
GED*Hispanic   -0.11 (-1.23)       
HS Dip*Hispanic   -0.05 (-0.70)       
AA*Hispanic   -0.12 (-1.17)       
Bach*Hispanic    0.03 (0.40)       
Mast*Hispanic    0.18 (1.35)       
Prof*Hispanic    0.13 (0.46)       
GED*Mixed    0.64 (1.45)       
HS Dip*Mixed    0.68 (1.66)       
AA*Mixed     1.12* (2.49)       
Bach*Mixed    0.64 (1.55)       
Mast*Mixed    0.63 (1.03)       
Prof*Mixed    0.58 (0.77)       
Work Int (V.low)           
Low       -0.005 (-0.19) -0.08** (-3.19) 
Medium        0.24*** (7.27)  0.10** (3.08) 
High        0.45*** (19.15)  0.32*** (13.78) 
Very high        0.83*** (39.08)  0.67*** (32.31) 
Work Int*Race           
Low*Black        0.18*** (3.87)   
Med*Black       -0.06 (-1.10)   
High*Black       -0.04 (-1.08)   
V. high*Black       -0.15*** (-4.34)   
Low*Hispanic        0.08 (1.70)   
Med*Hispanic       -0.05 (-0.86)   
High*Hispanic       -0.08 (-1.81)   
V. high*Hispanic       -0.18*** (-4.78)   
Low*Mixed         0.38* (2.08)   
Med*Mixed        0.30 (1.46)   
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High*Mixed        0.45** (2.80)   
V. high*Mixed         0.26 (1.94)   
Work int (mean)         0.34*** (16.22)  0.12*** (4.51) 
WorkInt*Race       -0.05*** 
 




          
Low*Female          0.31*** (7.94) 
Med*Female          0.24*** (5.18) 
High*Female          0.23*** (6.64) 
V. high*Female          0.20*** (6.68) 
WorkInt*Gender            0.06** (3.16) 
Constant  4.77*** (83.45)  4.77*** (74.83)  4.67*** (87.87)  4.22*** (71.48)  4.26*** (74.13) 
Between var  0.60*** (83.79)  0.59*** (83.61)  0.60*** (84.17)  0.52*** (80.51)  0.52*** (80.24) 
Within var  0.90*** (320.86)  0.89*** (320.88)  0.89*** (320.93)  0.86*** (321.44)  0.86*** (321.36) 
Observations  59296   59296   59296   59296   59296  
Cases  7037   7037   7037   7037   7037  






Table 18: Correlated Random Effects Models of logged annual employment income, NLSY 1997 interaction effects (Blocks 3-5) 













 Coeff t Coeff t Coeff  t Coeff  t Coeff  t Coeff  t 
Age   0.15*** (149.53)  0.15*** (149.62)  0.14*** (52.21)  0.16*** (149.91)  0.16*** (149.82)  0.16*** (149.82) 
Female -0.26*** (-14.61) -0.20*** (-3.95) -0.31*** (-20.83) -0.24*** (-15.83) -0.25*** (-16.68) -0.25*** (-16.54) 
Young parenting  0.05* (2.23) -0.02 (-1.21) -0.02 (-1.08)  0.06** (2.81)  0.07*** (3.98)  0.08*** (4.21) 
YParent*Female -0.15*** (-4.89)           
Race             
Black -0.15*** (-7.86) -0.15*** (-7.74) -0.12*** (-6.26) -0.09*** (-4.63)  -0.09*** (-4.05) -0.08*** (-4.36) 
Hispanic  0.02 (1.08)  0.02 (1.23)  0.05* (2.49)  0.05* (2.24)  0.04* (2.14)  0.04 (1.82) 
Mixed Race -0.06 (-0.88) -0.07 (-0.98) -0.06 (-0.85) -0.05 (-0.71) -0.06 (-0.82) -0.04 (-0.57) 
Educ (No quals)             
GED  0.20*** (5.97)  0.20*** (5.92)  0.19*** (5.72)  0.16*** (5.01)  0.15*** (4.68)  0.15*** (4.71) 
HS Dip  0.31*** (10.88)  0.30*** (10.67)  0.28*** (9.74)  0.22*** (7.63)  0.20*** (6.94)  0.20*** (7.01) 
AA   0.39*** (10.38)  0.38*** (10.16)  0.35*** (9.41)  0.27*** (7.42)  0.25*** (6.85)  0.26*** (6.95) 
Bachelor's   0.27*** (8.36)  0.27*** (8.30)  0.23*** (6.91)  0.11*** (3.39)  0.11*** (3.37)  0.11*** (3.34) 
Master’s    0.27*** (6.31)  0.27*** (6.30)  0.23*** (5.29)  0.10* (2.36)  0.11** (2.49)  0.10* (2.42) 
PhD -0.04 (-0.24) -0.04 (-0.24) -0.08 (-0.48) -0.21 (-1.34) -0.21 (-1.35) -0.22 (-1.38) 
Prof Deg  0.34*** (4.60)  0.34*** (4.56)  0.30*** (4.08)  0.16* (2.24)  0.16* (2.35)  0.16* (2.21) 
Geog (Rural)             
Urban  0.07*** (5.60)  0.07*** (5.60)  0.07*** (5.29)  0.07*** (5.61)  0.07*** (5.50)  0.07*** (5.48) 
Unknown   0.18*** (7.30)  0.18*** (7.35)  0.17*** (7.01)  0.18*** (7.29)  0.18*** (7.26)  0.18*** (7.22) 
Geog(mean)  0.004 (0.15) -0.003 (-0.11)  0.004 (0.15) -0.004 (-0.15)  0.005 (0.20)  0.005 (0.20) 
Census reg (NE)             
North Central -0.13*** (-5.75) -0.13*** (-5.75) -0.14*** (-5.84) -0.12*** (-5.27) -0.12*** (-5.14) -0.12*** (-5.12) 
South -0.02 (-0.85) -0.02 (-0.85) -0.03 (-1.02) -0.02 (-0.69) -0.02 (-0.59) -0.01 (-0.60) 
West  0.07* (2.15)  0.07* (2.19)  0.06 (1.77)  0.08* (2.37)  0.08* (2.41)  0.08* (2.44) 
Census (mean) -0.04** (-2.79) -0.04** (-2.82) -0.03* (-2.48) -0.04** (-3.25)  -0.04*** (-3.27) -0.04** (-3.26) 
Work Int (V. low)             
Low  0.08*** (3.99)  0.07*** (3.85)  0.08*** (4.22)  0.07*** (3.83)  0.07*** (3.85)  0.07*** (3.91) 
Medium 0.22*** (9.47)  0.22*** (9.39)  0.22*** (9.52)  0.22*** (9.38)  0.21*** (9.29)  0.22*** (9.33) 
High 0.43*** (25.77)  0.43*** (25.65)  0.43*** (25.90)  0.43*** (25.70)  0.42*** (25.38)  0.43*** (25.49) 
Very high 0.74*** (49.44)  0.74*** (49.23)  0.74*** (49.37)  0.74*** (49.00)  0.73*** (48.33)  0.73*** (48.44) 
Work Int (mean) 0.20*** (22.03)  0.21*** (22.24)  0.20*** (22.25)  0.18*** (19.88)  0.18*** (19.67)  0.18*** (19.44) 
Household size -0.10*** (-35.62) -0.09*** (-22.70) -0.10*** (-34.54) -0.10*** (-35.03) -0.10*** (-34.74) -0.10*** (-34.81) 
HH size (mean)  0.07*** (9.28)  0.07*** (3.20)  0.07*** (8.39)  0.09*** (10.96)  0.08*** (10.01)  0.08*** (10.08) 
Married  0.20*** (16.28)  0.20*** (16.17)  0.19*** (14.98)  0.20*** (16.06)  0.21*** (16.19)  0.20*** (16.10) 
MarStat (mean)  0.09* (2.94)  0.10* (3.17)  0.11** (3.48)  0.10* (3.29)  0.06* (1.97)  0.06 (2.03) 
Moved out (>24)             
Before 19  0.17*** (7.58)  0.17*** (7.53)  0.17*** (7.41)  0.19*** (8.55)  0.19*** (8.61)  0.19*** (8.56) 
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Between 19-21  0.17*** (7.91)  0.17*** (7.86)  0.17*** (7.81)  0.19*** (8.91)  0.19*** (9.08)  0.19*** (9.07) 
Between 21-24  0.10*** (4.77)  0.10*** (4.78)  0.10*** (4.74)  0.12*** (5.62)  0.12*** (5.71)  0.12*** (5.75) 
Moved back -0.07*** (-4.53) -0.07*** (-4.39) -0.07*** (-4.48) -0.06*** (-4.23) -0.06*** (-4.24) -0.06*** (-4.06) 
HH size*Female   -0.03*** (-5.58)         
HHsize*gender   -0.001 (-0.06)         
Moved out*Race             
Before 19*Black             
Before 19*Hisp             
Before 19*Mixed             
19-21* Black             
19-21* Hisp             
19-21* Mixed             
21-24* Black             
21-24* Hisp             
21-24* Mixed             
Parental Inc (Q1)             
Quintile 2     -0.12 (-1.30)  0.07** (2.68)  0.08** (2.95)  0.07** (2.85) 
Quintile 3     -0.08 (-0.88)  0.12*** (4.19)  0.12*** (4.33)  0.11*** (4.21) 
Quintile 4     -0.51*** (-5.88)  0.10*** (3.68)  0.11*** (4.02)  0.10*** (3.88) 
Quintile 5     -1.04*** (-11.95)  0.13*** (4.61)  0.15*** (5.29)  0.14*** (5.12) 
Missing     -0.30*** (-3.74)  0.10*** (4.33)  0.11*** (4.66)  0.11*** (4.51) 
Parental Inc*Age             
Quintile 2*Age      0.01* (2.37)       
Quintile 3*Age       0.01* (2.58)       
Quintile 4*Age      0.03*** (7.91)       
Quintile 5*Age       0.05*** (14.91)       
Missing*Age       0.02*** (5.61)       
Benefit recipient       -0.18*** (-8.13)     
BenRecd*YParent        0.27*** (9.73)     
        0.09      
Ben recd (mean)       -0.85*** (-10.51)     
Ben recd*YParent         0.12 (1.30)     
SNAP recipient         -0.21*** (-7.93) -0.17*** (-10.16) 
SNAP recd*Black          0.13** (3.41)   
         -0.08    
SNAP recd*Hisp         -0.002 (-0.06)   
SNAP recd*Mixed          0.24 (1.70)   
SNAP recd (mean)         -0.77*** (-7.54) -0.69*** (-11.14) 
SNAP recd*Race          0.04 (1.18)   
TANF recipient         -0.12*** (-3.65) -0.32*** (-5.47) 
TANF recd (mean)         -0.07 (-0.56) -0.68** (-2.63) 
SNAP *TANF            0.29*** (4.24) 
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            0.12  
SNAP*TANF            1.08* (2.52) 
Constant  4.40*** (69.27)  4.37*** (64.70)  4.80*** (54.79)  4.43*** (68.76)  4.42*** (68.23)  4.43*** (68.76) 
Between var  0.50*** (79.49)  0.50*** (79.62)  0.50*** (79.68)   0.48*** (77.80)  0.48*** (77.63)  0.48*** (77.63) 
Within var  0.85*** (321.38)  0.85*** (321.40)  0.85*** (321.42)  0.85*** (321.36)  0.85*** (320.90)  0.85*** (320.91) 
Observations  59296   59296   59296   59296   59282   59164  
Cases   7037   7037   7037   7037   7037   7035  
Displayed are the coefficients from a correlated random effects model of logged monthly wages with t statistics in parentheses. ***p<0.001, **p<0.01 *p<0. 
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5.4 NLSY Work Intensity Measure and Descriptives  
Description of outcome measure  
In the NLSY work intensity model the variable weeks worked per year is the basis for the 
work intensity outcome. This is considered to be a more robust measure of labour market 
attachment than what was available in the BCS survey for this investigation as it can 
capture the higher proportion of workers in the youth labour market in part time or 
seasonal work with variable-hour contracts who might not report usual weekly hours of 
work.  
The ordinal work intensity outcome is created by moderating the Eurostat measure of 
household work intensity, which is based on a household’s ‘workable’ months and the 
number of months the household members were ‘at work’53. The unit of this measure is 
weeks, with the number of workable weeks at a maximum of 52; those who are out of the 
labour market (0 weeks worked per year) are categorised in ‘very low work intensity’ along 
with those working 10 weeks or less per year. Unwaged work is not measured so this 
outcome measure is considered only waged work intensity, categorised as follows:  
Category 4: Very high work intensity [0.85 – 1; 44 to 52 weeks];  
Category 3: High work intensity [0.55 - 0.85; 29 to 44 weeks];  
Category 2: Medium work intensity [0.45 - 0.55; 23 to 29 weeks]; 
Category 1: Low work intensity [0.20  -0.45; 10 to 23 weeks]; and  
Category 0: Very low work intensity [0 - 0.20; 0 to 10 weeks]  
Although the ordinal work intensity variable is used in the models it is valuable to 
investigate the underlying measure to determine how the experience of those in work 
differs among demographic groups. Figure 49 illustrates the variation in mean weeks 
worked per year between men and women in the sample who report the measure, and 
indicates relatively identical trend lines between the two groups through the youth period; 
both with an average around 35 weeks per year at 24. After the youth period variation 
between men and women’s average weeks worked per year begins to emerge, although 
the variation is not as wide as perhaps one might expect. This suggests that the fall in 
labour market attachment related to childbearing may not yet have occurred for some 
                                                          
53 Eurostat creates a work intensity score between 0 and 1, calculated by dividing the number of 
months in a year a respondent is ‘in work’ by the number of ‘workable months’ per year (12) 
(Eurostat 2015). The measure of work intensity used in this investigation followed the numerical 
cutpoints of the Eurostat work intensity scores and translated them for use with the weeks worked 
per year unit.  
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women in the sample who have children after age 30, or women who do have children stay 
in the labour market at high intensity. Although this measure does not capture women who 
leave the labour market after the birth of children and does not stretch very far into 
adulthood, the result suggests that the impact of gender on this measure of work intensity 
may be quite small.   
Figure 50 shows the variation in weeks worked by racial groups, with smaller variation 
among White and Hispanic respondents particularly after the youth period. Black 
respondents at all time periods, however, work an average of around 8 weeks less than 
White respondents per year; indicating particularly different experiences in the labour 
market for these groups. The variation in trend lines in the first half of the figure speak to 
far higher success rates of White young people attaching to the labour market for more 
than half of the year on average while they are still in high school (to age 18) compared to 
both Hispanic and Black respondents; attachment that can provide an important 
foundation for later labour market success. There is particularly notable variation in work 
intensity (for those in the labour market) among those who were and were not young 
parents, which diverges starkly after age 21 (Figure 51). For young parents their average 
weeks worked per year stays around 33 weeks, while those who are not parenting have an 
average around 44 weeks per year from age 24 onwards. The final figure (Figure 52) for this 
variable is detailed by parental income, where those from the two highest quintiles have 
trend lines similar to one another (around 40 weeks/year from age 22 onwards) and differ 
most notably from those from the lowest income group. Those from the lowest income 
families have average weeks worked per year around 34 weeks from age 24 onwards. 
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Figure 49: Weeks worked per year (mean),    Figure 50: Weeks worked per year (mean),  
NLSY sample by gender      NLSY sample by race 







Figure 51: Weeks worked per year (mean),   Figure 52: Weeks worked per year (mean), 











The figures on the mean weeks worked per year measure, however, cannot provide a 
breakdown of the proportion of respondents in each group that are at very low levels of 
work intensity throughout the year (the majority of whom are out of the labour market). 
These groups are more accurately detailed by the percentage of group members who are in 
each work intensity category over the course of the survey. Figure 53 indicates that by age 
24 around 60% of all respondents are in the very high work intensity category; where 
around 20% of respondents remain in very low work intensity from around age 19 onwards.  
Figure 53: Percentage of sample in work intensity categories, total NLSY sample 
 
The trends in work intensity between men and women in the sample in Figures 54 and 55 
show that for both groups around 60% are in high work intensity by age 24, suggesting that 
a majority of both men and women transition ‘successfully’ in the employment domain by 
the end of the youth period. In both cases there are between 15 – 20% of respondents who 
are in the very low work intensity category from the early 20s onwards. Although a group of 
this size in very low work intensity might be expected for females in the labour market 
given what is known about childbearing and work intensity, the persistent group of men in 
this category is particularly notable and suggests that there is a distinct group of men who 
do not attach to the labour market with the same level of success as their male peers. 
The differences in work intensity trends among racial groups in Figures 56-58 appear to be 
far more substantial than between men and women. Here the largest difference is between 
Black respondents and White respondents, indicating much higher levels of Black 
respondents out of the labour market at every point in the survey. Of particular note is the 
gap in the proportion of group members in very high work intensity, with 60% of White 
respondents in this category at age 24 compared to 42% of Black respondents. The 
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proportion of Black respondents in very high work intensity increases through the 20s but 
only ever to around 55% of the group by age 25. Figure 57 also indicates that around 40% 
of all Black respondents are in very low to medium work intensity – only tenuously attached 
to the labour market throughout the year. It is likely then that race will be a prominent 
factor in this model, but perhaps only with differences between White and Black 
respondents.  
Figures 54-55: Percentage of respondents in each work intensity category, NLSY sample by 
gender  
Figure 54: Work intensity, NLSY males              













Figures 56 - 58: Percentage of respondents in each work intensity category, NLSY sample by race  
Figure 56: White respondents              Figure 57: Black respondents 






















5.5 Regression Results: NLSY Waged Work Intensity, Random Effect 
Ordered Logistic Regression 
Block 1: Demographic characteristics (Table 19) 
The first notable result in Block 1 is the result on the age covariate, and reports that the 
odds of being in a higher work intensity category increase with age (OR = 1.24). This could 
be considered the underlying effect that ‘growing up’ has on one’s labour market 
experience, and the descriptive figures in the previous section suggest that there may be 
some variation on the impact of this variable depending on both gender and race. However, 
the interaction terms of age and gender and age and race were not significant and suggests 
that this underlying trend is similar for these demographic groups.  
Although significant, the odds ratio on the gender covariate in Block 1 indicates that the 
odds of being in a higher work intensity category for women are 0.84 times lower than 
men, potentially smaller than expected. Gender may therefore be most valuable in this 
model as a moderating variable in interaction terms rather than as an independent 
covariate of interest. Race will also likely serve as a valuable moderating variable in 
interaction terms, particularly because of the large and significant odds ratios between 
Black and White respondents in the main effects iterations. At the end of Block 1 Black 
respondents have 0.50 times the odds of being in a higher work intensity category than 
White respondents on average; a covariate that remains significant through all model 
iterations. Finally, education as a main effect has generally consistent results with what is 
expected between those with higher education levels and those without qualifications, as 
those with higher education levels have increased odds of higher work intensity. As with 
the wages model, it will be valuable to consider if the impacts in education on work 








Block 1 interactions (Table 20)54 
The race and gender interaction was included to test whether the impact of race on work 
intensity was moderated by gender, and the results were particularly prominent among 
Black and White respondents. The positive odds ratio on the Black and female interaction 
term (OR = 1.22) indicates that the negative impact of being Black on one’s work intensity is 
not as large for Black women, and helps to confirm the findings of other researchers on the 
particularly poor labour market outcomes for Black men in America compared to other 
demographic groups. The smaller negative impact of race for Black women therefore result 
in odds ratios slightly closer to one for Black women compared to White women (OR = 0.55, 
in bold) as the odds ratios between Black men and White men (OR = 0.45). There are also 
significant differences in the impact of race for Hispanic men and women, with more 
negative effects of race on work intensity for Hispanic women (interaction term OR = 0.82). 
The results show that while there are no significant differences in work intensity among 
Hispanic men and White men (OR = 0.91), Hispanic women have 0.75 times lower odds of 
being in a higher work intensity category than White women (bold OR). When this 
interaction is viewed with race moderating the impact of gender, the model finds that Black 
women do not have negative work intensity odds based on their gender in the same way as 
White women: rather, the odds ratios of gender moderated by race for Black respondents 
is 1.01 (italicised), showing no work intensity ‘gender scar’ for Black women compared to 
Black men.  
The second significant interaction term among Block 1 covariates is on education and 
gender, and indicates that the impact of education on a respondent’s level of work intensity 
differs between men and women. In this case the interaction term odds ratios above one at 
all education levels indicate that education has a much larger and more positive impact on 
women’s labour market intensity odds than the same education level has on men’s work 
intensity odds. These results for the work intensity outcome echo the results for this 
                                                          
54 As a reminder, the interpretation of the interaction terms for a logistic regression is detailed in 
Figure 21, where the interaction term is the factor by which the odds ratio of the focal independent 
variable main effect (for the moderating variable at category = 0) must be multiplied to get the odds 
ratio of the independent variable when the moderating variable is at the other category values. For 
example, in the interaction of race (focal variable) by gender (moderating variable), the main effect 
is the odds ratio where the moderating variable category equals zero (e.g. effect of being Black for 
men), and the odds ratio in bold is the focal variable where the moderating variable category equals 
one (e.g. effect of being Black for women). The interaction term value is the factor by which the 
effect of race differs between Black men and Black women.  
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interaction on the wages outcome, where higher education levels had a much larger impact 
on women’s wage trajectories than on men’s wage trajectories. Unlike the wages model, 
there is no significant difference in the impact of education level on work intensity between 
racial groups.  
Block 2: Family Formation Domain (Table 19) 
The family formation characteristics in the work intensity model show some of the same 
types of results as the wages model and their inclusion slightly mediates the effect sizes on 
the gender and race covariates. Both household size and young parenthood have negative 
impacts on work intensity: a one-unit increase in household size decreases the odds of 
being in a high work intensity category by a factor of 0.89, and the experience of young 
parenthood decreases the odds by a factor of 0.89. These are not particularly large effects 
but there may be some variation in these impacts by gender, which will be tested for in an 
interaction term.  
The significant results for the age at initial move out variable indicates that those who make 
an initial move out of the parental home any time before age 24 have higher odds of being 
in a higher work intensity category, with slightly more positive results for those who leave 
between age 21-24 (OR = 1.35). These results suggest that leaving home earlier may be 
considered a positive factor higher work intensity outcomes, perhaps because labour 
market experience is obtained earlier in the life course out of necessity. This must also be 
considered with the impacts of moving back; as with the wages model the experience of 
moving back at least once has a negative impact on higher work intensity odds. Those who 
‘boomerang’ have 0.86 times lower odds of being in a high work intensity category than 
those who make a permanent exit from their parent’s homes. 
Block 2 interactions (Table 20) 
The interaction terms in Block 2 (Table 20) confirm that there are significantly different 
impacts of both household size and young parenthood depending on the gender of the 
respondent. As with the wages model, the increase in household size has a more negative 
impact on the work intensity odds of women (interaction effect = 0.85), with women having 
their odds of being in a higher work intensity category reduced by a factor of 0.83 
compared to a factor of 0.95 for men. Together with the descriptive figures earlier in this 
section, this suggests that the changes in family formation may be one of the key drivers in 
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the variation of work intensity between men and women. The second interaction term, 
young parenthood and gender, also shows particularly large negative impacts for females 
who become young parents compared to men who are young parents (interaction term OR 
= 0.56). In fact, the experience of young parenthood has a positive impact on work intensity 
for males who are young parents compared to men who are not (OR = 1.22) and may be 
further evidence young parenting is a positive factor in labour market attachment for young 
men. This is not the case for female young parents, where the experience has a markedly 
negative relationship with work intensity odds compared to women who are not young 
parents (bold OR = 0.69). Because of the significance of the interaction term and theoretical 
interest for this investigation, the interaction term is carried forward into the main effect 
iterations in Blocks 3b and 4a and 4b.  
Block 3: Parental Background (Table 19) 
The main effect results on the parental income quintile covariate show some particularly 
large impacts of parental background on work intensity, as respondents in all quintiles have 
higher odds of higher work intensity than those from the lowest income quintile. The odds 
ratios are largest for respondents from quintile 3 (OR = 1.39) and quintile 4 (OR = 1.47), and 
may indeed be reflective of the early and consistent labour market attachment for those 
from the middle income quintiles seen in the descriptive figure for weeks worked per year 
by parental income (Figure 50). Controlling for parental background income also has 
notable mediating impacts on race and young parenthood. The addition of parental income 
to the model reduced the negative impact of race such that there is no significant 
difference in work intensity odds between Hispanic and White respondents from the Block 
3b iterations onward. The impact of young parenthood on work intensity becomes slightly 
more positive for males in the sample (OR = 1.23) and less negative for females (OR = 0.70). 
These mediating effects illustrate the relationship between parental background and young 
parenting; whereby controlling for parental background reduces the negative effect size for 
both gender groups of young parents.  
Block 3 interactions (Table 20) 
The positive interaction terms on parental income and gender indicate that women from 
more affluent families have higher odds of being in a higher work intensity category than 
men from the same income group, suggesting that parental background is a more notable 
factor in women’s labour market attachment. The larger odds ratios between parental 
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income quintiles for women (ORs in bold) indicate that women from more privileged 
backgrounds (Quintile 4 OR = 1.74, Quintile 5 = 1.69) have much higher work intensity and 
are the group of women working most in this cohort. The result on the interaction term for 
parental income quintile and age indicates that the impact of parental income quintile 
changes with age only for those from the highest two income groups. These respondents 
show slightly lower odds of being in a higher work intensity category as they age compared 
to respondents from quintile 1. This suggests that higher parental income does not 
necessarily correspond to higher work intensity, a pattern that differs from this interaction 
in the model of wages. Finally, it is also notable that there is no significant interaction term 
on parental income and race, and therefore parental background impacts work intensity 
outcomes similarly for all racial groups. 
Block 4: Government Interventions (Table 19) 
The main effects of government intervention covariates on work intensity are negative and 
significant in both the any benefit receipt Model 4a (OR = 0.64) and in the SNAP and TANF 
Model 4b (SNAP OR = 0.53, TANF OR= 0.48). These results are particularly notable because 
of all of the demographic and youth transitions factors are controlled for, and indicate that 
benefit receipt in the youth period is associated with worse labour market attachment 
outcomes, particularly in comparison to those who do not receive benefits. However, the 
composition of the benefit recipient population must be considered when viewing these 
results, particularly considering that only those people who are already low income are the 
only sample members eligible for benefits, and thus may be expected to have lower 
attachment to the labour market than their non-poor counterparts. The more nuanced 
results regarding the mediating and moderating impacts of benefit receipt may thus be 
more valuable to consider here. Once benefit receipt is controlled for in Model 4a, the odds 
ratio for male young parents increases from 1.23 to 1.28 and the odds ratios for female 
young parents becomes less negative, from 0.70 to 0.81. These results suggest that benefit 
receipt (both any benefit receipt and SNAP and TANF receipt) is a notable, and potentially 
positive, factor that mediates the relationship between young parents and the labour 
market, particularly for female young parents.  
The mediating effects of benefit receipt is also present for Black respondents, slightly 
decreasing the negative impact of race on work intensity for this group in Model 4a (to OR 
= 0.56) and Model 4b (to OR = 0.58) when SNAP and TANF are modelled separately; 
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indicating that benefit receipt is also a factor that notably mediates the relationship of 
Black respondents to the labour market, potentially in a positive direction.   
Block 4 interactions (Table 21) 
The significant main effects of government intervention covariates do however differ in 
their effect sizes based on some key demographic characteristics. The impacts of both any 
benefit receipt and SNAP receipt are moderated by gender and race. The interaction term 
of young parenthood and benefit receipt is included to test whether the experience of 
young parenthood on work intensity is moderated by the receipt of benefits. This 
investigates to what extent young parents who receive benefits differ from young parents 
who don’t receive government assistance (given in the interaction term) as well as how 
they differ from benefit recipients who are not young parents (given in the resulting odds 
ratio).   
The results for benefit receipt and gender and SNAP and gender interactions are in the 
same direction, although with slightly increased effects in the SNAP interaction. The 
interaction terms indicate that the negative work intensity impacts of benefit receipt are 
exacerbated for females compared to males who receive benefits (any benefit interaction 
OR = 0.64, SNAP interaction OR = 0.73). The resulting odds ratios that compare benefit 
receipt among women therefore show lower work intensity odds for women who receive 
any benefit compared to women who do not (OR = 0.54) and for women who receive SNAP 
compared to women who do not (OR = 0.47). The experience of poverty, and the effects of 
involvement in a means-tested benefit system, therefore has outsized negative impacts for 
female labour market attachment compared to male attachment given in the benefit main 
effect results (any benefit main OR = 0.84, SNAP main OR = 0.65). 
The results on benefit receipt and race, however, tell a slightly different story. The negative 
impacts of benefit receipt on work intensity are slightly reduced for Black and Hispanic 
respondents, given by the odds ratios above one in the interaction terms for these groups. 
The results in both any benefit receipt and SNAP in bold show slightly smaller differences in 
work intensity outcomes between Black respondents who do and do not receive benefits 
(any benefit receipt bold OR= 0.69, SNAP bold OR = 0.66), and Hispanic respondents (any 
benefit receipt bold OR = 0.75, SNAP bold OR = 0.51) than the work intensity impacts of 
benefit receipt among White respondents (any benefit receipt main effect OR = 0.51, SNAP 
OR = 0.39). The results here indicate that benefit receipt does not have as large of a 
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negative impact on the work intensity odds of Black and Hispanic respondents as much as it 
does for White respondents. 
The significant interaction of young parenthood and benefit receipt indicates that benefits 
moderate the impact of young parenthood, and the positive odds ratio on the interaction 
term indicates that young parents who receive benefits have higher work intensity 
outcomes than young parents who do not (interaction OR = 1.94). The odds ratio in bold 
also indicates that among those who have received benefits, young parenting did not have 
a negative impact on work intensity compared to benefit recipients who are not young 
parents. In fact, the odds of being in a higher work intensity category is 1.73 times greater 
(bold OR) for young parents who receive benefits than for their peers who receive benefits 
but are not young parents. 
As with the wages model, the effects of SNAP on work intensity also differ between those 
who receive TANF and those who do not. The interaction term (OR = 2.00) indicates that 
SNAP has a much more positive impact on work intensity for TANF recipients compared to 
other SNAP recipients, and the resulting odds ratio of 1 in bold indicates that SNAP does 
not negatively impact work intensity for TANF families. Together with the wages results, 
this suggests that SNAP has a positive relationship with higher wage trajectories and higher 
work intensity for the very poor. 
Summary  
The NLSY work intensity model affirmed that both gender and race continue to be the most 
prominent demographic factors that shape both one’s later labour market attachment and 
the impact of government assistance on work intensity. Additionally, the impact of parental 
background is more prominent in labour market attachment than it is in the model of 
wages. Those from higher income groups have higher work intensity odds on average, with 
women’s labour market attachment more positively impacted by more affluent family 
backgrounds. However, the impact of parental income on work intensity does not widen 
with age as it does for wage trajectories; rather, those from higher income quintiles actually 
have lower odds of higher work intensity as they age, suggesting that perhaps these groups 
do not have to work as much to receive the same or higher wage returns. 
One of the more notable findings for work intensity is on the experience of young 
parenthood, which was found to be a trigger event that has a negative impact on work 
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intensity on average. Most notably this experience has particularly outsized negative 
impacts for females, with far lower work intensity than females who are not young parents. 
However, male young parents have the opposite result, as their odds of higher work 
intensity are higher than males who are not young parents. Benefit receipt both mediates 
and moderates the work intensity of young parents, especially female young parents. The 
results suggest that benefits play a larger role in young parents’ work intensity outcomes 
compared to their non-parenting peers and this factor can be positive for labour market 
attachment.  
Once all of the demographic and youth transitions factors are controlled for, benefit receipt 
in the youth period is associated with worse labour market attachment outcomes, 
particularly in comparison to those who do not receive benefits. However this is to be 
expected given the composition of sample members who receive means-tested benefits, 
and the more notable results in this model are those on the mediating and moderating 
impact of benefit receipt for other subgroups of sample members. Controlling for benefit 
receipt reduced the negative work intensity odds on the female covariate and slightly on 
the Black covariate, which indicates that engagement with the benefit system can partially 
explain the differences in work intensity between men and women and White and Black 
respondents. This result also led to an investigation of interaction terms with these 
demographic characteristics and benefit receipt, which found that the negative impact of 
benefit receipt is more pronounced for females. However this is not so for Black 
respondents, where the negative impacts of benefit receipt are not as large.  Finally, the 
effects of receiving SNAP differ depending on whether a respondent also receives TANF, 
where TANF families do not experience negative impacts on work intensity from SNAP 
receipt as other families; in fact, SNAP was found to be a positive factor in the work 
intensity experiences of these families.  
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Table 19: Longitudinal Ordered Logit Models of work intensity NLSY 1997, main effects (Blocks 1-4) 
 Block 1  Block 2  Block 3b  Block 4a  Block 4b  
 OR t OR t OR t OR t OR  t 
Age 1.24*** (75.37) 1.23*** (70.92) 1.23*** (70.94) 1.238*** (72.02) 1.237*** (70.55) 
Race (White)           
Black 0.50*** (-16.81) 0.52*** (-15.42) 0.55*** (-13.82) 0.56*** (-13.45) 0.58*** (-12.80) 
Hispanic 0.82*** (-4.51) 0.91* (-2.05) 0.95 (-1.05) 0.95 (-1.04) 0.94 (-1.41) 
Mixed Race 0.53*** (-3.51) 0.55** (-3.25) 0.58** (-2.93) 0.59** (-2.85) 0.60** (-2.70) 
Female 0.84*** (-5.57) 0.87*** (-4.28) 1.07 (1.69) 1.08* (2.12) 1.09* (2.30) 
Educ (No quals)           
GED 1.60*** (6.52) 1.53*** (5.93) 1.52*** (5.86) 1.48*** (5.57) 1.45*** (5.38) 
HS Diploma 2.95*** (17.71) 2.68*** (15.89) 2.60*** (15.48) 2.47*** (14.81) 2.37*** (14.24) 
AA 3.96*** (16.94) 3.43*** (14.98) 3.29*** (14.49) 3.10*** (13.90) 2.95*** (13.28) 
Bachelor's 3.85*** (20.91) 3.27*** (17.37) 3.01*** (15.90) 2.80*** (14.99) 2.68*** (14.41) 
Master’s 3.92*** (16.72) 3.32*** (14.03) 3.01*** (12.81) 2.79*** (11.99) 2.64*** (11.37) 
PhD 2.75** (2.81) 2.30* (2.36) 2.08* (2.15) 1.93 (1.94) 1.79 (1.70) 
Prof Deg 1.56** (3.02) 1.26 (1.58) 1.17 (1.10) 1.08 (0.57) 1.02 (0.13) 
Geog(Rural)           
Urban 1.22*** (6.55) 1.17*** (5.30) 1.17*** (5.36) 1.18*** (5.45) 1.18*** (5.61) 
Unknown 1.01 (0.24) 0.96 (-0.71) 0.96 (-0.73) 0.96 (-0.77) 0.96 (-0.73) 
Census reg (NE)            
North Central 1.18** (3.13) 1.17** (3.01) 1.16** (2.79) 1.17** (2.93) 1.17** (2.97) 
South 0.95 (-1.00) 0.93 (-1.35) 0.93 (-1.39) 0.93 (-1.45) 0.92 (-1.61) 
West 0.89* (-2.22) 0.88* (-2.33) 0.88* (-2.42) 0.88* (-2.51) 0.88* (-2.43) 
Health (Excellent)           
Very Good 1.11*** (5.18) 1.11*** (5.15) 1.11*** (5.05) 1.11*** (5.16) 1.11*** (5.23) 
Good 1.05* (2.10) 1.06* (2.34) 1.06* (2.35) 1.07** (2.65) 1.07** (2.91) 
Fair 0.86*** (-4.10) 0.87*** (-3.85) 0.87*** (-3.78) 0.88*** (-3.31) 0.91** (-2.58) 
Poor 0.39*** (-8.25) 0.39*** (-8.16) 0.39*** (-8.11) 0.41*** (-7.83) 0.44*** (-7.20) 
Household size   0.89*** (-17.47) 0.89*** (-17.25) 0.89*** (-16.30) 0.90*** (-16.01) 
Young parenting   0.89** (-2.98) 1.23*** (3.80) 1.28*** (4.55) 1.25*** (4.01) 












Moved out (>24)           
Before 19   1.17** (3.06) 1.16** (3.05) 1.18*** (3.37) 1.19*** (3.52) 
19-21   1.23*** (4.21) 1.23*** (4.21) 1.25*** (4.57) 1.27*** (4.93) 
21-24   1.35*** (6.27) 1.34*** (6.15) 1.35*** (6.40) 1.36*** (6.65) 
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Moved back   0.86*** (-4.40) 0.85*** (-4.63) 0.85*** (-4.64) 0.85*** (-4.61) 
 
Parental Inc (Q1) 
          
Quintile 2     1.26*** (4.01) 1.25*** (3.84) 1.24*** (3.72) 
Quintile 3     1.39*** (5.43) 1.36*** (5.20) 1.36*** (5.10) 
Quintile 4     1.47*** (6.36) 1.44*** (6.02) 1.43*** (5.91) 
Quintile 5     1.30*** (4.25) 1.27*** (3.83) 1.26*** (3.77) 
Missing     1.23*** (3.89) 1.21*** (3.65) 1.20*** (3.50) 
Benefit recipient       0.64*** (-14.28)   
TANF recipient          0.48*** (-12.03) 
SNAP recipient         0.53*** (-17.12) 
Observations 106365  106365  106365  106365  104889  
Cases  7209  7209  7209  7209  7209  
Displayed are odds ratios from an ordered logistic regression of waged work intensity with t statistics in parentheses; odds ratios in bold are those resulting from the interaction term. 










 HH size 
*Gender 
 Y. parenting 
*Gender 
 Parental Inc 
*Gender 
 Parental Inc 
*Age 
 
 OR t OR t OR t OR t OR t OR t 
Age  1.24*** (75.36) 1.24*** (75.36) 1.23*** (71.75) 1.23*** (70.96) 1.23*** (70.90) 1.21*** (30.09) 
Race (White)             
Black 0.45*** (-13.72) 0.49*** (-17.20) 0.52*** (-15.44) 0.52*** (-15.62) 0.55*** (-13.64) 0.55*** (-13.60) 
Hispanic 0.91 (-1.61) 0.82*** (-4.66) 0.91* (-2.03) 0.91* (-2.21) 0.96 (-0.91) 0.96 (-0.87) 
Mixed Race 0.60 (-1.84) 0.55** (-3.29) 0.54*** (-3.33) 0.56** (-3.07) 0.56** (-3.08) 0.56** (-3.10) 
Female 0.83*** (-4.33) 0.42*** (-7.99) 1.43*** (5.81) 1.06 (1.53) 0.73*** (-3.69) 0.88*** (-4.04) 
 1.01            
Race*Gender             
Black*Female 1.22* (2.57)           
 0.55 
1.01 
           
Hispanic*Female 0.82* (-2.43)           
 0.75 
0.68 
           





          
Educ (No quals)             
GED 1.61*** (6.63) 1.21* (2.03) 1.54*** (6.05) 1.53*** (6.01) 1.51*** (5.81) 1.51*** (5.78) 
HS Diploma 2.95*** (17.71) 2.24*** (10.06) 2.70*** (16.07) 2.73*** (16.31) 2.59*** (15.26) 2.54*** (15.08) 
AA 3.94*** (16.86) 2.47*** (7.49) 3.44*** (15.02) 3.49*** (15.27) 3.28*** (14.39) 3.22*** (14.20) 
Bachelor's 3.84*** (20.92) 2.32*** (9.74) 3.27*** (17.44) 3.23*** (17.29) 3.07*** (16.07) 3.04*** (16.00) 
Master’s 3.89*** (16.65) 2.13*** (6.20) 3.29*** (13.96) 3.21*** (13.72) 3.13*** (13.22) 3.10*** (13.07) 
PhD 2.75** (2.86) 0.67 (-0.66) 2.26* (2.31) 2.19* (2.31) 2.18* (2.24) 2.16* (2.17) 
Prof Deg 1.54** (2.96) 0.67* (-2.10) 1.25 (1.53) 1.24 (1.50) 1.19 (1.24) 1.18 (1.11) 
Geog (Rural)             
Urban 1.21*** (6.48) 1.22*** (6.69) 1.17*** (5.24) 1.17*** (5.35) 1.17*** (5.34) 1.17*** (5.11) 
Unknown 1.01 (0.23) 1.01 (0.29) 0.97 (-0.65) 0.96 (-0.73) 0.96 (-0.68) 0.95 (-0.99) 
Census Reg (NE)              
North Central 1.18** (3.11) 1.18** (3.12) 1.17** (2.97) 1.17** (3.00) 1.16** (2.83) 1.17** (2.97) 
South 0.95 (-1.02) 0.95 (-1.00) 0.93 (-1.37) 0.94 (-1.33) 0.93 (-1.41) 0.93 (-1.35) 
West 0.89* (-2.18) 0.89* (-2.26) 0.88* (-2.31) 0.88* (-2.34) 0.88* (-2.39) 0.88* (-2.47) 
Health (Excellent)             
Very Good 1.11*** (5.16) 1.11*** (5.08) 1.11*** (5.16) 1.11*** (5.08) 1.11*** (5.08) 1.11*** (5.03) 
Good 1.05* (2.06) 1.05* (2.04) 1.06* (2.40) 1.06* (2.33) 1.06* (2.37) 1.06* (2.32) 
Fair 0.86*** (-4.16) 0.86*** (-4.08) 0.87*** (-3.85) 0.87*** (-3.84) 0.87*** (-3.77) 0.87*** (-3.74) 
Poor 0.39*** (-8.28) 0.39*** (-8.22) 0.39*** (-8.14) 0.39*** (-8.13) 0.39*** (-8.12) 0.40*** (-8.07) 
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Education*Gender             
GED*Female   1.83*** (4.24)         
   2.23          




        
             
AA*Female   2.64*** (5.98)         
   6.53          




        




        
PhD*Female   9.77*** (3.32)         
   6.58          




        
Household size     0.95*** (-5.63) 0.89*** (-17.25) 0.89*** (-17.43) 0.89*** (-16.89) 
HHsize*Female     0.87*** (-10.25)       
     0.83        
Young parenting     0.90** (-2.62) 1.22*** (3.61) 0.91* (-2.48) 0.90** (-2.78) 




    
Moved out ( >24)             
Before 19     1.17** (3.17) 1.17** (3.11) 1.16** (2.97) 1.17** (3.04) 
19-21     1.24*** (4.32) 1.23*** (4.26) 1.23*** (4.21) 1.23*** (4.17) 
21-24     1.35*** (6.39) 1.34*** (6.24) 1.34*** (6.20) 1.34*** (6.16) 
Moved back     0.86*** (-4.32) 0.86*** (-4.53) 0.86*** (-4.45) 0.86*** (-4.50) 
Parental Inc (Q1)             
Quintile 2         1.24* (2.51) 1.54* (2.25) 
Quintile 3         1.31** (3.13) 1.02 (0.11) 
Quintile 4         1.24** (2.58) 0.79 (-1.18) 
Quintile 5         1.01 (0.17) 0.52** (-3.11) 
Missing         1.15 (1.91) 0.70* (-2.03) 
Parental Inc*Gender             
Quintile 2*Female         1.03 (0.27)   
         1.28    
Quintile 3*Female         1.13 (1.04)   
         1.47    
Quintile 4*Female          1.40** (3.01)   
         1.74    
Quintile 5*Female         1.66*** (4.57)   
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         1.69    





Parental Inc*Age              
Quintile 2*Age           0.99 (-0.99) 
           1.02  
Quintile 3*Age           1.01 (1.45) 
           1.03  
Quintile 4*Age            1.03** (2.90) 
           0.80  
Quintile 5*Age           1.04*** (4.17) 
           0.54  
Missing*Age            1.02** (3.00) 
           0.72  
Observations 106365  106365  106365  106365  106365  106365  
Cases  7209  7209  7209  7209  7209  7209  
Displayed are odds ratios from an ordered logistic regression of waged work intensity with t statistics in parentheses; odds ratios in bold are those resulting from the interaction term. 




Table 21: Longitudinal Ordered Logit Models of work intensity NLSY 1997, interaction effects (Block 4) 
 Ben receipt 
*Gender 
 Ben receipt 
*Race 









 OR t OR  t OR  t OR t OR  t OR t 
             
Age  1.24*** (71.98) 1.24*** (72.02) 1.24*** (72.37) 1.24*** (70.55) 1.24*** (70.64) 1.24*** (70.74) 
Race             
Black 0.57*** (-13.18) 0.54*** (-14.33) 0.57*** (-13.19) 0.58*** (-12.60) 0.54*** (-14.11) 0.58*** (-12.67) 
Hispanic 0.96 (-0.95) 0.90* (-2.29) 0.96 (-0.99) 0.94 (-1.34) 0.92 (-1.80) 0.94 (-1.86) 
Mixed Race 0.58** (-2.90) 0.57** (-3.16) 0.56** (-3.09) 0.59** (-2.79) 0.58** (-3.02) 0.59** (-2.85) 
Educ (No quals)             
GED 1.47*** (5.51) 1.48*** (5.53) 1.48*** (5.55) 1.45*** (5.34) 1.44*** (5.27) 1.45*** (5.33) 
HS Diploma 2.43*** (14.54) 2.43*** (14.44) 2.44*** (14.51) 2.34*** (13.97) 2.31*** (13.83) 2.33*** (13.95) 
AA 3.05*** (13.68) 3.05*** (13.64) 3.05*** (13.65) 2.90*** (13.07) 2.88*** (12.99) 2.90*** (13.09) 
Bachelor's 2.81*** (15.03) 2.79*** (14.89) 2.78*** (14.79) 2.69*** (14.47) 2.66*** (14.28) 2.69*** (14.45) 
Master’s 2.84*** (12.17) 2.83*** (12.09) 2.80*** (11.97) 2.70*** (11.59) 2.67*** (11.43) 2.70*** (11.58) 
PhD 1.96 (1.95) 1.96 (1.93) 1.97 (1.95) 1.84 (1.75) 1.82 (1.70) 1.85 (1.75) 
Prof Deg 1.09 (0.61) 1.08 (0.56) 1.07 (0.46) 1.03 (0.20) 1.02 (0.11) 1.03 (0.19) 
Geog (Rural)             
Urban 1.17*** (5.39) 1.18*** (5.45) 1.17*** (5.37) 1.18*** (5.55) 1.18*** (5.63) 1.18*** (5.58) 
Unknown 0.96 (-0.83) 0.96 (-0.77) 0.96 (-0.80) 0.96 (-0.74) 0.96 (-0.72) 0.96 (-0.73) 
Census Reg (NE)             
North Central 1.17** (2.92) 1.17** (2.93) 1.17** (2.97) 1.17** (2.99) 1.17** (2.98) 1.17** (3.02) 
South 0.93 (-1.47) 0.93 (-1.44) 0.93 (-1.47) 0.92 (-1.60) 0.93 (-1.56) 0.92 (-1.59) 
West 0.88* (-2.49) 0.88* (-2.49) 0.88* (-2.50) 0.88* (-2.39) 0.88* (-2.38) 0.88* (-2.41) 
Health (Excellent)             
Very Good 1.11*** (5.10) 1.11*** (5.22) 1.11*** (5.19) 1.11*** (5.23) 1.11*** (5.27) 1.12*** (5.30) 
Good 1.06* (2.56) 1.07** (2.72) 1.07** (2.69) 1.07** (2.87) 1.07** (2.98) 1.07** (2.95) 
Fair 0.88*** (-3.39) 0.89*** (-3.30) 0.89** (-3.26) 0.91** (-2.60) 0.91* (-2.52) 0.91* (-2.52) 
Poor 0.41*** (-7.89) 0.41*** (-7.79) 0.42*** (-7.82) 0.44*** (-7.24) 0.45*** (-7.15) 0.44*** (-7.21) 
Household size 0.89*** (-16.49) 0.89*** (-16.36) 0.89*** (-16.55) 0.90*** (-16.19) 0.90*** (-15.92) 0.90*** (-16.04) 
Female 0.99 (-0.43) 0.92* (-2.50) 0.91** (-2.75) 0.97 (-1.06) 0.94* (-2.00) 0.94 (-1.86) 
Benefit recipient 0.84*** (-3.42) 0.51*** (-12.90) 0.40*** (-16.69)       
Ben Recd*Female 0.64*** (-7.06)           
 0.54            
Young parenting 1.01 (0.28) 1.00 (-0.07) 0.89** (-3.00) 0.99 (-0.27) 0.99 (-0.34) 0.99 (-0.33) 
Moved out (>24)             
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Before 19 1.18*** (3.32) 1.18*** (3.37) 1.17** (3.20) 1.19*** (3.48) 1.20*** (3.57) 1.19*** (3.49) 
Between 19-21 1.25*** (4.58) 1.24*** (4.44) 1.24*** (4.38) 1.27*** (4.93) 1.26*** (4.82) 1.27*** (4.91) 
Between 21-24 1.35*** (6.46) 1.35*** (6.34) 1.35*** (6.36) 1.37*** (6.71) 1.36*** (6.65) 1.37*** (6.68) 
Moved back 0.85*** (-4.61) 0.86*** (-4.50) 0.86*** (-4.38) 0.86*** (-4.56) 0.86*** (-4.48) 0.86*** (-4.48) 
Parental Inc (Q1)              
Quintile 2 1.25*** (3.81) 1.25*** (3.86) 1.24*** (3.71) 1.24*** (3.70) 1.24*** (3.76) 1.24*** (3.67) 
Quintile 3 1.37*** (5.23) 1.37*** (5.31) 1.37*** (5.21) 1.36*** (5.16) 1.37*** (5.23) 1.36*** (5.13) 
Quintile 4 1.43*** (5.98) 1.43*** (6.00) 1.43*** (5.95) 1.42*** (5.90) 1.42*** (5.92) 1.42*** (5.88) 
Quintile 5 1.27*** (3.83) 1.26*** (3.69) 1.26*** (3.68) 1.26*** (3.77) 1.26*** (3.68) 1.26*** (3.72) 
Missing 1.21*** (3.60) 1.21*** (3.58) 1.20*** (3.50) 1.20*** (3.47) 1.20*** (3.49) 1.20*** (3.42) 
Ben Recd*Race             
Yes*Black   1.34*** (4.26)         
   0.69          
Yes*Hispanic   1.46*** (4.74)         
   0.75          




        




      
SNAP recipient       0.65*** (-7.18) 0.39*** (-15.16) 0.50*** (-18.05) 
SNAP*Female       0.73*** (-4.25)     
       0.47      
TANF recipient       0.49*** (-11.93) 0.47*** (-12.53) 0.29*** (-11.07) 
SNAP*Race             
Yes*Black         1.71*** (6.71)   
         0.66    
Yes*Hispanic         1.32** 
0.51 
(2.89)   





SNAP*TANF           2.00*** (5.36) 
           1.00  
Observations 106365  106365  106365  104889  104889  104889  
Cases 7209  7209  7209  7209  7209  7209  
Displayed are odds ratios from an ordered logistic regression of waged work intensity with t statistics in parentheses; odds ratios in bold are those resulting from the interaction term. 
***p<0.001, **p<0.01 *p<0.05        
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5.6 NLSY Poverty Ratio Measure and Descriptives   
Description of outcome measure  
The final outcome to be modelled for the NLSY sample is poverty ratio, a measure that is 
the ‘ratio comparing the gross household income variable (rounds 1 -7) and the gross family 
income55 variable (round 8 and up) to the federal poverty level [FPL] for the previous year, 
taking household size into account’; a poverty ratio of 100, therefore, is 100% of FPL 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics 2016). The poverty ratio measure can provide a fuller picture of 
the respondent’s economic standing than individual wages may provide. The poverty ratio 
thresholds used in government assistance programmes served as guidelines for creating the 
ordinal variable. A poverty ratio of 100 demarcates eligibility for nearly all forms of means-
tested government assistance. However, Americans are eligible for SNAP if their gross 
income is below 130% FPL and low-income children are eligible for the Children’s Health 
Insurance Program (CHIP) if their family income is under 200% FPL (Aussenberg 2014). In US 
public policy research, 200% FPL (poverty ratio 200) is considered a useful way to 
determine ‘low income’ status and is generally the highest level of income one can have to 
be eligible for government assistance (in the CHIP programme above).  
From these programme thresholds the ordinal measure is as follows: 
0 = Poverty ratio 200 or above  
1 = Poverty ratio 101 – 200  
2 = Poverty ratio 100 or below 
The ordinal variable categorised in this way will results in odds ratios above 1 indicating 
higher odds of being in a poverty group. 
Figure 60 details the percentage of all NLSY respondents in the three poverty ratio 
categories across the survey period. What is most notable is the relatively stable 
percentages of respondents who remain in each category from age 20 onwards. Changes in 
group membership mostly occur in this early youth period, as respondents are perhaps 
                                                          
55 According to the NLSY Topical Guide to the Data, ‘several questions were combined to create this 
income variable: non-farm and farm wages, the wages of the respondent’s spouse/partner, child 
support…rental income…parents’ income if the respondent resided with them, monetary gifts (other 




leaving the parental home and working to establish steady incomes on their own. At age 
18, around 40% of respondents are in the highest poverty group and almost 40% are in the 
lowest poverty group. By age 20, however, a much larger percentage of respondents are in 
the lowest poverty group (around 60%), while there are around 20% of respondents in each 
of the middle and high poverty groups.  
Figure 60: Percentage of sample in poverty ratio groups, total NLSY sample 
 
Unlike the other two outcome measures, the percentages of males and females in each 
poverty ratio group are relatively similar (Figures 61 and 62). This is likely due to the 
poverty ratio as a household-level measure rather than an individual-level measure, so 
there would likely be less of an independent effect of gender especially if there are two 
earners in the household.  
Viewing the poverty ratio figures by racial group, however, shows some very large 
differences in the percentage of respondents who are in each of the poverty ratio 
categories (Figures 63-65). The most notable differences in these figures are between 
White respondents and Black respondents: by age 19 over 60% of White respondents are in 
the lowest poverty group and remain so for the entirety of the survey period, while only 40-
45% of respondents who are Black are in this category from age 20 onwards. The 
percentage of White respondents in the lowest poverty group increase slightly with age (to 
nearly 75% at age 30), indicating that on average household incomes increase for this group 
as they approach their 30s (Figure 63). However, there is less change among categories for 
Black respondents and at no point in the survey are more than half of Black respondents in 
this lowest poverty group (e.g. above 200% FPL) (Figure 64).  
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Hispanic respondents in the group show quite a bit more movement among poverty groups 
during the course of the youth period, which is illustrated by the increase of respondents 
who are in the lowest poverty category from age 18 onwards (Figure 65). The percentage in 
the lowest poverty group increases from 40% of Hispanic respondents at age 18 to around 
60% at age 30. When viewed in reference to the results for White and Black respondents, 
this figure seems to suggest that the negative independent effect of race for Hispanic 
respondents compared to White respondents may become less prominent with age.  
Figures 61-62: Percentage of sample in poverty ratio groups, NLSY sample by gender  
Figure 61: Poverty ratio, NLSY males      



















Figures 63-65: Percentage of respondents in each poverty ratio category, NLSY sample by race  
Figure 63: White respondents                              Figure 64: Black respondents  






















5.7 Regression Results: NLSY Poverty Ratio, Random Effects Ordered 
Logistic Regression 
Block 1: Demographic Characteristics (Table 22) 
The most notable demographic characteristics for the poverty ratio outcome are relatively 
similar to those of note in the individual models, particularly as race and education have 
impacts in the same direction as the individual models. Black respondents at the end of 
Block 1 have 3 times higher odds of being in a higher poverty group than White 
respondents, while Hispanic respondents have around 1.3 times higher odds. The odds 
ratio reduces to 2.06 for Black respondents as all the family formation domain factors are 
controlled for (through Block 3), but the significant effect of race stays prominent through 
the first half of model iterations. The education covariate indicates a prominent impact of 
education on household poverty status, as higher levels of respondent education result in 
lower odds of being in a higher poverty group.  
A significant gender effect is present in Block 1 and shows higher odds of being in a poverty 
group for women (OR = 1.46), but this significant negative impact disappears with the 
inclusion of more covariates by the end of Block 3. This indicates that some of the variation 
in poverty ratio outcomes between men and women are captured by experiences in the 
employment domain and in the family formation domain.  However by Blocks 5a and 5b a 
significant gender effect emerges, where females have lower odds of being in a higher 
poverty group. 
Block 1 interactions (Table 23) 
Interaction terms for both gender and age and race and age are included in Table 21, and 
while the impact of gender changes as respondents age, the impact of race on one’s 
poverty outcome does not change with age. The significant result on the gender and age 
interaction term (OR = 0.98) indicates that females have slightly lower odds of being in a 
higher poverty ratio category than males with every half year. The insignificant result on 
the race and age interaction term indicates that the impact of race on poverty status 
remains consistent throughout the survey period and suggests that the differences 
between racial groups do not diminish as respondents age.  
There is however variation on the impact of race based on gender for Black respondents. 
The odds ratio above 1 on the Black and female interaction term indicates that the negative 
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impact of being Black on one’s poverty status is more pronounced for Black females, both 
in comparison to Black males (interaction OR = 1.57) and in comparison to White females 
(bold OR = 3.81). The results on this interaction term confirm that Black women in this 
sample have the highest odds of being in a household in poverty, and the results are 
particularly stark between Black and White women. There are no significant differences in 
the effects of race on poverty status between Hispanic men and women.  
The education covariate shows some distinct variation in the positive impacts of higher 
levels of education across both gender and race. The interaction terms below one for both 
female and Black respondents in particular indicate that a higher education level more 
markedly reduces the odds of being in a higher poverty group than It does for either male 
or White respondents. Therefore, the odds of being in a higher poverty category for Black 
respondents are much lower for those who receive Bachelor’s Degrees (OR = 0.04) and 
Master’s Degrees (OR = 0.03) compared to Black respondents with no qualifications. There 
are also prominent education impacts for women, where the odds of poverty are much 
lower for women with AA degrees (OR = 0.09), and Bachelor’s Degrees (OR = 0.07) and 
above.  
Block 2: Employment Domain (Table 22) 
The impact of the respondent’s annual employment income on household poverty status 
results in a coefficient as expected: as logged annual employment income increases by one 
unit, a respondent has 0.43 times lower odds of being in a higher poverty group. This effect 
size also is not affected by any of the family formation characteristics in Block 3, and only is 
changed in the model with government intervention covariates.  
Block 2 interactions (Table 24) 
It is valuable to determine if the positive impacts of the respondent’s annual employment 
income differ by racial group. Table 22 shows significant interactions for all racial groups, 
with the odds ratios closer to zero for both Black and Hispanic respondents indicating that 
their employment income has a larger impact on decreasing their odds of being in a higher 
poverty ratio category than the wage income of White respondents. For Black and Hispanic 
respondents, a one-unit increase in their logged annual employment income lowers the 
odds of being in a high poverty category by a factor of 0.39, while the impact for White 
respondents is slightly less (OR = 0.46). This evidence suggests that employment income is 
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a more notable factor in the poverty outcomes for these respondents, issues that are 
returned to in detail in Chapter 6.  
Block 3: Family Formation Domain (Table 22) 
All of the family formation covariates entered into the model were significant, although 
two areas in particular warrant extended explanation given the results on the individual 
outcomes. The results on the age at initial move out covariate show that respondents who 
leave the parental home at any age before 24 have higher odds of being in a higher poverty 
category than those who stay at home until at least 24, with large odds ratios for early 
movers (OR = 1.45) and those who leave between 19-21 (OR = 1.55). The negative odds 
ratios for early movers suggests that staying in the parental home is associated with more 
positive household economic outcomes for those who can benefit from this type of support 
in the youth period (lower odds of poverty). The result on the moving back covariate also 
illustrates this family safety net characteristic, as respondents who move back at least once 
have lower odds of being in a higher poverty category than those who make a permanent 
exit (OR = 0.89). For this sample, then, the ability to stay in the parental home until 24 and 
the ability to return if an initial move out is not successful provides more positive impacts 
on poverty status in the long term. The positive results of staying in the parental home on 
one’s long term poverty outcome trajectory is juxtaposed with the negative results of 
staying in the parental home on one’s work intensity and wage trajectory: respondents 
who leave earlier are more engaged in the labour market and have higher wages through 
their 20s. The results on this covariate across all models suggest that there may be some 
demographic and family characteristics of ‘late’ movers that impact their more positive 
results for the household poverty outcome, which are tested for in Block 3 interactions of 
age at move out with race and Block 4 interactions with parental aid history.  
The second most notable covariate among family formation characteristics is the impact of 
young parenthood. Here, the odds of being in a high poverty category are over two times 
larger for respondents who are young parents compared to those who are not. Because 
this main effect is large and significant (unlike this covariate in the wages model where it 
was insignificant or the work intensity model where the effect sizes were smaller, iterations 
in Blocks 4 and 5a and 5b will be considered with this main effect rather than an interaction 
term. However, in order to test the mediating effects of government interventions on 
young parents (particularly for young female parents), the Block 5c iteration of Table 20 
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includes the young parenting and female interaction term covariate in the table of main 
effects.   
Block 3 interactions (Table 24)  
There are two interaction terms which are significant with the age at initial move out 
covariate, race and the experience of moving back. The interaction terms below 1 for both 
Black and Hispanic respondents indicate that the experience of moving out initially before 
age 24 does not negatively impact poverty status as much as it does for White respondents. 
The moving out main effects in this iteration indicate that White respondents who move 
out early have odds of being in a higher poverty category around 2 times higher than White 
respondents who don’t move out before 24. These differences in odds are not nearly as 
large and are insignificant among Black respondents (odds ratios in bold). This seems to 
suggest that the positive impacts of staying in the family home until age 24 on poverty 
outcomes is an experience concentrated more among White sample members on average.  
The odds ratios less than one on the moving out and moving back interaction terms 
indicate that moving back into the family home moderates the negative impacts of making 
an early move out on long term poverty outcomes. For the sample of respondents who 
make a permanent move out of the family home (the main effects), moving out 
permanently before 19 results in 1.73 times higher odds of being in a higher poverty group 
and moving out permanently between 21-24 results in 1.28 times higher odds than those 
who move out after 24. For those who make a move back in with their parents after an 
early initial move out, the smaller bold odds ratios indicate lower negative impacts of 
making an initial move out before age 21 on one’s odds of being in a higher poverty group 
(early movers OR = 1.14, 19-21 movers OR = 1.22).  
The two interactions on the young parenthood covariate, one with race and one with 
gender, show significantly different impacts of young parenthood for female and Black 
respondent poverty outcomes. An odds ratio of 1.37 on the female and young parent 
interaction term indicates that female young parents have worse poverty outcomes 
resulting from this experience. Therefore, there are particularly large differences in the 
odds of being in a higher poverty category for female young parents compared to females 
who do not have children before age 24 (OR = 2.62). Although the difference in odds ratios 
is also quite large between men who have children before 24 and men who do not have 
children (OR = 1.92), the result confirms that women are more negatively impacted by the 
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experience of young parenthood across all economic independence outcomes than men. 
The final interaction with young parenthood indicates that young Black parents have higher 
odds of being in a higher poverty group than other racial groups (OR = 1.37), and confirms 
that young Black parents have perhaps the worst long term poverty outcomes compared to 
all other groups on average. When compared to those in the same racial group White 
young parents have 1.99 times higher odds of being in poverty than childless White 
respondents, while Black young parents have 2.72 times higher odds of being in a higher 
poverty category than Black cohort members who do not have children in the youth period.  
Block 4: Parental Background (Table 22) 
The results at the end of Block 4 confirm that those with parental aid history56 have 1.63 
times higher odds of being in a higher poverty group. This effect is slightly reduced when 
any benefit receipt is added to the model (OR = 1.56) and when SNAP and TANF are 
included in the model (OR = 1.58), which suggests a relationship between SNAP and TANF 
receipt and parental aid history. Controlling for parental background slightly reduces the 
negative independent effects on the Black covariate, increases the positive impacts of the 
education covariate, and slightly reduces the negative impact of moving out before age 24. 
The mediating impacts on the Black covariate with parental aid included are consistent 
with the mediating impacts of parental background on race in the individual models. The 
reduction in the effect of moving out before age 24 when parental aid history is included in 
the model provides further evidence that moving out is indeed a function of (and often 
contingent on) one’s parental background: part of the negative impacts of an early move 
out may be due to young people being forced to live on their own without parental 
resources, while others may choose to live on their own. Once controlled for by the prior 
variable of parental background, the effect size of moving out decreases.  
Block 4 interactions (Table 23)  
The impact of a respondent’s parental aid history on their poverty outcome is moderated 
slightly by age and differs between Black and White respondents, given by interaction 
terms in Table 25. The interaction odds ratio of 0.98 on parental aid and age indicates that 
there is a slight decrease in the negative impact of parental aid on one’s poverty outcomes 
                                                          
56 The specification of this parental background indicator, which differs from the other two models, 
and the rationale for its use is detailed in full in Chapter 3.4  
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as respondents age: however, the odds ratio relatively close to one suggests that the 
change is minimal. The impact of parental aid history also differs notably between Black 
and White respondents, as the interaction odds ratio of 1.48 indicates that parental aid 
history has a more negative impact on Black respondent poverty outcomes than for White 
respondents. The resulting odds ratios among Black respondents therefore show much 
higher odds of being in a poverty group for respondents with parental aid history compared 
to Black respondents without (bold OR = 2.18).  
Block 5: Government interventions (Table 22) 
The results of receiving any type of means-tested benefits and receiving SNAP or TANF 
have particularly negative impacts on household poverty outcomes. Respondents who have 
any benefit receipt have 2.43 times higher odds of being in a high poverty group compared 
to respondents with no benefit receipt. The odds ratios on the SNAP main effects are 
relatively similar (OR = 2.57). What is interesting in the final model is the much less 
negative odds ratio on the TANF main effect (OR = 1.23), which suggests that more of the 
negative impacts for TANF recipients are captured by controlling for other covariates such 
as parental aid receipt and young parenthood. Again as with the other model results on the 
benefit receipt covariate, the composition of the recipient population must be considered 
when making inferences about how benefits impact long term poverty outcomes. Those 
who are eligible to receive assistance are by definition living in a high poverty household, 
and there is indeed an association between these two experiences, which is unsurprising 
given the composition of the benefit population.   
As with the previous individual models, the inclusion of benefit receipt covariates mediates 
some of the independent effects on other covariates, particularly for groups that are 
known to engage in the benefit system to a greater extent. The odds ratio on the young 
parenthood main effect in Block 5a is reduced from 2.20 to 1.74, suggesting that the 
experience of benefit receipt in any of the component programmes is a notable factor in 
the relationship between young parents and their later household poverty outcomes. The 
negative odds ratios are also reduced for Black respondents, although the difference in 
poverty outcomes between White and Black respondents is still significant. Finally, the 
independent effect of gender now shows a significant difference in outcomes between 
males and females when any benefit receipt is controlled for in the model, as females now 
have slightly lower odds of being in a higher poverty group than males in the sample (Block 
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5a OR = 0.84). This suggests that experiences in the welfare state indeed impact both 
genders quite differently, and that for women in particular interaction with government 
assistance is likely a factor in the more negative household poverty outcomes seen in 
earlier model iterations.  
The final area of interest in Block 5 investigates how controlling for any benefit receipt 
changes the results for male and female young parents (Block 5c). Table 22 indicates that 
the same sort of mediating impacts of benefit receipt occur in a model of household 
poverty as in the individual models, particularly on indicators identifying groups that are 
known to have a relationship with the benefit system. The young parenthood main effect 
and the bold odds ratio in Block 5c show smaller negative impacts of young parenthood 
among men (OR = 1.63) and women (bold OR = 1.82) when compared to the results in 
Table 24 before benefit receipt covariates are included; where the male young parent OR = 
1.92 and the female young parent OR = 2.62. Perhaps most notably, however, controlling 
for any benefit receipt results in an insignificant interaction odds ratio for young 
parenthood and gender in Block 5c (interaction OR = 1.12). This indicates that once any 
benefit receipt is added to a model of household poverty, there is no significant difference 
in the experience of young parenthood between male and female young parents. This 
suggests that benefit receipt should be considered as important factor in mediating the 
experience of household poverty outcomes for parents, particularly female young parents 
(a target population for policy intervention).   
Block 5 interactions (Table 25) 
The interaction terms for Block 5 (Table 25) show significant differences in the impacts of 
benefit receipt on poverty status between men and women, as any benefit receipt as well 
as SNAP receipt shows slightly less negative impacts on the odds of being in a higher 
poverty group among women than among men (interaction term odds ratios below 1).  
Therefore, there is a larger difference in the odds of being in a higher poverty category 
among men who receive any benefits than men who do not (OR = 2.61), than there is 
between women who receive benefits and those who do not (OR = 2.32). There are similar 
results for SNAP in each gender group.  
The impact of any benefit receipt on household poverty also differs based on family history 
of aid receipt, as those with parental aid history have a slightly lower negative impact of 
benefit receipt on household poverty outcomes compared to respondents with no parental 
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aid history (interaction term OR = 0.82). Even though the results seem ‘less negative’ for 
individuals from families with aid history, this does not indicate that these respondents are 
better off overall – it only suggests that benefit receipt is not as large of a factor in the 
higher poverty outcomes of this group. The final significant interaction of Table 25 indicates 
that the impact of receiving SNAP differs between families who do and do not also receive 
TANF. The interaction term odds ratio of 0.71 indicates that SNAP has less of a negative 
impact on the poverty ratio for TANF families. This positive relationship between SNAP 
receipt and slightly more positive outcomes for TANF families is consistent with the results 
on the SNAP and TANF interaction terms in the other models, and suggests that the 
experience of receiving SNAP moderates these families’ relationship to the labour market 
and economic outcomes more broadly, and can be a positive influence in their outcomes.  
Summary  
At the end of model iterations for the household poverty outcome, the demographic 
characteristics of race and gender remain valuable factors to consider, both as independent 
covariates and as factors that moderate the experience of both young parenthood and 
benefit receipt. Black respondents on average, and particularly Black women, have higher 
odds of being in a household in poverty across all demographic groups. However, 
controlling for benefit receipt slightly limits the negative independent impact of race for 
Black respondents and reverses the direction of odds on the gender covariate. Once benefit 
receipt is controlled for women have lower odds of being in a higher poverty household, 
and suggests that experience in the benefit system is a larger factor in explaining the 
economic outcomes of women compared to men.  
Youth transitions experiences – moving out and young parenthood – were found to have 
long-lasting impacts on household poverty outcomes. Those who move out before 24 were 
found to have higher odds of being in a poverty category compared to those who were able 
to benefit from a parental safety net in the form of co-residence. These more positive 
impacts were also seen when the poverty outcomes were compared between young 
people who move out early but were then able to move back in with their parents and 
those who made a permanent exit at a younger age. The results suggest that the ability to 
‘boomerang’ may be associated with better long term outcomes compared to permanent 
early movers. Young parenthood also has negative consequences for respondent 
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household poverty, as these respondents had odds of being in poverty over two times 
larger than those who are not young parents.  
Finally, the results on the benefit receipt covariate when considered as a main effect were 
unsurprising for this poverty outcome, which suggests that respondents who have incomes 
low enough to receive benefits will be less likely to move out of poverty in mid-life. 
However, the impact of benefit receipt is again more nuanced. The inclusion of benefits 
into a model of household poverty has mediating effects on the negative impacts of other 
characteristics -- young parenthood, race, and gender – and should be considered as an 
important factor influencing the experience of young parents, non-White respondents and 
women in particular. The experience of young parenthood is particularly scarring for young 
women compared to young men, but these differences are also reduced when benefit 
receipt is controlled for. This suggests that among some of the ‘target’ populations of 
interest (young parents, females and low-income Black respondents), benefit receipt plays 
a valuable role in their youth transition experience. And finally, the results here also 
confirm again that SNAP receipt moderates the relationship of TANF families and 
household poverty; a moderating factor that influences the experience for this group in a 
positive way.  
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Table 22: Longitudinal Ordered Logit Models of poverty ratio NLSY 1997, main effects (Blocks 1-5) 
 Block 1  Block 2  Block 3  Block 4   Block 5a  Block 5b  Block 5c  
 OR t OR t OR t OR  t OR t OR t OR  t 
Age  0.92*** (-21.27) 1.06*** (13.86) 1.08*** (17.54) 1.08*** (17.51) 1.08*** (16.15) 1.07*** (14.32) 1.01*** (16.09)  
Race (White)               
Black 3.06*** (20.21) 2.40*** (17.10) 2.06*** (14.32) 1.87*** (12.34) 1.76*** (11.50) 1.75*** (11.35) 1.76*** (11.59) 
Hispanic 1.31*** (4.74) 1.28*** (4.63) 1.25*** (4.34) 1.20*** (3.57) 1.18** (3.27) 1.21*** (3.76) 1.18** (3.29)  
Mixed Race 1.57* (2.36) 1.31 (1.45) 1.18 (0.91) 1.10 (0.55) 1.06 (0.33) 1.07 (0.39) 1.05 (0.29) 
Female 1.46*** (8.76) 1.12** (2.77) 0.95 (-1.32) 0.93 (-1.86) 0.84*** (-4.37) 0.86*** (-3.77) 0.81*** (-4.36) 
Educ (No quals)               
GED 0.50*** (-7.55) 0.60*** (-6.02) 0.63*** (-5.75) 0.64*** (-5.53) 0.67*** (-5.11) 0.67*** (-5.03) 0.67*** (-5.14) 
HS Diploma 0.20*** (-20.60) 0.30*** (-16.77) 0.36*** (-14.17) 0.39*** (-13.03) 0.43*** (-12.18) 0.44*** (-12.05) 0.43*** (-12.25) 
AA 0.13*** (-19.39) 0.21*** (-15.66) 0.28*** (-13.18) 0.31*** (-12.21) 0.35*** (-11.42) 0.35*** (-11.24) 0.25*** (-11.49) 
Bachelor's  0.12*** (-25.04) 0.17*** (-21.95) 0.25*** (-16.88) 0.30*** (-14.46) 0.35*** (-12.98) 0.35*** (-13.01) 0.35*** (-13.00) 
Master’s 0.09*** (-18.76) 0.13*** (-16.65) 0.21*** (-13.30) 0.25*** (-11.87) 0.30*** (-10.53) 0.29*** (-10.65) 0.30*** (-10.52) 
PhD 0.10*** (-4.95) 0.12*** (-3.96) 0.19** (-3.19) 0.26* (-2.56) 0.32* (-2.24) 0.32* (-2.23) 0.32* (-2.23) 
Prof Deg 0.14*** (-9.17) 0.17*** (-7.78) 0.26*** (-6.09) 0.31*** (-5.20) 0.37*** (-4.52) 0.37*** (-4.51) 0.38*** (-4.51) 
Geog (Rural)               
Urban 1.12** (2.64) 1.24*** (4.76) 1.22*** (4.62) 1.23*** (4.79) 1.22*** (4.75) 1.22*** (4.72) 1.22*** (4.74) 
Unknown 1.10 (1.17) 1.25** (2.68) 1.26** (2.79) 1.27** (2.84) 1.25** (2.68) 1.26** (2.80) 1.25** (2.69) 
Census Reg (NE)               
North Central 1.30*** (3.65) 1.19* (2.57) 1.17* (2.41) 1.17* (2.41) 1.16* (2.38) 1.15* (2.25) 1.16* (2.38) 
South 1.25*** (3.54) 1.23*** (3.38) 1.22*** (3.41) 1.23*** (3.49) 1.25*** (3.96) 1.24*** (3.74) 1.25*** (3.96) 
West 1.31*** (3.78) 1.34*** (4.20) 1.37*** (4.70) 1.37*** (4.79) 1.38*** (5.05) 1.37*** (4.91) 1.38*** (5.04) 
Health (Excellent)                
Very Good 0.99 (-0.43) 0.99 (-0.25) 0.99 (-0.37) 0.98 (-0.52) 0.97 (-0.80) 0.97 (-0.81) 0.97 (-0.77) 
Good 1.10* (2.54) 1.09* (2.29) 1.09* (2.15) 1.07 (1.89) 1.05 (1.31) 1.05 (1.34) 1.05 (1.32) 
Fair 1.37*** (5.75) 1.29*** (4.71) 1.28*** (4.49) 1.25*** (4.16) 1.20*** (3.42) 1.19** (3.19) 1.20*** (3.42) 
Poor 1.67*** (3.67) 1.38* (2.45) 1.34* (2.17) 1.30 (1.94) 1.17 (1.17) 1.13 (0.89) 1.17 (1.17) 
Annual wages (ln)   0.43*** (-51.34) 0.43*** (-51.41) 0.43*** (-51.37) 0.44*** (-50.43) 0.45*** (-50.04) 0.44*** (-50.34) 
Married     0.56*** (-13.17) 0.56*** (-13.10) 0.53*** (-15.03) 0.56*** (-13.63) 0.53*** (-14.98) 
Young parenting     2.27*** (18.17) 2.20*** (17.66) 1.74*** (12.55) 1.92*** (15.00) 1.63*** (8,36) 
Yparent*Female             1.12 (1.50) 
             1.82  
Moved out (> 24)               
Before 19     1.45*** (6.35) 1.42*** (6.06) 1.40*** (6.02) 1.40*** (5.90) 1.40*** (6.02) 
19-21     1.55*** (7.50) 1.52*** (7.28) 1.48*** (7.09) 1.48*** (7.00) 1.48*** (7.09) 
21-24     1.19** (3.08) 1.18** (2.86) 1.16** (2.75) 1.16** (2.67) 1.16** (2.76) 
Moved back     0.89** (-2.73) 0.89** (-2.89) 0.87*** (-3.52) 0.87*** (-3.56) 0.87*** (-3.50) 
Parental aid               
Yes       1.63*** (11.46) 1.56*** (10.92) 1.58*** (11.05) 1.56*** (10.90) 
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Missing       1.29*** (3.81) 1.26*** (3.53) 1.27*** (3.71) 1.26*** (3.51) 
Benefit recipient         2.43*** (23.90)   2.42*** (23.67) 
SNAP recipient           2.57*** (22.60)   
TANF recipient           1.23* (2.50)   
Observations 49981  49981  49981  49981  49981  49885 49981   
Cases  6947  6947  6947  6947  6947  6945 6947   

















 OR t OR t OR t OR t OR t 
Age 0.93*** (-13.34) 0.92*** (-15.45) 0.92*** (-21.27) 0.92*** (-21.31) 0.92*** (-21.25) 
Female 2.32*** (4.18) 1.45*** (8.75) 1.26*** (3.93) 1.47*** (8.98) 2.48*** (6.31) 
Female*Age 0.98* (-2.36)         
Race            
Black 3.07*** (20.22) 2.03** (2.98) 2.42*** (11.77) 5.29*** (9.32) 3.08*** (20.37) 
Hispanic 1.31*** (4.74) 1.86* (2.38) 1.25** (2.94) 1.46* (2.32) 1.31*** (4.76) 
Mixed Race 1.57* (2.36) 0.21 (-1.37) 1.17 (0.63) 7.87* (2.32) 1.51* (2.15) 
Education            
GED 0.50*** (-7.54) 0.50*** (-7.56) 0.51*** (-7.46) 0.47*** (-5.31) 0.60*** (-4.39) 
HS Diploma 0.20*** (-20.60) 0.20*** (-20.63) 0.20*** (-20.63) 0.23*** (-11.92) 0.23*** (-14.94) 
AA 0.13*** (-19.38) 0.13*** (-19.39) 0.13*** (-19.52) 0.16*** (-11.61) 0.17*** (-12.29) 
Bachelor's 0.12*** (-25.04) 0.12*** (-25.05) 0.12*** (-24.99) 0.17*** (-14.31) 0.18*** (-15.33) 
Master’s 0.09*** (-18.76) 0.09*** (-18.80) 0.09*** (-18.81) 0.14*** (-12.17) 0.21*** (-8.32) 
PhD 0.10*** (-4.93) 0.10*** (-4.96) 0.10*** (-4.93) 0.10*** (-4.12) 0.24** (-2.76) 
Prof Deg 0.14*** (-9.18) 0.14*** (-9.18) 0.14*** (-9.19) 0.24*** (-6.18) 0.23*** (-4.71) 
Geog (Rural)           
Urban 1.12** (2.61) 1.12** (2.62) 1.12* (2.55) 1.12* (2.52) 1.12* (2.52) 
Unknown 1.10 (1.19) 1.10 (1.15) 1.10 (1.14) 1.10 (1.16) 1.10 (1.13) 
Census Reg (NE)           
North Central 1.30*** (3.65) 1.30*** (3.67) 1.30*** (3.70) 1.29*** (3.61) 1.31*** (3.71) 
South 1.25*** (3.53) 1.25*** (3.55) 1.26*** (3.61) 1.28*** (3.91) 1.26*** (3.62) 
West 1.31*** (3.75) 1.31*** (3.76) 1.32*** (3.85) 1.33*** (3.98) 1.31*** (3.80) 
Health (Excellent)           
Very Good 0.98 (-0.53) 0.98 (-0.44) 0.98 (-0.44) 0.99 (-0.19) 0.99 (-0.37) 
Good 1.10* (2.43) 1.10* (2.55) 1.10* (2.49) 1.12** (2.88) 1.10** (2.58) 
Fair 1.36*** (5.66) 1.37*** (5.78) 1.37*** (5.68) 1.39*** (5.99) 1.37*** (5.74) 
Poor 1.67*** (3.67) 1.67*** (3.67) 1.66*** (3.63) 1.69*** (3.75) 1.67*** (3.63) 
Race*Age            
Black*Age   1.02 (1.76)       
Hispanic*Age   0.99 (-1.36)       
Mixed Race*Age   1.08 (1.78)       
Race*Gender           
Black*Female     1.57*** (4.37)     
     3.81      
Hispanic*Female     1.10 (0.89)     
     2.05      
Mixed Race 
*Female  
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Educ*Race           
GED* Black        0.94 (-0.28)   
       0.44    





AA* Black        0.67 (-1.57)   
       0.11    





Masters*Black       0.23*** (-4.55)   
       0.03    
PhD*Black        1.87 (0.87)   
       0.20    
Prof Deg*Black       0.11*** (-3.37)   
       0.02    
GED* Hispanic        1.36 (1.40)   
HS Dip*Hispanic        0.95 (-0.31)   
AA* Hispanic        0.74 (-1.14)   
Bachelor's*Hispanic       0.79 (-1.13)   
Master’s*Hispanic        0.69 (-0.98)   
Prof Deg*Hispanic        0.33 (-1.43)   
GED*Mixed        0.36 (-1.07)   
HS Dip *Mixed         0.17 (-1.84)   
AA*Mixed       0.07* (-2.41)   
Bachelor's*Mixed       0.21 (-1.63)   
Masters*Mixed        0.09 (-1.63)   
Prof Deg*Mixed       0.64 (-0.48)   
Educ*Gender           
GED*Female          0.64* (-2.37) 
         0.39  
HS Dip*Female         0.71* (-2.13) 
         0.16  
AA*Female          0.54** (-2.92) 
         0.09  
Bachelor's*Female         0.38*** (-5.81) 
          0.07  
Master’s*Female         0.23*** (-5.96) 
         0.05  
PhD* Female          0.23 (-1.82) 
         0.05  
Prof Deg*Female         0.36* (-2.46) 
         0.08  
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Observations 49981  49981  49981  49981  49981  
Cases 6947  6947  6947  6947  6947  




Table 24: Longitudinal Ordered Logit Models of poverty ratio NLSY 1997, interaction effects (Blocks 2-3) 
 Employment 
income*Race 
 Moved out 
*Race 







 OR t OR t OR t OR t OR t 
Age 1.06*** (13.79) 1.08*** (17.50) 1.08*** (17.57) 1.08*** (17.41) 1.08*** (17.48) 
Race            
Black 11.36*** (7.58) 2.84*** (10.05) 2.07*** (14.36) 2.07*** (14.38) 1.82*** (9.35) 
Hispanic 6.33*** (5.43) 1.65*** (5.21) 1.26*** (4.46) 1.26*** (4.38) 1.22*** (3.04) 
Mixed Race 0.09* (-2.55) 1.65 (1.07) 1.19 (0.95) 1.16 (0.79) 1.07 (0.30) 
Annual wages (ln) 0.46*** (-38.18) 0.43*** (-51.40) 0.43*** (-51.41) 0.43*** (-51.24) 0.43*** (-51.40) 
Wages*Race           
Wages*Black 0.84*** (-5.05)         
 0.39          
Wages*Hispanic 0.84*** (-4.90)         
 0.39          
Wages*Mixed  1.34** 
0.62 
(2.89)         
Female 1.12** (2.83) 0.94 (-1.44) 0.95 (-1.36)   0.85*** (-3.32) 0.95 (-1.28) 
Education (No quals)           
GED 0.61*** (-5.98) 0.63*** (-5.67) 0.63*** (-5.76) 0.62*** (-5.84) 0.62*** (-5.81) 
HS Diploma 0.30*** (-16.63) 0.37*** (-14.03) 0.36*** (-14.16) 0.36*** (-14.38) 0.36*** (-14.24) 
AA 0.21*** (-15.56) 0.29*** (-13.07) 0.28*** (-13.17) 0.28*** (-13.35) 0.28*** (-13.31) 
Bachelor's Deg 0.17*** (-21.73) 0.25*** (-16.78) 0.25*** (-16.85) 0.25*** (-16.91) 0.24*** (-17.07) 
Master’s Deg 0.14*** (-16.48) 0.21*** (-13.33) 0.21*** (-13.29) 0.21*** (-13.25) 0.20*** (-13.46) 
PhD 0.12*** (-4.00) 0.19** (-3.20) 0.19** (-3.21) 0.20** (-3.13) 0.19** (-3.23) 
Professional Deg 0.17*** (-7.70) 0.25*** (-6.13) 0.26*** (-6.10) 0.26*** (-6.05) 0.25*** (-6.21) 
Geog (Rural)           
Urban 1.23*** (4.61) 1.23*** (4.67) 1.22*** (4.60) 1.22*** (4.59) 1.22*** (4.58) 
Unknown 1.25** (2.67) 1.26** (2.82) 1.26** (2.76) 1.26** (2.80) 1.26** (2.79) 
Census Reg (NE)           
North Central 1.19** (2.60) 1.17* (2.35) 1.17* (2.40) 1.17* (2.42) 1.17* (2.36) 
South 1.22*** (3.30) 1.22*** (3.36) 1.22*** (3.39) 1.22*** (3.40) 1.22*** (3.43) 
West 1.33*** (4.16) 1.35*** (4.53) 1.36*** (4.66) 1.36*** (4.68) 1.36*** (4.66) 
Health (Excellent)           
Very Good 0.99 (-0.15) 0.99 (-0.38) 0.99 (-0.35) 0.99 (-0.32) 0.99 (-0.34) 
Good 1.10* (2.44) 1.09* (2.18) 1.09* (2.18) 1.09* (2.16) 1.09* (2.19) 
Fair 1.30*** (4.86) 1.28*** (4.50) 1.28*** (4.53) 1.28*** (4.49) 1.28*** (4.49) 
Poor 1.39* (2.46) 1.34* (2.18) 1.34* (2.18) 1.33* (2.15) 1.34* (2.18) 
Married   0.56*** (-13.13) 0.56*** (-13.22) 0.56*** (-13.08) 0.57*** (-13.01) 
Married*Female            
           
Young parenting   2.27*** (18.14) 2.25*** (17.99) 1.92*** (10.46) 1.99*** (10.63) 
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YParent*Female        1.37***    
       2.62    
YParent*Race           
YParent*Black          1.37** (-2.98) 
         2.72  
YParent*Hispanic         1.12 (1.10) 
         2.23  
YParent*Mixed         1.34 (0.77) 
         2.67  
Moved out (>24)           
Before 19   1.90*** (7.45) 1.73*** (6.87) 1.46*** (6.35) 1.46*** (6.43) 
19-21   2.00*** (8.06) 1.77*** (7.29) 1.55*** (7.51) 1.54*** (7.42) 
21-24   1.35*** (3.30) 1.28*** (3.34) 1.20** (3.11) 1.19** (3.03) 
Moved back   0.89** (-2.74) 1.18 (1.83) 0.90** (-2.70) 0.90** (-2.98) 
Moved out*Race           
Before 19*Black   0.53*** (-4.64)       
   1.00        
19-21*Black    0.65** (-3.14)       
   1.31        
21-24*Black   0.83 (-1.34)       
   1.12        




      
19-21*Hispanic   0.60*** (-3.71)       
   1.20        
21-24*Hispanic   0.83 (-1.32)       
   1.12        
Before 19*Mixed   0.76 (-0.48)       
19-21*Mixed   0.436 (-1.39)       
21-24*Mixed    0.85 (-0.29)       
Moved out*Moved 
back 
          
Before 19*Yes     0.66*** (-3.52)     
     1.14      
19-21*Yes     0.69** (-3.11)     
     1.22      
21-24*Yes     0.76* (-2.25)     
      0.98      
Observations 49981  49981  49981  49981  49981  
Cases 6947  6947  6947  6947  6947  




Table 25: Longitudinal Ordered Logit Models of poverty ratio NLSY 1997, interaction effects (Blocks 4-5) 




 Benefit recd 
*Gender 
 Benefit recd* 






 OR t OR t OR t OR t OR t OR t 
Age 1.11*** (16.00) 1.08*** (17.50) 1.08*** (16.18) 1.08*** (16.12) 1.07*** (14.34) 1.07*** (14.21) 
Race              
Black 1.87*** (12.32) 1.44*** (4.38) 1.76*** (11.54) 1.75*** (11.48) 1.75*** (11.38) 1.75*** (11.36) 
Hispanic 1.21*** (3.62) 1.20* (2.35) 1.18** (3.26) 1.17** (3.19) 1.21*** (3.74) 1.21*** (3.77) 
Mixed Race 1.10 (0.54) 0.98 (-0.08) 1.06 (0.36) 1.06 (0.32) 1.07 (0.41) 1.07 (0.39) 
Female 0.93 (-1.91) 0.93 (-1.88) 0.86*** (-3.51) 0.84*** (-4.35) 0.88** (-3.14) 0.86*** (-3.76) 
Educ (No quals)             
GED 0.64*** (-5.49) 0.64*** (-5.56) 0.67*** (-5.10) 0.67*** (-5.15) 0.68*** (-5.00) 0.67*** (-5.02) 
HS Diploma 0.40*** (-
12.94) 
0.39*** (-13.10) 0.43*** (-12.12) 0.43*** (-12.22) 0.44*** (-11.99) 0.44*** (-12.05) 
AA 0.31*** (-
12.17) 
0.31*** (-12.25) 0.35*** (-11.38) 0.35*** (-11.46) 0.35*** (-11.20) 0.35*** (-11.25) 
Bachelor's 0.30*** (-
14.32) 
0.29*** (-14.60) 0.35*** (-12.96) 0.35*** (-12.94) 0.35*** (-12.97) 0.35*** (-13.01) 
Master’s 0.25*** (-
11.79) 
0.25*** (-11.98) 0.30*** (-10.54) 0.30*** (-10.49) 0.29*** (-10.65) 0.30*** (-10.65) 
PhD 0.28* (-2.55) 0.26* (-2.56) 0.32* (-2.26) 0.32* (-2.22) 0.32* (-2.23) 0.32* (-2.23) 
Prof Deg 0.32*** (-5.14) 0.31*** (-5.33) 0.37*** (-4.52) 0.38*** (-4.49) 0.37*** (-4.50) 0.37*** (-4.51) 
Geog (Rural)             
Urban 1.22*** (4.61) 1.23*** (4.78) 1.22*** (4.75) 1.22*** (4.76) 1.22*** (4.73) 1.22*** (4.72) 
Unknown 1.26** (2.77) 1.27** (2.85) 1.25** (2.67) 1.25** (2.70) 1.26** (2.80) 1.26** (2.81) 
Census Reg (NE)             
North Central 1.17* (2.44) 1.17* (2.38) 1.16* (2.37) 1.16* (2.40) 1.15* (2.26) 1.15* (2.23) 
South 1.22*** (3.47) 1.22*** (3.46) 1.25*** (3.97) 1.25*** (3.96) 1.24*** (3.76) 1.24*** (3.72) 
West 1.37*** (4.79) 1.37*** (4.75) 1.38*** (5.05) 1.38*** (5.04) 1.37*** (4.93) 1.37*** (4.90) 
Health (Excellent)             
Very Good 0.98 (-0.59) 0.98 (-0.47) 0.97 (-0.84) 0.97 (-0.81) 0.97 (-0.85) 0.97 (-0.81) 
Good 1.07 (1.86) 1.08 (1.93) 1.05 (1.28) 1.05 (1.30) 1.05 (1.32) 1.05 (1.34) 
Fair 1.26*** (4.22) 1.25*** (4.18) 1.20*** (3.40) 1.20*** (3.44) 1.19** (3.18) 1.19** (3.16) 
Poor 1.31* (2.06) 1.29 (1.92) 1.17 (1.17) 1.17 (1.19) 1.13 (0.89) 1.13 (0.89) 
Annual wages (ln) 0.43*** (-
51.14) 
0.43*** (-51.32) 0.44*** (-50.44) 0.44*** (-50.42) 0.45*** (-50.06) 0.45*** (-50.01) 
Married 0.56*** (-
13.30) 
0.57*** (-13.08) 0.53*** (-15.09) 0.53*** (-15.06) 0.56*** (-13.73) 0.56*** (-13.64) 
Young parenting 2.21*** (17.67) 2.20*** (17.62) 1.74*** (12.65) 1.73*** (12.54) 1.93*** (15.08) 1.92*** (14.97) 
Moved out (>24)             
Before 19 1.43*** (6.14) 1.43*** (6.10) 1.40*** (6.01) 1.41*** (6.06) 1.39*** (5.88) 1.40*** (5.91) 
19-21 1.53*** (7.34) 1.52*** (7.29) 1.48*** (7.10) 1.49*** (7.12) 1.48*** (7.01) 1.48*** (7.00) 
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21-24 1.18** (2.93) 1.17** (2.82) 1.16** (2.75) 1.16** (2.77) 1.16** (2.68) 1.16** (2.68) 
Moved back 0.89** (-2.94) 0.89** (-2.91) 0.87*** (-3.53) 0.87*** (-3.52) 0.87*** (-3.52) 0.87*** (-3.59) 
Parental aid             
Yes 4.80*** (7.58) 1.47*** (6.70) 1.56*** (10.93) 1.62*** (10.94) 1.58*** (11.05) 1.58*** (11.04) 
Missing 3.56*** (3.76) 1.18 (1.65) 1.26*** (3.53) 1.28*** (3.45) 1.27*** (3.70) 1.27*** (3.70) 
Parental aid*Age             
Yes*Age  0.96*** (-5.44)           
Missing*Age 0.96** (-3.12)           
 
Parental aid*Race 
            
Yes*Black     1.48*** (3.84)         
   2.18          
Yes* Hispanic    1.02 (0.19)         
Yes* Mixed Race   1.398 (0.86)         
Missing*Black   1.43* (2.08)         
Missing*Hispanic   1.06 (0.40)         
Missing*Mixed   0.87 (-0.28)         
Benefit recipient     2.61*** (16.75) 2.78*** (14.88)     
Ben Recd* Female     0.89 (-1.63)       
     2.32        
Ben Recd*P. aid             




    
Yes*Missing       0.89 (-1.01)     
             
SNAP recipient         2.86*** (15.43) 2.61*** (22.48) 
SNAP Recd*Female         0.84* (-2.06)   
         2.41    
TANF recipient         1.24** (2.62) 1.58** (3.03) 
SNAP*TANF           0.71 (-1.90) 
           1.85  
Observations 49981  49981  49981  49981  49885  49885  
Cases 6947  6947  6947  6947  6945  6945  
Displayed are odds ratios from an ordered logistic regression of poverty ratio with t statistics in parentheses; odds ratios in bold are those resulting from the interaction term.  





A summary of the final main effects models for all three of the NLSY models is found in 
Table 26, included here to detail broadly the effects of each of the covariates of interest; 
however, these tables do not include interaction effects, which are found in the regression 
tables in the previous pages.  
Table 26: Summary of Final Main Effect Model Results, NLSY   
Variable/Covariate   Wages                                  
(positive = higher 
wages) 
Work Intensity                       
(positive = higher 
work int) 
Poverty Ratio                               
(positive = higher 
poverty) 
Age    + *** + *** + *** 
Female    -- ***          + * -- *** 
Race: Black    -- *** -- *** + *** 
Race: Hispanic             + -- + ** 
Education (AA +)   + *** + *** -- *** 
High Work Intensity   + ***             n/a             n/a  
Wages               n/a             n/a  -- *** 
Poor Health     -- ***          + 
Household size    -- *** -- ***  
Married      -- *** 
Young Parent   + *** + *** + *** 
Young Parent*Female             + -- *** + *** 
Moved out before 24   + *** + *** + *** 
Moved back    -- *** -- *** -- *** 
Parental Income Q4 / Q5   + *** + ***  
Parental Aid History   n/a  n/a  + *** 
Benefit Receipt (any)   -- -- *** + *** 
SNAP receipt    -- *** -- *** + *** 




Chapter 6: Case Comparison and Discussion  
The detailed results of the previous two chapters provide new evidence for the final 
discussion of the broader, two-dimensional concept this investigation seeks to measure, 
economic independence. Considering this outcome as a combination of both individual 
labour market experiences and household poverty allows this work to investigate other 
factors that influence poverty and labour market attachment in youth beyond the 
structural or demographic. This chapter uses Powell and Barrientos’ welfare mix (detailed in 
Chapter 2.3) as the analytical framework to organise the discussion of the drivers of 
economic independence, enabling a discussion of all of the three welfare sources that 
influence this concept in each case and comparatively. This chapter first discusses the key 
drivers of economic independence in case narratives for the US and the UK, which identify 
particularly pertinent issues specific to each cohort and those that are brought forth to the 
case comparison in Chapter 6.2. The common drivers and themes are discussed in 6.2 in the 
three welfare mix areas, with an eye to the contextual characteristics that drive divergent 
results in each case. The findings and themes that emerged in the case comparison will 
then be situated in reference to existing work in both of the fields of literature 
underpinning this investigation, followed by the broad policy implications of this work for 
both the US and the UK.  
An important precursor to the discussion of both case results is the recognition that the 
most notable results on the way in which government assistance impacts youth transitions 
is extremely nuanced. Because of the composition of young people who are eligible to 
receive benefits in a means-tested system it is not particularly enlightening to detail the 
ways in which low-income young people compare to their higher-income (and therefore 
non-benefit receiving) counterparts. Rather, what is more notable to discuss is the way in 
which government assistance is a factor in the lives of those who receive it, and is 
associated with different types of youth transition experiences for particular groups. It is 
also valuable to underscore again the exploratory and associational nature of this 
investigation; this investigation is unable here to detail the causal effects of benefit receipt 
on these long term outcomes (see ‘Nature of Causality’ in Chapter 3.2), but can make some 
important first conclusions about how the welfare state is a factor in the economic 
trajectories of young people.  
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6.1 Drivers of Transitions to Economic Independence: Case Narratives 
Key Drivers for the UK cohort 
The state’s role in a transition to economic independence for the UK case was illustrated 
most prominently by results on the timing of benefits, the type of government intervention 
accessed, and interactions with ‘target’ groups such as women and young parents. What is 
particularly notable in this case is that the impacts of government assistance differ based 
on when in the life course they are received. In the work intensity model benefit receipt 
was found to be a significant factor at age 30 and older, and there was no significant 
negative impact of receiving benefits on household income at 42 if received at age 21. 
These results suggest that means-tested assistance may therefore have larger impacts on 
economic independence outcomes when received as a part of the family of destination 
rather than during the period of semi-dependence in youth.  
Results from the Youth Training Scheme measure also provided evidence that the type of 
government assistance provided in the youth period is an important consideration in future 
policy intervention. YTS participation either had negative or (at best) neutral impacts on a 
young person’s economic independence, and confirmed that this type of intervention was 
not associated with long term positive economic outcomes for recipients. Further 
investigation also found that the only participants who reported positive impacts from YTS 
were those who did not also engage with any other type of government assistance. This 
suggests that activation programmes may be best able to adequately support only those 
participants who are not structurally disadvantaged (e.g. are not poor enough to receive 
benefits), which may run counter to the goals of the programme. Interventions with some 
of the same types of characteristics as YTS have been implemented by subsequent UK 
governments through the 1990s and early 2000s and remains a recommended intervention 
for disadvantaged young people. This research suggests that it is likely that younger cohorts 
may also find participation in government sponsored training programmes to play a less 
positive role in their long term economic outcomes than is envisioned by policymakers. 
The impacts of means-tested assistance for this case also showed potentially surprising 
results for two of the ‘target’ groups for assistance, women and young parents. The results 
suggest that indeed benefits impact outcomes differently for men and women, but males in 
this British cohort were found to be more negatively impacted in their labour market 
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attachment than females. Importantly, this suggests that the small proportion of men who 
engage with government assistance in a means-tested system designed to serve primarily 
‘dependent’ women may be some of the hardest citizens to reach. The second group with 
surprising results for this British cohort was young parents (10% of the sample), who are 
often considered a high risk group for a successful youth transition and therefore expected 
to interact differently with government assistance than other cohort members. However, 
the impact of benefit receipt did not differ for this group, indicating that benefits impact 
long term economic outcomes in the same way regardless of young parenting experience 
for this cohort. Benefits were however found to be a potentially notable mediating factor in 
the labour market trajectory of these young parents, as controlling for benefit receipt in the 
work intensity model decreased the difference in outcomes between young parents and 
non-young parents.  
The second welfare source, the family of origin, can be measured either explicitly (in 
monetary resources) or implicitly, measured by the family’s socioeconomic status. In the UK 
case socioeconomic background provides unsurprising results given previous evidence on 
the advantages of an affluent family of origin in all aspects of economic independence 
(Chapter 2.2). Cohort members from the upper 40% of the parental income distribution 
have markedly higher wage trajectories and higher odds of being in the upper income 
quintiles themselves in mid-life, and importantly this affluence only increases in 
prominence in their life course with age; even when other correlated experiences are 
controlled for. Rather than the gap between the rich and poor becoming narrower into 
adulthood, the inequalities widen. The larger effect sizes for wage income as factor in gross 
household income for low income sample members points to the importance of the non-
wage assets and economic resources that come with an affluent background. These are 
valuable to consider but were not able to be captured in this investigation. Based on these 
models, it is therefore likely that inequalities that limit labour market returns will likely 
have more scarring effects on cohort members from low income families. 
Finally, the importance of wage income and work intensity to overall household poverty 
means it is critical to understand the factors that influence the labour market welfare 
source of this cohort. The most notable structural factor in labour market outcomes for the 
British cohort is gender, with women exhibiting lower labour market attachment and 
subsequent wages on average than males in the sample, even when controlling for 
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education and employment status. Importantly, then, the experience of ‘growing up’ for 
women in this sample does not inevitably result in stronger labour market attachment or 
remuneration. Divergence in labour market outcomes is also likely influenced by an 
increase in household size on women’s labour market attachment, as these models showed 
women’s work intensity more negatively impacted by household growth. Higher 
educational attainment on its own was found to have a more positive impact on women’s 
labour market experiences, suggesting that education is an important way for women in 
this cohort to improve labour market outcomes. Gender is also valuable to investigate from 
a male perspective for this cohort particularly because males in this sample have very 
strong and early labour market attachment, where 75% or more of males reported being in 
full time work from age 21 onwards compared to 50% or less of the female group. This is a 
period effect that likely does not arise with younger British cohorts, a there are higher 
proportions of females active in the labour market.   
The final issue to consider is that the smaller subgroup of young parents (parents at age 21) 
were not found to have systematically worse outcomes on average on either individual 
labour market outcome or household income. The impacts of young parenthood were also 
not found to significantly differ between men and women, which may also be surprising 
given the common cultural depiction of poverty-stricken young mothers. Rather than young 
parents in this cohort being more disadvantaged in the labour market, young parents were 
found to be more attached (particularly after controlling for benefit receipt) and not have 
significantly worse wages on average once employment status was controlled for. Perhaps 
the most surprising result was in household income at age 42, where young parenthood 
was not a significant factor in the outcome at any point in model iterations. In each of the 
three models, the results indicate that the impact of young parenthood in itself is partially a 
consequence of other prior factors, like parental background, which are reflected in 
insignificant values in final model iterations. Particularly in the household income model, 
the results suggest that for this cohort the hypothesised negative impact of this trigger 
event on its own does not extend into the respondent’s 40s. 
Key Drivers for the US Cohort  
The larger sample size of the US cohort, greater number of survey waves available, and 
data on specific programmes for all survey waves increased the ability to produce more 
nuanced findings for the US case on the effects of government intervention on economic 
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independence. The most notable results for this case were found when investigating 
government assistance for particular subgroups of cohort members. The US case confirms 
that the benefit system is a larger factor in the economic outcomes of women in the 
sample, particularly as the negative impacts of benefit receipt are exacerbated for women 
on the individual outcomes. However, this same type of effect was not seen on household 
poverty, where benefit receipt was found to be less negative for women and controlling for 
benefit receipt resulted in more positive household poverty outcomes for women on 
average than men. This may be evidence of the importance of government assistance for 
the poverty outcomes of females (and by extension female headed households), and 
affirms the gendered nature of a liberal welfare state serving more low income women 
than men. 
Two other notable features of the US case results are the interaction of government 
assistance with the lives of Black Americans and young parents. In each model the 
independent negative effect size on the race covariate for Black Americans is reduced once 
benefit receipt is controlled for in all three models. The controlling effect of benefit receipt 
in these models for Black Americans suggests that benefit receipt is not the cause of 
poverty for this group, but rather a symptom of disadvantage that is captured by modelling 
benefit receipt. Black Americans in this cohort were also found not to be as negatively 
impacted by benefit receipt in both wages and work intensity than White Americans, which 
suggests much higher levels of inequality between low-income White Americans and their 
White peers than among the Black respondents.  
The final group to consider in the US case is young parents, who generally access 
government assistance at higher rates due to a higher prevalence of poverty and their 
greater eligibility as a ‘deserving’ group. The results here are relatively encouraging, as 
controlling for benefit receipt results in reductions in the difference in effect sizes between 
male and female young parents in the household model and between young parents and 
non-young parenting peers in the individual models. This suggests that government 
assistance is a notable factor in the relationship between young parents and economic 
outcomes, and mediates how these young people transition successfully to independence.  
Perhaps most encouraging is that young parents who access government assistance were 
found to have higher odds of being attached strongly to the labour market compared to 
young parents without this support. The positive results for this group in particular signal 
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that intervention of this type is associated with some characteristics of a successful safety 
net, and suggests that more research is needed to understand how these young parents 
use government assistance to improve their youth transition outcomes.  
It is also important to consider the group of very poor Americans who engage with multiple 
benefit programmes, the group for whom means-tested benefits have been previously 
found to be effective in closing the poverty gap between the very poor and those hovering 
around the poverty line (Chapter 2.4). Those who are in receipt of TANF are categorically 
eligible to receive SNAP and are more likely to be in deep poverty, and indeed the impact of 
receiving SNAP differs for those who are receiving TANF in this investigation. SNAP receipt 
was found to have a positive impact on wages for TANF recipients and was found to not 
scar this group’s work intensity or household poverty outcomes as dramatically as for other 
SNAP recipients. This suggests that for Americans who are already poor enough to be 
receiving a small cash benefit like TANF, a programme like SNAP likely plays an important 
role in providing assistance to supplement very low incomes; a result which aligns with 
other evidence on SNAP’s ability to improve the outcomes of those in deep poverty.  
The US case provides evidence on both the implicit and explicit ways that the family welfare 
source impacts economic independence. The value of an affluent family in creating positive 
individual and household level outcomes for this cohort is consistent with previous 
evidence, as those from the top income quintiles have much more positive economic 
outcomes than their poorer peers. One of the factors to consider for this cohort is that 
those from more affluent families were found to attach earlier and more steadily to the 
labour market in the youth period, evidence of ‘stepping stones’ that may not be a common 
experience for lower income young people (Figure 50, Chapter 5). Parental background was 
also found to become a more prominent factor with age, although effects are not in the 
same direction for wages and work intensity. While the wages of those from more affluent 
families increase at a faster rate with age, the odds of being in a higher work intensity 
category are reduced with age. This suggests that that those from higher income families 
may be able to reduce their labour market attachment and still receive strong economic 
returns because of their place in higher waged work. The relationship between parental 
background and race was also confirmed for this cohort, as controlling for this factor 
reduced the independent effect of race for Black and Hispanic cohort members; confirming 
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that the impacts of race and socioeconomic background must be considered together when 
analysing survey data from the United States. 
The more explicit measure of family resources is found in the variables on residential 
independence; the age of first moving out and the incidence of moving back. The results 
suggest that those who are able to make a permanent exit out of the parental home in the 
youth period may have a more ‘successful’ youth transition as defined by a higher wage 
trajectory and stronger labour market attachment. However, the conceptualisation of 
economic independence also includes the explicit element of poverty status, and those who 
made their initial move out in youth had worse poverty outcomes than those who stay until 
at least 24; with young people who make a permanent move out of the family home before 
19 exhibiting the most negative poverty outcomes. The results here confirm that the family 
home for the US cohort serves as a valuable safety net in the youth period to improve later 
poverty outcomes, and that perhaps the experience of co-residence longer into the youth 
period and the ‘boomerang’ experience should therefore only be considered negative 
depending on which component of economic independence one is interested in (i.e. labour 
market attachment and wages, or poverty). The impact of family resources provided 
through co-residence also showed variation by race, where the positive impact of staying in 
the family home during the youth period was found to be particularly concentrated among 
White respondents, as Black and Hispanic respondent household poverty outcomes were 
not nearly as scarred by leaving the parental home earlier. Together, the two types of 
family resources combine to create much more positive economic independence outcomes 
for those who can rely on family resources during the transition period. 
Two structural factors and one trigger event showed particularly notable variation in 
individual labour market outcomes for the US case; gender, race, and young parenthood. 
The results on the independent effect of gender again showed relatively unsurprising 
results, with women exhibiting lower wages and work intensity. Despite a smaller gap in 
labour market attachment between men and women in the US case, an increase in 
household size and the experience of young parenthood were found to more negatively 
impact women in the sample compared to men. Therefore, although women in this cohort 
were found to notably change their labour market experiences with higher levels of 
education, changes in the family formation domain may be the more important driver to 
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analyse in women’s labour market experiences, especially as these effects hold even after 
controlling for education.   
The labour market experiences of Black and Hispanic sample members were found to 
notably diverge from White sample members, with lower wages and work intensity on 
average. As with all quantitative work, the results here estimate average effects: not all 
Black respondents in the survey are poor, nor are all White respondents affluent, but the 
results here broadly detail the inequalities that affect different racial groups. It is also 
important to consider further intersectional issues beyond race and class for the US sample 
in particular, as the experiences of Black and Hispanic men and women differ. Black women 
have slightly less negative outcomes than Black men on both wages and work intensity, 
while Hispanic women have slightly more negative outcomes than Hispanic men. The 
results for Black men confirm some of the previous evidence identifying this group of 
Americans as particularly disadvantaged in the labour market, with worse outcomes in both 
labour market attachment and returns. The experience of Black women is also notable 
because this group has higher labour market attachment than White women overall, but 
without the resulting higher earnings. The results for Black women here, as in other 
research, point to the combination of both the gender wage gap and the racial wage gap as 
two of the intersectional issues at work for this group of cohort members.  A pertinent 
issue to consider, then, and one that has been a perennial one in public policy debates, is 
the wage gap between men and women of all races.  
The results from the individual model of wages and the wage effect sizes in the 
investigation of household poverty for Black and Hispanic respondents suggests that the 
difference in poverty outcomes for these groups is a confluence of disparities in family 
assets as well as lower remuneration of respondents even when attached to the labour 
market consistently throughout the year. Wages were found to be a more prominent factor 
in the household poverty outcomes of both Black and Hispanic cohort members, and 
therefore lack of success in the labour market will therefore have an outsized effect on 
household poverty. Wage gains for these groups however, were not found to be strong 
even when in very high work intensity; this suggests that average wages for these groups 
consistently lag behind White respondents even with strong labour market attachment. 
Education was found to be an important factor in improving wages for these groups, as 
higher levels of education were found to more positively impact the wage trajectories of 
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Black and Hispanic respondents. However, Black and Hispanic respondents with higher 
education levels were not found to be compensated to the same degree in the labour 
market as their White peers at the same education level, a result consistent with other 
work on the impacts of education for Black and Hispanic Americans. Given the inequalities 
in the labour market between racial groups, it is not likely then that the gaps in economic 
independence outcomes will be closed by market work alone, and it may be worthwhile to 
consider to what extent the state can or should be involved in the transitions for these 
groups. 
The final factor to consider that influences the labour market welfare source is the 
experience of young parenthood (the case for 33% of the NLSY sample at age 24). While 
government assistance was found to play a potentially positive role in the experience of 
young parents, particularly when compared with young parents who did not receive 
benefits, the experience overall is still found to negatively impact labour market 
attachment and later household poverty on average. Therefore the experience should still 
be considered a risk factor affecting outcomes at least until one’s early 30s for this cohort. 
This particular trigger event has the most negative outcomes for female young parents, 
with a lower wage trajectory and far lower work intensity. In fact, more positive labour 
market attachment for male young parents suggests that the responsibilities of parenthood 
may push young men into the labour market while young female parents are further unable 
to attach steadily. Again, however, some of the more nuanced results suggest that benefit 
receipt plays a valuable role in the relationship of female young parents to economic 
outcomes in particular; a relationship that can potentially have a positive impact on their 
youth transition outcomes. The final intersectional issue to consider here is that although 
the stereotype of ‘young poor Black mother’ is synonymous with government assistance in 
the United States (see Fraser & Gordon 1994), this trigger experience impacts young people 
of all races relatively consistently on individual outcomes. The only variation among young 
parents of different races is in household poverty, where young minority parents were 
more negatively affected than White parents. This could be evidence of a number of issues 
related to less affluent parental backgrounds for Black and Hispanic respondents that more 
often co-exist with young parenthood, where fewer parental resources can be drawn on for 




6.2. Welfare Mix Case Comparison   
The two case narratives were able to bring forth the most relevant drivers of economic 
independence for each cohort, both on the primary focus of this investigation (government 
assistance) and issues of family resources and broader labour market inequalities. This 
section explicitly uses the welfare mix framework to bring the case results together to 
speak comparatively about how the results are similar and differ among two variants of a 
liberal welfare state.   
Although young people in liberal welfare states interact with each of the welfare sources 
similarly in a broad sense – with the key source of welfare first as the labour market 
followed by the family and the state – the contextual differences of the cases resulted in 
each cohort interacting with these welfare sources in slightly different ways. This section 
carries forward drivers of outcomes that can be compared most fruitfully using the welfare 
mix framework to detail a contrast of contexts in the spirit of Somers and Skocpol (1980) 
(issues that are notably case-specific [e.g. YTS] are found only in the previous section). This 
work therefore necessarily includes a comparative discussion of the way that structural 
inequalities underpin experiences in each of the welfare sources in each case, particularly 
the labour market, and how cohort experiences differ. The differences in results for each 
welfare source are outlined alongside the ways in which two cases that differ in both time 
period and country context share similarities by virtue of their place in liberal welfare states 
and liberal market economies.  
The State  
The primary focus of this research is the smallest welfare source in these two contexts, the 
state. A central conclusion from this work is that government assistance is indeed an 
important factor to consider in youth transition experiences, and the most valuable results 
are those which are nuanced and investigate subgroups that interact with the benefit 
system more notably. Three specific issues emerged from both cases: the importance of 
understanding the impact of government assistance for ‘target’ groups; that impacts vary 
based on the type of assistance received, including if respondents engage with multiple 
sources of assistance; and that the timing and dynamics of receipt is a valuable 
consideration when analysing this welfare source.  
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One of the primary target groups for a liberal welfare state’s benefit system are females, 
where discussions of a gendered welfare state identify women as particularly 
disadvantaged by the organisation of a liberal welfare state focused on means-tested 
benefits (seen in Fraser & Gordon 1994). This was seen in the US sample, where the 
impacts of benefit receipt were found to be more negatively scarring to female work 
intensity and poverty ratio outcomes. This higher incidence of engagement with the benefit 
system was found to be an important factor in the different poverty outcomes between 
men and women in the US sample; once this aspect of the biography was controlled for 
women’s household poverty outcomes were more positive. The more negative impacts of 
benefit receipt were not seen for women in the UK sample, which is likely due to the period 
effect of lower labour market participation for this older cohort of women. In the US case, 
more women are engaged in the labour market and therefore there is a larger gap in 
economic independence outcomes between women who do and do not engage in the 
benefit system. In current British cohorts where female labour market attachment is higher, 
results may likely be similar to those seen in the US case here with a more ‘active’ female 
reference group. 
The gendered aspects of the welfare state should however also be considered for its impact 
on males in each case. For the small percentage of UK men who receive benefits (around 
10-20%) their labour market attachment outcomes suggest a particularly challenging youth 
transition, as their work intensity outcomes are far more negatively impacted by benefit 
receipt than women and have much worse outcomes than men who do not receive 
benefits. Men were also found to be more negatively impacted by benefit receipt in their 
household poverty outcomes in the US, which indicates again that for the small percentage 
of male respondents who receive benefits (also around 10%), while their individual 
outcomes are not as scarred as women’s outcomes, their household poverty outcomes 
compared to men without benefit receipt are particularly negative. These results suggest 
that the system of means-tested government assistance in both cases designed to serve 
women and lone mothers does not meet the needs of the subpopulation of men in receipt, 
a population that may be overlooked in policymaking.  
The second notable group to consider is Black respondents, only able to be investigated in 
this research in the US case due to data and cohort constraints (although future UK 
research can engage with issues for ethnic minority groups). This group is not inherently a 
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‘target’ group as perhaps young parents are, but rather a higher proportion interacts with 
government assistance because of the higher proportion of group members in poverty on 
average. In each of the individual models Black Americans who receive benefits (particularly 
SNAP) are not as negative impacted in their wages or work intensity outcomes than White 
respondents, which provides evidence on both the wider income inequality within the 
group of White cohort members and the lower average wages and work intensity among 
Black Americans who do not interact with the benefit system. Including government 
assistance covariates in each of the three models also captured some of the independent 
impacts of race, particularly for Black respondents, and suggests that some of the ‘race 
effect’ seen in this work is a ‘poverty effect’ which is also measured by benefit receipt in a 
means-tested system. For Black respondents in particular, who were found to have the 
poorest labour market outcomes on average among racial groups, government assistance 
therefore features more prominently in these sample members’ life courses. Any changes 
to the systems of means-tested government assistance will thus have more prominent 
impacts on cohort members from racial minority groups. The unique contextual issue of 
race and structural racism attached to the benefit system is perhaps the most notable 
contrast between the two cases. As noted in the literature review, ‘welfare’ and ‘welfare 
dependency’ in the American consciousness is often viewed as a system and a problem of 
(predominantly) Black communities – even if the caseload data suggests otherwise. The 
results here confirm that the welfare state should be considered a racialised space as well 
as a gendered space.  
The most explicit target group for means-tested benefits found in the two cases is young 
parents. In both cases this group interacts more with the benefit system because of the 
higher proportion of young parents who are also on low incomes; however, young lone 
parents in this UK sample were eligible for assistance at the age 21 survey regardless of 
income level by virtue of only their family type (Table 1, Chapter 1). Lone parents who 
received benefits at 21 in the BCS sample may not necessarily be poor, and the benefit 
system for the BCS cohort likely serves a more heterogeneous group of young parents than 
the US system. Although the young parents in the UK cohort were not found to be 
particularly scarred by this experience as a main effect, there is evidence that benefit 
receipt is a mediating factor in the work intensity outcomes of young parents, and indeed 
plays a notable role in the transition outcomes for this group of young people.  This 
relationship was found in the US case as well, particularly for female young parents. 
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Controlling for benefit receipt reduced the negative impacts of young parenthood on wages 
for this group, as well as reduced the differences in individual outcomes between male and 
female young parents. Most notable for policymakers is that young parents in this sample 
who access government assistance had more positive labour market attachment outcomes 
than young parents who did not engage with assistance, which differs from the typical 
image of young parents receiving government assistance as a group destined for long term 
welfare dependency. For this group, and potentially for other groups of young people with 
challenging youth trigger events, government assistance (again, often received in the short 
term based on the descriptive results on Chapters 4 and 5) may indeed provide a safety net 
during this period and also a potential springboard for future labour market attachment.  
For all three of these ‘target’ groups (females, Black Americans and young parents) the 
results from this investigation indicate that the experience of receiving government 
assistance not only is a prominent experience in the life course, but is a factor in potentially 
reducing the negative impacts of structural disadvantage and of the particular youth period 
‘risk factor’ of young parenthood. However, these more positive effects of government 
assistance for target groups must be viewed with the understanding that benefit receipt, 
and the poverty that precedes benefit receipt, will still have negative effects for mostly all 
economic independence outcomes even after controlling for notable structural and youth 
transition factors. This is due to the nature of the benefit system in a liberal welfare state 
which serves primarily a residualist function, and therefore the benefit recipient group will 
necessarily have worse economic outcomes than other young people.  
There was also evidence in both cases that the type of government assistance accessed is 
an important consideration in analysing impacts on economic independence, although the 
two cases show slightly different facets of this issue. Evidence in the US case suggests a 
notable relationship between the receipt of SNAP and TANF benefits, and suggests that 
SNAP is a particularly important and positive factor in the relationship between those who 
are in receipt of multiple benefits and the labour market; particularly moderating the way 
that very poor TANF families engage with the labour market. The results for this very poor 
group of TANF families in particular illustrate the importance of an in-kind, guaranteed level 
of income support for those who are very poor in comparison to a workfare programme 
with harsh eligibility criteria. The nuanced results in the US case suggests that future 
research for a larger British sample should consider how in-kind assistance like Housing 
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Benefit impacts a respondent’s outcome in comparison with shorter term assistance like 
JSA. The UK case was also able to determine the relative merits of cash assistance, here in 
comparison with a government-sponsored training programme. In this case there were far 
less negative impacts of cash assistance to BCS sample members and much more negative 
impacts from participation in YTS. The UK case suggests that cash assistance received in the 
youth period may be a more adequate government intervention in this period than a 
training programme. Notably in both cases investigated here the impact of in-work benefits 
was not able to be explored explicitly, which will likely return different results given the 
different characteristics of those who access these benefits.   
Finally, there is evidence here to suggest that the timing of benefit receipt in the life course 
and the dynamics of benefit receipt are important factors to consider when analysing long 
term outcomes. The impact of benefit receipt emerging only if received after 30 for the 
individual outcome of work intensity in the UK case and benefit receipt at 21 not significant 
to household incomes at age 42 suggest that benefit receipt in the youth period may not be 
as consequential to long-term outcomes as those received in the family of destination. This 
suggests that the during the period of semi-dependence before career and family formation 
trajectories have stabilised, it might be valuable to consider that short term benefits may 
be a potentially positive intervention. Importantly for these cohorts, benefits are rarely 
received in many consecutive years (or survey periods) from the youth period onward, and 
rather recipients move off and on benefits as they become eligible. Based on the 
investigation of ‘runs’ of consistent benefit receipt for both samples, benefit receipt for 
these cohorts should be considered a short-term event as opposed to a continuous one, 
consistent with what is known about welfare dynamics in other cohorts. There is little 
evidence here that assistance in the youth period will lead to a ‘lifetime’ of consistent 
benefit receipt, however low income may still be a prevalent issue in their life course. It is 
valuable therefore to consider what benefits may be most valuable to stabilise young 
people in this period so that they do not become families who also must rely on means-
tested benefits for subsistence.  
Even with the positive results on the timing of benefits, when the full survey period was 
considered the UK case still did not reveal any more positive long term results for benefit 
recipients than the US case. Importantly, the supposedly more ‘generous’ benefit system of 
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the UK for this BCS cohort did not drastically alter the trajectory of low income young 
people compared to their non-poor peers.  
Because of the means-tested system and the composition of the benefit receipt population, 
what is perhaps more relevant is to consider how an episode of benefit receipt can or 
cannot alter the youth transitions of respondents who are more at risk of having 
‘unsuccessful’ outcomes by virtue of their place in disadvantaged groups. Evidence in both 
cases suggests that the benefit system plays a role in the youth transition outcomes 
particularly for young parents and those who are very poor, with some preliminary results 
suggesting that this may be associated with improving economic outcomes for these 
groups. The mediating impacts of benefit receipt for females in both cases and Black 
Americans in the US case also suggest that the benefit system also has a notable 
relationship with how these young people improve their economic outcomes throughout 
the youth period, again a potentially positive relationship. The more positive results for 
these disadvantaged groups indicates that benefit receipt is not a cause of further poverty, 
but it is rather a symptom of current poverty. Importantly to policymakers, the results here 
also indicate that there are very few recipients who stay consistently on benefits from 
youth to adulthood; rather, as with the dynamics of poverty, recipients move on and off 
benefits often as a response to their changing income and asset levels. Because of the short 
term and dynamic nature of benefit receipt, the results here suggest that flexible cash 
assistance may be a more responsive and appropriate way to provide assistance to low 
income young people.  
The Family  
Work on the first and smaller aspect of a liberal welfare state’s welfare mix, state 
intervention, suggested that the impact of benefit receipt on economic independence 
outcomes is a particularly notable feature for target groups of respondents, with nuanced 
results for different benefit programmes and when in the life course benefits are received. 
However, the more prominent driver of economic independence in both cases is the family 
of origin – indeed, it is impossible to even consider the supplemental effects of benefit 
receipt on a young person’s transition experience without controlling for and explicitly 
estimating the effects of parental background. In each of the cases respondents’ parental 
background impacted outcomes in a relatively consistent fashion, providing distinct 
variation among cohort members in both individual and household incomes. In both cases 
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the gaps in wage outcomes between those from lower and higher income families do not 
close as cohorts age; rather affluence continues to impact outcomes positively well into 
adulthood while those from poorer families struggle by comparison, even as employment 
and education factors are controlled for. There is emerging evidence in each case that an 
affluent family passes down resources that are not often explicitly measured, suggested by 
the larger role that wage income plays in the overall household poverty outcomes of lower 
income young people. 
The US case also provides detail on explicit family of origin resources, here measured in 
support provided through longer periods of co-residence. The results show that the family 
of origin provides support structures for young people transitioning to independence and in 
particular serves as a foundation for cohort members to have lower levels of household 
poverty in their 30s. The positive impact of staying in the parental home in the youth period 
is more notably experienced by the average White respondent, and confirms that this 
welfare source is indeed an avenue whereby White families on average are more able to 
pass down their affluence. An important contextual consideration for this investigation is 
that the experience of residential support through co-residence during the youth period 
was not prominent for the older UK cohort: indeed, over 90% of this cohort lived 
permanently away from their parents at age 21. This is a distinct way that the contexts of 
each cohort differ in this investigation. The cohort effects on the residential independence 
variables that were found in the US case may appear in later UK cohorts given the trends in 
co-residence: the increasing number of British young people living with their parents into 
their mid- to late-20s during the 1990s and 2000s means that future analyses will 
necessarily engage with these residential independence issues. Importantly, in a liberal 
welfare state with very low levels of state assistance, family resources will become even 
more prominent in future research on transitions to economic independence.  
The Labour Market  
As the labour market is the largest resource for young people to improve their economic 
independence in a liberal welfare state, the factors that cause variation in the labour 
market will therefore also be some of the largest drivers of economic independence. The 
structural drivers of gender and race and the trigger event of young parenthood are 
discussed in this section as drivers of inequality as independent factors rather than in their 
interaction with the benefit system as detailed above. In this way this section provides 
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commentary on divergence in how these structural issues function in both cases, and it is in 
this welfare source where a contrast of contexts is seen most prominently. 
The first prominent contextual area to consider is the role the gender plays in each of these 
cohorts, where the effect of ‘growing up’ (or the age effect) on wage growth and work 
intensity was particularly divergent for men and women in the UK case; as growing up did 
not necessarily correspond to higher wages or higher work intensity for women. Among 
American men and women in the cohort, however, the age effect on individual outcomes 
was indeed similar. This again suggests that the diverging trajectories in the UK case may be 
evidence of a cohort effect for the older UK cohort, where a smaller proportion of women 
in that cohort attached to the labour market at very high intensity than women in the US 
cohort.  
However, even though the male and female wage trajectories trend similarly among men 
and women in the US cohort, gaps in economic independence outcomes remain. Gender 
was a source of variation in both wages and work intensity outcomes for both cases, as 
women in the sample have notably poorer individual labour market outcomes even when 
controlling for all other transition and background factors. In particular, both cases 
displayed roughly the same ‘wage gap’ between women and men once all other factors 
were considered. The larger gap in work intensity between male and female UK cohort 
members is likely due to the cohort effects for women but also the cohort effects for men 
in the UK case, with particularly high work intensity for males (80% or more in very high 
work intensity from age 30 onwards, Figure 18 in Chapter 4) suggestive of a cohort effect of 
higher attachment for males entering the labour market in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
regardless of education level. Recent UK cohorts will have more females in higher work 
intensity consistent with national trends and will likely also not have as strong labour 
market attachment for males, given what is known about current youth labour market 
trends. However, the results from the US cohort signals that younger female cohorts in the 
UK will still likely lag behind males in wage income even with stronger labour market 
attachment.  
A common thread uncovered in both case results is that transitions in the family formation 
domain are particularly gendered, as the same type of negative effect occurs in labour 
market attachment and wage trajectories for women in both cases as household size 
increases. There is evidence in the US case that female work intensity is less impacted by an 
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increase in household size, as women reengage more in work after children while a greater 
proportion of women in the BCS sample stay out of the labour market altogether. Despite 
this difference in reengagement, however, the common result suggests that the initial 
‘shock’ to labour market outcomes from increasing household sizes seen here is a prime 
example of the ‘child earnings penalty’ that affects women who have children at any age 
(Waldfogel 1998), a feature of female transitions to economic independence which is not 
an experience for men in either cohort. This suggests that future research might want to 
consider designs that take gender more explicitly into account.  
A specific family formation factor of interest to youth researchers is the experience of 
having a child in the youth period, which was found to have a negative impact on female 
labour market outcomes in the US cohort. The large gaps in outcomes for this group with 
data to the early 30s, however, may be a cohort issue to consider when read in tandem 
with the UK cohort’s longer time horizon. In the UK, the impacts of young parenthood were 
not present in the same fashion, where no significant effects of young parenting were 
found on any of the labour market outcomes once other labour market factors are 
controlled for (even for female young parents). This suggests that the ‘shock’ of being a 
young parent may be an effect that erodes with age, which was found in most notably in 
the UK household income model; where becoming a parent before 21 did not affect 
household income at 42. However, the large and divergent negative experiences for young 
American mothers is present in their early 30s, signalling that government assistance may 
still be an important intervention for this group to improve labour market outcomes.  
The racial disparities endemic to the labour market in the United States is the largest 
difference in context between the cases, and the ‘race effect’ is indeed present here as in 
other US research. The wide variation in the economic independence outcomes of White 
and Black respondents on average, even after controlling for other labour market 
experiences and parental background factors, is an expected result in the US case but an 
issue that did not (of course) arise in the UK sample. The results suggest that the 
independent effect of race is partially an effect of poverty more generally; for Hispanic 
respondents, controlling for parental background eliminates the differences in work 
intensity and wages between this group and White sample members. However, both Black 
and Hispanic respondents do not experience the same type of wage gains even when 
working at high levels of work intensity. When this result is viewed in tandem with the 
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stronger reliance on wage income for these groups in the household poverty model, the 
inequalities that attend Black and Hispanic labour market experiences therefore will drive 
the disparities in household poverty. Because the UK cohort investigated here does not 
have a large enough minority ethnic sample to analyse, it was not possible to discuss the 
experience of Black and Minority Ethnic UK sample members comparatively. However, 
more recent British cohorts will have sample members from these groups and it will be 
valuable to consider how these group members are attaching to the labour market and to 
what extent they are engaging with government assistance. While the racial landscape of 
the UK is not comparable to the US, the issues of ethnicity must not be forgotten in future 
UK research on young people.  
Conclusions 
The comparative work done in each of the three welfare sources indicates that some of the 
larger characteristics of a liberal welfare state and liberal market economy work similarly in 
each of the cases here: particularly in that way that the benefit system is a notable factor in 
the youth transition experiences of target groups, the importance of family background and 
resources to economic outcomes, and the similar results on wages for women as they 
experience family change. Regarding government intervention, the insignificance of 
benefits received at age 21 on mid-life household income in the UK case may be evidence 
that the experience of benefit receipt in youth does not negatively impact outcomes into 
mid-life, but may also be a commentary on the different types of assistance available to 
youth cohorts in the US and the UK. However, the more ‘generous’ benefit system of the 
UK in the early 1990s did not impact individual outcomes any more positively than in the US 
case in the long term compared to those who do not receive benefits. The greater 
availability of benefits in the UK cohort at 21 along with the availability of the YTS 
intervention also demonstrated that the welfare state of this cohort considered young 
people deserving of government assistance; something not reflected in the US case. The UK 
case was therefore able to make more explicit conclusions about the relative merits of cash 
assistance and government training programmes for long term outcomes. In both cases, 
however, there was evidence that indeed the benefit system is notable factor, and indeed 




In each case the state as defined by interaction with means-tested benefits is not the 
largest factor to consider in a young person’s welfare mix, but the smaller number of young 
people who do engage with this system have markedly different experiences in the 
achievement of economic independence. The breadth of the welfare mix analytical 
framework allowed the case comparison to bring forward the ways in which contextual 
issues such as race, trends in co-residence, and the differences in the ability of young 
people to attach early to the labour market also drive economic independence, even as 
these issues were not able to be as directly compared in these cases. Where this work can 
compare the two cases rather directly on some of the larger systemic drivers such as 
gender, socioeconomic background, and family change, the research finds that the drivers 
impact outcomes and groups in similar ways. The next section will discuss the conclusions 
from this empirical work in reference to previous research on the effects of means-tested 
benefits broadly, and in previous research on the transition project. 
6.3 Speaking to Literature 
Given the conceptual areas of interest in this investigation, it is valuable to situate the most 
notable results of the case comparison within the larger fields of theoretical and empirical 
literature about government assistance as well as youth transitions. This section will speak 
to some of the previous research on the individual impacts of government assistance in 
Chapter 2.4, and note where the results of this work confirm and supplement main findings 
in literature. However, the lack of quantitative long-term empirical research on government 
assistance and young people as a group of benefit recipients means that the results here 
are not for the most part directly addressed in previous research; this more exploratory 
investigation can therefore provide a basis for exploring the issues raised here in future 
work. Placing the results in both literatures allows a picture to be created of the role 
government assistance plays in the lives of recipients, and what considerations must be 
taken into account for future research and policymaking for low-income young people. 
Literature on the effects of government assistance  
Much of the previous empirical research on the impact of government assistance is found 
in microeconomic causal impact analysis, generally ‘leavers’ studies, whereby respondent 
outcomes during and after a period of benefit receipt are compared using primarily 
difference-in-difference models (see Currie 2003, Mitchell et al 2017, Moffitt 2003 and 
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Ziliak 2016 for the US; Gregg et al 2009, Petrongolo 2007 and 2009, and Wright 2012 for the 
UK). While the research undertaken here does not use this method, the high-level findings 
are found to be broadly similar to some of the leavers studies of both TANF and JSA; that 
cash assistance shows consistent negative impacts to wages and later poverty. One of the 
primary findings from leavers studies is that the receipt of government assistance does not 
resolve the poverty status of the respondent in the long term, and that in general the 
potential wage gains from leaving benefits and moving into the labour market does not 
offset the loss of benefit income, particularly because the entrance to the labour market is 
in low wage work (Meyer & Wu 2018; Ziliak 2016). The results here are consistent with this 
previous evidence and suggest that rather than making a permanent exit from poverty, 
cohort members may be part of a larger subgroup of low income people who move in and 
out of benefit eligibility status as incomes hover at or near the poverty line.  
Evidence on the labour market effects of SNAP in previous research is scant, but there has 
been some evidence that SNAP is used as a ‘protective factor’ against family income shocks 
for those who receive it, and evaluations of SNAP recipients each year indicate that SNAP 
income is able to lift families above the poverty line and decrease the poverty gap between 
those at the poverty line and those in deep poverty (Fox et al 2015; Meyer & Wu 2015; 
Shapiro et al 2017). The mediating effects of any benefit receipt and SNAP receipt in the US 
case suggest that government assistance may also serve as a protective factor for groups 
who have worse labour market outcomes on average than their peers – young parents, 
Black Americans and women in particular. Results on the effect of SNAP for TANF 
recipients, perhaps the most disadvantaged subpopulation, also show that SNAP receipt is a 
positive moderating factor for those very low income families and their relationship with 
economic outcomes. Results from both this investigation and previous work therefore 
suggest that SNAP in particular is a form of assistance that provides disadvantaged 
populations with resources needed to improve their labour market experience, and 
suggests also that in-kind assistance with less harsh work requirements serves as an 
important resource for those with notable challenges in labour market attachment.  
The nature of benefit receipt in consecutive years and the transitions on and off benefits 
for both samples illustrate the same type of welfare dynamics identified by Bane and 
Ellwood (1994) and extended in other work (Hills 2014, Jenkins 2011, Propper 2002). For 
the NLSY sample around 20% of those who received benefits in one year do not receive in 
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the next, and around 4-8% of those who did not receive benefits in one year do so at the 
next. Because the time between survey periods is longer for the BCS sample the percentage 
of movers off and on benefits is slightly higher, but both cases indicate a notable change in 
the population who receive assistance from panel to panel. Importantly, there are very few 
sample members in each cohort who receive benefits consistently for many years in a row; 
contradicting the notion that the vast majority of those who receive benefits in the youth 
period will spend consecutive years receiving assistance. However, read alongside the main 
model results on the benefit receipt population it is indeed unlikely that a move off benefits 
for a year resolves poverty status. Importantly when reading the results of this 
investigation, the less positive long term economic independence outcomes are not 
particularly surprising for cohort members who have even one stint receiving benefits—by 
virtue of being poor enough to be eligible for benefits, this group can be expected to have 
more disadvantaged long term outcomes. 
The mediating effects of government assistance for American young parents’ work intensity 
in this study are particularly encouraging, where the negative impact of becoming a young 
parent on wages and work intensity is reduced for female young parents when benefit 
receipt is controlled for. This suggests benefit receipt is a notable factor to consider in the 
youth transition experiences of young parents, and can be associated with positive labour 
market attachment for this group.  This was also seen in the results on benefit receipt and 
young parenthood interaction terms, which indicated that young parents who receive 
benefits have more positive labour market attachment than young parents who do not 
access this assistance. This result is related to both qualitative and quantitative work on low 
income parents in the US and the UK. Qualitative work by Edin & Shaefer (2016) reported 
that SNAP in particular in the US serves for some families as the only consistent source of 
income each month, a type of stabilising assistance that can make it possible to engage in 
the labour market more adequately. Previous quantitative work on the lone parent 
population in the UK also showed that some types of benefits in particular can have a 
positive impact on work intensity (Gregg et al 2009, Blundell et al 2008).   
While young parents and lone parents are of course not equivalent populations, the 
previous research on lone parents that showed ‘unambiguously positive’ results on labour 
market attachment when tax credits were accessed could potentially indicate that this type 
of in-work assistance is likely also positive for the young parent population as well (Gregg et 
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al 2009). A limitation of this work is that it has not been able to fully delineate the impact of 
tax credits for respondents in the UK case, nor is there evidence on EITC for the US sample 
in all survey waves. Therefore, it is not entirely possible to determine the difference in 
impacts for a target group like young parents or recipients more broadly of both specific in-
work benefits and out-of-work benefits. But, the encouraging results from the NLSY for the 
population who receive ‘out of work’ benefits like SNAP and TANF may signal that in-work 
benefits could be even more positive for recipient outcomes. 
Theoretical work on gender and the welfare state by Orloff (1993) and Sainsbury (1996) in 
response to Esping-Andersen’s welfare regimes was investigated in the empirical work here 
by explicitly considering the different ways that women and men interact with the welfare 
state. This work showed that within all economic outcomes investigated here benefit 
receipt has a larger influence on the experience of females compared to males, with 
females in the US case in particular having larger negative impacts from benefit receipt 
than males in the sample. This concurs with Fraser and Gordon’s work on the gendered 
welfare state, whereby a means-tested benefit system with mothers as the ‘target’ group 
would therefore find female outcomes more notably shaped by the welfare state. What 
must be considered in this investigation is the potential limitation of this work because the 
outcomes of interest were gender-neutral, and did not taken into account some of the 
issues of care that work alongside a benefit system. This is discussed in further detail in 
Chapter 7.  
The most directly comparable results from this investigation to previous empirical work are 
those on the Youth Training Scheme. The negative long term wage and income impacts for 
YTS participants found in this BCS sample and the neutral results on labour market 
participation are consistent with results from Dolton and colleague’s 2001 work, where YTS 
participants were not found to have systematically worse unemployment outcomes than 
non-participants but were found to have poorer wages. Dolton’s later work using the full 
BCS sample in difference-in-differences methods at the year 2000 (Dolton et al 2004) 
showed particularly large negative wage effects for males, and is connected to the more 
negative household income outcomes found for males who participated in YTS at 42 in this 
study. A key addition to YTS evidence from this work identified differential impacts of the 
programme for particular subgroups of YTS participants, where YTS participants who are 
not poor enough to be in receipt of benefits during the survey period were found to have 
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more positive work intensity outcomes than cohort members who do not receive benefits 
and who did not participate in YTS. This suggests that again the driver of poorer outcomes 
for YTS participants is poverty more generally, and poorer young people’s participation in 
training programmes like YTS may not be able to improve their outcomes overall.   
Literature on the Transition Project  
The results of this research also contributes to existing evidence on inequalities in youth 
transitions more broadly, notably utilising the transition project domains (Settersten et al 
2005) as an explicit consideration in the research design. Education domain experiences for 
the two cases reiterate the value of attaching to higher education to long term outcomes 
(Bozick & DeLuca 2011; Howieson & Ianelli 2008; Shapiro et al 2017; Walker & Zhu 2011), 
and indicate that women in particular have larger wage and labour market gains with 
higher levels of education. More notable impacts of higher education were also found for 
Black US cohort members, and indeed confirm that both of these groups of respondents 
have ‘more to lose’ if they are unable to attain a higher education qualification (Wickrama 
et al 2012). These results also affirm the value that a liberal market economy places on 
general rather than specific higher education qualifications: the NLSY cohort in particular 
shows relatively strong results for respondents who were able to attend at the very least a 
two-year college compared to those with no qualifications or with a high school diploma. 
However, the attrition rate for those attending community colleges is relatively high 
(Karpilow et al 2013) and it is therefore important to design interventions to assist young 
people to complete community college, which will have a more positive effect on the 
lower-income population these institutions serve. It is important to recognise that higher 
levels of education for women do not fully close the wage gap between men and women 
(Goldin 2014), and that in particular higher educated Black women – who have very high 
labour market attachment – still lag behind other groups in wage outcomes (DuMontheir et 
al 2017).  
An important contextual issue to consider in the UK case is that these cohort members 
were perhaps not able to attend the more expanded post-1992 higher education sector to 
the same degree as younger cohorts immediately after secondary school, and the BCS 
sample may therefore be the last cohort to access the ‘older’ structure of higher education 
in the UK. The results for the BCS cohort members who did attend the more selective 
higher education sector show therefore much larger disparities in wages and household 
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income than those with lower qualifications. The higher and further education system in 
the United Kingdom has expanded to a type of tiered model with shorter college 
programmes generally accessed by lower income students (Boliver 2011; Halsey 2000), and 
it is therefore valuable to consider how best to assist young people through these 
programmes to avoid the attrition problems experienced by community college students in 
the United States. One of the more perennial problems in the education and training 
systems in a liberal welfare state is how to best improve vocational training programmes. 
The results from the Youth Training Scheme for the UK cohort confirm that the programme 
did not positively impact the wage incomes of participants in the long term, and suggest 
that a programme like YTS is not the best way to fill the gaps in vocational education and 
skills provision.  
In the employment domain, the results from this research are consistent with previous 
research on inequalities for women in both cases and Black Americans in the US. The 
results for women in the individual models affirm the results from other research on 
women’s labour market transitions, which show that women are more affected by family 
change than males overall; the effects of which are one of the most important factors in the 
wage gap between men and women (Aassve et al 2007; Blau & Khan 2017; Christopher et al 
2002, Katz & Goldin 2008). Although there are cohort differences in work intensity due to 
period effects, both female samples experience more dynamic labour market transitions 
related to changes in family structure. This can lead to less positive outcomes for females in 
both wages and work intensity, with a wage gap persisting for females even when work 
intensity is high (Goldin 2014; Goldin & Katz 2008). These results reiterate the value of 
supports for females in the labour market who want to get back to work after they have 
children, particularly in the area of remuneration, to make going back to work a better 
economic tradeoff than staying at home if so desired.  
The disparity in labour market attachment and returns for Black respondents in previous 
research is confirmed here, with worse labour market attachment outcomes for Black men 
– a group found to be particularly disadvantaged in the labour market as young people and 
as working-age adults (Fryer et al 2013; Hardaway & McLoyd 2009; Pager et al 2009; Sum et 
al 2013; Wilson 1987 and 1996). Even when attached to the labour market at a high work 
intensity, Black and Hispanic sample members’ wages are much lower: suggesting that 
these groups are far more likely to be in lower waged work and part time work than White 
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respondents through their 20s. One of the challenges for Black young people identified in 
previous research and affirmed in this work was that divergence in labour market outcomes 
between Black and White respondents occurs early (Entwistle 2000), and that the 
advantages of part time work while still in secondary school do not seem to be an 
experience shared by Black and Hispanic cohort members. Descriptive figures of the US 
case indicate that there is much higher labour market attachment at an earlier age for 
White respondents (age 16-19) (Figures 56) and it takes longer in the youth period for the 
highest percentage of Black cohort members to be in very high work intensity categories 
(Figure 57). Even then, a smaller proportion of Black respondents are in this work intensity 
group by the end of the youth period; only ever around half of Black respondents are in 
very high work intensity compared to 70% of White respondents. Both the model results 
and the descriptive work on the poverty outcomes of Black and Hispanic respondents also 
illustrated the systematic disadvantage of minority groups compared to White respondents, 
and in particular showed that there was very little change in the proportion of each racial 
group in each poverty ratio category after age 20 (Figures 63-65), suggesting that this gap in 
poverty status is driven by both the labour market but also likely by factors that are 
unmeasured in this investigation (such as the ‘wealth gap’ in Oliver and Shapiro, 1995). The 
less successful employment domain experiences of Black and Hispanic respondents in this 
investigation are indicative of the intersectional disadvantages identified in previous 
research that limit the ability of these groups to attach to the labour market in higher 
waged work like their White peers (Chetty et al 2018; Crenshaw 1991; Pager et al 2009; 
Massey & Denton 1993; Wilson 1996).  
Parental background is perhaps the most notable factor common in both cases that drives 
economic independence outcomes in the employment domain, and necessarily 
foregrounds nearly all research on youth transitions (DiPrete & Eirich 2006; Furlong & 
Cartmel 1997; Schoon 2014; Schoon & Lyons-Amos 2016). One of the ways that parental 
background is considered specifically in the youth transitions literature is by viewing the 
family of origin as both a ‘safety net’ and a ‘scaffold’ (Swartz et al 2011). The case results 
indicated that the impact of parental background on economic independence increases 
with age, and suggests that the ‘scaffolding’ ability of parents to provide resources (both 
financial and otherwise) lasts well into adulthood. The results here are also consistent with 
previous work done by Amato and colleagues (2008) and Ermisch (1999) that detail a 
‘safety net’ function, where they conclude that young people who are able to stay in their 
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parental home through co-residence or supported through other financial transfers may 
have more positive economic outcomes than other young people, as they may be able to 
avoid the precarity and insecurity of becoming independent at a young age. The work here 
also confirms that the family is indeed becoming (or has become) the primary source of 
welfare outside of the labour market and therefore young people who are able to access 
resources from their family of origin have better poverty outcomes in adulthood. And while 
young people across the income distribution are staying in their parental homes longer 
(Dey & Pierret 2014), the positive impact of staying at home is an experience found to be 
more positive to White respondents in this US cohort on average; suggesting again that 
both the safety net and the scaffold is a space that is shaped by race in the US sample. The 
family safety net and scaffold is an assumption built into the structure of the benefit system 
for young people, but there is little long-run evidence on the extent to which different 
subgroups of young people are able to benefit from this parental support. Evidence here 
contributes to the emerging area of research on the long term impacts of residential 
support, but notably there is no data available on this phenomenon for the UK case. 
However, regardless of the lack of long run evidence for the UK case, the work in previous 
research and in the US case suggests that supports are needed for young people who 
cannot or do not stay connected to their family after making an initial move out, as these 
young people fare worse economically into adulthood. 
The final results to consider in reference to youth transitions literature is the divergent 
experiences of young parents in each of the cohorts, the most prominent family formation 
transition measured in this investigation. The negative impact of young parenthood in the 
US sample is consistent with US research on this group, even though much of that research 
focuses only on respondents who give birth as teens (Aguilar et al 2013; Basch 2011). The 
work here affirms that the experience of young parenthood is partially a function of family 
background factors (which can be controlled for in quantitative models), but also the 
experience itself profoundly shapes the experience of becoming an adult. For the women in 
the US case, this experience showed particularly negative impacts on labour market 
outcomes. The lack of significance of young parenting in the outcomes of the UK sample 
also shows evidence that viewing young parenthood as a ‘risk’ in itself may not be entirely 
appropriate for this cohort (consistent with Duncan’s review in 2007). Rather, the UK case 
indicated that young parenting was a function of background while also suggesting that the 
effects of this youth trigger event may diminish with age. The impact of government 
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assistance was found to play a larger role in the youth transition experiences of female 
young parents, particularly in the US case, and this subpopulation may indeed be a group 
where benefits can have a positive impact on economic independence outcomes. 
Therefore, this group should continue to be an area of focus for research on welfare state 
interventions. The ways in which the key findings of this investigation influence future 
research agendas are detailed in full in Chapter 7. 
Key research considerations in investigating economic independence 
Bringing these two literatures together along with the results from these cases suggests 
that there can be and should be a more holistic approach to investigating transitions to 
economic independence in future research, especially in considering the state’s role in 
shaping these outcomes. The results from this investigation suggest four areas of focus that 
can be used to usefully bridge these two fields: the nature of structural disadvantage, the 
family welfare source, youth transition trigger events, and finally, the role of government 
assistance in the lives of young people.  
A thread throughout this work is the value of understanding the nature of structural 
disadvantage among the cohort of young people in any welfare state. In the cases here, the 
most prominent systemic areas of divergence that influence outcomes are found along the 
lines of gender, race, and socioeconomic status. Disadvantage in these areas is foundational 
in shaping the ‘success’ of a youth transition and also subsequently influences interactions 
with a means-tested benefit system in the US and the UK. Any research must therefore first 
consider how transition experiences diverge by these three (or more) areas, and how any 
changes to the system of government assistance (be it in cash assistance or in government-
sponsored training) will have an outsized impact on historically disadvantaged populations 
of young people.  
What must be considered in tandem with structural disadvantage, particularly 
socioeconomic disadvantage, is the family of origin as a site which structures advantage 
(DiPrete & Eirich 2006; Fingerman 2015; Schoeni & Ross 2005). This research engaged 
explicitly with how a young person’s family of origin is a resource that provides both a 
scaffold and a safety net during this transition period. The ‘scaffold’ effect was measured 
through parental background measures, where this research continued to confirm that 
young people from more affluent families will be more successful at becoming 
economically independent, and that the influence of family background becomes more 
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prominent with age. The results on the residential independence measures in the US case 
suggest that not only is socioeconomic status a factor to be controlled for in a model, but 
that the family of origin is a welfare source which should be explicitly measured and 
accounted for in models of youth transitions whenever possible.  
The trajectory of a youth transition is also shaped by particular ‘trigger’ events in the youth 
period (DiPrete & McManus 2004) that influence the experience of economic 
independence; those affected by these events should be considered as potential 
subpopulations that may need to engage with government assistance more often. The 
evidence here confirms that young parenting is one of the more important trigger events 
that shape a youth transition and provides an example of how the three issues of structural 
disadvantage, family of origin factors, and youth transition experiences coalesce for a 
particular subgroup. The intersectional experiences of these young people, combined with 
a benefit system designed primarily to serve (young) mothers, resulted in particularly 
notable mediating effects of the benefit system for this group in the US case, as well as 
differences in outcomes between young parents who do and do not engage with benefits. 
Because young parents are an important ‘deserving’ group in both cases, evidence on this 
group is more robust and should continue to be produced. However, researchers also need 
to consider what other youth period events might combine with family of origin factors and 
structural disadvantages to create subgroups of young people who may be in need of 
government assistance, and if/how government assistance might be useful in mediating 
negative outcomes; for those leaving care, those who are unable to or do not enter any 
further education, or those who have additional support needs. 
Once these issues in a young person’s path to economic independence are considered is it 
then useful to investigate how a means-tested benefit system in a liberal welfare state is 
designed to influence outcomes. The challenge of this research is in unpicking the effects of 
government assistance and the effects of poverty, the two of which are inextricably linked. 
Investigators must therefore foreground their discussions with an understanding that the 
liberal welfare state primarily only serves those for whom the other sources of welfare are 
insufficient to meet their needs; a very low income population. Therefore, it is more 
valuable to investigate how government assistance mediates the labour market 
experiences of young people who are structurally disadvantaged or to compare low income 
groups who do and do not receive assistance rather than compare citizens who receive 
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benefits to those who never do. When government assistance is analysed in this way for 
target groups the results indicate that government assistance should be considered a 
notable and potentially positive factor in the transition to independence and may not be a 
harmful experience in the long term if received only in the youth period. However, the 
results also indicate that government assistance in a liberal welfare state cannot 
appropriately be considered as a ‘hand up’, as poverty and disadvantage for these groups 
remain by virtue of the principles of residualism the characterise a liberal welfare state. 
Together these four considerations can be used to organise the way that researchers can 
approach the topic of economic independence for young people. The approach notably 
allows for youth researchers to think more explicitly about the practical functioning of the 
welfare state for young people who access it, and allows for welfare state researchers to 
more pointedly consider experiences in the youth period and the resources a young person 
may or may not have to make a transition successfully. This holistic approach bridges the 
two fields of study together explicitly, enabling the concerns of both fields to be considered 
in the analysis and development of policies for young people whose transitions may be 
challenging. These four areas can also be used to organise the policy implications of this 
research, both broadly and in some specific policy intervention areas.  
6.4 Policy Implications  
Before any specific policy implications can be discussed, the work must return to a tension 
in the literature regarding what role the government should play in the achievement of 
independence for young people. As noted in Chapter 1, while a liberal welfare state 
promotes independence from the welfare state as a primary goal of a youth transition 
(whether it is explicitly stated or not), the tension arises when a lack of sufficient labour 
market returns and a smaller welfare state combine to push young people back into the 
family home, causing a new dependence on the family of origin. For many young people, 
then, the principle of independence promoted by the welfare state is simply unattainable. 
The concept of economic independence used here seeks to bridge this tension, as the 
investigations of individual wages and work intensity identified factors prominent in a 
young person’s relationship with the labour market, while the poverty/household income 
measures identified factors that influenced whether the labour market experiences 
combined with other drivers to actually improve poverty in the long term. As the results of 
this investigation confirm, government assistance provided through a residualist welfare 
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state likely will not positively impact a recipient’s economic trajectory to resolve poverty or 
low incomes (if above the poverty line) in the long term, as an episode of poverty low 
enough to be eligible for benefits will still indeed impact labour market and poverty 
outcomes well into mid-life. This would suggest then that a welfare state functioning with 
means-tests at its core will not be able aid the achievement of economic independence as it 
is defined here, particularly because the broader goals of economic independence is at 
odds with the idea of government intervention only as a last resort for a very few number 
of citizens. However, the results from this investigation suggest that there are still ways a 
liberal welfare state can intervene in a youth transition to positively influence outcomes for 
those who receive government assistance. This last section details the broader policy 
implications of this work that align with the four areas that also influence future research 
directions in the previous section, and highlights key issues that will be addressed in specific 
policy recommendations for each country context in Chapter 7.4.  
Tackling Structural Disadvantage  
Much of the work of policymakers is focused on the ways to limit the gaps in outcomes due 
to income inequality. However, this research affirmed that structural inequalities by gender 
and race are key issues that shape outcomes in all three areas of a person’s welfare mix as 
well. By viewing structural disadvantage in multiple areas of a biography concurrently, this 
investigation was able to illuminate how intersectional issues combine to create even more 
challenging youth transitions for certain groups of young people57. Policymakers should 
therefore widen an inequality agenda to include other groups who may be disadvantaged in 
the youth period, an issue returned to in Chapter 7. 
The achievement of higher educational qualifications was found to be particularly 
prominent in changing the outcomes for cohort members who are often more 
disadvantaged in the labour market. The importance of education to higher wages and 
higher work intensity is not a new insight, but it does continue to affirm that traditional 
academic qualifications will likely be the best way to improve outcomes in a liberal market 
economy. It is important to consider that in this UK cohort the economic opportunities for 
men with low or no academic qualifications were still relatively abundant, and therefore 
                                                          
57 It is also notable to consider that inequality based on disability status was not considered in this 
research specifically, but it is indeed a prominent but often overlooked factor that structures 
experiences in a youth transition.  
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there was far less of a difference in labour market success among men with lower and 
higher qualifications. This characteristic of the male experience in Britain however is likely 
no longer present, especially given what is known about a distinct subgroup of young men 
who are disconnected from work and education. Therefore, it is extremely valuable to 
continue making policies to improve access to educational opportunities for those who 
want to go to further or higher education, and to also consider how to support low income 
young people in completing post-secondary qualifications. However, higher levels of 
educational achievement are but one avenue of intervention in the youth period for 
improving outcomes. The assumption of higher levels of education as a ‘silver bullet’ for 
reducing inequality is not only foolhardy but it is not borne out in the evidence. The work 
here found that controlling for education levels did not reduce the gaps in outcomes 
between men and women (in both cases) and between White and non-White cohort 
members (in the US case), and previous work confirms that even with higher levels of 
education and labour market attachment (e.g. Black women) gaps in income and poverty 
remain. It is important then to broaden policy thinking for young people to consider other 
ways to close gaps in outcomes beyond human capital formation by taking into account the 
holistic needs of disadvantaged young people if policies are considered for revision and 
introduction: including in the areas of housing, health, neighbourhood assets, and labour 
market attachment, including remuneration in the labour market high enough to create a 
successful independent life.  
Considering the Family as a Welfare Source  
A valuable insight from bringing these two literatures together is the importance of actively 
considering the family as a source of welfare when investigating or making policies for 
young people. The tacit assumption that young people will be able to use the family as a 
source of welfare to a sufficient degree during their youth period is implied in the age limits 
on cash assistance programmes in both countries and the UK minimum wage for young 
people; a rather passive recognition of the family as a welfare source. This assumption is 
not wholly incorrect, as previous evidence suggests that even low-income young people 
receive transfers from their family during their youth transition. However, the amount of 
family assistance will necessarily vary, and the availability of family resources is another 
way that inequalities are manifested in this period. It is also unrealistic to assume that all 
young people will be able to or will want to rely on their family of origin during their youth 
301 
 
period (particularly as co-residents). It is therefore important to consider how to support 
young people who may want to move out permanently but who are unable to do so 
successfully and to also consider that there are parents who are unable to provide the level 
of support assumed by the welfare state; the needs of both of these groups should be 
taken into account when debating and designing policy interventions for young people, 
specifically social security policy. 
The availability of co-residence in the youth period is an important way that families 
support young people in this period and a distinct way to measure the family source of 
welfare in future investigations. The increasing number of young people staying with their 
families through the youth period engages directly with the tension of how much a liberal 
welfare state does (or should) work to de-familialize young people during this period. A 
liberal welfare state in its current form places a high reliance on the family of origin, but 
does not wholly account for the extended period of support that parents provide to their 
children. Families may therefore have their incomes further strained by continuing to 
support children into their 20s or will simply be unable to support their children at all. In 
the UK today, the welfare state provides benefits to the family of origin for dependent 
children to 16 if the child is not in education and to 20 if they are in education, and US 
families only receive a dependent tax exemption to 19 for non-HE bound children and 24 
for HE-bound children, and Child Tax Credit to age 17. The eligibility criteria for these 
benefits does not adequately address the current type of relationships that many young 
people have with their family of origin while attempting to achieve independence. Many 
young people live with their parents beyond these age limits and receive assistance from 
them (particularly those who are not in higher education), but these parents receive no 
further assistance in maintaining their welfare; assistance that may be particularly vital for 
low-income families. Should a welfare state then raise the age of qualifying children for 
dependent benefits to 24 or 22 regardless of higher education status, recognising the status 
of the family of origin now as a primary welfare source? 
If the welfare state seeks rather to incentivise young people to become independent of the 
family of origin, more assistance should therefore be put in place for young people both 
with and without children to access both cash assistance and tax credits under age 25. 
Current welfare state arrangements disadvantage young people who wish to leave the 
family home but due to insufficient labour market returns and no assistance from the 
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welfare state are unable to do so. Explicitly considering how and to what degree a welfare 
state incentivises independence from the family of origin (whether through stated policies 
or through the absence of policies) engages with larger questions of which actor in a youth 
transition the state wishes to support. The value of a study like this one is that it brings 
these issues more clearly to the forefront of the policy conversation, and asks how the 
welfare state should address the negative outcomes that both parents and young people 
are experiencing in the current welfare state configuration in both countries. 
Considering Youth Period Events  
This work also affirmed the value of taking into account particular youth-specific events in 
the areas of family formation when designing policies for young people. This is a missing 
link in current thinking about youth transition policy, as the primary focus is usually on 
employment and education outcomes rather than what happens in the family formation 
domain. As mentioned above, the ‘shock’ to one’s economic independence trajectory from 
becoming a parent at a young age is perhaps one that disappears with age, but it does 
indeed still have particularly notable impacts for young people, especially young women. 
Government assistance for young parents therefore continues to be both necessary, and 
from the results here, a potentially very notable way that a young parent’s economic 
trajectory can be positively influenced and shaped. The results for young parents’ 
interaction with government assistance in particular goes against the notion that this group 
is destined to be ‘welfare dependent’ into adulthood: rather, the evidence here suggests 
that government assistance is an important and positive factor for this group’s labour 
market attachment in particular, especially when viewed in comparison to young parents 
who do not access assistance. The encouraging results for this group of young people 
deemed to be a ‘target’ group for assistance suggests that it is also valuable to consider 
other youth period events that may be just as scarring for a young person’s economic 
outcomes but are not addressed by policy. Having to move out of the family home in the 
late teens and early 20s, attending university/further education with little income, 
establishing a household (with perhaps little to no family support), attempting to find a first 
job that pays enough to live independently: all youth period transitions that are occurring 
simultaneously that must be managed by the young person on their own and currently are 
not directly addressed by the state with the same prominence as young parents. If policy is 
to work toward improving experiences for all young people, it may be time to reconsider 
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and widen the groups deemed deserving of assistance, given what researchers have already 
identified as particularly ‘risky’ transition experiences. 
The Role of Government Assistance 
Finally, this work has implications for policymakers working explicitly within welfare 
systems. The results from this study suggests reframing the approach to state interventions 
in three areas of welfare state functioning – out of work benefits, in-work benefits, and in 
the consideration of cash assistance versus training programmes. By reframing the 
conversations in these areas, the work also engages with larger questions on the role of the 
state in a youth transition, interrogating long-held beliefs about the best way to assist 
young people and looking to ways that approaches should change to incentivise 
independence and improve long term outcomes.  
A reframing of state interventions for young people must first engage with a key tenet of a 
liberal welfare state; defining who is deserving of assistance. Current policy in both 
countries investigated here (and in most others, see Chevalier 2016) defines groups of 
young people as deserving of assistance slightly differently based on parenting status. In 
general, young parents are deserving of assistance and low income young people without 
children are generally less so. Indeed, for the latter group this lack of deservingness is 
implied by their ineligibility or more stringent eligibility for any cash assistance. Especially in 
United States welfare policy, the silence regarding young people as a vulnerable group is 
particularly telling. Simply put, young people without children are not deemed a priority 
group for intervention. What if, recognising the inherent risks associated with a youth 
transition, particularly for those whom policymakers know are structurally disadvantaged, 
all low-income young people under 24 were considered a deserving group for assistance? 
This reframing not only would change the way that young people engage with the state in 
this period, but would also change the way that young people engage with both their family 
and the labour market welfare sources.  
A key area where this reframing would impact government intervention policy is in the 
administration and eligibility for in-work benefits. Given the prevailing policy rhetoric in 
both countries that ‘the best route out of poverty is work’, the lack of eligibility for young 
workers without children for working tax credits in both countries is a particularly cruel 
oversight. Given the proven anti-poverty effects of these programmes and the work 
incentive effects of these benefits, changing eligibility for in-work benefits is also politically 
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palatable. Improving the labour market returns of young people will also more notably 
improve the experiences of young people from low-income backgrounds and those from 
minority communities. Improving returns from the labour market through wider tax credit 
eligibility will not only affirm the values of individualism that a liberal welfare state 
espouses, but can help to limit the reliance on family resources in this period and can help 
to close some of the gaps in labour market returns between young people from 
disadvantaged families and their more advantaged peers that characterise both cases.  
Although focusing on improving in-work benefit eligibility is a more politically palatable way 
to change state interventions for young people, it is important to affirm the value of out of 
work benefits as a key support structure for this population. It is in this aspect of 
government intervention where this work makes a notable contribution, providing nuanced 
evidence to how government intervention for particular subpopulations impact long term 
outcomes within the context of a youth transition. The results of this investigation for 
target groups of recipients of out of work benefits like SNAP and TANF make the case that 
these benefits play a role in the support systems of young parents and those with lower 
labour market success on average, who are more likely in very high poverty. The evidence 
on SNAP in particular adds to the wealth of evidence that asserts that receipt can be a 
positive factor in labour market attachment for this group; a result that may be due to 
SNAP not imposing lifetime limits or stringent work requirements for parents. The youth 
period in particular is one with necessarily uneven or challenging labour market 
experiences – characterised by precarity, starts and stops, and seasonal work if any at all – 
and therefore the encouraging results for current target groups suggests that out of work 
supports should be kept in place at the very least, or expanded to serve more young people 
who would not be eligible for in-work support and would likely not be eligible for standard 
social insurance benefits due to their lack of contributions. 
Indeed, the youth population in particular has notable life course challenges and 
experiences that may be most amenable to short-term, safety net interventions that a 
liberal welfare state is more willing to support. The emerging results from the UK case also 
suggest that benefits received when young people are making multiple transitions before 
reaching their family of destination may not be as scarring to long term outcomes as often 
believed. This period is fraught with challenges for young people but is also ripe for 
intervention, before transition pathways are set and families of destination are formed. 
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This period of semi-dependence, at the intersection of structural disadvantage, youth 
period trigger events, and family resources, is an intervention nexus where assistance can 
be utilised perhaps only for a short time, but effectively, for young people in need. The 
results here, paired with the encouraging results for target populations, goes against the 
prevailing idea that cash assistance is an intervention that destines young people for a ‘life 
on the dole’; indeed, none of the UK sample members who received benefits in youth 
received them in all the other survey periods and less than 2% of US sample members 
received benefits in the seven consecutive years of the youth period.  
The final intervention area that can be reframed following this investigation is the type of 
government intervention deemed worthiest of implementation for low income young 
people. One of the current areas of consensus among UK policymakers is that assistance for 
young people is best delivered through labour market attachment programmes; through a 
large government programme like the Youth Training Scheme or its descendants delivered 
in various public/private arrangements. The UK case provided a way to compare the 
impacts of means-tested cash or in-kind assistance to direct labour market intervention, 
here in the Youth Training Scheme. In this case, the long term wage outcomes and work 
intensity outcomes for YTS participants are worse than cohort members who do not 
participate, and low income YTS participants were not found to have significantly better 
outcomes than low income cohort members who do not participate in YTS. So, while YTS 
may improve short term labour market attachment in youth, there was found to be no long 
term positive impact of the programme for the group of young people in this sample who 
chose to take up the YTS offer. Indeed, this investigation found the only subgroup of YTS 
participants with positive outcomes were sample members without any further interaction 
with means-tested benefits – sample members who are not particularly disadvantaged. 
Overall, this intervention and perhaps also descendant programmes with the same 
characteristics should be seen perhaps only as a stopgap rather than a path to permanent 
labour market attachment. The more encouraging results for the cash assistance and in-
kind programmes suggest that it may be best to consider using funding currently being 
spent on intensive or prescribed job training programmes towards making short term cash 
assistance more available for young people.  
A prescribed labour market programme or other variants of workfare are also seemingly 
incongruous with how a liberal market economy functions. With little opportunity to gain 
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transferable qualifications necessary in a flexible labour market and with lower wages than 
traditional workers, participation in programmes of this type seem to stifle independence 
from either the welfare state or the family or origin. Importantly, the evidence here goes 
against the prevailing wisdom that the only thing that young people need is initial labour 
market attachment opportunities; for young people with multiple disadvantages, it is 
simply not enough, and for others, the attachment might have been achieved on their own. 
With the key issues regarding government assistance outlined here, Chapter 7.4 puts forth 
Policy Recommendations for organising welfare state systems to promote young people’s 
economic independence.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion  
The final chapter brings together reflections on this investigation in three areas: a reflection 
on the approach taken in this investigation and its limitations; the contributions this 
investigation has made methodologically and in each of the fields of literature it engaged 
with, including what further research agendas should be pursued as a result of this work; 
and finally, specific policy recommendations within and related to social security policy that 
could improve the achievement of economic independence for low-income young people 
with and without children. 
7.1 The Approach and its Limitations 
Reflecting on this investigation’s approach necessarily brings one back to the issue of 
causality and the claims which can be made from the regression models. As detailed first in 
Chapter 3 (pp. 105-107), here the inferential approach to understand the impact of benefit 
receipt on economic independence is associational rather than causal primarily because of 
the relatively new approach to bridging these two fields together. This investigation is one 
of the first to utilise a youth transitions lens to questions of welfare state functioning using 
quantitative data. Therefore, understanding the relationships between youth transition 
experiences and outcomes and welfare state interventions is the necessary first stage of 
research in this area, and only after relationships are identified in detail can hypotheses be 
investigated using causal inference approaches. Bringing these two fields of work together 
necessarily led to a more flexible and exploratory approach, as the work explicitly 
considered the theoretical approaches of both youth sociologists and welfare state 
researchers in the research design. In order to adequately analyse relevant factors in all 
three domains of a young person’s transition project (i.e. education, employment and 
family formation) alongside the impact of government assistance rather than just 
controlling for these factors, an empirical model had to analyse internal characteristics and 
youth transition experiences that do not fit into a causal impact model (see Rubin’s Model 
of Causal Inference, Holland 1986).  
Therefore, the work necessarily extends beyond the more narrowly-defined and 
hypothesis-driven models of economists that work within causal inference. A positive 
aspect of the associational approach for this piece of work was the ability for unexpected 
results and relationships to emerge during the modelling process that would have likely 
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been controlled for in a causal impact analyses. An example of this benefit was seen most 
notably in the emerging results on the impact of the family welfare source, measured in the 
US sample by the age at initial move out covariate and also by the covariate on moving back 
in with one’s parents. The nuanced results for this covariate was included particularly 
because the youth transition project framework was used to structure the modelling logic; 
a framework that could allow residential independence to be considered as an independent 
measure of family support rather than a dependent measure of economic independence 
more common in youth transitions research. Because it was not the primary independent 
variable of interest, the nuanced results on the family welfare source and its prominence in 
the outcomes would not be able to be addressed in causal models and would be instead 
controlled for, and these notable emerging findings would be missed. In short, an 
associational approach was able to provide more breadth to the investigation and allowed 
the space for new relationships and phenomena to be investigated as these two fields were 
brought together in a new way.  
However, in exchange for the ability of more exploratory issues to emerge in an 
associational model, this investigation could not make causal claims or produce point 
estimates about how benefit receipt affects labour market attachment or poverty 
outcomes as can be produced by economists. This is a limitation of this investigation, and is 
due in part to the key issue of treatment versus composition effects that cannot be 
delineated in a model of this type. Although this investigation does not operate within the 
framework of economic models these two concepts are relevant to detail here, and are 
useful in understanding what can and cannot be inferred about the effect of benefit receipt 
in these models. In an investigation like this one the treatment effect of interest would be 
the true effect of receiving benefits on economic independence outcomes, where a 
composition effect is defined as ‘the part of the observed between-group difference in the 
distribution of an economic outcome that can be explained by differences in the 
distribution of covariates’ (Rothe 2015). In this case the composition effect, or between-
group difference in the main benefit receipt effect results, is partially due to the eligibility 
criteria for means-tested benefits; those who are ‘treated’ by benefit receipt are already 
different to the untreated group due to poverty status.  The difference in economic 
outcomes between those who receive benefits and those who do not receive benefits is 
therefore likely due to variation in this characteristic and potentially other demographic 
characteristics among sample members. In this model then it is not possible to disentangle 
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the true ‘treatment’ effect of benefit receipt from the ‘composition’ effects that 
characterise the benefit receipt population. An investigation of that type would have to be 
undertaken using causal inference models, a valuable extension of this work. This issue in 
particular is one of the key reasons why it is not particularly valuable to consider the main 
effect sizes in each of the models investigated here, and rather the more nuanced 
interaction effects and the mediating and moderating effects are more notable in this 
associational analysis. 
The second limitation of this investigation’s approach emerged in the course of model 
iterations; the assumption of a ‘gender-neutral actor’ in the achievement of economic 
independence via labour market participation and returns (Orloff 2004). This assumption 
does not take into account the way that women’s experiences in the labour market are 
shaped by caring responsibilities and the provision of services, either privately or publicly, 
to support women’s employment. As noted in Chapter 1, the development of each of the 
liberal welfare states investigated here during each of the time periods of interest have 
slightly different traditions of providing support for women to be ‘defamilialized’ from the 
male-breadwinner model, which both states functioned under in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Esping-Andersen 1999; Fraser, 1994). In the case of the UK, the male breadwinner model 
still remained a relatively consistent organising principle during the period of the BCS 
cohort, with higher levels of support from the state to remain in the home with caring 
responsibilities for low income mothers. A comparable level of state support to mothers 
and parents was not a feature of the US welfare state of the NLSY cohort after welfare 
reform, with the provision of both ‘carrot’ and ‘stick’ measures in the US put in place to 
ensure high levels of labour market participation for all women (the ‘universal breadwinner 
model’) (Fraser 1994; Orloff 2004). Regardless of whether the state provided more supports 
for women in the BCS cohort to stay in the home, or whether full employment was 
encouraged and care instead ‘marketized’ as in the US cohort (Orloff 2004), a key factor in 
the experience of young women’s economic independence trajectories is the role of caring 
responsibilities (Lewis 2006).   
As gender was explored explicitly as a covariate of independent interest in each of the 
models it became clear, particularly in the UK case results, that the transition experiences 
and subsequent interactions with the welfare state are systematically different for males 
and females. This was seen notably in the results in the family formation domain; in the 
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effect of household size, young parenting, and also in some of the interaction terms 
between women and benefit receipt in these models. The models showed that the 
achievement of outcomes, some of the key youth transition experiences of interest, and 
the interaction with benefits are a particularly gendered space. This suggests that the 
achievement of economic independence for females is therefore a categorically different 
experience to that of males, and further that there is a danger in assuming the ‘inevitability 
of…[the] “adult worker model family”’ as it does not reflect the reality of the ways that 
social life is organised for women (Lewis 2006, p. 106). Indeed, based on the strong 
variation in outcomes by gender in these models –even in the US case where women’s 
labour market participation is closer to that of males in a cohort sample – it is likely that the 
gendered aspect of all of these systems will emerge particularly during the childbearing 
years. It may therefore be a limitation of this work that men and women are modelled 
together.  
Considering women and men in separate models would allow for the impacts of youth 
transition factors and government assistance to be analysed for groups with the same type 
of gendered experiences, avoiding the assumption that both men and women will interact 
with the labour market in a similar way and have subsequently similar economic 
independence outcomes. This would then be able to further illuminate the impacts of 
benefit receipt, for example, as the gendered functioning of the welfare state would be 
even further controlled for with a single-gender model. The challenge of using models 
where women and men are considered separately, however, occurs when we look at the 
theoretical underpinnings of how youth transitions are conceptualised in both cases. What 
is missing in theories of youth transitions and government policies, which create the 
normative expectations of a youth transition, is the discussion of gender. The predominant 
‘climate of normality’ of youth transitions operating in liberal welfare states is remarkably 
gender neutral, with no detail in policy documents or in many theories of youth transitions 
as to how the principle of ‘early economic independence’ and a focus on ‘employability’ 
should or does differ for males and females (Walther 2006). Although the transition project 
framework does indeed consider explicitly how family formation affects youth transitions 
separately for men and women (Settersten et al 2005), there is very little consideration 
about how youth transition outcomes for those in the US and the UK could or should be 
considered separately by gender.  
311 
 
One way to more appropriately consider youth transition outcomes for men and women is 
by using less gendered outcomes of interest. This could be measured by conceptualising 
economic independence as the establishment of an independent household using outcome 
measures such as residential independence or homeownership, which are less gendered 
than any labour market outcome measures. Homeownership in both the US and the UK is 
encouraged through deliberate policy choices; for example, through the reduction in social 
housing stock (notably seen in the UK) and the introduction of tax incentives for 
homeowners (in the US via the mortgage interest deduction). It is also the most notable 
way for one to build wealth (Oliver and Shapiro 1995). Therefore, the choice of this 
outcome indicator is valuable from a policy perspective and solves the problem of the more 
gendered labour market outcomes used here.  
The use of a homeownership outcome measure of economic independence must however 
be considered in reference to how it is a ‘fixed state’ measure as opposed to a measure of a 
youth transition on a continuum (such as work intensity or wages). This formulation is 
reminiscent of the type of ‘markers of adulthood’ that youth researchers may be moving 
away from. Indeed, the current trends in the ability for current cohorts of young people to 
achieve economic independence defined by this measure is far more challenging than in 
previous cohorts, and homeownership for those on low-incomes may never be possible. If 
this ‘state’ of adulthood may not be able to be realistically achieved for the low-income 
population of interest in this work, it may be questionable whether homeownership is a 
useful way to conceptualise adulthood status when it may never occur. The 
appropriateness of this measure of economic independence is a useful issue for qualitative 
researchers to consider in future work, because while policymakers view homeownership 
as an important adulthood milestone it will be useful to consider if young people of all 
backgrounds feel the same. 
Despite these limitations, this investigation was able to contribute to knowledge 
methodologically and to the two fields of literature the work engages with (youth 
transitions and the welfare state). The next two sections outline the main contributions of 
this investigation in both areas and what research agendas emerge as a result, turning first 




7.2 Contributions to Data Use and Methods 
This investigation contributes to the wealth of studies that utilise these two datasets for 
longitudinal analysis. Because of the breadth of topics covered in each of the surveys it was 
not feasible or relevant to consider all of the previous investigations that have used them 
and how this work compares. However, it is useful to consider how this work engaged with 
each of the datasets to achieve the aims of this study and to propose ways they can be used 
in future work in these subject areas.  
As noted in Chapter 3, the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth is an extremely robust 
survey, and the low attrition rate and breadth of life course topics and income information 
(including government assistance) it contains allowed for the US case to investigate some 
youth transition issues in slightly more detail than the UK case. This work was one of the 
first to exploit information on residential independence contained in this survey alongside 
benefit receipt, in order to consider if benefit receipt mediates the impacts of an early or 
late exit from the family of origin. The use of the welfare mix as an organising framework 
also allowed the residential independence covariates to serve as explicit indicators of the 
family welfare source, when in other studies residential independence is used as an 
outcome variable of a youth transition. The findings from the aspect of work in particular 
suggest that future surveys should continue to include questions on this important 
experience and if possible include even more explicit and consistent questions about 
parental transfers and support. It also suggests that future investigations with the NLSY 
should consider residential independence as a driver in outcome achievement as well as 
the outcome itself.    
The size of the sample also allowed the models to separately consider the impact of two 
government assistance programmes, SNAP and TANF. This allowed for the investigation to 
consider the interaction of these two factors in the models, and illuminated how different 
types of government assistance may impact subpopulations of benefit recipients 
differently. The emerging results when two separate assistance programmes are 
considered suggests that future work with the NLSY should also try to separately include 
government assistance programmes that may serve different poor populations (as seen in 
the SNAP and TANF example), or include programmes that can compare ‘in-work’ in to ‘out-
of-work’ benefits. An aspect of the NLSY dataset that was not able to exploited because of 
the need to have conceptually comparable measures between the two cases was monthly 
313 
 
benefit receipt information gathered from 1997 to 2009, which were used to create the 
programme-specific covariates on SNAP and TANF. The monthly data could be used in their 
original form to great extent, particularly with methods like survival analysis to investigate 
moving in and out of benefit eligibility within the course of a year or in the youth period 
more generally. The NLSY also contains information on the amount received in government 
assistance; monthly for the period 1997-2009 and annually for all waves. Future work can 
also consider if and how the amount of benefit receipt impacts the outcomes of interest 
here (such as labour market participation) or if there is a relationship between benefit 
amounts and residential independence for low income groups.  
Future work with the NLSY can also investigate more detailed issues not able to be 
addressed here. First, due to data access issues and comparability requirements of this 
study the work was not able to investigate the geographical variation in outcomes for 
programmes like TANF. Researchers working in US institutions have access to state 
identifiers for each sample member and therefore can investigate whether the impacts of 
TANF differ between states with stricter and more lenient conditionality requirements and 
between states with higher and lower cash assistance values. Importantly, a key extension 
of this investigation is to produce more causal impact models with this cohort and with 
these additional topics using models such as regression discontinuity designs. 
Working with the BCS subsample was a more challenging process than working with the 
NLSY, due in part to the funding history of this cohort survey (well documented in Pearson 
2017) that made it challenging to capture consistent and detailed data in all waves. The 
funding challenges experienced by those administrating the survey in the late 1980s and 
1990s meant that the only youth period survey available for this cohort was a shorter 
survey on a subsample of respondents, limiting the ability of the BCS case to make as 
nuanced conclusions as was achieved in the US case. The welfare state changes that took 
place during the BCS cohort’s youth period also meant that information on only two benefit 
programmes – Housing Benefit and Income Support – was gathered in all survey waves. 
Paired with a very small number of sample members who received these benefits, it was 
determined that an aggregated measure of ‘any benefit receipt’ was the more adequate 




The value of using the BCS subsample is that the work was able to measure youth specific 
experiences of a cohort in the early 1990s for a relatively large number of sample members, 
which is not available to be investigated with a large enough sample for this cohort by 
creating synthetic cohorts with household datasets like the British Household Panel Survey 
(BHPS). This investigation is one of a small number that use data on the BCS subsample to 
age 42, and despite the challenges noted above it was able to provide robust results about 
the youth period for this cohort which is not provided in other work with the larger BCS 
sample. In general youth research in the UK with this age group tends to use Youth Cohort 
Studies (which only covers the initial transition years out of secondary school) or more 
localised data for young people in one city or local authority. This work then was able to 
adequately exploit an underutilised resource within the BCS, and suggests that it can 
provide useful evidence on the youth period when synthesised with earlier BCS waves. 
Future work can also synthesise the 21-year sample survey with earlier BCS waves which 
was not undertaken here, which can provide evidence on childhood and family drivers of 
benefit receipt at 21 for this cohort which may be of particular interest for youth 
researchers.  
The last notable technical contribution of this investigation is the use of the correlated 
random effects model for the wage outcome in both cases. While this model or a variant of 
it (the ‘hybrid model’ in Allison 2009) is included in the methodological literature and was 
first introduced by Mundlak in 1978 and reintroduced by Wooldridge in 2010, there has 
been very little empirical application of CRE models in the social sciences (notable 
exceptions include Elzinga and Gasperini 2015). It was important for this investigation to be 
able to explicitly estimate the main independent effects and interaction effects of time-
invariant characteristics of sample members, which would be not be estimated in a fixed-
effects model, and to ensure the standard errors on all covariates would be an unbiased as 
possible, a concern in random effects models. The ability of these two conditions to be met 
by using a correlated random effects model for a continuous outcome suggests that it 
should be considered alongside random- and fixed-effects models for future social science 
research if appropriate to the concerns of the research question. In this case it was valuable 
from a theoretical standpoint to explicitly measure characteristics like gender and race 
together in the US for example, and the application of this model was able to address those 
research concerns adequately. This work adds to the small number of publications who 
apply this work to empirical questions, and therefore is unique in the social sciences.  
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7.3 Contributions to Fields of Study: the Welfare State and Youth 
Transitions 
This section distils the most important contributions of this investigation to the two fields 
of study brought together in this work, research on the welfare state and youth transitions. 
Notably, this section does not detail how the results here connect with all of the literature 
reviewed (which can be found in Chapter 6), but rather are the contributions that open up 
new lines of research inquiry.  
In the welfare state literature, contributions to understandings of young parents, the role of 
government assistance for the poor and the very poor, and the gendered aspects of the 
welfare state are most notable to bring forth here. One of the research gaps identified at 
the beginning of this investigation was the relatively limited understanding of how young 
people as a subgroup interact with the benefit system. In general, previous studies in the 
welfare state literature (both econometric and otherwise) either do not differentiate 
benefit recipients by age or consider only young parents, even though especially in the UK 
young people are still eligible for benefits if they do not have children (this is less so in the 
US, as detailed in Table 2). The results in this investigation on young parents and the 
welfare state contributes to the work in previous studies. This work affirmed the 
importance of benefit receipt as a positive factor in the experience of young parents that is 
found in previous quantitative and qualitative work on this subpopulation. For the NLSY 
sample in particular, the association between benefit receipt and more positive outcomes 
for young parents who receive assistance compared to those who do not receive it concur 
with quantitative evidence that showed SNAP serves as a ‘protective factor’ to family 
income shocks (Shapiro 2017). This investigation also suggests a concurrence with 
qualitative evidence whereby SNAP is used as a consistent source of income to help parents 
engage in the labour market more effectively, as they are able to avoid ‘fight or flight’ 
responses to very low income emergencies (Edin & Shaefer 2016).  
In general, though, the results of this associational investigation bring up even more 
questions than answers, both about the causal effects of benefits for this group but also 
new areas where associational research can be undertaken. The results here suggest that 
future research should consider the ‘young’ in young parents more adequately, particularly 
because much of the previous research on the welfare state considers parents of all ages. 
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There is more to be learned about how young parents may react differently to the benefit 
system than older parents who are low income, mostly because the latter group has more 
established work histories and labour market participation. For young parents, then, 
government assistance may be an even more notable factor to their overall labour market 
trajectory than older parents. Another aspect of the welfare state that should be studied in 
more detail for young parents as a particular subpopulation is tax credits. While there has 
been some evidence on lone parent’s use of tax credits in the UK there has been little 
research in the US on this subgroup, and the lack of evidence on in-work benefits for this 
youth subgroup is a useful extension of this work. This could be explored firstly in 
associational models with administrative data on young parents and tax credits and then 
extended to causal models exploring poverty outcomes if the data exists. 
The second aspect of welfare state research where this investigation contributes is in 
understanding the type of government assistance that is utilised by different subgroups of 
those who are low income. The results of this investigation on the different impacts of 
SNAP receipt for sample members who receive TANF and those who do not (i.e. a poor 
versus a very poor population) suggest that SNAP is a more positive factor in lives of the 
very poor than others. This aligns with econometric work whereby SNAP is seen as an 
assistance programme that has a larger effect on closing the poverty gap between the very 
low and low income than it does in moving sample members over the poverty line (Fox et al 
2015; Meyer & Wu 2015). The variation in impacts of SNAP and TANF in this investigation 
may also suggest that there are different impacts of benefits based on the conditionality 
components of the benefit or that there are different impacts for cash and in-kind benefits; 
neither of which could be investigated fully here. These types of questions can also be 
explored using larger datasets in the UK with more adequate samples of those who receive 
JSA or Housing Benefit, for example. Future research should therefore find more adequate 
datasets (potentially administrative) that include both in-kind and cash assistance with 
substantial sample sizes in receipt where this type of variation can be investigated. Ideally 
this could be done with causal models analysing the relative merits of both to long-term 
poverty outcomes. 
Finally, the variation in impacts of benefit receipt for women and for young female parents 
is a contribution to the understanding of how a liberal welfare state is gendered. The 
results here affirm that the welfare state continues to operate differently in the lives of 
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women compared to men even in countries where a ‘universal breadwinner’ model is now 
considered standard. As noted in section 7.1, future work should therefore consider gender 
more notably in the modelling strategy or conversely use less gendered outcomes for a 
study of youth transitions. The gender and benefit receipt interactions in these models also 
uncovered the need for future youth transitions work to more explicitly consider the way 
that young women are able to (or are not able to) engage with the welfare state while they 
transition in the family formation domain. These questions can be addressed with more 
quantitative research but also qualitative work which specifically addresses the tradeoffs 
and choices that young women have to face when they have children, and if and how 
government assistance is seen as a viable option to assist women in this period. The 
evidence here affirmed that family change is a key site of variation between male and 
female outcomes, and it would be valuable to consider whether the welfare state could 
more adequately play a role in reducing the ‘child earnings penalty’ exhibited by females in 
this investigation. 
There are two further contributions more often addressed within the youth transitions 
literature that this investigation contributes to; intersectionality and the family as a welfare 
source. The US case was able to most notably consider the intersection of race and gender 
and race and class in the economic outcomes of sample members, and concurred with 
previous research identifying detailed variations in youth transition outcomes when 
multiple demographic factors are considered together. For example, the case of Black 
females in the US sample is a particularly notable population of interest that deserves 
further investigation in quantitative youth transitions work. The results here suggest that 
even with high levels of education and high levels of work intensity there are still higher 
poverty odds for this group (concurring with DuMontheir et al 2017). Intersectionality with 
regards to race and gender will remain a persistent concern for longitudinal youth 
researchers in the US (both for males and females), but will also need to continue to be a 
primary concern for youth researchers in the UK that investigate more diverse cohorts. In 
both cases more work should consider variation within gender groups as an area for future 
investigation, particularly given some of the first results on the intersection of gender and 
education in these models. Because of the time period of the BCS cohort and demographic 
makeup of the UK in 1970 it was not possible to investigate how race and gender or race 
and parental background impact the trajectory of a youth transition. The youth transitions 
research agenda in both countries is therefore primed to consider this area of conceptual 
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focus: considering intersectionality in youth transitions not just with regards to race but 
potentially with regards to young people with or without additional support needs, those 
with mental health concerns, by class or social status, sexuality and a myriad of other 
characteristics that shape the way that young people experience this transition period.  
The final area where this work makes a notable contribution to youth transitions literature 
is in the application of the welfare mix framework (Powell & Barrientos 2004) to questions 
about young people and the welfare state as proposed by Antonucci et al (2014). This 
framework enabled the investigation to interact explicitly with the family as a welfare 
source. This approach stands in contrast to the implicit consideration of the family in a 
youth transition experience in current policy formulations, whereby policies differ for those 
under age 25 based on the assumption of family support but it is an issue not addressed 
explicitly. This investigation affirmed that the family welfare source is an avenue through 
which inequality is manifested in multiple ways, and this investigation showed that indeed 
the family can be considered a ‘safety net’ and a ‘scaffold’ during the transition to 
independence Swartz et al (2011). The consideration of the family as welfare source was 
included in this investigation in two ways; using a measure of parental background and 
using a measure of residential independence. First the work explicitly considered in both 
cases how the impact of a young person’s parental background varies for different 
demographic groups, and also how this factor’s influence may or may not change as a 
young person grows up. This investigation found that rather than the impact of parental 
background losing its significance into adulthood this factor persists, concurring with 
previous work affirming that parental background is a key factor shaping youth transitions 
(DiPrete & Erich 2006; Fingerman 2015; McLanahan 2004).  
The explicit analysis of the impact of parental background rather than as a control variable 
also aimed to connect with research on parental resources and transfers in a youth 
transition (Ermisch 1999; Ermisch & DiSalvo 1997; Schoeni & Ross 2005; Smeeding & 
Phillips 2002). Unlike those studies, however, the datasets used in this investigation did not 
provide information on discrete monetary amounts transferred to sample members and 
therefore the same type of estimates were not able to be produced. Rather the inclusion of 
parental background served as a proxy for how parental resources may potentially function 
in a young person’s life course. This is an important area for future surveys and research to 
address, and surveys should aim to include a measure of the amount of parental transfers 
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received by a young person. Future qualitative work can also continue to investigate how 
this type of monetary support for young adult children affects the nature of the parent-
child relationship and subjective feelings of independence for the young person. 
Despite the lack of explicit measurement of parental transfers in these datasets, this study 
was able to notably contribute to both youth transitions and welfare literature by 
considering the measure of residential independence as a youth transition resource rather 
than an outcome. The US case investigated the impact of moving out earlier in the youth 
period on economic independence and also began to consider empirically the ‘safety net’ 
aspects of the parental home and the ability to ‘boomerang’ back home. A contribution of 
this investigation to debates in the field is the finding that moving out early should be 
considered as normatively ‘better’ or ‘worse’ for a successful youth transition based on the 
measure of economic independence being analysed. Here the work found that those who 
move out before age 24 have higher work intensity odds and higher wages on average; 
evidence perhaps of a ‘successful’ youth transition. However, echoing previous life course 
work by Aassve and colleagues (2007), this investigation found higher poverty rates in early 
adulthood for those early movers. This work also affirmed that the ability of a young person 
to move back into their family of origin also was associated with lower poverty outcomes. 
Both fields of research should therefore more adequately conceptualise the family as a 
concrete and explicit resource that young people draw on in this period, and work should 
consider the value of the parental safety net as even more important in a welfare state 
context where a state safety net is limited.   
The findings in this area open up many new lines of inquiry in the youth transitions and 
welfare state research agenda, particularly if work in both begin to place a greater focus on 
the family welfare source as suggested here. First, quantitative work can more actively 
consider how to include measures of family resources as influences in a youth transition 
apart from the traditional measure of parental background as socioeconomic status. Using 
the age at initial move out covariate was the way this investigation was able to proxy for 
parental resources, but this has a drawback of not being able to adequately capture why a 
young person left; were they able to leave because their parents were able to support them 
independently, or did they have to leave because their parents were unable to support 
them in the home? A measure of parental monetary transfers in quantitative work might 
then be more ideal, and future qualitative work can continue to investigate these 
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complicated family experiences that arise when family resources can only be provided via 
longer co-residence.   
Two other issues regarding residential independence emerged here and warrant future 
investigation in the field. The work found emerging results on the impact of moving back 
after an initial move out on later outcomes and found that the ability to move back in is 
associated with lower odds of poverty, but this ‘boomerang’ experience was only 
considered at one occurrence. The NLSY and other survey datasets should consider the 
impact of this boomerang experience more adequately, especially if there is a tipping point 
in the number of ‘boomerang’ experiences that change it from a protective factor to a 
negative factor as evidence of a ‘failure to launch’. Emerging results in this investigation 
also found that the impact of moving out of the parental home before age 24 differs by 
racial group, opening up a new avenue for youth research in considering how and why race 
matters in this experience. For example, future work can interrogate whether this result is 
because White parents on average have more capital to support children both in and out of 
the home in a youth transition and therefore the ‘safety net’ plays a larger role in their 
transition experiences (which can be detailed quantitatively). Or, future investigations can 
address intra-family relationships as a driver for this residential independence pattern, as 
the pattern may be the result of distinctly different expectations of independence for 
young people from different racial groups (which may be better answered qualitatively). 
Because the boomerang experience and later residential independence is an emerging life 
course pattern for Millennial and younger cohorts, it is particularly valuable that 
researchers in both fields consider these issues now; both to understand the nature of 
short term impacts but to include them in research designs and datasets interested in 
longer-term impacts of youth transition experiences. 
7.4 Policy Recommendations  
The closing issue to consider is how the results of this investigation can be translated into 
concrete policy recommendations for both country’s welfare states. An important point to 
consider from the comparative discussion of this work is that indeed, even though short-
term impacts to recipients may differ, the long-term impacts of means-tested benefits 
operate similarly for each country by virtue of their place in a liberal welfare state. These 
common long-term outcomes are likely due to the nature of a residualist liberal welfare 
state that is designed primarily as a safety net, so low-income young people who interact 
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with the system will therefore have relatively the same characteristics and prospects. 
However in both cases the work found positive findings for target groups of recipients, 
which suggest that there are ways to improve current welfare programmes to become less 
punitive and more accessible for young people with and without children.  
The policy recommendations here therefore consider changes to policies within the 
structure of the two liberal welfare states investigated; both to make this work more 
immediately policy relevant and because this work does not engage with debates about the 
relative merits of different welfare regimes for youth transition outcomes (which is outside 
the scope of this thesis). Because this investigation interacted with issues in policy areas 
related to labour market outcomes and welfare policy, policy recommendations in the 
education and training policy areas are not included. However, these policy areas do impact 
the prior conditions for a young person’s transition project and are indeed particularly 
notable for the youth population. And finally, all of the policy recommendations here are 
provided within the context of the young person as the benefit unit rather than their family 
of origin. Chapter 6 raised the issue of whether these welfare states should consider 
supporting the family of origin to a greater extent via more child benefits or child tax 
credits, which would shift further responsibility for a young person’s welfare onto their 
family in the youth period. Given that the aim of this investigation is to consider how young 
people can become economically independent away from their family of origin, however, 
this point of view for policy recommendations is not appropriate. Instead, this final section 
considers how policies can be reformed to improve individual economic independence for 
low-income young people as independent benefit units.  
Making work pay  
Attachment to the labour market is the key outcome of interest for youth policymakers, 
and indeed in a liberal welfare state the labour market is considered the primary source of 
one’s welfare. As noted earlier in this chapter the assumption of labour market attachment 
is a gendered outcome for a youth transition, but the policy context for youth labour 
market attachment is currently a ‘universal breadwinner model’. Therefore, changes to a 
young person’s returns from the labour market is likely the most notable way to intervene 
to improve transition outcomes for all young people. In the UK, economic independence 
can be improved by removing different wage rates between young people and those over 
25 in all types of work and increase apprentice wages in all industries to the minimum wage 
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even in their first year; currently low-wage workers under 25 are not eligible to receive the 
National Living Wage (which is the minimum wage defined by the Government) and 
apprenticeship wages are lower than the minimum wage if the apprentice is under 19 or in 
their first year (UK Government 2018). These two changes would ensure young workers are 
compensated adequately for their work and would enable young people who are already in 
the labour market to support themselves independently to a greater extent. This should 
however also be followed by a change for workers in all sectors to be paid a more 
appropriate living wage as defined by the Living Wage Foundation, which sets the wage 
higher than the government minimum wage (currently £9/hour outside of London and 
£10.55 in London, compared to the government minimum wage of £8.21/hour for all adults 
over 25) (Citizens UK 2018). 
Changes to minimum wages should also occur in the United States, where it is currently not 
possible to have a comfortable standard of living for those working full time on a minimum 
wage income. Minimum wage rates are set federally but are also set by states and cities, so 
there is particularly wide variation across the country. A grassroots movement in the US 
currently calls for $15/hour minimum wages for workers in cities and states with 
particularly high costs of living (e.g. San Francisco, Seattle, Illinois, New York) and as of the 
time of this writing some cities and states have been able to enact these pieces of 
legislation. However, these changes have been achieved in a piecemeal fashion and should 
be made nationwide, with state-level standards of living calculated and then addressed 
with new minimum wage policies appropriate to the state context. A change to the 
minimum wage will have an outsized effect on young people in particular, as this 
population is concentrated in low- to minimum-wage work and would ensure that labour 
market attachment enables young people to become independent from their family of 
origin.  
Changes to the minimum wage would affect young people who do and do not have children 
equally, so therefore a distinction is not made in the policy recommendations in this area. 
However, all other policy recommendations must be considered separately for both 
countries and for parenting and non-parenting young people. Because of the programme 
contexts differ and are more complex the two countries are taken in turn; first the US and 
then the UK, with young parents considered first and young people without dependents 
considered second.  
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Policy Recommendations: young parents in the US  
The results of this investigation affirmed that the welfare state plays a key role in the 
experience of young parents and their attachment to the labour market, and therefore they 
should still be considered a key deserving population of interest regardless of if the parents 
are in a single or lone parent household. An overarching policy recommendation for this 
subgroup is to ensure that all young parent families living under 150% FPL should be eligible 
for cash and in-kind assistance, a recommendation that affects administration of TANF 
most notably. TANF is either not accessed by low-income families or is simply unable to 
adequately aid young families who do receive the benefit; this is because benefit levels are 
low, conditionality is high and the system harshly punishes recipients who do not comply 
with work requirements. This has created a system which is not fit for purpose and simply 
does not serve as a way for low income families to access cash assistance that can be used 
for non-food items. A challenge for cash assistance programmes is to balance work 
incentives and adequate support mechanisms. To improve this programme for young 
parents, lifetime limits for TANF should be removed altogether and rather TANF should be 
made available to young parents until their youngest child is age 5 and stringent work 
requirements should be removed for this group with very young children. For parents with 
older children TANF should still be available, however, but benefit levels should be 
increased to 70% of the average minimum wage for those who have no earned income, 
with work requirements in place and time limits for shorter consecutive periods (e.g. 6 
months consecutively). This would be able to account for the dynamic nature of welfare 
and poverty occurrence more adequately than lifetime limits. To accomplish this, more of 
TANF’s block grant funding to states should be allocated to cash assistance than to other 
less-directly applicable services to the majority of young parents.  
One of key oversights when requiring work for TANF families in the current system and a 
challenge for most low-income families generally is the absence of quality, low-cost 
childcare available in the United States. This ‘crisis of care’ (Lewis 2006) is an issue that has 
been relatively ignored by social policy in the United States, and is incongruous with the 
expectation of young parents to engage with the labour market. With changes to TANF as 
recommended above, the childcare system as it exists now would not have to substantially 
change because women would be able to stay at home until their children are school aged. 
However, if the welfare state wants to improve young parents’ labour market success there 
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is a need for free or low-cost childcare to be made more available, particularly to parents at 
150% FPL or below. This could be done by creating a voucher system in the same vein as 
Housing Choice Vouchers to purchase childcare via the private market or could be done by 
increasing funding of Head Start early childhood programmes by federal and state 
governments. Given that most of TANF block grant funding is allocated to other social 
service programmes, another reallocation of those funds could go towards establishing 
more Head Start centres in each state to assist TANF-eligible families in accessing free early 
childhood care. If possible, the provision of childcare should also be available outwith the 
standard working day of 9 am to 5 pm Monday through Friday, particularly as low income 
workers in the service or retail sectors work in the evenings or weekends and are not 
adequately served by current programmes. 
The final area to consider for young parents is in housing assistance, as a major concern for 
low-income families is accessing housing that is safe and affordable when only roughly a 
quarter of eligible families (currently those living below 50% AMI) are able to access any 
type of housing assistance in the US (Edin & Shaefer 2016). Changes to wages, childcare and 
TANF as recommended here would certainly improve the prospects of low income young 
parents to find suitable housing but unfortunately there is a consistently low stock of 
affordable housing in the United States. To address this, TANF families who are very low 
income (under 75% FPL) should be considered as priority for current housing assistance and 
‘passported’ into existing vouchers. This change would therefore necessitate more funding 
for housing vouchers from the federal government than is currently offered to still account 
for current priority voucher groups (those who are homeless and the low-income elderly). 
An expansion of housing vouchers as an entitlement for those young families living at 150% 
FPL would also provide more security for this low income parenting group, whereby the 
family would still be required to put forth 30% of their monthly discretionary income to 
rent and the rest would be addressed by the voucher amount. This would require housing 
assistance to become an entitlement rather than a discretionary programme as it currently 
functions, where assistance amounts are fixed by local housing authorities. The 
government budget for housing assistance would therefore expand and adjust based on 
need. Finally, the government itself could commit to building more public housing, 




Policy Recommendations: young people without children in the US 
As mentioned in Chapter 6, an important way to improve the outcomes for young people 
without children who are active in the labour market is to make the Earned Income Tax 
Credit available for those under 25 at the same rates as single earners over 25. This would 
ensure that, along with increases in the minimum wage, low income young workers would 
be able to access assistance adequately. SNAP assistance is another existing programme 
that can be revised to more adequately address the needs of young people, and is one of 
the policy recommendations most explicitly addressed by this investigation. First, all those 
under 150% FPL should be eligible for SNAP assistance without limits to the amount of time 
that a young person can receive assistance if not working; for those who may be 
unemployed for longer than 3 months there needs to be a way for people to access food in 
supermarkets rather than in an ad-hoc manner through the third sector. SNAP assistance 
should also be made available for those who are low income and enrolled in postsecondary 
education (both full and part-time) who are currently barred from the programme. This 
likely contributes to the growing percentage of low income students who are food insecure 
(Goldrick-Rab et al 2018). Opening up this benefit to both of these groups would ideally be 
able to extend the benefits of SNAP as a protective factor to this low income group.  
The challenge in the current US welfare system is the lack of an existing programme for 
young people who are unemployed without any substantial contributions to 
unemployment insurance, a group that has never been considered a deserving group for 
assistance. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that in the current policy climate there would be 
an appetite to establish a programme of cash assistance. That aside, there may be a way to 
identify particularly high-risk young people for short-term cash assistance via receipt of 
SNAP who would be eligible for a new programme of intensive social work and labour 
market attachment assistance. Cash assistance would be available at higher levels for the 
first 6 months of the programme, potentially set slightly lower than the minimum wage rate 
of full time workers per week to incentivise labour market attachment alongside social 
work interventions. A social work model would assess what skills are needed to access the 
labour market successfully and a further 6 months of assistance would be available if 
needed. Importantly, the levels of assistance for the first six months would not reduce if a 
job was attained, as the amount of assistance would allow for independent living situations 
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to be achieved in the rental market (which is a major barrier for young people entering the 
rental market without money for a deposit).  
This year-long intervention for the particularly hard to reach would be buttressed by 
changes finally to the system of housing assistance for single young people. Ideally the 
system of assistance would be revised to a UK housing benefit style assistance for young 
people who are particularly vulnerable: those who are leaving the care or juvenile justice 
system and young people who receive SNAP who also are currently unhoused or unstably 
housed (e.g. living doubled-up with friends or relatives). Although within the current 
welfare system resources should still be targeted towards young parents with children, if 
the system expands it should be possible for young people who have been identified as 
homeless or high-risk to receive a place in public housing or with a housing choice voucher; 
again with the acknowledgement that funding would have to increase.  
Policy recommendation: young parents in the UK  
Today’s UK welfare system is very different than what was accessed by young parents in 
the BCS cohort, with reforms arguably moving the UK further towards a more punitive 
welfare state for both young people with and without children (save for the entitlement to 
Housing Benefit). Up until the Conservative reforms in 2008, low income unemployed 
families with children were able to access the cash assistance system of Income Support 
while their children were under the age of 8 without work requirements. However, reforms 
to move parents from Income Support to JSA, and the introduction of work requirements 
for the small number of lone parents eligible for Income Support with children as young as 
3, has meant that most parents with children are subject to work requirements in order to 
receive cash assistance. As with the recommendations for the TANF programme, reinstating 
cash assistance via Income Support available for young lone parents without work 
requirements while the youngest child is under 8 is recommended, particularly because 
there are fewer assistance options for families without work requirements in the current 
system. Perhaps the largest change to young parent incomes introduced in recent welfare 
reforms is the benefit freeze and benefit cap, which freezes the real value of benefits and 
tax credits and limits the total amount of assistance that can be received; simply, low-
income young parents are now able to afford less (CPAG 2017). A way to offset these 
freezes is to have benefit amounts increase with inflation such that the real values of 
benefits stay consistent. To combat this issue outside of uprating, one way to improve 
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outcomes for young parents is to increase the amount of Child Benefit by £5 per week for 
those who are low income parents. This style of income supplement was introduced by the 
Scottish Government in 2018 and would be worthwhile to introduce in other parts of the 
UK. This seemingly ‘small’ policy change would ensure an extra £20 a month for very low 
income parents to buy more food and other necessities without work requirements, and 
would increase the amount of guaranteed support a family receives a week.  
Again, a primary challenge for low-income parents in the UK is accessing available childcare 
while their children are young so they can participate in the labour market. Ensuring that an 
adequate number of free or low cost early childhood centre places are available to families 
in a local area is a key way that young parents’ labour market situations can improve. 
Current policy allows for a certain number of childcare hours per year for 3 and 4 year olds, 
but this should be extended in all UK countries for 2 year olds. Local authorities should also 
receive more central government funds for the establishment of childcare centres for low 
income families or to expand the hours that centres are open to account for low income 
parents who work in sectors with non-traditional hours. Childcare support is also provided 
through the tax credit system for low-income families, whereby families can claim back up 
to 70% of eligible child care costs. An increase back to 80% as it was before the 2011 
reforms could ensure that more low-income families can keep their income for other 
necessities. For young parents who are able to work at (often) low wage work, the 
availability of low cost or free childcare is a key component of ensuring labour market 
attachment for this group, and is an area of assistance that can help to cushion the negative 
effects of young parenthood for females in particular.  
Finally, the entitlement to affordable housing for young parents is an area where support 
should continue as a priority, particularly for the growing number of young parents who 
have to rent in the private sector. The reduction in social housing stock and the lower rate 
of local housing allowance available to young parents to be paid to private landlords has 
meant that young people with very low incomes have been unable to make up the 
difference in the local housing allowance with their income. A way to improve this is to 
rebuild social housing stock, to increase the local housing allowance paid to private 
landlords back up to half of the median market rental value, and to ensure that the local 
housing allowance is uprated to adjust to the market values rather than the consumer price 
index (CPAG 2017). Although likely not possible within the current system, it might also be 
328 
 
valuable to pilot whether the housing assistance amount could be better administered by 
using the difference in 30% of the recipient’s income and the monthly rental amount at the 
average market rental price as the voucher system works in the United States. This system 
would ensure that no more than 30% of a young parent’s disposable income is paid 
towards housing costs, which may be able to ensure that housing does not take up a 
disproportionate amount of disposable income. 
Policy recommendations: young people without children in the UK  
Young people without children in the UK do have a comparatively more generous system of 
supports available to them than young people in the US because of the presence of some 
form of cash assistance, but the system can be improved upon to ensure that young people 
are able to live independently and receive adequate support into the labour market if 
needed. As with the US, a particularly notable way to improve the economic independence 
outcomes of many low-income young people who are engaged in the labour market is to 
make Working Tax Credits eligible for those under 25. Paired with a higher living wage, this 
would enable more young people to become independent and would also provide more 
benefits to being engaged in the labour market early. This oversight in policy can be 
addressed relatively easily within the current system.  
A second way to assist young people to independence in the UK is by improving Housing 
Benefit. Currently those who are under 35 receive the lowest rate of Housing Benefit (the 
Shared Accommodation Rate) which is often still not enough to afford many rooms in 
private tenancies. Increasing this amount alongside making more places available in social 
housing for single young people are ways to improve these outcomes and would also 
necessitate more social housing to be built and more private landlords who would be 
willing to rent to a young person on Housing Benefit (now Universal Credit). These issues 
have become particularly prevalent in the last five years, with a rise in youth homelessness 
a result of these benefit changes and higher private rental costs (Centrepoint 2018). An 
increase in social housing stock would solve some of these problems which would need to 
be paired with greater targeting of social housing placements for young people who have 
been identified as homeless or those with complex needs (i.e. those leaving care or the 
juvenile justice system).  
One important programme of support available to single young adults with no job history is 
Jobseeker’s Allowance, which theoretically can provide safety net assistance for young 
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people who are unemployed. However, the amount is often unable to address the basic 
needs of food and shelter and the sanction regime is particularly punitive. It is therefore 
vital that the model of support is focused on social work principles rather than activation 
principles, and that the amount of assistance is slightly increase to ensure subsistence. To 
improve the way that JSA functions for young people, social workers should assess the 
needs and skills of young people early in the claiming process and those who have 
particularly complex cases (e.g. little family support, history in the care system, 
drug/alcohol issues) should be geared towards an intensive programme before they are 
unemployed for 6 months. This is in contrast to the current system where higher-intensity 
levels of support are only available once a recipient has been unemployed for 6 months. 
Ideally young people should be able to receive high levels of social work interventions early 
on, with connections both to further education, meaningful paid training programmes, and 
connections to employers if they are deemed ready. A challenge for young people in their 
initial labour market attachment is the inability to be supported with other aspects of 
independence if working at a low income or if they are in a training programme/further 
education with little family support; a social work model of intensive support for those with 
the most complex cases may be able to help these young people attach more steadily than 
the current model. It is important in this period to also avoid sanctions and punishment for 
the majority of participants. It is likely that jobs will be insecure and lives chaotic, so 
sanctions will do little for this group specifically, and indeed it may cause further 
disengagement from support they are entitled to. 
Overall recommendations: the role of assistance  
Although all of the policy recommendations here must be necessarily varied to account for 
the different country contexts, the recommendations as a result of this investigation are 
premised on the notion that there are indeed ways for an existing liberal welfare state to 
intervene positively in the lives of low income young people; and more pointedly that state 
assistance can be a pivotal part of a youth transition for those who are particularly 
disadvantaged. This investigation sought to interrogate this question specifically and looked 
towards longitudinal data to ask how interactions with the benefit system in the youth 
transition period can influence the trajectory of economic independence. The key findings 
suggest that for the low income young people who are eligible to receive means-tested 
benefits, government assistance can serve as a positive factor in labour market transitions, 
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particularly for those groups such as young parents or very low income families who can 
currently receive more support. This work also was able to find emerging results on the way 
in which the family welfare source functions in a youth transition, and affirmed that the 
family is a key resource in a youth transition that must continue to be interrogated both in 
research and policy design. Overall, the work affirms that if young people are to reach the 
high expectations of early economic independence, low income young people in particular 
should be able to receive more concentrated levels of stable support via cash and housing 
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Appendix A: NLSY Outcome Descriptives by year of birth 
NLSY descriptive figures on the three outcome variables of interest (or their underlying 
measures) and the cohort members’ year of birth were produced to determine if it is 
appropriate for a dummy variable for birth year to be included in regression models. In 
each of the figures for ages where the total sample is surveyed (ages 17-29), the figures did 
not show sufficient variation to warrant dummy variable inclusion. Therefore, the NLSY 







Appendix B: Patterns of panel missingness 
Case 1: BCS patterns of panel missingness  
Figure 1: Patterns of panel missingness, n = 1645 including 1986 survey wave  











Figure 2: Patterns of panel missingness, n = 1131 (does not include 1986 panel) 
 
Case 2: NLSY patterns of panel missingness  
Figure 3: Patterns of panel missingness, n = 8,894  












Appendix C: Univariate Statistics  
Case 1: BCS Univariate Statistics, All Covariates 
Univariate statistics provided for all covariates used in the modelling apart from those 
which are also used as outcome measures, the details of which are provided in Chapter 4 
before each of the outcome model results. Univariate descriptive statistics for the 
covariates of primary interest in this investigation, Government Intervention, are provided 
in detail at the beginning of Chapter 4.   
Block 1: Demographic Characteristics  
Gender   
 Freq % 
Male 489 43.24 
Female 642 56.76 





 Freq % 
None 97 8.58 
CSE/NVQ 1 93 8.22 
O Lev/NVQ 2 294 25.99 
A Lev/NVQ 3 202 17.86 
Higher Qs/NVQ 4 372 32.89 
Degree +/NVQ 5 73 6.45 
Total 1131 100.00 
 
Region  1991  2000  2004  2012  
 Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % 
London 109 9.64 126 11.71 106 10.39 100 8.84 
Rest of 
England 
964 85.23 886 82.34 857 84.02 968 85.59 
Wales & 
Scotland 
58 5.13 64 5.95 57 5.59 63 5.57 
Total 1131 100.00 1076 100.00 1020 100.00 1131 100.00 
 
Block 2: Employment Domain  
Employment 
Status 
    
1991 
       
2000 
     
 2004 
     
2012 
 
 Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % 
FT Work 805 71.24 735 68.44 655 64.34 716 63.42 
PT work 49 4.34 152 14.15 187 18.37 260 23.03 
Unemployed 81 7.17 25 2.33 14 1.38 27 2.39 
FT Ed 112 9.91 11 1.02 10 0.98 3 0.27 
Home 67 5.93 121 11.27 122 11.98 93 8.24 
Training 6 0.53 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Sick/Disable
d 
10 0.88 30 2.79 30 2.95 30 2.66 
360 
 









       
 2004 
       
2012 
 
 Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % 
Excellent 435 38.56 361 33.61 325 31.89 253 22.45 
Good  568 50.35 568 52.89 486 47.69 735 65.22 
Fair  115 10.20 130 12.10 157 15.41 98 8.70 
Poor  10 0.89 15 1.40 51 5.00 41 3.64 
Total 1128 100.00 1074 100.00 1019 100.00 1127 100.00 
  
Block 3: Family Formation Domain  
Marital   
Status 
        
 1991  2000  2004   2012  
 Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % 
Not Married  820 73.61 579 53.91 447 43.87 420 37.17 
Married 294 26.39 495 46.09 572 56.13 710 62.83 
Total 1114 100.00 1074 100.00 1019 100.00 1130 100.00 
 
HH Size      
1991 
      
2000 
      
2004 
      
2012 
  
 Freq Mean SD Freq Mean SD Freq Mean SD Freq Mean SD  




1017 3.08 1.27 1131 3.37 1.27   
 
Young parenting   
 Freq % 
No 1005 89.81 
Yes 114 10.19 
Total 1119 100.00 
 










 Freq % 
Quintile 1 115 12.17 
Quintile 2 212 22.43 
Quintile 3 208 22.01 
Quintile 4 58 6.14 
Quintile 5 34 3.60 
Missing 318 33.65 
Total 945 100.00 
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Case 2: NLSY Univariate Statistics, All Covariates 
Univariate statistics provided for all covariates used in the modelling apart from those which 
are also used as outcome measures, the details of which are provided in Chapter 5. Univariate 
descriptive statistics for the covariates of primary interest in this investigation, Government 
Intervention, are provided in detail at the beginning of Chapter 5.    







Race   
 Freq % 
Black 2212 26.66 
Hispanic 1773 21.37 
Mixed Race 77 0.93 
White 4234 51.04 
Total 8296 100.00 
 
Highest Degree    
2011   
 Freq % 
None 738 10.06 
GED 924 12.59 
HS Diploma 3244 44.21 
AA 536 7.30 
Bachelor's Deg 1474 20.09 
Masters Deg 335 4.57 
PhD 13 0.18 
Prof Deg 74 1.01 
Total 7338 100.00 
 










 % % % % 
Rural  23.91 20.44 18.46 18.12 
Urban  72.75 76.50 78.33 79.29 
Unknown  3.34 3.06 3.21 2.59 
Total  100 100 100 100 
Gender   
 Freq % 
Male 4233 51.02 
Female 4063 48.98 
Total 8296 100.00 
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 % % % % 
Northeast 17.17 16.67 15.69 15.40 
North Central 22.37 22.09 21.55 20.82 
South 38.36 39.01 40.12 41.02 
West 22.1 22.23 22.64 22.76 
Total 100 100 100 100.00 
 
 










 % % % % 
Excellent 38.60 31.7 27.02 22.94 
Very 
Good 32.85 35.50 36.09 36.13 
Good 23.10 25.79 28.33 29.48 
Fair 5.05 6.45 7.79 10.06 
Poor 0.40 0.56 0.77 1.39 
Total 100 100 100 100 
 
Block 2: Employment Domain  
Employment domain covariates used in models, annual income from employment and work 
intensity, are described in detail in Chapter 5, as they also serve as outcome variables  
 
Block 3: Family Formation Domain  
 










 % % % % 
Not 
married  97.66 90.56 76.72 64.82 
Married  2.34 9.44 23.28 35.18 












 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 












 Freq % 
Not a parent 





Total 8296 100.00 
 
Age at initial 
move out 
  
 Freq % 
Before 19 2077 25.04 
Between 19-21 2056 24.78 
Between 21-24 1865 22.48 
After 24 2298 27.70 
Total 8296 100.00 
 
Ever move back 
after initial move 
out 
  
 Freq % 
No 3542 45.50 
Yes 4242 54.50 
Total 7784 100.00 
 





 Freq % 
Quintile 1 1241 14.96 
Quintile 2 1284 15.48 
Quintile 3 1196 14.42 
Quintile 4 1232 14.85 
Quintile 5 1193 14.38 
Missing 2150 25.92 





 Freq % 
No 3652 44.02 
Yes 3715 44.78 
Missing 929 11.20 





Appendix D: Hausman specification tests  
The Hausman specification test results for the BCS wage model and the NLSY wage model, 
all run on the final main effects model.  































Appendix E: Benefit receipt, SNAP and TANF receipt by Census Region  
Benefit receipt by Census region   
 
SNAP receipt by Census region  
 
TANF receipt by Census region  
 
 
